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This book could not have been written without the people of Liverpool, past 
and present. It is a story about their history—albeit one strand in a colourful 
tapestry—woven out of oral testimony and multiple personal reflections. A 
large part of the narrative has been composed through conversations with 
numerous insightful participants who each, in one way or another, helped 
make history in Liverpool. They include Jane Corbett, Chris Davies, John 
Earnshaw, Juliet Edgar, George Evans, Ed Gommon, Bill Halsall, Jackie 
Harris, George Howarth, Richard Kemp, Eleanor Lee, Rob MacDonald, 
Tony McGann, Erika Rushton, Max Steinberg, Bill Taylor and many others 
who wish to remain anonymous. I am especially indebted to Paul Lusk, whose 
first-hand account of the co-op movement helped frame my own, for guiding 
me, step by step, through the potted history of cooperative development on 
Merseyside. To Jack McBane, for his hospitality and enthusiasm for my project, 
in many ways extending his own on the Eldonians, who he worked so closely 
with to construct and materialise their vision. To Jonathan Brown (of Share 
the City and SAVE Britain’s Heritage) who introduced me to Liverpool’s 
urbanism and its controversial politics of housing regeneration through his 
excellent tours. And also to (the late) Des McConaghy, former director of the 
Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project (and the first person I interviewed for 
my doctoral research upon which this book is broadly based) for his take on 
the early period of experimentation in Granby. 
I would especially like to thank Ronnie Hughes, Granby’s own unofficial 
urban historian and photojournalist, who has been a brilliant help in 
piecing together the history since SNAP. And Gemma Jerome, a Terrace 21 
cooperator and Granby CLT collaborator, who first introduced me to the 
neighbourhood and its emerging CLT campaign. Likewise, her Terrace 21 
comrade, Marianne Heaslip, has generously imparted critical insights into both 
Granby and Homebaked. To Ronnie, Gemma and Marianne, I am grateful for 
the dialogue we have continued on and off over the years since we first met in 
2013. More recently, the Homebaked collective have been a real inspiration 
to me. I would like to thank them all for their warm welcome in bringing 
me into the fold for an all too brief period in 2017 and 2018, when I served 
as a participant-observer on the CLT board. Alongside Angela McKay, Sue 
Humphreys, Ralph Bullivant, Peter Colby, Andrew Beattie, Sam Jones, Paul 
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Kelly, Sally Anne-Watkiss and (the late) Cal Starr, Britt Jurgensen in particular 
has been an amazing critical friend in helping me get the narrative right, as 
someone so passionately committed to crafting and realising Homebaked’s 
collective vision. In (re)constructing Liverpool’s hidden history of collective 
housing alternatives, I have drawn upon, and been influenced by, the testimony 
of all these participant-contributors. What follows, however, is not a direct, 
unmediated representation of their views but wholly my own, distinct take 
on events, one triangulated with multiple secondary sources and alternative 
analyses and refracted through a theoretical lens that I feel illuminates this 
history most clearly—a necessarily partial interpretation which, no doubt, 
will be seen in a different light by others. 
Writing this book has been a long, meandering journey that began back 
in 2011 when I started my PhD at the University of Manchester. I am forever 
grateful to Graham Haughton and Ste Hincks for showing me the way—in 
equal measure encouraging and challenging in their tireless (and tirelessly 
entertaining) supervision. I want to thank Graham for introducing me to 
the work of Colin Ward (Graham’s own unique brand of radicalism is not 
unlike Ward’s: modest, respectable, scholarly). And Ste (born and bred on 
Merseyside) for persuading me to study the history of collective housing alter-
natives in Liverpool rather than in Manchester or London. Neil McInroy and 
Alex Lord, too, my third and fourth supervisors, for bringing fresh perspec-
tives and making connections. Manchester’s PhD programme and cohort 
within the geography, planning, international development and architecture 
departments—and politics, too—was a hotbed of radical intellectual activity; 
the extraordinary richness of which I have only come to appreciate since 
moving on to pastures not quite so green. In reading groups and seminars—
often degenerating into long, ale-fuelled sessions at Sandbar—I made so many 
friends and comrades whose energies have, each in their own way, fed into 
the conception and writing of this book (not least Abby Gilbert, Ben Sessions, 
Craig Thomas, Chris Foster, Dan Slade, Esther Meininghaus, Gareth Price-
Thomas, Gemma Sou, Jess Hope, Jon Las Heras, Nadim Mirshak, Natalie 
Langford, Paul James, Phil Horn, Purnima Purohit, Rachel Alexander, Roisin 
Read, Sally Cawood, Sam Hayes, Shamel Azmeh, Simon Chin-Yee, Soma 
Laha, Tomas Maltby and, through association, Charlie Winstanley and Dale 
Lately). The Urban Rights Reading Group organised by Melanie Lombard 
was really constructive. Through working (and playing) with the OpenSpace 
collective—Maria Kaika, Erik Swyngedouw, Lazaros Karaliotas, Ioanna 
Tantanasi, Nadim Mirshak and Caglar Koksal—and organising a number of 
critical urban studies events together, I was introduced to Andy Merrifield 
and Japhy Wilson, whose work on Henri Lefebvre and the production of 
space has been a major inspiration. Andy’s passion in articulating a Lefebvrean 
perspective on the city, and on his home town of Liverpool, has been a guiding 
light throughout. My interest in Marxist and critical urbanism was first piqued 
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whilst studying for a Masters in Urban Planning at UCL—particularly by 
Michael Edwards’ enlivening teaching and a reading group on David Harvey’s 
Limits to Capital convened by Louis Moreno. Whilst at UCL, my knowledge of 
community land trusts, which were to become the main subject of my PhD, 
was initiated through conversations with fellow students, Daniel Fitzpatrick 
and Dan Durrant especially.
My understanding of CLTs has been honed over the years not only through 
engaged research in Liverpool but also discussion at conferences and other 
events with a number of practitioners and scholars, not least Tom Moore, 
whose pioneering efforts at bringing together a network of CLT researchers 
from the across the UK has been instrumental to the development of my 
own research. Catherine Harrington and Tom Chance at the National CLT 
Network, as well as action-researcher Tom Archer, have each helped me get to 
grips with the complex policy landscape and technicalities of CLTs. Similarly, 
David Rodgers (formerly CDS Cooperatives) was a fount of wisdom on co-ops; 
Hugh Ellis (Town and Country Planning Association) on utopian planning 
alternatives; and David Ireland (World Habitat) on self-help housing and 
bringing empty homes back into use. I owe an intellectual debt to countless 
scholars and theorists of capitalism, cooperativism, housing and the commons 
who have helped me see many of the conceptual connections I make in what 
follows—too many to list here but whose names can be gleaned from glancing 
at the bibliography.
Many of the theoretical arguments I make in the book were first tested 
out at various academic conferences through dialogue with comrades I met 
along the way, not least Michele Vianello, Hamish Kallin and Jessie Brennan. 
Conferences proving particularly formative include the 9th International 
Social Innovation Research Conference in Melbourne, Australia, in 2017, the 
7th International Conference of Critical Geography in Ramallah, Palestine, 
in 2015 and the Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP) 
Young Academics Network conference in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 2014. 
Melissa García Lamarca and Philipp Horn were frequent fellow travellers 
from Manchester to such conferences and astute critical friends in shaping 
my arguments. At an AESOP PhD workshop in Belfast in 2013, Ben Davy 
pushed me to develop my ideas further. Since first meeting her at the 2013 
RGS-IBG conference in London, Antonia Layard has always been really 
supportive. David Mullins was particularly encouraging when I first met 
him at the Housing Studies Association Conference in York in 2012; I thank 
David, and also Quintin Bradley, for such generous critical feedback as peer 
reviewers of the first draft submitted to Liverpool University Press (LUP). 
I am grateful to Alison Welsby, my editor at LUP, for her encouragement 
and patience with continual deadline extension requests; and for backing 
this book to be made open access online as part of a demonstration project 
in open access academic publishing funded by the University of Liverpool 
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Library. I can only hope the finished product lives up to these expectations 
placed in it.
I would like to thank Alan Southern for all his support and sage advice 
over an exciting, if rather unstable and precarious period marked by informal 
short-term postdoctoral contracts during which he has been my mentor as well 
as comrade. So too Pete North, who had the unenviable task of examining 
my PhD thesis in 2015 and who has since provided great guidance, particu-
larly in our recent work together, with Alan and others such as Vicky Nowak 
and Helen Heap, on researching and cultivating the social and solidarity 
economy in Liverpool and beyond. The planning academics at Liverpool 
University—particularly Alex Lord, Olivier Sykes, John Sturzaker and Bertie 
Dockerill—invited me to give a number of guest lectures around 2016 and 
then welcomed me as one of their own while I was writing up the book, or 
trying to. I would also like to thank Len Gibbs for putting his faith in me, 
inviting me onto the board of EPIC Housing Association (Empowering People, 
Inspiring Communities) in Stoke-on-Trent in 2016. My few years there volun-
teering as a board member taught me a great deal about the practical and 
policy challenges—and ethical dilemmas—facing community-based housing 
associations in this difficult era of commercialisation and ratcheting austerity. 
This book has been (almost) completely rewritten and reconstituted from 
its embryonic form as my PhD thesis. I am grateful to my good friends Will 
Wheeler and George Hoare for reading and reviewing in great depth the 
new introductory and concluding parts which has certainly sharpened up my 
analysis; and to Matt Ingleby for coming up with the title, amongst other 
imaginative alternatives. I am indebted to the Leverhulme Trust for providing 
the financial support enabling me to dedicate much of my time to writing and 
editing during the first year of my early career fellowship. The majority of 
the writing, however, took place while I was unemployed, between postdocs, 
living back in my home town with my mum and dad, Chris and Brian, over 
the summer of 2018—long, productive days bookended by beautiful bike rides 
into the South Downs or runs on Bognor beach. Being unemployed has never 
been so much fun; but it was only because of mum and dad that this was made 
possible. I am grateful for all their love and support over the years. Finally, 
none of this would ever have seen the light of day were it not for Abby—she 
is an unstoppable force of ruthless critique and joyful inspiration. Doubtless 
I could not have remained so energised about the radical potential residing in 
the everyday life of collective housing activism were it not for Abby’s loving 




In 2015, a long-neglected neighbourhood on the south side of inner-city 
Liverpool, Granby, was thrust into the media spotlight when a small resident-
led experiment to bring empty homes back into community use, the Granby 
Four Streets Community Land Trust, became the first ever architectural 
or housing project in the Turner Prize’s controversy-punctuated history to 
be nominated for and indeed win Britain’s coveted national art award. The 
community land trust (CLT) and their architects Assemble were up against the 
usual (dis)array of avant-garde nominees and were bemused to be shortlisted 
by the judges for a prize that recognises cutting-edge interventions in the 
visual and material arts—not so much architecture, and certainly not so-called 
‘community architecture’ associated with vernacular housing (and for many 
decades derided by the architecture establishment). What had regenerating 
housing in a self-consciously amateur ‘do-it-together’ approach that decentred 
the role of the architect and, by the same token, foregrounded residents as 
the collective ‘artist’ got to do with art? Thus ensued a debate in the national 
press about the function of art and the merits of an award that continually 
sought to push the boundaries—beyond breaking point for many critics—of 
the very concept it celebrates. Some commentators rolled their eyes; others 
pointed to the way in which these four streets, saved from demolition by 
their few remaining inhabitants (the majority having been forced out years 
ago by urban decline and state-led demolition threats), had been turned into 
a work of art through spontaneous acts of guerrilla gardening, street planting 
and wall murals. Tricky questions were raised over the changing role of art 
in society; over why the prize had been awarded to Assemble rather than the 
residents who had been working hard to transform the streets for years before 
the trendy architectural collective arrived on the scene from London; and why 
it had been left to citizens and artists—however (re)defined—to regenerate 
public space and renovate housing, much of it ex-council and now owned by 
housing associations, more obviously the responsibility of the state.
When the news broke of Granby Four Streets’ Turner Prize victory, I was 
fortunate enough to have been observing the project for a number of years as 
part of my doctoral research. I was based nearby in Manchester at the time 
and, in seeking to study alternative approaches to public housing and urban 
regeneration, I had been seduced by Liverpool’s rich history of cooperative 
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housing as well as the city’s two CLT campaigns, Granby Four Streets and 
Homebaked. Both projects were pioneering in their application of the CLT 
model—originally developed out of the American Civil Rights movement 
and imported to Britain in the 1990s to tackle rural affordability issues—to 
an urban context suffering disinvestment and decline. They aimed to demon-
strate how housing and neighbourhood governance could be done differently, 
more imaginatively and democratically, by drawing people together around a 
common project of breathing life back into urban spaces long left to rot by 
public authorities and private landlords alike. 
My involvement with Granby was only ever very partial. I was an outsider 
looking in—and there were many of us. Those community activists that I 
met in the early days of my research were understandably reticent to give me 
much of their time. They complained of ‘researcher fatigue’—referring to the 
growing number of students, researchers and journalists who were each asking 
for a little of their time. It soon adds up of course. Trying to find the extra 
time and energy outside of their day jobs and family and personal lives to give 
to the CLT campaign, let alone deal with research requests, was challenging to 
say the least. I intended to make my approach as participatory and reciprocal 
as I could; in return for access and information, I wanted to get involved and 
offer up my skills in whatever way might be helpful. An opportunity arose to 
do just that when Assemble asked me to write a short reflective piece on the 
theoretical and historical background of the CLT model as a chapter in the 
catalogue they were putting together to present to the Turner Prize judges at 
the exhibition of the nominations in Glasgow.1 I was incredibly honoured to be 
invited to play a part, however small; that was where my formal involvement 
began and ended.
By 2016, having defended my dissertation, I moved to Liverpool and found 
myself getting more involved with Homebaked as part of new research I was 
undertaking on the city region’s social economy at the University of Liverpool. 
I was invited onto the CLT board as a participant-observer and so I began 
working closely with activists, residents and other board members on how 
to turn their vision for a revitalised local high street of community-owned 
enterprise and housing into a reality. Witnessing at first hand the travails of a 
small community project to bring creative ideas to fruition, I was impressed 
by the energy and commitment invested but so too exasperated by the barriers 
imposed by policy and bureaucracy at various levels and the sheer complexity 
of coordinating so many actors and interests towards a common goal. It was an 
insight into a slow collective learning process—a steep curve no doubt scaled 
by countless others before Homebaked and many others still to come. There 
was a sense among activists that they were reinventing the wheel; that surely 
all this had been done before and it was merely a matter of finding out how. 
1 “What Exactly is a CLT?”, in Assemble, eds, Granby Workshop Catalogue 2015, pp. 56–59.
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That was one impetus for writing this book. I wanted to show how similar 
things had been done in the not too distant past, in the same city, often in the 
very same street, by other collective housing movements that shared so much, if 
not their name, with Liverpool’s budding community land trust movement. In 
the 1970s, fuelled by tenant protests over poor conditions and the displacement 
entailed by the council’s ‘slum clearance programme’, one of the largest and 
most imaginative housing co-operative movements in Britain if not Europe was 
born—Liverpool’s so-called ‘Co-op Spring’2 or ‘Co-operative Revolution’.3 
With unprecedented levels of resident participation and democratic decision-
making in all aspects of housing, the new-build co-op movement was heralded 
at the time as a possible—but ultimately unworkable—paradigm shift towards 
Public Housing 2.0. Nonetheless, some 50 housing co-ops can still be found 
across Merseyside to this day—a not insignificant sum for a British city. This 
book aims to bring the historical development of Liverpool’s co-op movement 
into conversation with the presently unfolding CLT campaigns through tracing 
historical, geographical and conceptual connections.
In excavating Liverpool’s role in Britain’s ‘hidden history’4 of housing 
co-ops, I found other important experiments that seem to have been largely 
forgotten or else overlooked by activists and policymakers as well as scholars. 
The co-ops came out of a time in which voluntary associations were beginning 
to vie with municipal authorities in the provision of public housing and the 
governance of neighbourhoods. Liverpool proved especially fertile ground to 
grow housing associations and, as I dug deeper, it seemed to me that these 
associations had grown out of a radical era of activism against council-led 
demolition of inner-city ‘slums’ in the 1960s and 1970s—an era in which the 
homelessness charity Shelter was founded and which experimented with an 
innovative approach to rehabilitate rather than demolish run-down housing 
in Granby called the Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project or, quite simply, 
SNAP. In the policy switch SNAP initiated, Liverpool City Council supported 
the growth of old and new housing associations, which took on municipal 
stock precisely in order to rehabilitate it, helping develop the city’s burgeoning 
co-operative movement. SNAP also saved from demolition the four streets 
that would later become the site of Granby CLT. In the intervening years, as 
society has been reshaped by the tightening grip of neoliberalism, these same 
housing associations have become bureaucratic behemoths with large-scale 
for-profit development arms and instrumental roles in the latest round of 
clearance and redevelopment that has in turn provoked new waves of housing 
2 José Ospina, Housing Ourselves (Hilary Shipman Ltd, 1987).
3 CDS, Building Democracy: Housing Cooperatives on Merseyside. Update ’94 (Cooperative 
Development Services (Liverpool) Ltd, 1994).
4 Johnston Birchall, “The Hidden History of Co-operative Housing in Britain”, Department 
of Government Working Papers 17 (1991).
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activism, leading to the contemporary CLT movement, which includes several 
failed campaigns as well as the two success stories. This book, then, is also 
about how collective housing activism has influenced the direction of neigh-
bourhood renewal policy and demonstrated a more sensitive way of doing 
urban regeneration as an alternative to the large-scale redevelopments that all 
too often befall our cities.
In reconstructing Liverpool’s history of collective housing alternatives, 
it became clear that the movements came in waves and that the force of 
these waves was heightened by the swell created by the last. Historical waves 
deposited resources for activists of the future to salvage from the beached 
wreckage of past struggles and use afresh. Local cultural practices of cooper-
ation and community organising developed by the co-op movement provided 
just such a depository of stored energy and practical wisdom for contemporary 
CLT campaigns. Collective memory of cooperative campaigning implanted 
in place the seeds that would eventually flower when the climatic conditions 
were once again favourable. After a long dormancy, from the 1980s through 
to the 2000s, collective housing was reactivated when Granby and Homebaked 
CLTs were established in 2011—the year in which ‘the political’ erupted 
back onto the world stage after decades of neoliberal inertia and techno-
cratic tinkering with redoubled force in global urban occupations; the year of 
dreaming dangerously, as Slavoj Žižek has put it.5 The critical geographer Don 
Mitchell goes so far as to position the embryonic Liverpool CLT movement 
alongside the ‘movements of the squares’, as part of a radical tradition of 
anti-capitalist struggle and experimentation that had its last pivotal moment 
in the events around May 1968. “Homebaked Community Land Trust and 
Co-operative Bakery Anfield”, writes Mitchell, “are just as thrilling as the 
example of the neighbourhood park forums that developed across Turkey 
after Taksim Square was cleared out. They show that urban space can be 
collectively taken and collectively remade, that use can dominate exchange, 
that our fate is not necessarily a fate written by the tendency towards abstract 
space in capitalism”.6 Whilst Homebaked and Granby CLTs are clearly not so 
dramatic or disruptive events as, say, Occupy Wall Street or the Arab Spring, 
they nonetheless seem to reignite the political possibilities and creative trans-
formation latent in Liverpool’s own ‘Co-op Spring’, its housing cooperative 
revolution in the 1970s. The co-op and CLT movements are each the product 
of particular openings in the ideological fabric that wraps our world with a 
veneer of stability and certainty, but which blinds us from seeing political 
alternatives. These movements represent two such alternatives—what I call 
collective housing alternatives—to the bipolar status quo, the public–private, 
5 Slavoj Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (Verso Books, 2012).
6 Don Mitchell, “Taking Space”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2, Homebaked: A Perfect 
Recipe (2014).
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state–capitalist system of owning and managing housing that has dominated 
our political economy for over a century.
But what caused these collective alternatives to flourish when they did? Was 
it just a sign of the times, or a factor of political, economic and cultural condi-
tions embedded in a particular geography? Or, does it have something to do 
with the specific legal and institutional designs of the co-op and CLT models 
themselves? This book tells the stories of the people and movements involved 
in bringing these abstract models to life in Liverpool and how those models 
in turn shaped their social and urban environments as and after they were 
instituted. It is thus a tale of the dialectical interplay between collective actions 
and institutional forms, which, like skeletons, give strength and structure yet 
contort the muscle tissue that animates collective alternatives.
What hope do we have for institutionalising collective housing alternatives 
without compromising their radical political intentions? What changes occur 
in the transition from the excitement of political campaigning to the proce-
dural task, once the campaign is won, of developing governance mechanisms 
for the ongoing practical management and maintenance of housing? Why 
have the most experimental and radical ideas for developing public housing 
gradually shifted outside the purview of the local state and into the hands of 
professional and community groups in civil society? Why has what was once 
deemed public housing provision delivered by the state become the subject 
of art? What does this categorisation as art say about how our approach to 
providing shelter for everyone has changed over time? Can collective housing 
alternatives become a mainstream tenure as part of a revitalised municipalism 
or are they fated to remain marginal, bespoke solutions to specific urban 
problems? What distinguishes the ‘common’ and the ‘public’ in housing? Can 
we rethink these two categories together? Is there something in the co-op 
and CLT models tried and tested out in Liverpool that could provide a real 
utopian vision for the future renewal of public housing and the expansion 
of our housing commons? Why did all this happen here, in Liverpool, of all 
places? Can it be replicated elsewhere? These are some of the critical questions 
to which this book seeks answers.






Introducing Collective  
Housing Alternatives
Part I: Introduction
1: Introducing Collective Housing Alternatives
As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it 
is folly to hope for an isolated solution of the housing question or 
of any other social question affecting the fate of the workers. The 
solution lies in the abolition of the capitalist mode of production 
and the appropriation of all the means of life and labour by the 
working class itself.1
These words, written in 1872 in The Housing Question by Karl Marx’s comrade 
and collaborator Friedrich Engels, distil the problem of the housing crisis 
down to its essence: as one of the capitalist modes of production, initiated 
by state-enforced enclosure of the commons and only ever resolvable through 
its abolition and transformation. Engels does not offer us any intermediate 
solutions and, moreover, derides the ‘bourgeois reformists’, utopian-socialists 
and anarchists, who all in different ways sought to combat the housing crisis 
wrought by capitalism through some form of alternative: common or state 
ownership. A debate ensued—over the nature of revolutionary social change, 
over the value of housing, over the place housing occupies within the capitalist 
economy—which has never really been fully resolved. It is no accident that, 
after many decades of relative obscurity, The Housing Question is once again 
commonly cited in critical commentaries—some even proclaiming the ‘return 
of the housing question’—revealing startling parallels between Engels’ and 
our own age of capitalist urbanisation.2 Even in a globalised process of capital 
1 Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question (Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 73–74.
2 Manuel B. Aalbers and Brett Christophers, “The Housing Question under Capitalist 
Political Economies”, Housing, Theory and Society 31.4 (2014): 422–428; Stuart Hodkinson, 
“The Return of the Housing Question”, Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization 
12.4 (2012): 423–444; Danny Dorling, All That Is Solid: How the Great Housing Disaster 
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accumulation increasingly predicated on speculative investment in (fictitious) 
financial, land and property assets rather than production of (real) commod-
ities, it seems we cannot escape Engels’ devastating logic in his original 
formulation. This book is one attempt to find possible pathways beyond 
this impasse and to outline some cursory, necessarily partial answers to the 
housing question through a political and social history of Liverpool’s unique 
experiment with precisely those ‘isolated solutions’ dismissed by Engels. This 
is a book about finding collective alternatives to public housing and urban 
regeneration in, against and beyond capital and the state.
Public housing—like all things public—has been under threat for a 
number of decades. The market fundamentalists who have occupied the 
upper echelons of power in Britain, and increasingly the rest of the world, 
since the ascendance of what has become known (perhaps all too well) as 
neoliberalism, have set about the near total destruction of the ‘municipal 
dream’ of housing everyone in decent homes, designed and delivered by local 
councils with a democratic mandate.3 Whilst not all the housing built by the 
state was of good quality, or always that responsive to all residents’ needs, it 
nonetheless represented a dignified alternative to the often inhumane slum 
conditions that went before it. Of those council homes built in the heyday 
of mass municipal housing that are still standing today, many have been sold 
off into private ownership through populist policies such as the Right to 
Buy, which offered tenants a leg up onto the property ladder but, through 
passing into the wrong hands, effectively offered handouts to speculative 
buy-to-let landlords who profit from public subsidy. Thatcher’s promise of a 
property-owning democracy has failed to materialise; its failure confirmed 
by the rise of Generation Rent and the return of a private rental sector to 
levels not witnessed since the 1970s. At the same time, privatisations have 
occurred through the transfer of council stock to housing associations—part 
of a neoliberal project to privatise public land, assets and services4—whilst 
councils have come under mounting pressure to outsource, streamline and 
marketise what is left of their own much diminished housing service in 
the face of neoliberal reforms and austerity-driven public budget cuts. The 
confluence of these trends is, tragically, all too visible in the Grenfell Tower 
fire disaster of 2017 in which 72 people lost their lives.
Defines Our Times, and What We Can Do About It (Allen Lane, 2014); Neil Gray, “Spatial 
Composition and the Urbanization of Capital: The 1915 Glasgow Rent Strikes and the 
Housing Question Reconsidered”, in Neil Gray, ed., Rent and Its Discontents: A Century of 
Housing Struggle (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 49–67.
3 John Boughton, Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing (Verso, 2018).
4 Brett Christophers, The New Enclosure: The Appropriation of Public Land in Neoliberal Britain 
(Verso, 2018); James Meek, Private Island: Why Britain Now Belongs to Someone Else (Verso 
Books, 2014).
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If the state was once harnessed to provide public homes for those neglected 
by the market, as a better quality and more affordable alternative to private 
renting, but has since become embroiled in a neoliberal project of dismantling 
council housing—housing which has, moreover, often been found wanting by 
inhabitants and designers alike—then what is the non-state public alternative? 
One alternative already tried and tested is the voluntary housing association 
model. Today they manage most of what is now known as ‘social housing’ in the 
UK. This shift in language—from public (or council) to social—reflects the 
fact that housing associations are neither public nor private but something else 
entirely. Whilst many are becoming increasingly market-oriented for-profit 
organisations, housing associations are historically rooted in a distinctive and 
oft-forgotten heritage of voluntary association within civil society, mutual aid, 
philanthropy and solidarity. Emerging neither out of the state (public sector) 
nor the market (private sector), they have thus been labelled part of the ‘third 
sector’. Such language reflects their co-optation by neoliberal policy agendas 
(such as the ‘Third Way’ championed by the Democrats in the USA and New 
Labour in the UK in the late 1990s) but so too does it point to historical 
origins, and a potential future, in an alternative system—neither state-
socialism nor market-capitalism—for organising the development, allocation 
and management of shelter. Unfortunately, housing associations have (so far 
at least) failed to live up to this potential—as the following history of their 
development in Liverpool attests.
Another alternative—gestured at by housing associations—seems to 
suggest something ‘social’ or ‘common’ that now only exists in the interstices 
between technocratic state management and property-based market exchange, 
even if it pre-existed both. One way to answer this question—what alternative 
to state-led public housing?—is thus to look back at what went before both 
the state and market. If the capitalist market was socially constructed through 
the state-enforced enclosure of previously common land, how did those 
commoners once provide for themselves before they faced the encroachment of 
private property and their dispossession? Such questions conjure up romantic 
images of the commons, an ancient, pre-modern code of collective rights—
or rites as in customs—to share in the resources of common land, managed 
through cooperative relations and mutual aid, increasingly understood as 
practices of what Marxist historian Peter Linebaugh terms ‘commoning’.5
In our modern era of state-regulated capitalism, the commons appears 
a long way away in the distant past, despite growing empirical evidence 
that commons continue to flourish in the present,6 and can point the way 
5 Peter Linebaugh, The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All (University of 
California Press, 2009). 
6 Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak et al., eds, The Drama of the Commons 
(National Academy Press, 2002).
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towards—and, perhaps, prefigure in present practices—a potential post-
capitalist future.7 Over the past century or so, activists and advocates have 
innovated a number of different models that attempt to articulate in some form 
or another our common right to housing—making the most out of the legal 
materials and institutional frameworks they have to hand. These models have 
a variety of names—from co-operatives and co-housing to mutual homeown-
ership societies, common ownership societies and community land trusts—all 
coalescing around the conceptual kernel of solidarity, reciprocity, co-operation 
and mutuality. What they all have in common—the principle of the ‘common’ 
over private or public—is an eschewal of possessive individualism and private 
property in favour of collective ownership; and an emphasis on cooperative 
relations, shared responsibilities and democratic governance over top-down, 
hierarchical and bureaucratic management. This book is about bringing to 
life some of these models—specifically co-operatives and community land 
trusts—by tracing their historical genesis and evolution in one particular 
city with a rich history of experiments in collective alternatives—Liverpool, 
England. Before delving into Liverpool’s history, it is worth considering why 
collective housing alternatives can help us understand—and move beyond—
our present conjuncture, defined as it is by housing crisis.
The prevailing system for providing shelter under advanced capitalism is, 
quite simply, broken—and collective housing alternatives might just provide 
a way to mend it. Co-ops and CLTs may be marginal models now, in these 
inimical conditions, but they point towards another way of housing ourselves 
that is not so dependent on volatile markets or on distant bureaucracies. The 
way in which we have, for over a century now in the UK as in many capitalist 
liberal democracies, sought to provide shelter is through a dual system of state 
and market, of public and private ownership and management. This broadly 
correlates with the time in which we have as a society generally lived out 
our lives under an urban-industrial system. The dawn of industrial capitalism 
created what many still see as an ongoing housing crisis—rising costs, declining 
quality, shortage of access, homelessness, physical dilapidation, tenant exploi-
tation and alienation—and, despite state intervention and rising prosperity 
during the post-war decades, the crisis has arguably been with us ever since. 
Indeed, as critical urbanists David Madden and Peter Marcuse argue in their 
2016 polemic, In Defense of Housing, ‘crisis’—despite semantically implying 
a temporary moment of emergency—has been invoked by anti-capitalist 
activists and social reformers for over a century precisely because capitalism 
makes crisis conditions a norm, especially for working-class communities.8 In 
the grand scheme of things, however, this characterisation as crisis may not 
7 J.K. Gibson-Graham, A Postcapitalist Politics (University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
8 David Madden and Peter Marcuse, In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis (Verso, 
2016).
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seem so contradictory after all: the anarchist writer Colin Ward (a significant 
protagonist in Liverpool’s co-operative history) conjectures that for 90 per cent 
of human history people have housed themselves through subsistence—only 
denied this ‘freedom’ (or, depending on your perspective, saved from this cruel 
fate) once state-capitalist enclosures began forcing people from the land and into 
mass housing to work the factories in burgeoning industrial cities, “because by 
that time the space, the materials and the means of subsistence all belonged to 
someone else”.9
That capitalism continually reproduces the housing crisis anew—despite 
admirable attempts to use the state to legislate against it—should be of no 
surprise. The capitalist system of commodity production is necessarily predi-
cated upon scarcity—either ‘natural’ or socially created—in order to realise 
value for exchange. The artificial creation of scarcity amidst relative plenty and 
abundance is the central mechanism driving a commodified housing system as 
a profitable sector of capital accumulation. This raises some serious questions 
about the nature of value—an issue that informs a great deal of this book. 
What is the real value of housing? How is it valued? What form does that 
value take? Who dictates how value is conceived, produced and utilised; and 
who benefits from it? At the root of these questions is a fundamental tension: 
value in housing understood as a commodity to be traded for financial gain 
versus that understood as the use of a space for people to inhabit now and in 
the future—the dichotomy intrinsic to capitalism between exchange value and 
use value. Treating housing as a commodity over a basic need may optimise 
the production of exchange value but in so doing leads to a poor or suboptimal 
distribution of housing as an essential use value. This presents an intractable 
contradiction between capital accumulation based on exchange value and social 
reproduction based on use. The phenomenon of swathes of empty homes across 
the country amidst worsening housing shortages and a homelessness epidemic 
is just one peculiar outcome of the dominance of exchange over use value. 
Taking housing out of the market so that it is relatively free from the logic 
of capital and governing it through alternative mechanisms—either through 
some sort of public ownership by the state or through a more decentralised 
and citizen-led form of common ownership that protects and enhances use 
values—is the challenge, and choice, we now face if we wish to tackle the 
housing crisis.
So what can the state do in this regard? Although the state was of course 
complicit in enforcing the acts of enclosure that were responsible for the 
dispossession and displacement entailed in the process Marx identified as 
‘primitive accumulation’—thereby complicit in the very creation of the housing 
crisis—the state has also been harnessed by reformists to ameliorate the worst 
9 Colin Ward, Welcome, Thinner City: Urban Survival in the 1990s (NCVO Publications, 
1989), p. 101.
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excesses of this crisis and, at its most ambitious and utopian, to inaugurate a 
universal social system of good quality housing provision intended as one of the 
material foundations for the socialist transformation of society. That was—and 
perhaps still is—the promise of municipal housing in Britain and beyond. But 
that promise has long been broken—or at least has not lived up to our hopes 
placed in it. The history of municipal housing and its renewal in Liverpool, as I 
sketch out towards the end of this introduction, provides a clear account in this 
regard. There are two broad reasons why. First, the social-democratic project 
of universal municipal housing has been thwarted, hijacked even, by stronger 
political forces which have hollowed out public ownership through privatisations, 
outsourcing and market disciplining. From Margaret Thatcher’s Right to Buy and 
stock transfer policies in the 1980s to the intensifying marketisation and finan-
cialisation of the housing associations that have replaced councils as the primary 
providers of a much diminished and renamed ‘social housing’ sector—it is clear 
that the dream of universal housing provision has been trumped by neoliber-
alism.10 What many of us, until relatively recently, have taken for granted—a 
right of citizenship to decent affordable shelter guaranteed by the state—is 
actually a historical abnormality. Housing theorist Michael Harloe has described 
what is known as the ‘residualisation’ of council housing11 (its demise from a 
mainstream tenure of choice for the skilled working class to an increasingly 
residual part of provision only for the most marginalised in society) not as some 
aberration but as a return, awful as it may seem, to the ‘normal’ or default mode 
under capitalism; a climb down from a seemingly stable but brief and abnormal 
golden age in European history where in the wake of two world wars the state, 
aspiring to universal welfare provision and responding to market failure, had to 
step in to restructure capitalist society and meet new demands for housing and 
other public goods and services. That era is now well and truly over.
Secondly, for all its good intentions, there were inherent problems with this 
state project—even when delivered at the municipal scale by local authorities 
(as is all too evident in Liverpool’s history)—to do with the way in which 
housing was done to and for people rather than by them. Participation in the 
process of dwelling is argued by some12 to be an important part of being 
human—it informs our relationship with ourselves (our self-identity), with 
our immediate environments, the people around us and with wider society. 
Housing delivered by the state has often succumbed to impersonal bureaucratic 
10 Boughton, Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing.
11 Michael Harloe, The People’s Home? Social Rented Housing in Europe and America (Wiley-
Blackwell, 1995).
12 Peter King, Private Dwelling: Contemplating the Use of Housing (Routledge, 2004); John 
F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter, eds, Freedom to Build (Collier Macmillan, 1972); Martin 
Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in David Farrell Krell, ed., Basic Writings 
(Routledge, 1978), pp. 347–363.
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procedures that prevent people from shaping these relationships to mutually 
beneficial ends and alienates them from the deeply personal and sociable process 
of dwelling. Moreover, when the state controls housing decisions the democratic 
distance between citizens and the bureaucratic machinery that implements 
decision-making, via elected representatives, is often too wide a gap to bridge. 
Bad decisions are made. Slum clearance policies destroy people’s homes without 
due consideration of their affective bonds to place. Communities are broken 
up needlessly, along with the collective cultures of social provisioning that 
they sustained. Architecture is designed by experts that, however impressive 
aesthetically, proves too monolithic or inflexible to meet the everyday needs of 
residents. The tendency towards abstraction and alienation from everyday life 
inhering in elite expertise and professionalisation—cutting across public and 
private domains—is a theme that will recur throughout this book. Collective 
housing alternatives are in many ways about healing these divisions—between 
the producer and consumer of housing; between the physical object of the house 
and the act of living in it; between those who make decisions about dwelling and 
those who have to live with them—that were first cracked open by enclosure 
and carved deeper by the abstractions of state-capitalist modernity. Whether 
these models can be any more than a sticking plaster in this regard—whether 
they are mere symptoms of capitalism or prefigurations of something else 
entirely—is a key question I want to consider.
Why Collective Housing Alternatives?
At this point it would be useful to explain some terminology. Precise technical 
definitions of housing cooperatives and community land trusts—my main focus 
in the book—will be delineated as the narrative unfolds. For now, suffice to say 
that they are not-for-profit, democratically governed voluntary associations for 
the development, ownership and management principally of affordable housing 
but also of other local assets. They exemplify what I define as collective housing 
alternatives. What precisely do I mean by this? First, co-ops and CLTs can 
be characterised as alternatives by offering another option to the mainstream. 
Indeed, they remain a marginal, bespoke form of housing provision, especially 
in Britain. At the time of writing, the National CLT Network reports on its 
website around 300 CLTs in total in England and Wales and only 935 homes 
built to date—but the sector is expanding rapidly, having grown six-fold in the 
last six years, with 16,000 homes in the pipeline. The larger, more established 
(and slower growing) co-op housing sector had by 2012 over 600 co-ops in 
England alone and an estimated total of over 45,000 dwellings across the UK.13 
13 Housing Europe, Profiles of a Movement: Co-operative Housing around the World, 
CECODHAS Housing Europe ICA Housing, 2012: www.housingeurope.eu/resource-115/
profiles-of-a-movement.
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This likewise remains marginal in the broader national housing context—under 
0.2 per cent of total housing stock—especially in comparison with European 
counterparts, such as Germany (5 per cent of total national stock in 2012), 
Spain (6 per cent), Belgium (7 per cent), Austria (8 per cent) and Sweden (17 
per cent). Britain’s—but more specifically England’s—exceptionally low levels 
of cooperative housing might be explained by cultural factors: the enduring 
national obsession with private homeownership, wrapped up with an anti-
urban, individualistic privatism (expressed in the problematic proverb ‘an 
Englishman’s home is his castle’) and a subtle reverence for feudal and aristo-
cratic forms of bucolic (sub)urbanism (captured in the image of the English 
country garden or village green) over any bourgeois or socialist or cooperative 
forms of urbanism.14 On this point, Scotland for one is a different story, 
arguably sharing more with continental Europe than England. The reasons 
may also be political: Britain has been the subject of a brutal experiment in 
neoliberalism, penetrating faster and deeper into everyday life than anywhere 
else. Yet Britain also pioneered the cooperative movement in the nineteenth 
century and, in the aftermath of war, established a national health service as a 
collectivist form of public provision based on experiments in cooperative social 
care in Welsh mining villages. Set against this ambiguous context, the potential 
for co-ops and CLTs to become more mainstream sectors—and grow into an 
alternative system of owning and managing housing and neighbourhood assets 
that can challenge the hegemony of private property—is a background concern 
animating this book. 
Collective housing alternatives are named just that—alternatives—as they 
speak to the relatively hidden traditions of utopian socialism, libertarian 
communism and democratic socialism (as opposed to social democracy) 
that share many of the same overall goals of state-socialism and public 
ownership—that is, providing a collective alternative to private property and 
the individualism of the market—but, in light of the latter’s historical diffi-
culties, point us in a different direction towards achieving them. Collective 
alternatives also speak to the more ancient tradition of the commons. As 
political economist Massimo De Angelis states, the commons stand at the 
beginning—and at the end—of capitalist history.15 The state played an 
intrinsic, complicit part in that capitalist history and cannot, therefore, at least 
in its current form, hope to resolve it. What it can do, though, is help support 
the flourishing of new forms of commons that exist in the here and now and 
14 Patrick Keiller, “The Dilapidated Dwelling”, in The View from the Train: Cities and Other 
Landscapes (Verso Books, 2013), pp. 51–63; Dorling, All That Is Solid: How the Great Housing 
Disaster Defines Our Times, and What We Can Do About It; Owen Hatherley, A Guide to the 
New Ruins of Great Britain (Verso Books, 2011).
15 Massimo De Angelis, The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital (Pluto 
Press, 2006).
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could potentially become the cell structure of a new, post-capitalist state and 
society. A rich academic debate on the meaning and potency of political and 
economic alternatives, including co-ops and CLTs, and their variously opposi-
tional and ambiguous relationships to the state and capital—captured by the 
term ‘alterity’16—informs my approach here.
But why have I chosen to use this term when there are already plenty of 
other—perhaps too many—similar concepts all jostling to describe roughly 
the same thing? For instance, for some time now in the UK, the group of 
housing models that I have been referring to as collective alternatives—
co-ops, CLTs, self-build, co-housing, mutual homeownership, community 
self-help etc.—has come to be called ‘community-led housing’. This empha-
sises that it is the community—not the state or the market—that controls 
the decisions regarding housing and seems to derive from particular British 
traditions of community organising and voluntary association in civil society 
as well as, perhaps, more recent neoliberal and Third Way trends towards 
centring community in public policy as part of a new localism.17 In conti-
nental Europe, particularly central and northern European countries such 
as Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, there is an emerging consensus 
around the term ‘collaborative housing’.18 This draws attention to the more 
partnership-based approach towards building cooperative housing in collabo-
ration with housing associations, professional organisations and the state, 
stemming from traditions of corporatism in these countries. Another concept 
gaining currency, originating in Australia, is ‘self-organised housing’19 which 
emphasises the autonomous nature of these movements, drawing connections 
with the ‘community economies’ research of feminist political economists 
J.K. Gibson-Graham and their concern with cultivating prefigurative practices 
of a post-capitalist future.20
16 Duncan Fuller, Andrew Jonas and Roger Lee, eds, Interrogating Alterity: Alternative 
Economic and Political Spaces (Ashgate, 2010); Andrew Leyshon, Roger Lee and Colin 
C. Williams, Alternative Economic Spaces (SAGE, 2003). In particular, see Stuart Hodkinson, 
“Housing in Common: In Search of Strategy for Housing Alterity in England in the 21st 
Century”, in Fuller, Jonas and Lee, Interrogating Alterity, pp. 241–258.
17 David Mullins and Tom Moore, “Self-Organised and Civil Society Participation in 
Housing Provision”, International Journal of Housing Policy 18.1 (2018): 1–14.
18 Darinka Czischke, “Collaborative Housing and Housing Providers: Towards an 
Analytical Framework of Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration in Housing Co-Production”, 
International Journal of Housing Policy 18.1 (2018): 55–81; Richard Lang and Harald Stoeger, 
“The Role of the Local Institutional Context in Understanding Collaborative Housing 
Models: Empirical Evidence from Austria”, International Journal of Housing Policy 18.1 
(2018): 35–54.
19 Louise Crabtree, “Self-Organised Housing in Australia: Housing Diversity in an Age 
of Market Heat”, International Journal of Housing Policy 18.1 (2018): 15–34.
20 Gibson-Graham, A Postcapitalist Politics.
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Fundamentally, the concept of collective housing alternatives attempts 
to draw out an important relationship with the state and the notion of the 
public that I think is missing from the more familiar terms outlined above. 
First, Community-led, collaborative and self-organised each describe—with 
different inflections on community, autonomy and partnership—the actors 
involved in organising this kind of housing, but they do not adequately 
convey the wider state–market nexus within which they necessarily develop. 
Secondly, each descriptor conjures images that run against the grain of what 
many in these movements are attempting to achieve. ‘Collaborative’ is too 
acquiescent, too caught up in existing institutional relations to inspire much 
meaningful social change. ‘Self-organised’ puts the stress on self and thus fails 
to capture notions of collectivity, solidarity and cooperation. ‘Community’ 
suggests a parochialism and exclusivity that does not sit well with notions of 
the common or public good. Instead, I use collective as a simple descriptor 
to infer that decisions are made collectively—at various scales—rather than 
individually and that outcomes are achieved with collective benefits in mind 
rather than just self-interest. This is intended to reappropriate the language 
of collectivism from the collectivist scale of the state and reinvigorate interest 
in alternative forms of collective organisation that are more democratic than 
bureaucratic. In this way, it speaks to renewed discourses around collective or 
alternative forms of public ownership of the economy and economic democ-
racy.21 Housing is just as much a part of the economy as manufacturing and 
we should do more to make that connection rather than maintain a silo. If we 
drop the ‘housing’ in the concept we could be talking about any other part 
of the economy—and many of the arguments made in this book are intended 
in this generalist spirit.
By focusing on collectivity and commons over community, I wish to draw 
attention to certain facets of collective alternatives that the term community-
led housing tends to obfuscate. Whereas community suggests members are 
bound together by a shared identity or homogeneous culture, commons 
transcends identitarian concerns and points towards common interests in 
owning, governing and maintaining a set of shared resources.22 This entails 
bringing people together from across traditional cleavages in new formations, 
which, rather than look inwards to define a bounded community, connect 
outwards towards the public sphere or the ‘common’ in ways which may 
21 Andrew Cumbers, Reclaiming Public Ownership: Making Space for Economic Democracy (Zed 
Books, 2012); Robin Murray, Jeremy Gilbert and Andrew Goffey, “Post-Post-Fordism in 
the Era of Platforms: Robin Murray Talks to Jeremy Gilbert and Andrew Goffey”, New 
Formations 84/85 (2015): 184–208. 
22 Jeremy Gilbert, Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism 
(London: Pluto Press, 2013).
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prefigure a post-capitalist future.23 By associating collective alternatives with 
the commons I invoke their as yet unrealised potential as an alternative, 
democratised form of public housing—part of a reformed, decentralised state 
that enables and protects commons.
The commons is becoming increasingly relevant in contemporary 
movements fighting for social justice the world over: as the domain that 
broadly describes all social activity and circuits of value that remain or, more 
often, are fought free from the capitalist logic of exchange relations and private 
property—especially in the domain of the city and urban space.24 Applying 
this perspective to housing, critical geographer Stuart Hodkinson contrasts 
intensifying ‘new urban enclosures’ threatening to reverse the post-war 
progress made with public housing—such as attempts to regenerate ex-council 
estates through private finance initiatives which so often lead to dispossession 
and displacement—with efforts to reclaim our ‘housing commons’ with 
collective alternatives such as cooperatives and CLTs.25 In the commons–
enclosure debate, therefore, public ownership can be aligned in solidarity 
with common ownership as a (partial, imperfect) shelter from the full force 
of exchange relations.
Collective housing alternatives play a part in this struggle as institutional 
articulations of a housing commons that has at once been lost and is, perhaps, 
still yet to come. Encompassing a broad range of different organisational 
designs—from more informal and oppositional interventions like squatting 
through more institutionalised initiatives like cooperatives and co-housing to 
more politically pragmatic models such as co-ownership societies, self-help, 
community land trusts and community development trusts, all with variations 
on bespoke legal devices and organisational covenants—collective housing 
models attempt to articulate in existing political and legal terms the kinds 
of relationships and practices that might one day constitute a new kind of 
post-capitalist society. More immediately, they inculcate ways of living in the 
present that are beneficial to individual and collective well-being and help heal 
some of the division and deprivation wrought by capitalist markets. 
Specifically, collective housing alternatives—as an ‘ideal type’—can 
be seen to do three things to combat the deleterious effects of treating 
housing as a commodity rather than a home. First, they attempt to resolve 
exploitation—the unproductive (and often parasitic) extraction of rent by 
landlords or of mortgage interest by banks which is in itself a moral problem 
23 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Harvard University Press, 2009).
24 Stavros Stavrides, Common Space: The City as Commons (Zed Books, 2016).
25 Hodkinson, “The Return of the Housing Question”; Hodkinson, “Housing in 
Common: In Search of Strategy for Housing Alterity in England in the 21st Century”; 
Stuart Hodkinson, “The New Urban Enclosures”, City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, 
Theory, Policy, Action 16.5 (2012): 500–518.
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but also, when coupled with speculation in land and property treated as a 
financial commodity, creates crisis conditions in affordability, thereby socially 
constructing exclusion from one of life’s most fundamental needs. Second, they 
attempt to tackle alienation—the disconnection of residents from their homes 
and the spiritually fulfilling act of dwelling by the mediations of capital (banks, 
neo-feudal landowners and buy-to-let property speculators) or of distant 
bureaucracies (be they private, public, or quasi-public absentee landlords). 
Third, they attempt to protect against displacement—the increasingly common 
experience of being ‘dis-placed’ that occurs through market-led speculation 
and gentrification or through state-backed regeneration projects that forcibly 
relocate residents against their will, dislodged from their lodgings. 
How do collective housing alternatives go about doing this? In short, they 
protect land from the market by holding it in common, through alternative 
forms of ownership that are neither private nor public, that are collective 
but not collectivist. Taking land or property off the market and into some 
form of collective ownership—be that through a mutual, a co-operative or 
a charitable trust—works via three mechanisms in relation to the problems 
identified above. First, in response to exploitation, they provide a legal asset 
lock which protects that land from being bought out, sold off or bet upon. 
This prevents the extraction of the value of land and property such that any 
surpluses from rent or rising land values are ‘locked in’ and recycled for 
community benefit rather than being siphoned off as profit. Strictly speaking, 
co-operatives do not do this, but may create an effective lock through a 
cooperative ownership structure and ethos. Second, in answer to alienation, 
they seek to reconnect the consumer and producer of housing through 
participation in design, development and management decisions. This brings 
residents together in the governance of a shared resource in ways which are 
small enough in scale—collective rather than collectivist—that enable more 
proximate and directly democratic forms of engagement than could possibly 
be achieved at greater scales, by the state. Third, in response to displacement, 
they provide a counterpower to both market and state—guaranteed, perhaps 
paradoxically, by (state-enforced) law—that protects residents’ rights to 
dwell in place. 
Articulating Our Housing Commons
These three powers of collective housing alternatives position them as torch-
bearers of a housing commons. We can see this in the way that a commons is 
commonly defined in a similar tripartite fashion: as a shared resource pool (the 
housing that has been taken off the market into common ownership, to prevent 
exploitation and extraction); as a ‘public sphere’ of encounter, interaction and 
democratic deliberation that is collective but not collectivist in character (as 
a salve to alienation); and as a collective rights claim over a specific place of 
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dwelling by its inhabitants (to protect against displacement). The third of these 
aspects, the issue of rights, is a thorny one that I will consider in some depth 
below. The first two—resource pool and public sphere—reveal the dialectical 
nature of the commons as a domain which is both simultaneously a material 
resource with spatial dimensions and a set of embodied practices enacted 
through time. This reflects anarchist architect John F.C. Turner’s dualistic 
characterisation of housing as both a noun (material object) and a verb (lived 
process).26 The changing relationship between housing seen as a noun and as a 
verb is a major theme of this book, one which will inform our understanding 
of how collective housing alternatives differ from public and private forms of 
ownership; how within housing activism there is always a tension between 
the verb-like social practices that are the lifeblood of collective alternatives 
and the noun-like legal models and organisational forms which codify creative 
experiments as enduring structures. One of the arguments I wish to make 
is that whilst noun-like models are essential to the sustenance of collective 
housing alternatives they also risk calcifying as brittle bones the dynamic 
energy that first inspired them as campaigns. There is always a trade-off to be 
made between these forces and tendencies.
Another, related background argument of this book is that state and 
capitalist forms of housing provision, ownership and management all too 
often fall into this trap of freezing verb-like practices into noun-like abstrac-
tions; while, to the contrary, collective housing alternatives attempt to resist 
this tendency towards objectification and abstraction by foregrounding the 
embodied practices and lived experiences of commoning. Commoning best 
describes those verb-like social practices that are analytically distinct from 
(though dialectically embedded within) the material resource pool of the 
commons. Collective housing alternatives embody and encourage acts of 
commoning, in differential degrees, through the organisational form they 
take and the governance arrangements that this entails. Why can they only be 
articulations—proxies at best—of a housing commons? Because they are, by 
legal definition, forms of property—albeit common or collective or mutual or 
co-operative property but property nonetheless—and property is antithetical 
to the very idea of a commons.27 Private property was, after all, the very 
technology by which the commons, at the beginning of capitalist history, 
were enclosed by the state. Enclosure is in many ways an act of transforming 
verb-like lived reality into a noun-like object, a commodity, which can then 
be divorced from its embedded social context to be owned, accumulated and 
traded as the property holder sees fit. Since original acts of enclosure, the 
26 John F.C. Turner, “Housing as a Verb”, in John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter, eds, 
Freedom to Build (Collier Macmillan, 1972), pp. 148–175.
27 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City (Routledge, 2004).
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capitalist economy has increasingly become, as Karl Polanyi famously argued, 
‘dis-embedded’ from society and ecology.28
This process of dis-embedding and abstracting from lived processes is 
inscribed in the very logic of ownership and private property rights. No study 
into the changing nature of housing can ignore ownership and property rights 
as foundational concepts. When it comes to property, the state and the market 
form a nexus—the public–private dualism. The twentieth century can in many 
respects be seen as a sustained though unstable flirtation with the domain of 
the public as a means to organise the ownership of land and the provision of 
goods and services, not least housing, which appears to be in stark contra-
distinction to the domain of the private so often portrayed, for instance, in 
studies of privatisation of the welfare state, as the enemy of the public. Yet the 
public–private dichotomy is not best characterised as two distinct ways of doing 
things but as dialectically related poles of one essential view, which property 
theorists, following Joseph William Singer, call the ‘ownership model’.29 This 
dominant conception of property rights as distinct, individualised, separable, 
exclusive and clearly bounded—that is, abstracted and objectified from the flow 
of lived experience—is the legal foundation for the successful development of 
capitalism and neoliberalism, a political discourse founded on the liberal insti-
tution of private property. In its ideal type expression, the ownership model 
invests absolute control over a clearly delineated space or thing in a single 
identifiable owner, who therefore enjoys certain rights and entitlements to use 
the property as they wish, including the power to exclude all others as well 
as the power to pass on all powers of ownership to another through transfer 
of rights, which are protected by determinate boundaries that mark ownership 
off from non-ownership, simply by virtue of being identified in formal legal 
title. As Singer surmises: title bestows entitlement. The powerful protection of 
exchange rights under the ownership model allows the enclosure of our housing 
commons into an alienable object, and the extraction of its socially produced 
surplus value through exchange on the global market. It is the state that enforces 
this institution, through legally binding property rights.
Property rights, then, seem antithetical to the very concept of the 
commons and commoning. Yet the latter have nonetheless been expressed in 
various ways in the language of rights. For instance, in describing the city as a 
kind of urban commons, Colin Ward has this to say: “the city is the common 
property of its inhabitants. It is, in the economic sense, a public good”.30 This 
is ‘common property’ and ‘public good’ meant in the more expansive sense of 
28 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(Beacon Press, 1944).
29 Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (Yale University Press, 
2000).
30 Ward, Welcome, Thinner City, p. 1.
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these terms. We can see the concept of rights mobilised in the mantra of the 
global social movement for the Right to the City—first articulated by Marxist 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre—which “like a cry and a demand” agitates for “a 
transformed and renewed ‘right to urban life’”.31 Radical planning theorist 
Mark Purcell delineates two fundamental components of the right to the 
city: the right to appropriate urban space for its social use value and the right 
to participate centrally in the political decision-making that produces space.32 
Rather than rights of citizenship being founded on passive membership of a 
nation-state and abstract entitlement to property, they derive from the active 
contribution of each inhabitant to the creation of a complex urban ecology as 
well as their necessary embeddedness within the web of social relations that 
make up the city. At its heart, then, argues Marxist urbanist Andy Merrifield, 
is a radical reconception of citizenship in which the tragically disconnected 
city-dweller and citizen are reconciled as one.33 So too are rights here 
reconfigured away from the formal entitlements of private property towards 
more expansive rights of social citizenship. Lefebvre’s image of the city as 
an oeuvre—a collective work of art created by the daily rituals and practices 
of its inhabitants, and therefore justly governed by them—turns on its head 
the justifications for private property and relocates rights to urban space to 
the citizens that breathe life into them. This has important implications for 
housing, that is, if we see housing, in a microcosmic relation to the city, as 
an urban commons whose use value—and, by extension, exchange value—is 
produced by its inhabitants and all those who engage in productive and socially 
reproductive activities in its environs.
The notion of rights hailed by the commons and the right to the city is a 
very different one from that instituted by the ownership model. Rights talk 
assumes from the outset that there is some sovereign institution in which 
ultimate authority is invested and to which rights claims can be made and in 
turn legitimated and upheld. As political philosopher Todd May has argued, 
this moves the responsibility for fulfilling such rights from citizen to that 
institutional body and focuses attention on “what people are owed, on what 
they should receive” from the state, which therefore renders what can be an 
active process of political empowerment into a “matter of passive recipiency”.34 
31 Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities (Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), p. 168.
32 Mark Purcell, “Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its Urban Politics of 
the Inhabitant”, GeoJournal 58.2–3 (2002): 99–108; Mark Purcell, “Citizenship and the 
Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order”, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 27.3 (2003): 564–590.
33 Andy Merrifield, “The Right to the City and Beyond: Notes on a Lefebvrian 
Re-Conceptualization”, City 15.3–4 (2011): 468–476.
34 Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008), p. 34.
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Exemplifying what cultural theorist Jeremy Gilbert calls ‘Leviathan logic’35—
referring to the dark shadow cast by Hobbes over all subsequent (neo)liberal 
political thought—private property rights invest authority in a sovereign 
source supporting a hierarchical structure of individual rights-bearers who 
are related to each other only by their shared vertical relationship with the 
ultimate authority, the state. But collectivism need not be synonymous with 
the state and there is a missing mediating horizontal link to be (re)discovered 
in the commons. Where Hobbes saw the state of nature as a nasty, brutish 
world, red in tooth and claw, from which humans needed protecting by means 
of the state, the Leviathan, anarchists such as Peter Kropotkin have conversely 
seen the state of nature as a sort of primordial commons defined more by 
cooperation and mutual aid than by violence, competition and hierarchy. In 
seeking to break free from the Leviathan logic of liberal thought the notion 
of the commons speaks to this anarchist perspective on human nature and 
envisages a world where (to borrow a Marxist idea) the state one day withers 
away—however impossible that appears today.
The common right, in contrast to the private, is a highly contextual and 
interactive claim to shared space originating immanently through negotiation 
among users, not transcendentally from some abstract deed of entitlement 
authorised by the state. In its fullest expression, the commons represents 
a break with Leviathan logic, in that members are related in a collective 
structure where rights are legitimated through the very act of their mutual 
negotiation. In principle, a commons perspective refutes the very idea of a 
predetermined right that can be passively owed to someone; insisting instead 
on the active cooperative justification of rights between members based 
on the self-legitimating authority of democracy. In practice, however, as I 
argue below, we cannot so simply free ourselves from Leviathan logic but 
must engage with rights as they currently are if we wish ever to bring about 
actually existing commons. Moreover, if the state withers away, who or what 
is left to adjudicate between the self-legitimating authorities of individual 
commons?
Seeing the city as an oeuvre and housing as a commons highlights property as 
essentially relational—its verb-like qualities—against the abstract, noun-like 
concept of property conceived by the ownership model (the public–private 
dualism). In the latter, property is presented in a highly simplified model that 
emphasises simplicity, certainty, security, clarity and legibility. In attempting 
to ‘unsettle’ the conceptual certainties of the ownership model, critical 
geographer Nick Blomley acknowledges one of its greatest strengths: that 
it appears ‘settled’ (in the spatial legibility of its visible boundaries, such as 
walls and fences, for instance, or in the legal legibility of title deeds) and 
therefore acts to ‘settle’ the complexities, ambiguities, disputes and conflicts 
35 Gilbert, Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism.
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in property claims into an ordered, coherent and uncontested settlement.36 
But this also acts to obscure the inherently messy multiplicity of uses and 
claims that constitute property—its verb-like nature as a relational set of 
practices—in favour of an abstract, mono-typological noun-like concept. It 
also obscures the fact that property more accurately reflects a set of relation-
ships between people in terms of the things they can access, and not simply, 
as the ownership model implies, an isolated relation between a single owner 
and a thing. Property is perhaps better understood as an unfinished, embodied 
act of ‘doing’ than as an abstract enacted state of ‘having’. It only really gains 
any value—either for use or exchange—through the social relations that 
construct it as a meaningful and respected power to do certain things with 
certain objects in relation to other people. The aspects which make housing 
at all valuable or worth owning are mostly socially produced, through a 
complex web of relations that stretch out through society. For instance, 
private property remains protected and valuable on the market only insofar as 
people respect its boundaries, desist from vandalism and actively valorise the 
surrounding public space and the wider territory through spending money in 
local shops, paying taxes for the upkeep of public services, valuing its spaces 
as attractive places, expending energy interacting with others or just simply 
walking through it so as to produce and reproduce its social vitality. In short, 
private ownership depends upon the collective and the locality: in terms of 
both tacit assent in its recognition and also its relational co-production as a 
product of social conditions actively created by inhabitants.
Such a relational understanding of property provides the intuitive and 
moral foundation for collective housing alternatives and the particular 
common property rights they attempt to articulate. Ebenezer Howard, one 
of the founding fathers of modern common property regimes, built into his 
original vision of the Garden City model at the turn of the twentieth century 
a legal device, a trust structure, for capturing what he called the ‘unearned 
increment’ of land and property value37—that which is socially produced and 
therefore not strictly earned by the individual property owner. This has been 
adapted down the decades as the basis for a number of different collective 
housing alternatives, especially the CLT model. On the ethical understanding 
of ‘just deserts’ based on proportionality, the American CLT advocate and 
theorist John Emmeus Davis has called for a reallocation of the equity value 
of property so that “to the individual goes the fruits of individual labour; 
to the community goes the social increment”.38 This is the ethical principle 
36 Blomley, Unsettling the City.
37 Ebenezer Howard, To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Town And Country Planning 
(Cambridge University Press, 1898).
38 John Emmeus Davis, ed., The Community Land Trust Reader (Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, 2010), p. 363.
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underpinning the CLT model’s rejection of the ownership model’s preference 
for individual exchange rights—specifically to transfer and to speculate—
over common use rights. By specifically blocking the rights of individuals to 
speculate or profit on their share of the equity, the CLT model enables the 
realisation of use values usually suppressed by the power of accumulative 
interests.
Articulating the commons through a language of legal rights may well be 
a dangerously slippery slope down into private property terrain, yet it is clear 
that there is no getting away from it, at least any time soon. It is a game that is 
worth playing if we seek to make any headway with combating the dominance 
of the ownership model in the current conjuncture. A property right is an 
enforceable claim to use or benefit from a particular property, enforced by the 
sovereign authority of the state. In other words, rights are claims made upon 
the state to recognise, grant, protect or provide some particular entitlement to 
space, privileges or resources. It is only through their translation into property 
rights that property relations gain the necessary legitimacy and enforceability of 
‘proper’ proprietorship. Property theorist Carol Rose highlights the striking 
etymological ties between property, proprietorship (the private ownership of 
property) and propriety (the proper ordering or correct conformity to conven-
tional values and usages).39 Property makes invisible those claims that are not 
deemed proper or legitimate by legal authority; it obfuscates moral claims to 
land (and housing) and the full scope of rights and responsibilities deriving 
from social stakes in ownership. Here opens up an important distinction 
between a mere rights claim, an appeal awaiting legal sanction, and a right 
itself, which is a legitimate claim enforced by the state. It is in this gap, this 
traverse—converting claim into right—wherein the lines of political and 
social inclusion are drawn. Collective housing alternatives can be seen as tools 
for attempting to bridge that gap; they are means for the commons being 
deemed a proper—that is, legitimate and visible—form of ownership under a 
system that otherwise maintains the fiction of its invisibility. Indeed, we will 
never get anywhere with trying to defend our housing commons in practical 
ways—for instance, resisting displacement and dispossession—without some 
kind of legal protection and state-recognised entitlement to that space we 
seek to defend. This means engaging with the language of property rights and 
articulating housing commons as common property institutions. 
The governance structures that dictate the rules, membership and the 
associational relations of various collective housing models (CLTs, co-ops 
etc.) are the institutionalised forms of common rights. But, of course, 
39 Carol Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently 
Public Property of Chicago Law Review”, University of Chicago Law Review 53.3 (1986): 
711–781; Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of 
Ownership (Westview Press, 1994).
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many tensions, contradictions and inevitable compromises are entailed in 
any attempt to translate collective user rights into private property rights. 
Collective housing alternatives can thus never be fully realised embodiments 
of a commons by virtue of being expressed as property. In reality, they are 
messy hybrids of various property forms and tenure types. Common property 
regimes such as CLTs and co-ops are perhaps closer to being what alternative 
property theorists call “collective private ownership”40 than common property 
per se; more accurately understood, in Carol Rose’s term, as ‘limited common 
property’—that is, “property held as a commons among the members of a 
group, but exclusively vis-à-vis the outside world”.41 Co-ops, for instance, 
can be seen to embody the commons internally—sharing resources through 
mutual aid and cooperation—but must inevitably act externally like collective 
private property: excluding all non-members and thereby threatening to 
reproduce the social exclusion of private property only at a higher scale than 
the individual. By the same token, this exposes collective housing alternatives 
to the very real and present danger of co-optation, incorporation and coloni-
sation by neoliberal forces, which thrive through the language of property 
rights.
Bringing the State Back In
The state, therefore, is important for a number of reasons: for giving legal 
legitimacy to the tools used to support the ongoing growth and sustenance 
of collective housing alternatives; for providing institutional shelter from 
neoliberal incursions; and for providing the scalar coordination and connection 
to the notion of the public that so many small-scale commons, as micro-
enclosures, lack the capacity for or, for reasons of self-preservation, sometimes 
turn their backs upon. Indeed, by positioning collective housing alternatives 
in an antagonistic relationship to both the market and the state, I do not wish 
to overemphasise any supposed fundamental opposition to them, especially 
the state. The state is crucial and is potentially an ally, as it has been in the 
not too distant past, at the dawn of municipal socialism and then, again, at 
the birth of the welfare state. Following neo-Marxist state theory,42 the state 
should not be seen as a fixed entity, an agent with a particular agenda or 
simply the offices of government, even though its institutional design seems to 
prescribe certain bureaucratic tendencies in favour of capitalist class interests 
above all others. The state is an arena of social forces, a set of competing 
40 Charles Geisler and Gail Daneker, Property and Values: Alternatives to Public and Private 
Ownership (Island Press, 2000), p. 72.
41 Carol Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems”, Minnesota Law Review 83.129 (1998): 129–182 (p. 132).
42 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place (Polity Press, 1990).
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political interests and class alliances, a multi-scalar and far-reaching apparatus 
of central and local state institutions (from government departments to local 
authorities) and a diverse range of governmental, quasi- and non-governmental 
agencies (including housing associations) through which the invested capacities 
of the public are implemented as public policy. It is therefore highly contingent 
upon the social, political and ideological forces of the historical juncture—or 
certainly seems to be so in the UK. Here, under a highly adversarial, first-
past-the-post system of parliamentary democracy, we see the state being 
geared in different directions depending on political circumstances with a 
rough pattern of distinct approaches emerging every thirty years or so. In 
the post-war period we saw the Fordist settlement produce a relatively well-
funded welfare state that invested in council housing and to some degree 
delivered on the municipal dream of providing shelter for all citizens—which 
also created new circuits of capital accumulation through infrastructure for 
collective consumption, the contradiction animating the Urban Question.43 
Following the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s, we saw neoliberalism retool 
the state towards the dismantling of public housing provision in favour of the 
market. Thus the state can, at different times and contexts, be co-opted as an 
ally or an enemy of the democratic-socialist project for a housing commons.
Moreover, the public is not incompatible with the commons; it is its essential 
counterpart. Just because the state has delivered public housing in the past in ways 
which run counter to the participatory principles of the commons does not mean 
we should dismiss the importance of the state in bringing the housing commons 
to fruition. One way in which this can be seen clearly is through the concept of 
the ‘foundational economy’—another domain to which collective housing alter-
natives belong. The term itself was first conceived and popularised by a collective 
of researchers who sought to draw attention to those materially and socially 
important aspects of the economy that have in the past been taken for granted 
and conceptualised lazily as public services or civic infrastructure delivered 
by the state and therefore not strictly economic.44 The foundational economy 
comprises two components: material infrastructure (the pipes and cables, utilities 
and networks of everyday life, such as transport, food and retail banking) and 
what the foundational economy collective call ‘providential’ services (referring 
to the providence—the benevolent care and guidance—to be found in health, 
education and welfare provision). In being “welfare-critical for users because 
limited material and providential access stunts lives and limits possibilities”,45 
43 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (MIT Press, 1977).
44 Justin Bentham, Andrew Bowman, Marta De Cuesta et al., Manifesto for the 
Foundational Economy, CRESC Working Paper 131 (Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural 
Change, 2013).
45 Foundational Economy Collective, Foundational Economy: The Infrastructure of Everyday 
Life (Manchester University Press, 2018), p. 22.
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the foundational economy is bound up with notions of citizenship and the 
common good and therefore demands greater care and accountability in its 
delivery, through some form of public ownership or scrutiny (leading, ironically, 
to its undervaluation, under neoliberalism’s privileging of the private realm, as 
not strictly part of the productive or so-called ‘real’ economy). 
Interestingly, housing occupies a central though ambiguous position 
within the foundational economy, identifying fully neither with the material 
nor providential but straddling both. It is arguably the very foundation of the 
foundational economy itself—for housing provides the minimum underlying 
basis for households to enjoy access to all other material and providential 
goods. The Foundational Economy Collective make much of the household as 
the nexus through which material infrastructures—all the pipes, cables and 
networks—flow to provide our daily essentials, such as water, power, food, 
care and information. One of the central defining features of the founda-
tional economy is that it is composed of a ‘branch and network structure’ 
whereby multi-scalar systems of access and provision determine individual 
consumption of a good or service. For instance, you can buy a bathroom 
tap on the open market but without integrating it with the regional water 
utility network there is no chance of receiving any water from it. Similarly, 
though perhaps less obviously, when it comes to housing, house-builders (or, 
for instance, communities seeking to take empty homes into co-operative 
ownership) need to comply with planning regulations at the municipal and 
national levels and also make sure their plans fit with requirements for all 
the material and providential services that connect with households via local, 
regional and national infrastructures. The need for a branch and network 
structure in housing is enough to show that the state plays an important 
role in its provision. A point underlined by the abject policy failure of 
outsourcing to profit-hungry private companies much of the branch and 
network foundational economy of the UK, notably water, gas, electricity and 
the railways—representing a kind of privatisation of taxation.46 A housing 
commons requires a supportive state infrastructure if it is ever to flourish 
on any significant scale.
The foundational economy is part of a recent rediscovery of the moral 
economists R.H. Tawney, G.D.H. Cole and Karl Polanyi, amongst others. 
According to Polanyi, the economy is composed of four elements each operating 
according to different logics: householding, according to self-provisioning; the 
market, by a logic of exchange; the state, by a logic of redistribution; and 
civil society, by a logic of reciprocity.47 Polanyi’s fundamental insight—the 
double movement—was to show how the tendency under capitalism was 
to ‘dis-embed’ and abstract the market economy from the social relations, 
46 Meek, Private Island: Why Britain Now Belongs to Someone Else.
47 Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
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cultural practices and material environments that produce and sustain it and 
to elevate exchange as the primary principle governing economic relations; 
in turn producing a counter-movement for re-embedding the economy into 
society through the reassertion of the principle of reciprocity, often by way 
of state redistribution. Indeed, on this reading of the state, the Leviathan is 
not just a force of hierarchical control, physical violence and abstract power 
wielded over subjects but also the overarching arbiter of justice, through 
which redistribution is possible. Actors from within both the state and civil 
society, then, are to be seen as (potential) allies in the counter-movement of 
reclaiming the commons. 
Since the 1970s, however, the state has been in retreat, consumed by 
the logic of exchange, leaving the counter-movement solely in the hands of 
collective alternatives. The “recognition of housing as a foundational need”, 
argue the Foundational Economy Collective, “depends on political struggle 
which does not have an inevitable outcome”.48 Of all the foundational economy, 
it is housing, perhaps, that has been subject to the most political contestation. 
This is partly due to its ambiguous relationship with economic value—limited 
employment, mostly taken up with construction, yet astounding asset value. 
In countries such as the UK, property value has increasingly replaced state 
welfare provision as the primary source of social security, particularly income 
in retirement. In a context in which state capacity, and appetite, for universal 
welfare has been systematically eroded, private debt-fuelled investments in 
property assets appeared sensible. This has created political pressure to inflate 
the housing market in ever-expanding bubbles that cannot but eventually 
burst. Collective housing models offer an alternative that may one day prove 
politically popular, after the bubble bursts, but in the meantime may struggle 
to gain adherents who are pressured to ‘buy in’ to this unsustainable model in 
the absence of an adequate publicly owned foundational economy.
With this in mind, the question then becomes how to re-engineer the 
state to work for, rather than against, the housing commons. How can we 
re-scale the state towards more decentralised and networked institutions that 
enable us to engage in democratic decision-making over the material and provi-
dential services that underpin our lives? How can we reform the monolithic, 
centralised and hierarchical versions of public ownership of the post-war past 
into more collective and participatory forms of common ownership? How can 
we bring the state into closer conversation and engagement with that third 
domain of economic ownership and management often referred to as the 
social economy? Like the commons, the social economy is an alternative to 
the public and private domains and a historical tradition from which collective 
housing alternatives can be seen to derive. But whereas the commons stands in 
48 Foundational Economy Collective, Foundational Economy: The Infrastructure of Everyday 
Life, p. 28.
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a more antagonistic opposition to the public–private dualism constituted under 
capitalism, the social economy can be seen to emerge alongside, and often in 
cooperation with, the state to provide an alternative to capitalism that in some 
way mediates the public and the private without discarding it completely.49 
The social economy thus emerges from within modernity and its notions of 
property and economic ownership but seeks to transform these according to 
non-profit, co-operative and democratic values.
The original co-operative movement of the nineteenth century in Britain, 
sparked by the Rochdale Pioneers in northern England but drawing on older, 
medieval traditions of mutualism and guild socialism, is perhaps the quintes-
sential historical figure of the social economy, from an era when this concept 
was only just beginning to be articulated. Co-operatives were at first organised 
to democratise the relations of production, in worker-owned co-ops, then 
consumption, with the rise of retail co-ops and, more recently, areas more 
associated with social reproduction, such as housing co-ops. The argument 
implicit in the concept of the foundational economy—that domains conven-
tionally conceived as parts of social reproduction rather than production are 
actually an intrinsic, foundational part of the productive economy—helps us 
see that non-profit forms of ownership, such as state and co-operative activ-
ities, are just as much a part of the economy as are for-profit sectors. It also 
helps us see that housing co-ops are just as much a part of the social economy 
as the worker co-ops that more immediately come to mind. 
Social economy traditions such as the co-op movement provided much of 
the inspiration and impetus for the involvement of the state in the production 
and provision of the foundational economy. Granted, the original so-called 
‘gas and water’ municipal socialism of the 1880s and 1890s in which European 
municipalities pioneered the provision of basic material infrastructure may 
have drawn on a different intellectual hinterland. But the state provision 
of providential services, such as social care and housing, brought to life in 
the 1940s, owed much to earlier experiments in co-operative practices at 
more localised scales in the social economy. Thus we see the public sector 
and the social economy developing together through imitation, competition, 
conflict and mutual support, over the past century or so. This book charts 
one particular period of their co-evolution in Liverpool, where a budding 
co-operative housing movement was brought to life by central and local state 
support, in ways which proved at least partially mutually beneficial. But this 
alliance between the state and Liverpool’s co-op movement proved fragile 
and ultimately precarious upon political circumstance. The question remains 
whether any such relationship can be rekindled for the development of a 
49 Frank Moulaert and Oana Ailenei, “Social Economy, Third Sector and Solidarity 
Relations: A Conceptual Synthesis from History to Present”, Urban Studies 42.11 (2005): 
2037–2054.
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publicly minded housing commons in the future, building on the lessons learnt 
from this history. Having defined collective housing alternatives and suggested 
why they are of interest in understanding how to move beyond our present 
housing crisis, in the remainder of this introduction I want to do two things: 
to outline the structure of the book but, first of all, to introduce Liverpool 
and explain why this city, of all places, provides an important case study into 
the historical and ongoing development of collective housing alternatives.
CHAPTER 2 
Why Liverpool of All Places?
2: Why Liverpool of All Places?
If there were to be a revolution in England it would start in 
Liverpool.1
Liverpool has long been a leading light in public housing and its alterna-
tives—one of the first cities to build municipal housing in Europe and home 
to one of the continent’s most inventive and intensive housing cooperative 
movements as well as, later, a pioneer of British urban community land 
trusts. This inventiveness extends beyond housing into civic and social 
domains. During its heyday as England’s second city and a primary port of 
the British Empire, Liverpool was an innovator of inter-city rail as well as 
underground, overhead and overwater metro railways, integrated sewerage 
systems, cast iron churches, electric trams and the longest underwater road 
tunnel at the time—the list goes on.2 Animating its knack for innovation is 
an ‘edginess’3 that still shines through its culture today. The global trading 
links connecting Liverpool with far-flung places have been vital conduits for 
the transmission and cross-pollination of radical new ideas and cultures—
leading to a perception of Liverpool as a cosmopolitan ‘city on the edge’.4 
Quite literally on the edge of the British Isles and Europe, at the intersection 
with other continents, this edgy city full of edgy people experimenting 
with cutting-edge ideas is said to have more in common with Atlantic 
port counterparts—Naples, Marseilles, Istanbul, New York, New Orleans, 
Kingston—than with other British cities: “the tides carry the rhythm” of 
these ‘mari-time’ cities.5 Liverpool’s temperament seems to reflect the 
estuary that defines its urban landscape, the River Mersey—one of the 
1 Jim Allen, quoted by Ken Loach in Dave Sinclair, Dockers: The ’95 to ’98 Liverpool Lockout 
(2015), p. 19.
2 Olivier Sykes, Jonathan Brown, Matthew Cocks et al., “A City Profile of Liverpool”, 
Cities 35 (2013): 299–318.
3 Steve Higginson and Tony Wailey, Edgy Cities (Northern Lights, 2006).
4 John Davies, Cities on the Edge (Liverpool University Press, 2008).
5 Davies, Cities on the Edge, p. 14.
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most extreme tidal ranges in the UK. Movement is essential to Liverpool: 
expressed in the rhythms of the popular music that has come to define it and 
the maritime flows of people and ideas, making it a hotbed of effervescent 
energy, creativity and cultural movements, as it has evolved from ‘world 
city to the world in one city’.6 Yet at the same time it is a city with a very 
distinct identity—of Scouse and Scousers7—paradoxically dissociated from 
other places and turned inward towards its own unique culture as much as 
it can be said to be outwardly connected to others. 
Its historical evolution as a place made up of migrants and intersections of 
ideas from elsewhere, but which have grown into their own, is tinged with a 
certain political flavour, distinctly radical, democratic and anti-authoritarian. 
It has been a hotbed of radicalism over the decades, experimenting with 
new forms of revolt and resistance leading, in turn, to new forms of social 
organisation. The “foundational myth” of Liverpool’s radical identity is the 
1911 strike.8 What began as a strike by transport workers escalated into one 
of the most significant moments of working-class agitation in British history, 
involving some seventy thousand workers from across a wide range of indus-
tries in direct action led by syndicalists. The city came, the Liverpool Daily Post 
reported at the time, “near to revolution”—a phrase borrowed for the title 
of labour historian Eric Taplin’s book on the subject—prompting then Home 
Secretary Winston Churchill, anticipating insurrection, to deploy troops into 
Liverpool and a gunboat up the Mersey.9 That such extreme actions by the 
state were taken twice more to pre-empt further strikes in the early twentieth 
century confirms Liverpool’s identity as a revolutionary city in the minds of 
the ruling and working classes alike. A recent edited collection commemo-
rating this distinctive history is subtitled: ‘city of radicals’.10 Perhaps it is no 
surprise, then, that Liverpool has over the years produced some truly radical 
movements and innovations—in the original sense of the term, getting to the 
structural root of the issue—and not least in the domain of public housing 
and its alternatives long after its economic power faded.
6 Tim Bunnell, From World City to the World in One City: Liverpool through Malay Lives (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2016).
7 Philip Boland, “The Construction of Images of People and Place: Labelling Liverpool 
and Stereotyping Scousers”, Cities 25.6 (2008): 355–369.
8 Mark O’Brien, “Liverpool 1911 and Its Era: Foundational Myth or Authentic Tradition”, 
in John Belchem and Bryan Biggs, eds, Liverpool: City of Radicals (Liverpool University 
Press, 2011), pp. 140–158.
9 Eric Taplin, Near to Revolution: The Liverpool General Transport Strike of 1911 (Bluecoat, 
1994). 
10 Belchem and Biggs, Liverpool: City of Radicals.
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A City of Radicals and Reformists
One such radical attracted to Liverpool’s streets was Friedrich Engels—but 
for very different reasons. Engels came to Liverpool to document the terrible 
conditions that industrial capitalism presented for the new urban proletariat in 
his 1844 work The Condition of the Working Class in England. This was based on 
field studies of the rapidly industrialising cities of northern England, including 
Liverpool:
Liverpool, with all its commerce, wealth, and grandeur … treats its 
workers with the same barbarity. A full fifth of the population, more 
than 45,000 human beings, live in narrow, dark, damp, badly ventilated 
cellar dwellings, of which there are 7,862 in the city. Besides these 
cellar dwellings there are 2,270 courts, small spaces built up on all four 
sides and having but one entrance, a narrow, covered passage-way, the 
whole ordinarily very dirty and inhabited exclusively by proletarians.11
What Engels’ early observations reveal is that Liverpool’s radical innova-
tions in housing are only partly explicable by its revolutionary inventiveness; 
the large part was driven by sheer necessity—a response to the horrendous 
conditions wrought by colonial-capitalist urbanisation. As Britain’s leading 
slave port between 1699 and 1807—although no slave as such ever set foot 
there—slaving profits continued to enrich the city long after the British 
Empire as a whole abolished slavery in the 1830s. Its great wealth is still 
evident in the legacy of monumental architecture, with more listed buildings 
than anywhere else in Britain outside London, now protected by UNESCO 
World Heritage status. Such wealth and power was paid for with severe 
social and housing problems: inexcusable side-effects of the accumulation 
of capital, in which the bare minimum of surplus value produced by the 
exploitation of workers was allocated to the construction and maintenance of 
their dwellings. Liverpool’s maritime economy was driven by working-class 
labour, comprised largely of poor migrants drawn from across the UK and 
beyond through its far-reaching trade connections. The city has, for instance, 
the most established black community in Britain and the oldest Chinatown in 
Europe. Economic migrants settled in the waterfront districts in north and 
south Liverpool that developed behind the working docks, which became 
incredibly dense and overcrowded, constituting “a city within a city” the size 
of Bristol or Newcastle in itself.12 
As a result, Liverpool was regarded as the most unhealthy English city, 
with 34 per cent of the city’s population in 1841 living in filthy overcrowded 
11 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Penguin Classics, 1992).
12 Tony Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, 2nd ed. (Liverpool University Press, 1997).
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cellars without light, ventilation, sanitation or fresh water; 25 per cent living 
in back-to-back tenement courthouses housing the growing numbers drawn 
to work on the docks.13 As urban historian Bertie Dockerill has highlighted, 
Liverpool’s housing conditions compared unfavourably with counterparts 
such as Manchester or Leeds by the excessive if not unique prevalence of 
cellar accommodation owing to the city’s more mercantile than industrial 
heritage.14 All this was made worse by the sudden arrival of Irish migrants 
escaping the Potato Famine of 1845–47, a disaster largely attributable to 
British colonial-capitalist practices—practices to which Liverpool’s fortunes 
were inextricably linked. Liverpool was the first port of call for refugees, 
with some two million travelling through the city over the following decade. 
Over half were designated by the authorities as ‘paupers’, and tens of 
thousands stayed, many settling in slum areas in the north end of the inner 
city, built behind the docks that provided much of the employment on offer. 
Housing conditions were hardly improved by new purpose-built tenements 
thrown up by speculative builders, from which the phrase ‘Jerry-built houses’ 
is said to have originated.15 
Liverpool was the first city in Britain to legislate against the dire urban 
conditions created by capitalism. The 1842 Liverpool Building Act, Dockerill 
demonstrates, challenged laissez-faire attitudes of the time to municipal 
intervention—enforcing minimum space and hygiene standards in newly 
constructed privately rented courts across Liverpool. In 1846, the Liverpool 
Sanitary Act—the first comprehensive health legislation in England, two 
years ahead of the national Public Health Act, which likewise made local 
authorities responsible for drainage, sewerage and water supply—inaugurated 
the world’s first Medical Officer of Health and Borough Engineer in 1847 
so as to begin to ameliorate some of the worst conditions through public 
improvements such as sewers. In Municipal Dreams, charting the rise and fall 
of council housing in Britain, housing historian John Boughton describes how 
“Liverpool led the way” in the design and delivery of these early reforms: the 
only local authority, significantly, to make use of the 1866 Labouring Classes 
Dwellings Act that permitted councils to purchase sites and build or improve 
homes for people who would otherwise remain at the mercy of unscru-
pulous private landlords.16 Dockerill goes further to suggest that “Liverpool 
13 José Ospina, Housing Ourselves (Hilary Shipman Ltd, 1987), p. 66.
14 Bertie Dockerill, “Liverpool Corporation and the Origins of Municipal Social 
Housing, 1842–1890”, Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire 165 
(2016): 39–56.
15 Robert Cowan, P. Hannay and R. Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel, in 
Vauxhall Victors: Eldonians Special Issue”, Architects’ Journal (23 Mar. 1988): 37–66.
16 John Boughton, Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing (Verso, 2018), 
pp. 12–13.
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Corporation did not merely foreshadow central government guidelines, but 
set a socio-political agenda that was a model which other local authorities 
would eventually emulate”.17
Liverpool Corporation—as the city council was then called, known by 
its tenants as the ‘Corpy’—built Europe’s first municipal housing scheme, 
St Martin’s Cottages in Vauxhall, in 1869, to replace back-to-back slums. 
These were not cottages as the name suggested but tenements—six blocks 
over five storeys (including basements)—which failed to make much progress 
in answering working-class housing needs but nonetheless began a trend for 
council tenement-building that would only decease in the 1980s. Even by 
1880, some 70,000 people still lived in courthouses condemned as unfit for 
human habitation, in dockside districts, which, as the new Medical Officer of 
Health remarked in 1882, were as “plagued as the cholera-smitten cities”.18 
Two decades later, a successor Medical Officer reported that “there was not 
a city in this country, nay in Europe, which could produce anything like the 
squalor … found in some of Liverpool’s back streets”.
In response, Liverpool has delivered amongst the most intensive programmes 
of slum clearances and municipal house building the world over. The city has 
given birth to a number of innovations in council housing construction and 
provision, including pioneering the use of prefabricated concrete housing. 
These municipal interventions to replace terraced housing with modernist 
tenements were embarked upon in distinct phases. The first wave of pre-war 
tenements included experiments such as one of the first prefabricated concrete 
housing blocks in the world, at Eldon Street. Prior to the First World War, 
with a total of 2,747 flats and houses, Liverpool was the only city in England 
to build proportionately more municipal housing than London.19 The second, 
inter-war period saw the Conservative City Council—motivated by a mix 
of Tory paternalism and electoral tactics—construct monumental art deco 
‘garden’ tenement blocks, arranged around a central communal courtyard or 
garden, and inspired by the municipal socialist schemes of Vienna, such as 
Karl Marx-Hof, following site visits made by Liverpool’s city architect and 
housing director to Austria. For Marxist sociologist and Liverpool historian 
Tony Lane, “the best council housing ever built in Liverpool went up under 
the aegis of a Tory council”:
In the 1930s, apart from the Labour-controlled London County 
Council, Liverpool was comfortably the most progressive housing 
authority in Britain. The monolithic tenements of the inner city were 
17 Dockerill, “Liverpool Corporation and the Origins of Municipal Social Housing, 
1842–1890”, p. 45.
18 Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, p. 66.
19 Boughton, Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing.
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modelled on the Karl Marx Stadt blocks of socialist Vienna and the 
suburban estates were borrowed from Welwyn Garden City.20 
Liverpool stood alone with London amongst English cities—Scotland was a 
different story—to embrace the continental European trend for large-scale 
multi-storey urban architecture, as opposed to the taste for more quintes-
sentially English garden suburb designs, which disavow the urban. Indeed, 
it has often been said that Liverpool is in but not of England; “an English 
city”, remarks the ‘militant modernist’ architectural critic Owen Hatherley, 
“as honest about its urbanity as a Scottish or European one”.21 Following the 
post-war birth of the welfare state, the third phase produced three-storey 
‘walk-up’ tenements—built in the 1940s and 1950s in infill sites left over by 
war damage or pre-war clearances. The appetite for municipal intervention 
did not get into full swing until 1955, when the Labour Party was elected 
to the council for the first time in the city’s history—unusually late for a 
northern industrial city with strong working-class traditions. Liverpool was 
unusual among northern industrial cities with strong working-class traditions 
for electing Liberal and Tory council administrations when others voted in 
Labour—partly due to the religious sectarianism that had divided the city 
since the Irish in-migration in the nineteenth century: Protestants tended 
to vote Tory; Catholics Labour. This fourth phase, from the mid-1950s and 
through the 1960s, was more ambitious and embraced the systems-built 
prefab concrete tower block as its emblem. In the modernist and often 
utopian fervour of the period, city planners rebuilt much of Liverpool and 
its housing stock—large parts having been destroyed in Second World War 
bomb damage—and designed and constructed on the urban periphery entire 
new towns and outer estates to which many inner-city communities were 
relocated in the slum clearance programme. Due to numerous interlocking 
factors—alienating designs, poor quality construction techniques and building 
materials, bureaucratic mismanagement, political choices and socioeconomic 
decline—much post-war municipal housing built in Liverpool quickly deterio-
rated and became increasingly unpopular. Tony Lane remarks: 
Who would have dreamt in the 1950s that a housing dept. would have 
to invent the term “hard-to-let”? Who would have dreamt that some 
tenants would have been driven to a systematic destruction of their 
own housing as a means of forcing a change in policy? Who could have 
imagined a situation where tenants would have complained of the state 
of repair of their buildings—and then said that they didn’t want repairs 
20 Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, p. 340.
21 Owen Hatherley, A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain (Verso Books, 2011),
p. 336. 
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carried out because they wanted the place to deteriorate to the point 
where they would have to be re-housed?22
A more sympathetic view of municipal housing would contend that it was 
not only its failure that caused the alienation and resistance of tenants but 
also its success. It was only through the universal provision of warm, dry, 
light, spacious, hygienic housing with all the mod cons that residents had the 
minimum satisfaction of basic needs met required for more complex needs 
and desires to seem at all attainable. Whether it was due to its success or 
failure—or both—by the 1970s, campaigns for better council housing were 
becoming commonplace among Corpy tenants, who were gaining in confi-
dence and collective organisation. This was Liverpool’s late ‘Indian Summer’ 
before the long winter fell; a time when unemployment was only 5 per cent, 
residual wealth accrued through colonialism was still circulating and the 
working classes had gained the confidence to challenge the cultural authority 
of the ruling elite. It was the era of rock ’n’ roll and Beat poetry—the 
Beatles, Mersey Beat and the Mersey poets were Liverpool’s own home-
grown talents—the era when the American Beat poet Allen Ginsberg arrived 
in Liverpool (in 1965) and famously declared the city to be “at the present 
moment, the centre of consciousness of the human universe” whilst psycho-
analyst Carl Jung had visited Liverpool previously and recorded a dream about 
it that “Liverpool is the pool of life”.23 Tony Lane again:
In the 1960s Liverpool became the working class capital of the UK. No 
city could have been better equipped to express the brash self-confi-
dence of young working people; the anarchic solidarism of the seafarer 
was just perfect for the temper of the times. This was also the decade 
of shop floor liberation. The yoke of the old autocracy in the trade 
union movement was being lifted and a belief in the virtues of local 
self-government and direct action rippled out into the sleepiest quarters 
of the labour markets.24
In the 1960s, Liverpool gained a reputation for trade union militancy, for 
a distinctively bolshie, anarchic and spontaneous style, an independent-
mindedness and ‘swagger’—gestures that were in many respects inherited 
from the traditional seafaring lifestyle, the casualised nature of work on 
the docks and the influence of anarcho-syndicalism—seeded by Spanish and 
American seafarers during the time of the Spanish Civil War—over more 
22 Tony Lane, “Liverpool—City of Harder Times to Come”, Marxism Today (Nov. 1978): 
336–343 (pp. 338–339).
23 Carl Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Random House, 1961).
24 Lane, “Liverpool—City of Harder Times to Come”, p. 11.
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traditionally socialist labour movement ideologies. These specific forms of 
labour empowerment in the realm of production rippled out to influence the 
community activism that was beginning to emerge in the sphere of social repro-
duction, notably housing. Various rent strikes and marches were organised by 
council tenants angry at the terrible condition of their homes, culminating 
in the intensive strike actions of 1972. Other communities protested against 
being rehoused in the council’s so-called ‘slum clearance programme’; not 
only protecting themselves from displacement to outer estates but also from 
the threat of being split up as a community. 
Some of these protests fuelled what was to become one of the largest 
and most imaginative housing co-operative movements in Britain if not 
Europe—setting in motion an alternative process, led by working-class tenants 
themselves, of building, owning and managing municipal homes. In 1974, 
Colin Ward’s book Tenants Take Over was published and, a few years later, his 
call for ‘collective dweller control’25 was answered by the Weller Street Co-op, 
the country’s first ever new-build housing co-op to be designed, owned and 
managed by its tenants. Whilst the early cooperative movement was focused on 
the rehabilitation of terraced housing and was led largely by idealistic middle 
class professionals, the later waves were focused on new build and were led 
by tenants who worked with professionals, such as architects and development 
managers, in ways which reversed the conventional balance of power between 
these two groups. The historical development of Liverpool’s rehab and the 
new-build co-op movements is the subject of Part II.
A City on (the) Edge?
Liverpool is radical or edgy in another sense, too. It has often been characterised 
as a ‘city on the edge’26 or ‘on the brink’27 of economic collapse and political 
disaster. Liverpool’s rise to major global port and leading cultural light is matched 
only by its swift and brutal decline. As the British Empire rescinded and the 
UK turned away from the Atlantic towards Europe, Liverpool found itself on 
the wrong side of the British Isles to benefit from the growing trade with the 
European Community. Coupled with automation of port activities, thousands of 
jobs on the docks were lost, with huge knock-on effects for ancillary industries. 
From a peak of some 870,000 people at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
city had, by the century’s close, lost over half its population. Unemployment 
was high for those left behind. Capital flight and public divestment blighted 
25 Colin Ward, Tenants Take Over (Architectural Press, 1974).
26 Diane Frost and Peter North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013).
27 Michael Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle against Government Cuts 
(Policy Journals Ltd, 1985).
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housing and the general urban environment. All this was compounded by 
the council’s ‘slum clearance programme’—a policy conceived in Liverpool’s 
late ‘Indian Summer’ period of growth and optimism in which impending 
socioeconomic decline seemed incredible. By removing thousands of the city’s 
working-age population from the inner city to outer estates and new towns, city 
planners unintentionally exacerbated this decline. This created the conditions 
for social unrest and political upheaval. The Toxteth Riots of 1981—sparked by 
up to 90 per cent unemployment rates for young black men coupled with racial 
discrimination against the local black community—were amongst the most 
significant in living memory and suffered one of the most violent repressions by 
police witnessed on mainland Britain.28 All these various factors combined with 
regional stigmatisation to create popular depictions of Liverpool as a ‘basket 
case’, a ‘self-pity city’: “They should build a fence around [Liverpool] and charge 
admission. For sadly, it has become a ‘showcase’ of everything that has gone 
wrong in Britain’s major cities”.29
The Conservative government was torn between two opposing visions 
for Liverpool—equally patronising and propagating of the victim mentality 
stigma that had attached itself to the city and its inhabitants. One was to 
withdraw public investment entirely and let the city sink or swim, through 
a policy of ‘managed decline’; the other was to inject additional resources 
through new top-down, post-democratic, property-led urban policies designed 
to pump-prime the private sector. The latter strategy won out, continuing a 
trend of government policy experimentation in area-based initiatives for which 
Liverpool had for a number of decades been at the forefront. By the mid-1980s, 
however, it was clear that the long line of regeneration experiments conducted 
on the city had each in turn largely failed to counteract socioeconomic decline, 
as Liverpool’s urban policy guru Michael Parkinson argues in Liverpool on the 
Brink:
Since the 1960s, the city has been the recipient, or victim, of 
every urban experiment invented, including Tony Crosland’s educa-
tional priority areas, Jim Callaghan’s traditional urban programme, 
Roy Jenkins’s community development projects, the Home Office’s 
Brunswick neighbourhood project, Peter Walker’s inner area studies, 
Peter Shore’s inner city partnerships, Geoffrey Howe’s enterprise 
zones and Michael Heseltine’s urban development corporation. Two 
decades’ experience of those policies had not substantially improved 
the city’s problems.30
28 Andy Merrifield, “Them and Us: Rebuilding the Ruins in Liverpool”, in Dialectical 
Urbanism (Monthly Review Press, 2002), pp. 53–73.
29 Article in Daily Mirror (11 Oct. 1982), quoted in Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea.
30 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle against Government Cuts, p. 16.
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The real shift in the city’s economic fortunes began not from the top 
down but from the bottom up, with the local election of a left-wing Militant 
Tendency-led Labour-run Council to pursue a radical policy agenda of municipal 
socialism. This involved huge public investment in housing, public services and 
the urban environment, including a massive council house building programme 
in an era when municipal house building nationally had been slowed to a dribble 
by hostile neoliberal reforms. The Militant-led Council also came to blows with 
Thatcher’s government, for spending what was seen to be too much on public 
projects, in setting an ‘illegally’ high budget. Yet it was precisely this municipal 
socialist reinvestment in the city’s infrastructure and public sector job creation 
which arguably31 brought Liverpool, contra the orthodoxy of Michael Parkinson’s 
thesis,32 ‘beyond the brink’ of ruin and kick-started its regeneration, which really 
began to take off in the late 1990s. This was the last gasp of municipal housing 
in the UK before being plunged beneath a powerful neoliberal tide. It remains 
a fascinating period for study, not least for its unique local politics, which saw 
the municipal socialist council turn against its potential ally, the burgeoning 
co-operative movement. In the council’s policy of ‘municipalisation’, housing 
co-ops in development were taken into council control and all future projects 
were foreclosed. The ideological origins of this battle between municipal and 
cooperative approaches, state-socialist and democratic-socialist conceptions 
of providing public housing—and how the battle was concluded—are the 
issues closing Part II. Municipalisation spurred on one co-op campaign group 
in particular, known as the Eldonians, to go further with their aspirations to 
become a ‘self-regenerating community’. Now characterised as an exemplar 
of ‘social innovation’,33 attracting policy tourists from all over the world, the 
Eldonians turned around their fortunes through forging alliances with some 
unlikely bedfellows—the Thatcher government and Minister for Merseyside 
Michael Heseltine’s Task Force—to challenge successfully the Militant-led 
council. Their struggle against all odds to build the Eldonian Village out of their 
derelict ex-industrial neighbourhood is the main subject of Part III.
A City Playing the Urban Regeneration Game
Although Militant arguably did more than the Minister for Merseyside to reverse 
Liverpool’s fortunes, it was the approach instated by the Urban Development 
Corporation and Task Force that gained most traction amongst policymakers and 
31 Frost and North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge.
32 Michael Parkinson, Liverpool Beyond the Brink: The Remaking of a Post-Imperial City 
(Liverpool University Press, 2019).
33 Peter Roberts, “Social Innovation, Spatial Transformation and Sustainable Communities: 
Liverpool and the ‘Eldonians’”, in Paul Drewe, Juan-Luis Klein and Edward Hulsbergen, 
eds, The Challenge of Social Innovation in Urban Revitalization (Techne Press, 2008).
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politicians, who have since pursued a succession of regeneration programmes 
aimed at boosting the city’s image, attracting inward investment and resolving 
the multiple deprivations that remain a drag on economic recovery and growth. 
Regeneration has become almost a self-generating industry in Liverpool—the 
first to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of its maritime economy. Some 
local academics and commentators go so far as to suggest Liverpool’s contem-
porary economy is primarily geared around the so-called ‘regeneration game’:
Liverpool’s vivid socio-economic and environmental degradation, 
alongside its rich cultural capital and architectural legacies (often seen 
as being at risk), has given momentum to intensive processes of “regen-
eration”, latterly drawing upon large sums of national and European 
Union monies. Ahead of many other urban localities, processes 
of regeneration have led to the formation of new semi-permanent 
governance frameworks, involving multi-level “collaborative milieus” 
of local, regional and national institutions. “Regeneration” has become 
the city’s dominant, if seldom quantified or questioned, objective.34
Liverpool went through the post-industrial transition ahead of the curve; it 
also, rather interestingly, appears to have carved out its own niche in this very 
space, as a city that specialises in regeneration. The next round of compre-
hensive redevelopment of the city’s ageing housing stock was, therefore, 
a very different beast from the urban renewal of the 1960s, despite very 
much embodying the latter’s scale and ambition. With the Housing Market 
Renewal programme of the 2000s, Liverpool once again found itself at the 
centre of academic and policy debate over the management and renewal of 
public housing. By the late 1990s, like many of its post-industrial northern 
counterparts, the city was suffering with what policymakers diagnosed as 
an oversupply of terraced housing (see Figure 1)—some in public ownership 
or in the hands of housing associations; much of it privately owned. Their 
solution was a large-scale housing renewal programme that was to provoke, 
much like the ‘slum clearance programme’ of the 1960s, serious opposition 
amongst some of the communities targeted for ‘demolition and rebuild’. A 
few of these activist groups were galvanised by successful defence of their 
housing to experiment with the latest collective housing alternative, the CLT 
model, which had been imported to Britain from the USA where it was first 
devised as an institutional solution for redistribution of rural property and 
black empowerment in the Deep South. Thus Liverpool became one of the first 
places in the UK—alongside London—to witness the emergence of distinctly 
urban CLTs that challenged the demolition of terraced housing and sought to 
revitalise urban neighbourhoods. The logic, operation and impacts of Housing 
34 Sykes, Brown, Cocks et al., “A City Profile of Liverpool”, p. 300.
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Figure 1 Dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhood abandonment in 
Liverpool 8 in 2015.
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Market Renewal on Liverpool’s inner city, and the development of successful 
(and failed) campaigns for CLT alternatives is the subject of Part IV.
Structure of the Book
Just as Engels provided a rich description of the terrible housing conditions 
afflicting Liverpool in the early days of capitalist urbanisation, his seminal 
work The Housing Question provides the perfect point of departure for struc-
turing this book. Those vivid scenes he painted of Liverpool in The Condition 
of the Working Class in England no doubt informed his later work. Although 
written around a century and a half ago, this still provides a serious challenge 
for any political project pursuing a housing commons via collective alterna-
tives to public ownership, or, indeed, any intellectual project seeking to 
understand it. The housing question resurfaced once more in the 1970s in a 
debate between John F.C. Turner and his Marxist critics over the commodity 
value of housing.35 Today, the housing question is yet again being reconsidered 
by critical geographers eager to highlight how changing capitalist dynamics 
make much of Engels’ thesis moot and put a different, more optimistic spin 
on the potential of collective alternatives to provide a radical reformist path 
towards its possible resolution.36 Most importantly, the housing question 
has been reinterpreted and expanded beyond the walls of housing into the 
urban sphere by various neo-Marxist scholars who have sought new ways of 
reflecting on the evolution of capitalism. The most famous statement in this 
regard is The Urban Question by Manuel Castells, a former student of Lefebvre’s, 
highlighting the new power of ‘the urban’ in the post-war period as a site of 
collective consumption, resistance and political change.37 Engels had seen the 
housing crisis as a mere secondary contradiction of capitalism, owing to the 
fact that only at the point of production, in the factory, is surplus value created 
by workers and in turn extracted by capitalists—the primary contradiction 
35 Dennis Conway, “Self-Help Housing, the Commodity Nature of Housing and 
Amelioration of the Housing Deficit: Continuing the Turner-Burgess Debate”, Antipode 
14.2 (1982): 40–46.
36 Neil Gray, “Spatial Composition and the Urbanization of Capital: The 1915 Glasgow 
Rent Strikes and the Housing Question Reconsidered”, in Neil Gray, ed., Rent and Its 
Discontents: A Century of Housing Struggle (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 49–67; Tim 
Joubert and Stuart Hodkinson, “Beyond the Rent Strike, Towards the Commons: Why 
the Housing Question Requires Activism That Generates Its Own Alternatives”, in Neil 
Gray, ed., Rent and Its Discontents: A Century of Housing Struggle (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2018), pp. 185–200; Udi Engelsman, Mike Rowe and Alan Southern, “Community Land 
Trusts—A Radical or Reformist Response to the Housing Question Today?”, ACME: An 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 15.3 (2016): 590–615; David Madden and 
Peter Marcuse, In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis (Verso, 2016).
37 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (MIT Press, 1977).
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understood as the original alienation of workers from the fruits of their 
labour. As capitalism advanced, production per se became less important in 
relation to consumption as a site of value realisation and struggle. Later, as 
neoliberalism took hold, financialisation intensified, with land and property 
becoming a spatial fix to capitalist crises in productive sectors. In The New 
Urban Question, Andy Merrifield, building on the work of Lefebvre, Castells as 
well as his own doctoral supervisor David Harvey,38 has sought to update the 
Marxist analysis of the urban to reflect the increasingly central role land and 
property has to play in capital accumulation.39 Housing is placed centre-stage 
in this unfolding drama.
This Marxist history of capitalist urbanisation—and the changing role 
of housing within it—provides a useful background framing for exploring 
Liverpool’s history of collective housing alternatives. The empirical body 
of the book is structured into three parts—the Housing Question, the 
Neighbourhood Question and the Urban Question. Each deals with a different 
period in this history and each, respectively, with a different collective housing 
model: co-operatives (both rehab and new-build movements) in the 1970s; 
community development trusts (the Eldonians) in the 1980s; and, post-2000, 
community land trusts. These models can be seen as the most appropriate 
response to the issues of their time. There is also a progression through 
geographic scale—from a focus on housing to the neighbourhood and, finally, 
to the wider scale of the urban. This reflects the way in which the housing 
question has evolved with new questions thrown up in each era by Marxist 
urbanists each taking Engels as their departure point. Each part is split into 
two broad sections: the first introductory chapter of each part addresses more 
theoretical issues (chapters 3, 7 and 10), acting as a lens through which to 
explore the empirical history in the more substantial following chapters.
Part II, ‘The Housing Question’, opens with the original problems posed 
by Engels and aims to address these through an examination of more recent 
neo-Marxist theory and anarchist thought on the nature of the state, capitalism, 
value, housing and social change. I begin my empirical history in the late 1960s, 
with the re-emergence of anarchist ideas in housing and their influence in 
Liverpool through the work of John F.C. Turner and Colin Ward, who can be 
seen as the anarchist descendants of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Engels’ principal 
interlocutor in The Housing Question. Their ideas—particularly on user autonomy 
and collective dweller control—had purchase in a budding co-op movement 
that had grown from a small professional-led project centred on rehabilitating 
inner-city terraced housing to an increasingly resident-led movement for 
designing, developing and building new bespoke co-op housing, funded by the 
state and supported by co-op development agencies. The social, economic and 
38 David Harvey, Limits to Capital (Verso Books, 2007).
39 Andy Merrifield, The New Urban Question (Pluto Press, 2014).
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political roots of this movement—and its outcomes—comprise the main subject 
of chapters 4 and 5. The Engels–Proudhon debate also acts as a precursor 
to the not-dissimilar antagonism that would later arise between Liverpool’s 
co-operative movement and the Trotskyist Militant council administration’s 
municipal socialist project, explored in chapter 6, which bookends Part II.
Part III primarily explores what I call the ‘Neighbourhood Question’. Uneven 
urban development has become a central preoccupation of Marxist urbanists and 
critical geographers since the economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s, 
with the crisis of Fordism and ascendance of neoliberal globalisation, impacted 
heavily upon old industrial cities such as Liverpool. Here, economic decline has 
not been evenly distributed but spatially concentrated in certain areas, which 
various state-led urban programmes have sought (in vain) to regenerate. In 
The Housing Question, Engels presciently analysed the way in which ‘bourgeois 
reformist’ attempts to revitalise deprived urban neighbourhoods through state 
intervention would simply displace the problem—deprivation arising from 
capitalist exploitation—elsewhere in the city and the planet. The Neighbourhood 
Question thus describes the knot of economic and social problems produced by 
uneven urban development and coalescing around the scale of the neighbourhood 
and which cannot easily be resolved through conventional economic devel-
opment or regeneration policies. Collective housing alternatives, however, might 
provide an answer. Chapters 8 and 9 explore the efforts of one such alternative, 
the Eldonian Community Development Trust, to regenerate their blighted, 
ex-industrial neighbourhood in a local context of political infighting between the 
municipal socialist council and the housing co-operative movement.
By the late 1990s, Liverpool’s neighbourhood question had mutated into 
the symptomatic spread of empty homes and even neighbourhood abandonment 
in declining inner-city areas suffering depopulation (see Figure 1)—but was 
also in some sense produced by regeneration programmes and the perverse 
incentives written into urban policy funding regimes. Part IV, ‘The Urban 
Question’, explores two alternative approaches to tackling this issue. The first, 
Housing Market Renewal (HMR), originated as a ‘grant regime’ between 
public and private partners aiming to revalorise urban space and capitalise on 
the state funding made available to stimulate new economic growth. This, I 
argue in chapter 10, is an example of the most recent period in capitalism’s 
evolution towards the commodification and financialisation of urban land as a 
site of capital accumulation. In its narrow focus on house type and the housing 
market, without casting its vision any wider to socioeconomic structures, 
HMR, I argue, commits a kind of housing fetishism that is symptomatic of the 
way in which policymakers tend to treat housing as a noun rather than a verb. 
If ever there was an example of an “isolated solution to the housing question”, 
in Engels’ terminology, this is it. 
The second approach to tackling empty homes arose as a reaction to the 
demolitions and dispossessions entailed by the first, developing into the CLT 
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movement we see emerging in Liverpool today—the subject of chapters 11 
and 12. The CLT campaigns are attempting to produce and protect an urban 
commons—and not just a housing commons—in their expanded focus on 
community enterprise, public space, food growing and cultural activities as 
well as affordable homes. They also hope to act as an arena for democratic 
encounter between members of the wider community as well as residents 
and therefore possess something distinctly urban about them. Part IV, then, 
narrates a battle between two opposing visions of the urban question—the 
question of how to remake urban spaces and cities for people over profit in the 
context of capitalist restructuring and uneven urban development. 
Finally, in the concluding Part V, I attempt to bring all these issues 
together and consider the prospects for systematically institutionalising 
collective housing alternatives. Although this book is focused on Liverpool—a 
city of deep contradictions, where things seem to happen for the first time, 
both good and bad; a city where the most dystopian and utopian realities 
appear side by side, often in the very same phenomena, a city providing the 
(im)perfect testbed for the development and study of collective housing alter-
natives—this book is also about transcending the particularisms of people and 
place to find generalisable lessons for the development of collective alterna-
tives to state-socialist and market-capitalist approaches to dwelling. Although 
this book is focused on the past, it thus looks to the future. The potential of 
collective housing alternatives is to enact a different way of organising dwelling 
to the public–private binary with which we currently live. In this sense, much 
like the utopian-socialist experiments that inspired the early cooperative 
movement and, so too, like the modernist visions that informed the devel-
opment of municipal housing, this book is about utopia—but not some utopia 
out there, some ‘non place’ in the distant future. Rather, it is concerned with 
tracing the outlines of what the late Marxist sociologist Erik Olin Wright 
called ‘real utopias’40—those already existing housing commons in the here 
and now which might just, at the turn of unforeseen political events, gain 
enough traction to create substantive structural transformation. In answer to 
Engel’s bipolarised dilemma between all-out insurrectionary revolution and 
mere reformism, this book attempts to tread a cautious path between these 
poles: a ‘radical reformism’, of the like that post-Marxist Chantal Mouffe 
envisions41—a most transformative reformism working within our political-
economic coordinates, slowly and patiently, sometimes through rupture, to 
transform their shape into something else entirely.
40 Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (Verso, 2010).
41 Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (Verso, 2018).
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Revisiting the Housing Question
3: Revisiting the Housing Question
Modernity, it seems, is exemplified not so much by the business 
park or the airport, but by the dilapidated dwelling. This is 
especially odd given that dwellings constitute the greater part 
of the built environment, that they are the spaces where most 
people spend most of their time, and where what is arguably the 
‘real’ work of society is done.1
In his essay and film of the same name, The Dilapidated Dwelling, psychogeog-
rapher Patrick Keiller asks why housing is so much more visibly run-down and 
relatively dilapidated than the retail units, corporate offices and business parks 
that constitute commercial property. He notes that domestic property—what 
he calls ‘old space’ in contrast to corporate ‘new space’—is in the UK the 
oldest and most underinvested in Europe, at an average age of 60 years, but 
that this discrepancy is by no means a uniquely British disease. Capitalism 
appears to favour investment in spaces of production over spaces of social 
reproduction despite, as Keiller curiously points out, the latter being “where 
what is arguably the ‘real’ work of society is done”. 
Is this really that surprising? Marxist critics would contend that capital 
always flows where there is profit to be made, and that some relative underin-
vestment in our domestic spaces compared with commercial spaces is therefore 
to be expected. Marx and Engels were amongst the original antagonists in 
the drama of capitalism but, whilst they may be its staunchest, they are by 
no means its earliest detractors. As the coordinates of the capitalist mode of 
production began to reveal themselves amidst the upheavals of enclosure and 
industrialisation in northern Europe, thinkers of various political stripes set 
forth their gripes. Not least amongst them were the early utopian-socialists 
such as Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Henri de Saint-Simon and 
Robert Owen who imagined and experimented with new ways of living in 
what we might now call intentional communities or anarchist communes. 
1 Patrick Keiller, “The Dilapidated Dwelling”, in The View from the Train: Cities and Other 
Landscapes (Verso Books, 2013), pp. 51–63 (p. 54).
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These were perhaps the first examples of collective housing alternatives in the 
modern age. Marx and particularly Engels were quick to denounce them as 
naïve and utopian—‘utopia’ was of course a concept coined by Thomas More 
in his 1516 work of the same name to denote a ‘good place’ but whose Greek 
roots also connote ‘no place’, suggesting Utopia was a satire about the impos-
sibility of materialising any utopian vision.2
In The Housing Question, Engels famously derided the anarchist Proudhon and 
his followers as mere ‘bourgeois reformists’ and ‘practical socialists’ working 
in vain to improve the lot of the working class through self-help experiments 
but failing to take account of the structural dynamics of capitalism. Thus 
the housing question under capitalism was framed by Engels as a debate torn 
between, on the one hand, a Marxist argument that claims “the solution lies 
in the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of 
all the means of life and labour by the working class itself ”3 and, on the other, 
an anarchist argument ascribed to Proudhon that contends that small-scale 
collective initiatives in which new forms of social organisation are tested out in 
the here and now through incremental grassroots experimentation can reform 
capitalist-state structures from within. Like Marx, Engels saw “the housing 
shortage from which the workers and part of the petty bourgeoisie suffer in our 
modern big cities” as just “one of the numerous smaller, secondary evils which 
result from the present-day capitalist mode of production”.4 In other words, 
the ‘evils’ suffered by tenants at the hand of profit-maximising landlords is 
just a symptom—a refracted displacement—of a more fundamental relation of 
exploitation between workers and capitalists. Proudhon, however, equated the 
tenant–landlord relation with the labour–capital relation such that, in Engels’ 
caricature, “As the wage worker in relation to the capitalist, so is the tenant 
in relation to the house owner”, which Engels declared “totally untrue”.5 With 
such assertions the debate commenced between radical-revolutionary and 
bourgeois-reformist solutions to the housing question and, by extension, the 
social question of how to transform society as a whole; digging within social 
theory and political activism a seemingly insurmountable chasm between 
structural processes and experimental action, between structure and agency.
The housing question has resounded down the decades. A strikingly similar 
debate emerged in the 1970s between John F.C. Turner6—an intellectual 
heir of Proudhon who will reappear later through his links to the Liverpool 
2 Benoît Godin, “Social Innovation: Utopias of Innovation from c.1830 to the Present”, 
Project on the Intellectual History of Innovation 11 (2012): 1–52.
3 Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question (Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 73–74.
4 Engels, The Housing Question, p. 19.
5 Engels, The Housing Question, p. 21.
6 John F.C. Turner, “Housing in Three Dimensions: Terms of Reference for the Housing 
Question Redefined”, World Development 6.9–10 (1978): 1135–1145.
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co-ops—and structuralist Marxists such as Rod Burgess.7 Engels and co. may 
be right to deduce that no exploitation as such occurs at the point of rent 
extraction, for tenants do not produce surplus value to be expropriated in the 
way that workers do. Logically it then follows that capitalism cannot be trans-
formed by reforming the tenant–landlord relation even if rent extraction is 
eliminated through collective control of land and housing, for capital would still 
reign supreme in production, including of housing. In turn, all attempts to do so 
appear to underestimate the deep penetration of capital into global production 
processes and therefore commit a kind of technological determinism in 
believing that small-scale user-led models can flourish independently, let alone 
challenge, the logic of capital. From such an uncompromisingly structuralist 
view, the fundamental conflict between capital and labour is the bottom line as 
to why—in answer to Keiller’s conundrum in The Dilapidated Dwelling—“one 
can perhaps discern a general tendency … that under advanced capitalism it is 
increasingly difficult to produce and maintain the dwelling”.8
Despite its apparent internal consistency, the Marxist argument nonetheless 
begins with some partial basic assumptions about social reality—assumptions 
which have since divided anarchists and Marxists alike. Here opened schisms—
at least four—between opposing perspectives of looking at the same thing: 
at the primary contradictions of capitalism; at the nature of social change; 
the nature of value itself; and the role of land in capitalism. These arguments 
provoked by the housing question about the role and value of housing in 
capitalism and social change are an illuminating way to frame the historical 
development of the cooperative housing movement in Liverpool. Before 
tracing this history and evaluating the impact of collective housing alternatives 
it is useful, therefore, to understand the import of these arguments.
The fourth issue listed above—the growing importance of land and 
property in the process of capital accumulation—presents a major challenge 
to Engels’ framing such that housing, and political interventions within it, 
are increasingly intrinsic to the present functioning and future viability of 
capitalism, phenomena not yet apparent to Engels when he was writing. This 
is a historical shift that has occurred over the past half century that sees 
The Housing Question reformulated by neo-Marxist scholars first as The Urban 
Question9 and more recently as The New Urban Question10—a history I explore in 
more depth in Part IV, thus entitled the Urban Question. In the remainder of 
7 Rod Burgess, “The Limits of State Self-Help Housing Programmes”, Development and 
Change 16.2 (1985): 271–312; Rod Burgess, “Petty Commodity Housing or Dweller 
Control? A Critique of John Turner’s Views on Housing Policy”, World Development 6.9–10 
(1978): 1105–1133.
8 Keiller, “The Dilapidated Dwelling”, p. 54.
9 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (MIT Press, 1977).
10 Andy Merrifield, The New Urban Question (Pluto Press, 2014).
Part II: The Housing Question48
this chapter I address each of the other three issues in turn as a way to frame 
the development of co-operative housing in Liverpool.
Nouns and Verbs: On the Nature of Value
Perhaps the most fundamental of issues within this debate is the nature of 
value. Put simply, this amounts to exchange versus use value—or value versus 
values. Value in the singular describes exchange value made equivalent as a 
quantitative measurement to define how something is worth more or less than 
other things. Values—in the plural—implies multiple use values and principles 
that are irreducible, not easily reduced to a quantifiable form of equivalence 
for exchange. Whilst Marx was a rigorously dialectical thinker and showed 
how any commodity, including housing, contains both use and exchange values 
simultaneously, there is a sense in which he limits his analysis of value to only 
that of the commodity form, the social relation of exchange value, in that he 
admits “use values as such lie outside of the sphere of investigation of political 
economy”.11 This means that the housing crisis is seen narrowly as a problem of 
material deprivation within a totalising system of capitalism. Turner, however, 
draws our attention to the double ontological status of dwelling as both a noun 
and verb: as an active lived process of doing as well as a static material object 
in which to invest or to trade.12 Whilst the market conceives of housing as a 
material object to be bought and sold, residents see their homes as a means 
for dwelling.
Whilst this dialectical perspective of seeing value from two opposing 
vantage points—use and exchange, value and values—is relatively simple to 
hold in the mind’s eye, it gets much trickier to grasp when pondering from 
where value derives. Marx and Engels arguably subscribed to some rendition 
of the labour theory of value—the theory that value is produced primarily 
by acts of human labour to transform nature into useful products that can 
then be used or traded. Although he acknowledged that ultimately value 
must derive from the free gifts of nature, Marx held that it is the creative 
process of applying human labour—imagination, innovation, knowledge, skill, 
techniques, tools—to natural materials that produces or creates the value that 
is then (erroneously) deemed to inhere in desirable objects that meet human 
needs. Their use value to humans makes such objects precious commodities 
that thereby take on exchange value in being traded for other commodities. 
In this production process, value is seen to be ‘produced’ by labourers in the 
workplace, for this is where the value that workers create through their labour 
11 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (International Publishers, 
1970), p. 413.
12 John F.C. Turner, “Housing as a Verb”, in John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter, eds, 
Freedom to Build (Collier Macmillan, 1972), pp. 148–175.
3: Revisiting the Housing Question 49
is extracted by capitalists as ‘surplus value’, from which is derived the profit 
that motivates capitalists and drives the system. Here, the production of value 
is conflated with the production process itself. 
One of the absurd distortions of capitalism, anarchist anthropologist 
David Graeber is fond of reminding us,13 is in privileging the production 
of objects over the (re)production of human beings. He demonstrates how 
value has come to be conflated with production, even seeping into the way in 
which we describe the production of human beings as ‘going into labour’.14 
Graeber points to a bifurcation in society between ‘productive labour’ and 
‘caring labour’—the former associated with factories and manufacturing 
where surplus value is produced by ever greater efficiencies and technological 
innovation; the latter with ‘unproductive’ domestic and civic spaces where 
education, health, entertainment and the general maintenance of living spaces 
and communities is performed to enable the so-called ‘real’ productive labour 
of society. However, as robots and machines threaten to automate most 
productive jobs in society, it seems likely that the majority of employment will 
switch into caring jobs that produce and reproduce human beings rather than 
commodities. A major component of that task is, of course, housing.
Recall Keiller’s consternation at the relative dilapidation of old space 
vis-à-vis new space despite the fact that this is where the ‘real work’ of society 
is performed. Feminist thinkers on the commons such as Silvia Federici and 
J.K. Gibson-Graham have long argued that domestic labour in the home and 
community activity in the neighbourhood comprise the hidden and unpaid yet 
real productive labour of society, in creating and reproducing the conditions 
for all other production to occur.15 This is memorably referred to as capital-
ism’s ‘hidden abode’.16 The fundamental though often overlooked importance 
of daily and generational renewal of human life for capitalist (re)production 
is the subject of ‘social reproduction theory’, an influential and recently 
reinvigorated school of thought in Marxist Feminism.17 Social reproduction is 
not just domestic labour for the sake of capital accumulation—the basic daily 
reproduction of labour power—as important as that is; it also means those 
familial relationships and social interactions, emotional bonding and cultural 
creation, caregiving and education, collective joy and festivity that together 
13 David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own 
Dreams (Palgrave, 2001).
14 David Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (Allen Lane, 2018).
15 Silvia Federici, Re-Enchanting the World: Feminism and the Politics of the Commons (PM 
Press, 2019); J.K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique 
of Political Economy (Blackwell, 1996).
16 Nancy Fraser, “Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode”, New Left Review 86 (2014).
17 See Tithi Bhattacharya, ed., Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering 
Oppression (Pluto Press, 2017).
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constitute and continually reproduce society across households and genera-
tions—and imbues life with meaning and (social) value. To the question of 
where value is really produced in society—in the workplace, at the point of 
production, or in the home and the street through social reproduction—the 
answer hinges on what we, so to speak, value as value. If we privilege the 
value inhering in the labour–capital relation—i.e. valuable products and 
assets—then we might well subscribe to the traditional Marxist view. If, 
however, we foreground the social values of being human and dwelling 
together in societies then it is the production of human beings and cultural 
practices—rather than commodities—that really count. Marxists, of course, 
would counter that none of this changes the fact that under capitalism housing 
is still produced as a commodity however much it is valued in other ways. 
As I explore below, their interlocutors question whether seeing the world 
primarily through exchange value—reading the world through the language 
of capitalism—can ever be the most effective way to transform it.
Exploitation and Alienation: On the Contradictions of Capitalism
Moving onto the second issue, the Engels–Proudhon debate anticipated a 
break that would re-emerge decades later within Marxism over the relative 
importance of different ‘moments’ in the capitalist process of production, 
distribution and consumption of goods like housing. In broadly subscribing 
to the labour theory of value Marx and Engels held that the labour–capital 
relation remains the primary contradiction of capitalism, for this is where 
surplus value is extracted by capitalists—representing a kind of theft, a 
discrepancy at the centre of the system, an instance of the central Marxist 
term ‘contradiction’. Marx’s genius was in seeing how the “capital-relation 
presupposes a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of 
the conditions for the realisation of their labour”18—workers who, in being 
separated from each other and alienated from the fruits of their labour, were 
“now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another”.19 
In short, he identified the distinctively modern condition of alienation that lies 
at the heart of capitalism and its contradictions.
In reaction to exploitation in the workplace, various social movements 
arose to resist and find alternative solutions—what collective action scholars 
refer to as the ‘first modern cycle of contention’.20 This began in 1848, the 
year Marx and Engels published their revolutionary call to arms, The Communist 
18 Karl Marx, Capital: Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (Penguin Classics, 1990), 
pp. 874–875.
19 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, ed. Martin Nicolaus 
(Penguin, 1973), p. 164. 
20 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge 
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Manifesto, when the gradual growth of socialist organisation out of localised 
factory-based associations eventually erupted into self-organised revolt, most 
famously in the Paris Commune. From there, the movement split into various 
anarchist, communist and social-democratic strands, eventually absorbed and 
institutionalised into state-capitalist ensembles through the successful incor-
poration of worker demands into better working conditions and the formation 
of formal political parties and trade unions which represented and organised 
action on behalf of the working class. 
It was in this era that radical ideas around mutualism and cooperativism gained 
traction. Heir to medieval mutualist traditions of guilds, brotherhoods and civic 
associations, these movements were later enriched by the utopian philosophies of 
the likes of Proudhon and also socialist ideas emerging in the workers’ syndicalist 
and communist movements to innovate new forms of economic organisation such as 
worker-owned cooperatives. The thrust of the modern cooperative movement—
as originally articulated by the Rochdale Pioneers in northern England—is for 
economic democracy: from collective ownership of tools and workplaces to 
democratic management of the production process to equitable distribution of 
surpluses. These ideas soon spread from the sphere of production into distri-
bution and consumption—creating the consumer co-ops we are most familiar 
with today—and into the domain of social reproduction more broadly, notably 
housing. In the following decades, the innovation of various new legal instru-
ments—building societies, credit unions, tenant co-partnerships,21 co-ownership 
societies, non-mutual housing co-ops and common ownership co-ops—helped 
construct the institutional architecture for the (more or less) democratic ownership 
and organisation of housing. Although they had an enduring political impact, 
cooperatives were by the early twentieth century overshadowed and marginalised 
by monopoly capital and the welfare state, through the introduction of mass 
production techniques and the municipal provision of social necessities. 
Although the rise of bureaucratic state management of housing and other 
basic needs had, by the post-war period, alleviated the worst material depri-
vation wrought by capitalism, new forms of alienation were becoming apparent. 
Rather than emerging in the workplace, at the point of production, these forms 
of alienation were located in cultural and political spheres. Henri Lefebvre, 
like other leading lights of the New Left, criticised Marx for limiting his 
analysis to the economic sphere and the commodity form; for not seeing the 
effects of alienation in the political and cultural spheres of bureaucratic state 
power and the quantification, calculability and managed spectacle creeping 
University Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to Revolution (Longman Higher 
Education, 1978).
21 Tenant co-partnerships were incorporated with garden suburbs, including Wavertree 
in Liverpool; see Johnston Birchall, “Co-Partnership Housing and the Garden City 
Movement”, Planning Perspectives 10.4 (1995).
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into everyday life.22 Lefebvre was one of a number of New Left thinkers who 
provided some theoretical inspiration for the uprisings of 1968, particularly 
in and around Paris. In the multiplication of ‘secondary fronts’ of resistance, 
in the various movements from anti-racism to feminism, environmentalism to 
anti-colonialism, direct expropriation of surplus value through enforced wage 
labour—exploitation—was no longer always the prime target. These diverse 
political movements were all nonetheless responding to some form of exclusion 
from social life, which neo-Marxists began to re-theorise as secondary contra-
dictions of capital, displaced from the workplace into the sphere of collective 
consumption and everyday life.23 In shifting political focus away from the 
primary contradiction of capitalism in production and towards these secondary 
fronts in the realm of social reproduction, the organising concept of struggle and 
critical analysis, exploitation, was displaced by alienation, acting as a “‘coagulant’ 
making it possible to [consider] the unity of these various struggles”.24 
In post-war attempts to resolve the housing question, Lefebvre identified 
alienation in the discursive shift from ‘residence’ to ‘housing’, replacing a more 
active, personal process with clinical abstraction: 
It was at this juncture that the idea of housing began to take on definition, 
along with its corollaries: minimal living-space, as quantified in terms 
of modular units and speed of access; likewise minimal facilities and a 
programmed environment. What was actually being defined here … 
was the lowest possible threshold of tolerability. Later, in the present 
century, slums began to disappear.25 
As the modernist state began to eliminate the worst conditions brought about 
by capitalist urbanisation (through ‘slum clearances’ and the construction of 
council estates, new towns and the subsidisation of private suburban housing), 
this was, however, paid for through the imposition of standardised units 
measured according to the ‘bare minimum’ of acceptable standards, both in 
terms of material tolerability and the “lowest possible threshold of sociability—
the point beyond which survival would be impossible because all social life 
would have disappeared”.26 
22 Japhy Wilson, “‘The Devastating Conquest of the Lived by the Conceived’: The 
Concept of Abstract Space in the Work of Henri Lefebvre”, Space and Culture 16.3 (2013): 
364–380.
23 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, vol. 2 (Verso, 2002); Castells, The Urban 
Question: A Marxist Approach.
24 Razmig Keucheyan, The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today, ed. Gregory 
Elliott (Verso, 2013), p. 37.
25 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Blackwell, 1991), p. 314.
26 Lefebvre, The Production of Space.
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Only once the conditions created by technocratic state-capitalism were 
fully realised, and beginning to be challenged in this ‘second modern cycle 
of contention’, did mutualism and cooperativism experience a revival. The 
original cooperative principles enshrined by the Rochdale Pioneers in 1844 
were reinvigorated in 1966 when the International Co-operative Alliance 
ratified its five principles: (1) open and voluntary membership; (2) democratic 
control; (3) fair distribution of economic results according to labour or 
consumption rather than capital ownership; (4) education in cooperation; (5) 
cooperation between co-ops.27 This was the era when the housing cooper-
ative movement fledged the nest and really took off. Its two wings were a 
more bourgeois-bohemian, lifestyle-libertarian movement associated with 
intentional communities such as squats and communes, and more working-
class, place-based and community-led resistance to the alienation of council 
housing and the displacements of top-down municipal urban renewal. This 
was supported by an undercurrent of professional interest in an alternative 
policy solution for managing deteriorating public housing stock via a nascent 
voluntary housing association sector. It is the combined force of these latter 
two that are most significant for what would occur in Liverpool amongst other 
British cities, notably London and Glasgow, through the 1970s. 
The co-op movement coincided and collided with several other, related 
trends in housing. First, self-help housing—defined today as “local people 
bringing back into use empty properties, and organising whatever repairs 
are necessary to make them habitable”28—drew on a long tradition in Britain 
of self-build or do-it-yourself techniques by commoners, cotters, squatters, 
plotlanders, homesteaders and rehabilitators of inner-city terraces.29 The insti-
tutional precursors to community self-help were building societies founded in 
the nineteenth century as temporary organisations for working-class families 
collectively to pool resources to build homes. Another influence came from 
the global South, particularly Latin America, where ‘barefoot architect’ John 
F.C. Turner first witnessed user autonomy in practice in the self-organised 
‘autoconstruction’ of informal settlements.30 The influence of Turner’s ideas 
in British inner cities in the 1970s was palpable—not least in Liverpool. 
This was the era of ‘grassroots professionals’ and ‘architecture without archi-
tects’ and became known (in often derisory terms) within the architectural 
27 Johnston Birchall, Building Communities the Co-operative Way (Routledge, 1988), p. 176.
28 David Mullins, “Self-Help Housing: Could It Play a Greater Role?”, Third Sector 
Research Centre, Working Paper 11 (2010), p. 3.
29 Colin Ward, Cotters and Squatters: The Hidden History of Housing (Five Leaves 
Publications, 2002).
30 John F.C. Turner, Housing by People: Toward Autonomy in Building Environments (Pantheon 
Books, 1977).
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profession as the ‘community architecture’ movement.31 This represented a 
shift from highly institutionalised, professionalised and technical forms of 
modernist housing knowledge—attacked as elitist—towards vernacular and 
quotidian styles designed by users themselves through new participatory design 
processes. 
In this context, a number of writers and activists helped channel and give 
shape to the grievances with modernist urban planning and municipal housing 
being voiced by communities. Among them were Jane Jacobs32 and anarchists 
such as Robert Goodman33 and Colin Ward, known rather paradoxically as 
the ‘anarchist planner’. Ward identified a tendency towards bureaucratic pater-
nalism and alienation in public landlordism, which he believed treats tenants 
like ‘inert objects’ rather than active subjects. He argued that this ‘municipal 
serfdom’ was responsible for the swift physical dilapidation of council 
housing estates,34 which in turn contributed to the rationale for their residu-
alisation—the decline from mainstream to an increasingly residual tenure 
of last resort—and replacement with marketised social housing. Central to 
this perspective is the idea that housing delivered through impersonal state 
bureaucracies—and private sector ‘absentee landlords’—alienates dwellers 
from their immediate living environments, thereby failing to instil any real 
sense of ownership or pride and removing all obvious incentives to care for 
and maintain the property. Crucially, this severs the psychologically health-
giving and spiritually fulfilling direct connection with the home, so important 
for a sense of personal meaning, empowerment and self-identity. Anarchist 
philosopher Paul Goodman’s ideas on the ‘organism–environment field’ are 
influential in all this: he emphasised the importance of direct engagement and 
interaction between the self and its immediate environment for health and 
well-being, personal growth and meaningful living.35
This holistic view of dwelling is shared by diverse philosophical positions—
from those anarchist positions outlined above to more conservative perspectives 
concerned with the privacy of dwelling.36 For existentialist and phenomeno-
logical philosopher (and Nazi sympathiser) Martin Heidegger, dwelling is the 
very embodiment of what makes us human: “to be a human being means to 
be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell”, such that “Man’s relation to 
locales, and through locales to space, inheres in his dwelling. The relationship 
31 Nick Wates and Charles Knevitt, Community Architecture: How People Are Creating Their 
Own Environment (Penguin Books, 1987).
32 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Vintage Books, 1961).
33 Robert Goodman, After the Planners (Simon & Schuster, 1972).
34 Colin Ward, When We Build Again: Let’s Have Housing That Works! (Pluto Press, 1985).
35 Carissa Honeywell, “Utopianism and Anarchism”, Journal of Political Ideologies 12.3 
(2007): 239–254.
36 Peter King, Private Dwelling: Contemplating the Use of Housing (Routledge, 2004). 
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between man and space is none other than dwelling”.37 In his exploration of 
the notion of dwelling, Heidegger asked “what is the state of dwelling in our 
precarious age?”—highlighting the housing shortage afflicting early twentieth-
century Germany—yet rejoinders that “the proper plight of dwelling does not lie 
merely in a lack of houses”.38 Heidegger affirmed that dwelling is an essential 
activity for humans: necessarily including the narrower sense of ‘building’—
the dual activities of cultivation of the land and construction of dwellings—but 
also a fuller, more expansive sense of dwelling through the richness of lived 
experience, in the way in which humans dwell poetically in place.39 
Inverting Heidegger’s reactionary romanticism into a revolutionary 
romanticism,40 Lefebvre posited dwelling as a fundamentally creative and 
meaningful activity—inhabitance—which he contrasted with the increasingly 
alienated and abstracted form of habitat in late modernity. Thus, for Lefebvre 
and fellow anarchists41 Ward and Turner, the housing question was not simply 
that working-class housing was marked by material deprivation, as a secondary 
consequence of worker exploitation, but that it also revealed a deeper contra-
diction in the activity of dwelling, arising from alienation.
Ends and Means: The Point Is to Change It!
Lefebvre’s was above all a critique of the disconnection of ends from means and 
the instrumentality brought about by the abstraction in capitalist rationality. 
Ward and Turner likewise highlighted the failure of the structuralist Marxists, 
going back to Engels, to distinguish usefully between ends and means in 
resolving the housing question. Answering Marx and Engels’ critique of 
utopianism as a naïve faith in some unrealisable future, anarchism foregrounds 
the real utopian possibility of societal change as immanent within existing 
social capabilities; refocusing utopianism from idealist future-gazing towards 
a present pregnant with as yet unrealised possibilities.42 The intimate relation 
37 Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in David Farrell Krell, ed., Basic 
Writings (Routledge, 1978), pp. 347–363 (pp. 349 and 362).
38 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, p. 363.
39 Martin Heidegger, “‘… Poetically Man Dwells…’”, in Poetry, Language, Thought, ed. 
Martin Heidegger and Albert Hofstadter (Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 213–229.
40 Japhy Wilson, “‘The Devastating Conquest of the Lived by the Conceived’: The 
Concept of Abstract Space in the Work of Henri Lefebvre”, Space and Culture 16.3 (2013): 
364–380.
41 In answer to the question of whether he was an anarchist, Lefebvre is renowned to 
have replied, “no, I’m a Marxist, of course, so that one day we can all become anarchists!” 
Quoted in Andy Merrifield, Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2006), 
p. xxvi.
42 Stuart White, “Making Anarchism Respectable? The Social Philosophy of Colin 
Ward”, Journal of Political Ideologies 12.1 (2007): 11–28; Nathaniel Coleman, “Utopian 
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between ends and means in political action is expressed in the core principle 
of ‘prefiguration’—the idea of cultivating social relations which prefigure in 
present practices those aspects aimed for in future. This counterintuitive sense 
of the performativity of prefiguration is encapsulated by critical geographer 
Paul Chatterton as ‘demanding the urban impossible’.43 But the idea need not 
be so paradoxical as initially appears. 
For Ward, prefigurative experiments in cooperative living based on 
quotidian practices of mutual aid are “like a seed beneath the snow, buried 
under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste”.44 
If carefully cultivated and given the space to grow such seeds existing in the 
“interstices of the dominant power structure”45 might eventually transform 
this structure incrementally from within through proactive social change. One 
of his biggest influences, theological philosopher Martin Buber, was fond of 
quoting another of Ward’s anarchist influences, Gustav Landauer, who viewed 
the capitalist state not simply as an external apparatus that can be destroyed by 
revolution but as “a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a 
mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by 
behaving differently”.46 Such a perspective has inspired the autonomist Marxist 
tradition, which emphasises how capitalism—like any seemingly abstract 
social structure—is actively created by its participants through embodied 
everyday action. Interestingly, Crack Capitalism, John Holloway’s popular book 
on bringing about revolutionary change through growing alternatives in, and 
thereby slowly breaking open, the ‘cracks in capitalism’,47 was originally to 
be called—as Graeber has revealed48—Stop Making Capitalism. Pre- and post-
capitalist practices already exist in society, within the very same social spaces 
as those partially colonised by capitalism, which only survives as an edifice 
kept alive by the subterranean forces of mutual aid and voluntary association.
From another angle, J.K. Gibson-Graham critique structural Marxism 
for its ‘strong theorising’—a negative, paranoid, conspiratorial perspective 
reducing all phenomena to expressions of some fundamental threatening 
thing, notably capitalism or neoliberalism. They describe this reduction of 
all forms of life to capital as ‘capitalocentrism’. In reading for dominance, in 
being blind to diversity, we ironically reinforce the status quo, dampening and 
Prospect of Henri Lefebvre”, Space and Culture 16.3 (2013): 349–363; Colin Ward, Anarchy 
in Action (Freedom Press, 1973); Honeywell, “Utopianism and Anarchism”.
43 Paul Chatterton, “The Urban Impossible: A Eulogy for the Unfinished City”, City 14.3 
(2010): 234–244.
44 Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (Freedom Press, 1973), p. 11.
45 Colin Ward, Housing: An Anarchist Approach (Freedom Press, 1983), p. 20.
46 Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (Beacon Press, 1958), p. 46.
47 John Holloway, Crack Capitalism (Pluto Press, 2010).
48 Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory, p. 238.
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discouraging non-capitalist and post-capitalist possibilities. Gibson-Graham 
repeat Marx’s dictum—‘to understand the world in order to change it’—“but 
with a poststructuralist twist—to change our understanding is to change the 
world, in small and sometimes major ways”.49 Thus they call for weak theorising 
that can read for difference, more attuned to the emergence of innovation, possi-
bility and creativity; “to yield something new” rather than simply critique.50 
This enables a clearer view of the diversity, contingency and dynamic nature 
of the institutions that make up capitalism, which are performed into being 
through daily practices as much as they appear to be enduring structures. It 
also brings to light all those diverse economic practices other than class-based 
wage labour that remain invisible to capitalocentric reasoning: alternative 
forms of market relations such as cooperatives, self-employment, state enter-
prise and non-profit social enterprise; and non-market relations, such as the 
gift economy, mutual aid, neighbourhood association, domestic labour and 
volunteering. In terms of housing, such alternatives might include squatting, 
self-build and co-ops. The ultimate solution to the housing question is not to 
sit back and wait for the Revolution when the conditions are right in some 
distant future but instead to seek multiple, partial, incremental solutions that 
prefigure—and thereby potentially bring about—a different society. This 
might seem merely ‘utopian’ to old-school Marxists, but it is common sense 
to feminists, anarchists and ‘bourgeois reformists’ alike.
Deeply embedded in this common sense, Ward’s is characterised as a 
distinctively pragmatic or ‘respectable’ brand of anarchy: the modest dignity 
deriving from personal autonomy and creative self-assertion.51 He saw such 
anarchy in the hidden housing history of communes and squats, garden allot-
ments and plotlands.52 This perspective rejects some totalising abstraction of a 
post-capitalist society produced in purity as an autonomous zone and affirms a 
hybrid view that social spaces can be more or less freedom-enhancing, the aim 
being to make them free-er.53 Ward’s radical manifesto for ‘collective dweller 
control’54—helping inspire the Liverpool co-op movement—was strongly 
influenced by Turner’s framework for ‘user autonomy’ in self-help housing. He 
frequently quotes what he calls Turner’s First Law of Housing:
49 J.K. Gibson-Graham, “Diverse Economies: Performative Practices for ‘Other 
Worlds’”, Progress in Human Geography 32.5 (2008): 613–632 (p. 615).
50 Gibson-Graham, “Diverse Economies”, p. 619.
51 Stuart White, “Making Anarchism Respectable? The Social Philosophy of Colin 
Ward”, Journal of Political Ideologies 12.1 (2007): 11–28.
52 Ward, Cotters and Squatters: The Hidden History of Housing.
53 Stuart White, “Social Anarchism, Lifestyle Anarchism, and the Anarchism of Colin 
Ward”, Anarchist Studies 19.2 (2011): 92–104.
54 Colin Ward, Tenants Take Over (Architectural Press, 1974).
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When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their 
own contributions in the design, construction, or management of their 
housing, both this process and the environment produced stimulate 
individual and social well-being. When people have neither control over 
nor responsibility for key decisions in the housing process, on the other 
hand, dwelling environments may instead become a barrier to personal 
fulfilment and a burden on the economy.55
Turner derived his ideas from witnessing self-help housing in urban squatter 
settlements in Peru, where he worked and researched during the late 
1950s and 1960s. He proposed a housing system driven by what he called 
‘resourcefulness’ as an alternative to the logic of ‘productivity’ driving 
the large-scale, capital-intensive, efficient yet wasteful, misallocative and 
unresponsive top-down system of mass housing under state-capitalism.56 
Turner advocated more imaginative, practical, locally attuned and needs-
based use of resources for self-housing, through labour-intensive craft-based 
production, utilising local skills and knowledge. This was to be enabled 
by state and professional infrastructures, but driven by spontaneous grass-
roots energy of people housing themselves through cooperative labour and 
directly related to the final product. Contrary to Marxist critics, resource-
fulness does not entail the abandonment of technologically sophisticated 
and beneficial systems of capitalist production and organisation—as a kind 
of romantic fetishism of pre-capitalist rural artisanal culture—but instead 
promotes the appropriate use of tools and technologies to fit the scale and 
needs of the problem, with a subsidiarity principle favouring localised 
forms where possible, due to their convivial and fulfilling connection with 
the user. In this way, Turner’s ideas fed off and into a current of radical 
thought in the 1970s which critiqued the technocratic rationalisation of 
modern industrial society and foregrounded human-centred technologies 
and socially useful production, popularised by the likes of Ivan Illich and 
E.F. Schumacher in their respective works Tools for Conviviality and Small is 
Beautiful. Turner’s central insight was that the means are just as important 
as the ends, with direct participation infusing greater satisfaction, personal 
investment and the will to care into the activity of housing—seen as a verb 
as well as a noun. These ideas were to find their expression in Liverpool’s 
1970s housing cooperative movement via Ward.
Ward’s radical call for dweller control—strongly influenced by Turner’s 
ideas—found expression in Liverpool’s 1970s housing cooperative movement; 
influencing the development of the country’s first new-build co-op to be 
designed, owned and managed by its working-class residents, the Weller Street 
55 Turner and Fichter, Freedom to Build, p. 241.
56 Turner, Housing by People; Turner, “Housing in Three Dimensions”.
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Co-op. In a personal interview, Ward explains the impact of his book Tenants 
Take Over:57
The book had a salutary effect in Liverpool during a brief period when 
the Liberals controlled the city’s housing policy. It inspired several 
instances … of newly-built housing where the tenants of old slum 
houses were enabled to find a site, and commission an architect to 
design their own new housing … The proudest moment of my housing 
advocacy was when the Weller Street Co-op chairman, Billy Floyd, 
introduced me at a meeting by waving a tattered copy of Tenants Take 
Over and saying: “Here’s the man who wrote the Old Testament … But 
we built the New Jerusalem!”58
The Weller Street campaign ignited what some have dubbed Liverpool’s 
“Co-op Spring”59 or “new-build cooperative revolution”,60 fuelling what became 
the country’s largest such movement. This constituted an extraordinary shift 
from a situation in which most of Liverpool’s working-class residents were 
housed by the ‘Corpy’, without any control over the type, design or location 
of their home, to one where for the first time they had genuine decision-
making power over these aspects and a real sense of ownership. It incorporated 
radical new ideas around dweller control, design democracy and participatory 
techniques, then being experimented with in the community architecture 
movement; and inspired successive groups of council tenants to develop a new 
wave of new-build co-ops across Liverpool. This remarkable period in which 
various fortunate factors came together in mutual combination to produce 
around 50 resident-led co-ops, of which most still function today, is the subject 
of the following chapters.
57 Ward, Tenants Take Over.
58 Colin Ward and David Goodway, Talking Anarchy, 2003 (Five Leaves Publications, 
2003), pp. 74–75.
59 Ospina, Housing Ourselves.
60 CDS, Building Democracy: Housing Cooperatives on Merseyside. Update ’94 (Cooperative 
Development Services (Liverpool) Ltd, 1994), p. 7.
CHAPTER 4
Liverpool’s Co-operative Revolution
4: Liverpool’s Co-operative Revolution
From its inception in the late 1970s, the co-operative movement spread 
rapidly across Liverpool and beyond to Merseyside in the following decade. 
Its geographical spread suggests the movement was groundbreaking in more 
than one respect. Catherine Meredith, the chief executive of Co-operative 
Development Services (CDS), Liverpool’s leading co-op support organisation, 
has claimed that
The scale and number of co-ops on Merseyside, alongside the very 
radical approach taken to the control of the design process, represents 
a major innovation which has no comparable phenomenon in Western 
Europe.1
Paul Lusk, a co-op development worker for CDS, said at the time:
What’s happening now, in Liverpool, is that a new form of public 
sector housing is being developed … new-build co-ops. Only through 
new-building do you have the opportunity to shape an environment. 
And it’s going to be … a major, possibly dominant, form of public 
housing in the twentieth century. And the Weller Streets would have 
been the model.2
More-disinterested commentators have characterised it as the beginning 
of a new paradigm in public housing—public sector housing 2.0, mark II, or 
phase 2—as evident in the title of architect Nick Wates’ contemporaneous 
exposition of Liverpool’s co-op movement in the Architects’ Journal.3 It was 
seen by many as the birth of the third sector, but one distinct from the large-
scale housing association sector we see today, heralding a radical new model, 
1 CDS, Building Democracy: Housing Cooperatives on Merseyside. Update ’94 (Cooperative 
Development Services (Liverpool) Ltd, 1994), p. 10.
2 Interview with Paul Lusk in Alan McDonald, The Weller Way: The Story of the Weller Street 
Housing Cooperative (Faber & Faber, 1986), p. 208.
3 Nick Wates, “The Liverpool Breakthrough: Or Public Sector Housing Phase 2”, 
Architects’ Journal (8 Sept. 1982).
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the Weller Way of doing things. This put residents in the driving seat of a 
development machine funded, legislated and regulated by the central state but 
deploying resources through an unprecedentedly decentralised programme of 
design and construction, using a range of local professional services organi-
sations, all chosen and commissioned by residents themselves. A political 
figure centrally involved in constructing this new model explained to me the 
motivation behind the idea:
There’s a possibility here of public housing mark II. Instead of the state 
or the Corpy being in charge and doing a miserable job, why can’t 
people who don’t have educational qualifications, don’t have often much 
of an employment, don’t have the money, why can’t they nonetheless 
be in charge of running their own estates?
Clearly, this cuts two ways: hinting at a possible progressive future of 
democratic control over housing resources yet also of a presently fashionable 
policy for offloading responsibilities for public services onto communities that 
lack the capacity to run them. The latter appears to have won out. Why is 
that the case? Did the Liverpool co-op model ever have a chance of healing 
the symptoms of the housing question, if only at a local level? And why have 
we not seen Liverpool’s new-build co-op model replicated across the country 
to become the dominant form of public housing, as a potential solution to 
the housing question nationally, if not globally? In this chapter I reconstruct 
the social and political history of how the new-build co-op movement in 
Liverpool came to be considered by some as the blueprint for Public Housing 
2.0—and attempt to provide some explanation as to why such bold predictions 
ultimately failed to materialise.
To understand why the co-op movement was so successful in Liverpool 
during the 1970s, we need to grasp the extraordinary historical context 
from which it sprung. Liverpool was unusual among the northern industrial 
cities dominated by the working classes for electing Liberal and Tory council 
administrations when others voted in Labour. This was partly due to the 
religious sectarianism dividing the city since the Irish Catholic migration in 
the nineteenth century. Tory paternalism coupled with the desperate need to 
resolve severe inner-city overcrowding and squalor informed inter-war policies 
of slum clearance and construction of new estates on the then metropolitan 
periphery, starting with Norris Green.4 In the 1950s, the labour movement—
boosted locally by national political victories since 1945—began to challenge 
sectarian influences on party politics. In 1955, the Labour Party was finally 
4 John Boughton, “Liverpool’s Interwar Multi-Storey Housing: Building an ‘A1 Community 
in a Properly Planned Township of Flats’”, Municipal Dreams Blog (10 Feb. 2015): https://
municipaldreams.wordpress.com/.
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elected, bringing to an end a century of Conservative rule. This inaugurated 
a period of almost two decades of Labour control of the council, a political 
machine led by Jack and Bessie Braddock, who represented a distinctively 
right-wing, traditional, anti-communist ‘boss politics’.5 Under the Braddocks, 
the council embarked on a more systematic and large-scale plan of compre-
hensive redevelopment, decanting large numbers of inner-city residents to 
overspill estates and new towns on the metropolitan periphery. An article 
published in the Liverpool Post in 1957 states that “this exodus would affect close 
on 125,000 people”,6 revealing the huge scale of the overspill plan:
48,000 people would go to Skelmersdale (population at that time 
6,216); 18,000 would go to Widnes to increase the population to 
66,000; 19,350 would explode the numbers in the Parish of Halewood 
(population 6,216 at that time); 6,000 would go to Cantril Farm; 3,500 
would swell the population of Formby from 10,000 to 13,500; 30,000 
would head for Kirkby.
Collective outrage and resistance to these forced relocations expressed itself 
through various cultural mediums at the time. ‘Back Buchanan Street’, a 
popular folk song written by Harry and Gordon Dison in the mid-1960s for 
a BBC song-writing competition and broadcast on television, was melancholic 
and nostalgic in its refrain, repeated in each verse, that “We’ll miss” various 
aspects of life in the old terraced streets. The opening and closing stanzas 
intoned:
A fella from the Corpy, just out of Planning School
Has told us that we’re being moved right out of Liverpool
They’re sending us to Kirkby, or Skelmersdale or Speke
Don’t want to go from all we know in Back Buchanan Street.
From Walton to the Dingle, you’ll hear the same old cry
Stop messin’ round with Liverpool at least until we die
Don’t want to go to Kirkby, or Skelmersdale or Speke
Don’t want to go from all we know in Back Buchanan Street.
The threat of displacement and the breaking up of tight-knit communities 
was one of the main drivers behind the development of campaigns for 
cooperative alternatives. But it was not simply resistance to relocation out 
of Liverpool proper that galvanised the movement from below—it was also 
5 Merseyside Socialist Research Group, Merseyside in Crisis (Manchester Free Press, 1980).
6 Quoted in chapter 24 of Ken Rogers, The Lost Tribe of Everton and Scottie Road (Trinity 
Mirror Sport Media, 2010).
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the terrible conditions of the existing housing within the inner city. The 
nineteenth-century two-up two-down terraced houses were insanitary by 
modern standards, often ‘back-to-back’—windowless internal back walls 
built against the houses behind—or else separated by a narrow alley. It was 
no accident, one of the architects of the new-build co-ops told me, that the 
Council’s redevelopment policy was called the ‘Slum Clearance Programme’: 
“You were saying ‘slum’ is quite a harsh word, but all those houses had 
outside toilets … It was pretty primitive, and there were thousands of them 
like that”.
In response, the council replaced thousands of terraces with tenements 
and high-rise blocks. Part of the slum clearance programme entailed the 
construction of new tenements on the sites of old terraces. Yet the tenements 
built in their place soon deteriorated. By far the most notorious of these were 
the trio of tower blocks colloquially known as ‘the Piggeries’ or the ‘ugly 
sisters’, built in 1965 in Everton to replace slum terraced housing. Conditions 
deteriorated so rapidly (partly due to a lack of dweller control) that tenants 
were swiftly moved to rent strike. A council officer at the time recalls how 
the Piggeries were
Only about five years old, but so badly built that the tenants had gone 
on rent strike and therefore the council, in direct retaliation, had gone 
on a repairs strike … Within another five or six years the blocks had 
gone. So there was great hunger for anything that was better.
When residents resisted, in such large numbers, living in these conditions, 
the council had little choice but to begin emptying flats out in preparation for 
demolition, which, a resident of the Piggeries remembers, made conditions 
even worse for those unfortunate enough to remain until the very end:
The conditions towards the end were appalling. Once something has 
been declared for demolition everyone stops caring. Some of those flats 
stood for less than ten years when the previous terraced streets, as bad 
as the conditions were, had stood for a century.7
A leading co-op activist concurs that conditions in the tenements were a 
principal motivation for co-op campaigning:
When they actually built them, they were just thrown up, they were 
laid on top of all the sewerage system, it wasn’t replaced, so that started 
to crack, people had sewage literally coming up into their properties … 
I went upstairs, and she had not just black mould in the corner, it was 
7 Quoted in chapter 30 in Rogers, The Lost Tribe.
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like a black blanket right the way across the ceiling … so they were all 
living downstairs and the sewage was coming through.
Hidden behind these images is a story of neglect and bureaucratic failure. 
A council housing manager at the time remembers “one tenement, Melrose 
Place, where they were actually fitting in new gas fires at one end while they 
were demolishing the other, because the contract had already been made—it 
was madness!” Another describes how the Corpy had become “a shockingly 
poor landlord”, exemplified in the working culture of the Scotland Road 
office, where he “managed fourteen to fifteen thousand properties with a 
team of about 25 of us, so it was quickly getting out of control; and the 
culture in there despised the tenants … The poetic name for the tenants was 
‘deadbeats’”. Conditions were so bad in some of the high-rise blocks that repair 
reports were simply ignored: “At the end of every day they were thrown away, 
because the council was just refusing to do repairs”.
Various rent strikes and marches mark this period, from the 1960s to the 
1980s, in which residents of council tenements organised to challenge neglect, 
mismanagement and rent rises. Collective action came to a head in 1972, in 
reaction to the Conservative government’s 1972 Housing Finance Act, which 
brought in so-called ‘fair rents’, representing rent rises for council tenancies 
of 25 per cent. Many Labour Councils across the country were re-elected on 
the strength of pledges to resist implementation of the Act.8 In Liverpool, 
Labour councillors were unable to prevent Tory and Liberal members forming 
a majority to vote in the measure. Marches were organised across Merseyside 
with around three thousand protestors led by tenants’ campaign groups 
marching to the Pier Head. 
One particularly prominent example of the 1972 rent strikes occurred 
in Kirkby, in the Metropolitan Borough of Knowsley, one of the ‘overspill’ 
new towns built to the east of Liverpool in the 1950s and 1960s as part of 
the slum clearance programme but which, by the early 1970s, was, like 
Liverpool itself, suffering with severe unemployment and social problems 
as the multinational company branch plants that had located there began to 
close.9 Women from one particular estate, Tower Hill—an overspill of an 
overspill—were particularly vocal in response to the factory closures and 
the 1972 Housing Finance Act, organising discussion and support groups 
and forming the Tower Hill Unfair Rents Action Group. The group initiated 
a fourteen-month-long rent strike involving some three thousand tenants in 
Kirkby. This is as good an example as any of how the male-dominated domains 
8 Merseyside Socialist Research Group, Merseyside in Crisis.
9 Richard Meegan, “Merseyside in Crisis and in Conflict”, in Michael Harloe, Chris 
Pickvance and John Urry, eds, Place, Policy and Politics: Do Localities Matter? (Routledge, 
1990), pp. 67–83.
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of docklands militancy outflew their origins into female-led struggles in the 
sphere of reproduction. A decade later, Kirkby women were once again 
leading the campaigns for new-build housing co-ops to replace the crumbling 
tenement blocks—a subject I touch upon towards the end of Part II.
It was these experiences, coupled with growing collective anger over the 
slum clearance programme, which eventually led to a diminution of support 
for the local Labour Party. In 1973, the Liberals were elected as controlling 
party on the council, promising a new kind of ‘pavement politics’ in place of 
Labour’s boss politics or the Tories’ paternalism.10 The Liberals took advantage 
of various policy changes at the national level to install a new public housing 
programme at the local—one which turned its back on council housing and 
focused on private and cooperative alternatives, in a bid to diversify and decen-
tralise what they and many residents now saw as moribund municipal housing. 
Before exploring these changes in more detail, we must first turn our attention 
towards a little-known policy experiment in Liverpool which did a great deal 
to pave the way for the Liberals’ housing policy and the development of the 
co-op movement.
Rehabilitating Housing in a SNAP
By the 1960s, emerging urban social movements composed of communities 
and idealistic professionals were beginning to resist top-down compre-
hensive redevelopment and propose rehabilitation in its place. In response, 
the government passed the 1969 Housing Act, which put the onus on local 
authorities to consider rehabilitation through General Improvement Areas, 
specifically prohibiting combining these with slum clearance in the instances 
where residents preferred the option of rehabilitation.11 The development 
of this new ‘rehab’ approach to regeneration was profoundly influenced by 
a policy experiment in Granby, a deprived inner-city neighbourhood to the 
south of Liverpool city centre in L8, unusual amongst postal districts nationally 
for standing as a place identity signifier.12 The Shelter Neighbourhood Action 
Project (SNAP), an action-research programme rolled out from 1969 to 1972, 
was one of the first programmes nationwide to deliver rehabilitation rather 
than demolition of inner-city terraced neighbourhoods.13 Founded in 1966 
as a voluntary charity campaigning for the homeless, Shelter had by 1968 
10 Diane Frost and Peter North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013).
11 Michael Hook, “New Homes for Old: A Cold Hard Look at Urban Renewal”, Architects’ 
Journal (1 July 1970).
12 John Cornelius, Liverpool 8 (John Murray Publishers, 1982).
13 Des McConaghy, Another Chance for Cities: SNAP 69–72 (Shelter Neighbourhood Action 
Project, 1972).
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developed its role beyond just housing, seeking to resolve the broader urban 
issues at the root of homelessness. Shelter’s Neighbourhood Action Project 
aimed to do just that. At the same time, the 1969 Housing Act opened up the 
space for local authorities to engage with voluntary associations in ameliorating 
housing problems. Following the 1969 Act, the council set up Granby Planning 
Action Area and invited Shelter to investigate local demand for rehabilitation 
of a section of this area.
SNAP paralleled the Community Development Projects (CDPs) then 
being established on similar principles: understanding the nature and causes 
of deprivation in twelve deindustrialised inner-city areas across the UK and 
finding requisite solutions.14 Shelter lobbied for Granby to be included as a 
CDP, but lost out to Vauxhall in north Liverpool over council concerns that 
resources should not be too spatially concentrated. Unlike Vauxhall’s largely 
homogeneous, stable, cohesive working-class Irish-Catholic communities, 
Granby, like much of L8, was (and still is) seen as the most multicultural and 
ethnically diverse area of the city.15 British shipping briefly boomed in the 
post-war period and many migrants brought to Liverpool through seafaring 
work settled in and around Granby, including from the Caribbean, West 
Africa, Somalia and Yemen, Pakistan, India, Malaysia and China, alongside 
the Irish population.16 New waves of migration in the 1980s due to civil war 
and famine brought many more Somali and Yemeni people, who now make up 
much of the population. Jermyn Street in Granby was home to the Malay Club 
for many decades—a social club for Liverpool-based seafarers from Malaysia 
and Singapore.17 In the 1950s and 1960s, Granby Street was abuzz with shops, 
cafés, bars and clubs—the home of music culture for much of Liverpool, 
attracting bohemians and art students from across L8 to dance alongside the 
predominantly black locals. Some 60 shops lined Granby Street selling things 
that could not be bought elsewhere in Liverpool. Yet, by the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, as Liverpool’s docks declined, this once prosperous quarter of 
merchant and artisan houses fronting tree-lined streets and grand boulevards 
began to fade, accruing a reputation for transience, crime, vandalism and 
squalor.18
SNAP was forward-thinking in conceptualising Granby as a ‘twilight area’ 
stuck in a ‘twilight trap’—a vicious cycle of poverty compounded by societal 
14 Martin Loney, Community against Government: British Community Development Project, 
1968–78 (Heinemann Educational Books, 1983).
15 Cornelius, Liverpool 8.
16 Madeline Heneghan and Tony Wailey, “Granby: A History”, in Assemble, eds, Granby 
Workshop Catalogue 2015, pp. 5–9.
17 Tim Bunnell, From World City to the World in One City: Liverpool through Malay Lives 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2016).
18 Michael Hook, “SNAP: Toxteth, Liverpool”, Architects’ Journal (10 June 1970).
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discrimination. The acknowledgement of systemic forces by SNAP invited 
a more holistic approach. Writing in the final report, SNAP Director Des 
McConaghy (who was a great help in helping me piece together this history) 
proclaimed that “to deal with such areas in isolation would be to treat local 
sores without administering any systemic medicine”.19 The report recom-
mendations anticipated those of the final CDP report, provocatively titled 
Gilding the Ghetto.20 Indeed, SNAP prefigured later ideas in urban theory and 
the kind of area-based initiatives now de rigueur in urban renewal policy. 
More immediately, it helped incubate and flesh out in practice the General 
Improvement Area approach that had been given the bare bones of legal 
definition in the 1969 Housing Act. SNAP was the “flagship” project for 
General Improvement Areas and would later influence the development of 
Housing Action Areas21—both important policies for the development of the 
housing association and co-op movements in Liverpool.
Communications between Granby residents and the council were made 
difficult by local deprivation, transience, the hostility garnered by the threat 
of demolition imposed by the post-war slum clearance programme and also 
by the predominance of small-time investors—absentee landlords for a largely 
privately renting population. SNAP was to provide the vital link with residents, 
articulate their needs to the council and offer free advice on health, welfare 
and housing issues. Its main task was to deliver environmental improvements: 
reducing housing densities, repairing existing properties, reorganising internal 
space and installing inside toilets, bathrooms and kitchens. Generally, no 
such amenities were available in the nineteenth-century slum terraces. This 
became the blueprint for the General Improvement Area rehab approach. 
Yet the idea was to go deeper than mere physical upgrading: to work closely 
with existing residents to understand their complex needs and deliver lasting 
improvements in health, welfare, environment and employment. A local office 
for the SNAP team—comprising architects, housing managers and even a 
sociologist—was opened in Granby, allowing direct contact with residents. 
Street committees were elected by residents at SNAP meetings and task 
forces organised on each topic of local concern, such as housing, health and 
crime. Their findings were incorporated in the SNAP report to the council: 
an early experiment in community participation in regeneration and the 
now-ubiquitous ‘co-production’ of public services.
Yet the SNAP project revealed a complex knot of place-based problems 
tied into a Byzantine local bureaucracy that presented too many complica-
tions to be loosened by a participatory rehab approach alone. The principal 
19 McConaghy, Another Chance for Cities: SNAP 69–72, p. 11.
20 CDP (Community Development Project), Gilding the Ghetto: The State and the Poverty 
Experiments (CDP Inter-Project Editorial Team, 1977).
21 Christopher Holmes, A New Vision for Housing (Routledge, 2005), p. 124.
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problem was the scattered distribution of housing ownership and the large 
number of multi-tenanted private rented dwellings. Absentee landlords 
were not incentivised to invest voluntarily in rehabilitation, owing to low 
and unreliable rents. Of the 740 terraced dwellings in the Granby General 
Improvement Area, only 17 per cent were owner-occupied; almost all the 
rest owned by private landlords; with 566 in need of improvement.22 The 
SNAP final report revealed a convoluted bureaucratic process of 71 separate 
procedures required to obtain a single council grant. Liverpool’s urban 
governance was marked by too many competing agencies, regulations and 
contractors resulting in “welfare chaos”, as McConaghy put it. Alternatively, 
SNAP recommended wholesale restructuring into development corporations 
coordinating local service agencies and strategically directed at the national 
level through a central urban task force.
The problem of rehabilitating multi-tenanted private rented terraces split 
between small-time landlords was partly resolved by their consolidation into 
co-operative and housing association ownership. One flank of the holistic 
SNAP strategy was to build tenant buy-in and find a common regeneration 
solution through participatory mechanisms. The other was to persuade 
absentee landlords to endorse the scheme despite their disinclination, before 
resorting to Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPO). However, blanket municipal 
ownership was too expensive in the context of large numbers of individual 
owners needing to be bought out. Local housing associations were therefore 
encouraged to buy stock from landlords and owner-occupiers. Shelter had 
supported the development of two key local associations: Liverpool Housing 
Trust (LHT), established in 1965 as a church-based initiative; and Merseyside 
Improved Houses (MIH), established in 1928 as Liverpool Improved Homes, 
becoming one of the first Shelter-supported associations, and later morphing 
into Riverside, one of the biggest associations in the UK. Both LHT and MIH 
were geared towards inner-city neighbourhood improvement using fundraising 
from Shelter, council improvement grants and mortgages. The SNAP approach 
innovated by Shelter was a major inspiration for the housing association and 
co-op movements, as this former LHT officer attests:
LHT’s whole ethos came out of the SNAP project. The SNAP project 
in Granby had shown, at least for a while, how much good it could do 
to one small area—not just on the housing but on housing, shops, all 
of the public services, and work intensively with the community in 
that area and turn it around. And so that became our idea and that’s 
why we always then had small teams in local offices wherever we then 
went to work … It’s how everybody works now, but at the time it was 
really quite revolutionary.
22 McConaghy, Another Chance for Cities: SNAP 69–72.
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SNAP was directly involved in kick-starting the co-op movement. A small 
group of idealistic architects and housing professionals—living locally and 
working with SNAP—approached the council to negotiate a mortgage for 
the acquisition and rehabilitation of terraced houses. Granby Street Housing 
Co-operative was established in 1972, Liverpool’s first rehab co-op.23 This 
became the model for a whole series of replications, driven by aspiring and 
idealistic young professionals seeking to “make a difference”. Shortly after 
Granby Street Co-op’s establishment, Liverpool council designated a second 
General Improvement Area not far away, in the Canning area of Georgian 
terraces, and invited the co-op to participate directly in the improvement 
programme.24 Granby Street Co-op declined this invitation but helped 
residents set up their own, Canning Co-op, in 1973, to rehabilitate empty 
council houses. Canning was full of what one co-op member describes as 
“the arty-farty middle class”.25 These co-ops were ‘non-mutual’, which meant 
that not all members were residents or tenants. This allowed outside activists 
to become members, bringing with them expertise to help establish and 
manage the co-ops. However, it therefore also dissuaded the full involvement 
of residents themselves, who were therefore not always given an adequate 
cooperative education to enable full mutual control.
Granby and Canning Co-ops were run entirely voluntarily, but the acqui-
sition of further houses, totalling 30 between them, meant the workload was 
taking its strain on volunteers.26 By pooling resources into a more profes-
sionalised secondary co-op, members could service both primaries more 
effectively. They jointly founded Neighbourhood Housing Services in 1973, as 
a subsidiary company wholly owned by members of co-ops using its services. 
This was Britain’s first secondary housing cooperative—what many in the 
movement refer to as the ‘mother’ of multiple ‘daughter’ co-ops. Once in 
place to promote their development, the co-op movement grew rapidly: 
Neighbourhood Housing Services began with just two employees but by 1977 
it had twenty staff serving eight rehab co-ops completing over a hundred 
housing improvements a year.27
A secondary co-op is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such rapid 
growth. How did prospective co-ops establish themselves and acquire land? 
And where did the funding come from? To understand the swift genesis of the 
23 Graham Towers, Building Democracy: Community Architecture in the Inner Cities (Routledge, 
1995).
24 Tom Clay, “The Liverpool Co-ops”, Architects’ Journal (5 July 1978).
25 Quoted in Paul Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social 
Rights: The Liverpool New-Build Housing Co-operative Movement”, unpublished thesis, 
Salford University, 1998.
26 Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”.
27 Towers, Building Democracy: Community Architecture in the Inner Cities, p. 91.
Part II: The Housing Question70
new-build movement that followed the rehab co-ops in Liverpool, we must 
first rescale our attention to the national level, to build a picture of the critical 
changes to the legislative landscape occurring in the 1960s. Co-op growth at 
the local level was preceded by the development of a supportive legislative, 
regulatory and funding regime at the national scale.28 The establishment of 
the Housing Corporation as a government agency dedicated to funding and 
regulating a new collective form of tenure, co-ownership societies, was the 
result of colliding political impulses. From one direction came the promotion 
by key figures in the cooperative movement of housing co-ops as an alternative 
form of public provision. From another came largely Conservative calls for an 
enlarged private rented sector to assume responsibility for state provision and 
fill in the growing supply gap between owner-occupation and council housing. 
In the early 1960s, the Conservative government identified unmet housing 
needs in good-quality, low-cost private rented housing and homeownership, 
and sought to expand the cost-rental sector with £25 million made available 
in the 1961 Housing Act.
Inserting themselves into this policy context were two especially significant 
individuals: Harold Campbell, then serving as Secretary of the Co-operative 
Party, and, later, Reg Freeson, Housing Minister in the 1974–79 Labour 
government, also a Co-op Party member, and key supporter of the very 
first post-war cooperative housing experiments in London. Campbell was 
an influential promoter of cooperative ownership in the early 1960s. He 
persuaded Conservative government ministers to support co-operative housing 
alongside cost-rental in the 1961 Act, but dubbed ‘co-ownership’ societies 
as a political tactic to assuage Conservative suspicions of cooperative—and, 
by association, socialist—values. Campbell’s lobbying of the Conservative 
government led to the establishment of the Housing Corporation—and his 
appointment as its Deputy Chairman—in the 1964 Housing Act as a body 
to fund co-ownership societies, a collective model originally imported from 
Scandinavia, alongside other forms of cost-rental housing. In 1965, Campbell 
helped found the Co-ownership Development Society, a secondary service 
organisation borrowing from the Scandinavian system, in which a ‘mother’ 
or secondary society helps establish many independent ‘daughter’ or primary 
co-ownership societies.
Co-ownership societies, however, had several failings. They were developed 
by professionals with financial stakes in the projects with too little participation 
28 Birchall, “The Hidden History of Co-operative Housing in Britain”; Johnston Birchall, 
“Co-Partnership Housing and the Garden City Movement”, Planning Perspectives 10.4 (1995): 
329–358; Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”; 
David Clapham and Keith Kintrea, Housing Co-operatives in Britain (Longman, 1992); David 
Clapham and Keith Kintrea, “Importing Housing Policy: Housing Co-operatives in Britain 
and Scandinavia”, Housing Studies 2.3 (1987): 157–169.
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or input from residents, who were often unaware they were even living in a 
co-op. Moreover, spiralling house price inflation in the 1970s revealed a fatal 
flaw in the co-ownership financial model—trapping individual equity stakes in 
inflationary bubbles, enabling individuals to profit from their sale, and making 
capital loans too expensive to fund, eventually leading to its demise as a viable 
model. Yet the co-ownership model nonetheless helped pave the way for the 
next phase of collective housing experimentation: the ‘common ownership 
co-op’. SNAP Director, Des McConaghy, paints the background context:
The major 1972 “sea change” occurred when governments began to 
panic about a threatened collapse of the lower end of the private housing 
rental market. They feared the threat of US style “abandonment” of 
property and in particular the bi-partisan fear of any further “munici-
palisation” of our older housing areas. This triggered a Ministerial bid 
for direct control over public-sector housing—and that called for a 
new super national quango. Hence the Conservative’s 1973 Housing 
Bill became Labour’s 1974 Housing Act—and a tiny and moribund 
Housing Corporation was resurrected to promote and oversee a whole 
multitude of new local quangos … a truly massive expansion of our 
“voluntary” housing movement. However, the bottom drawer plan was 
to eventually replace all our UK public sector housing in this way; and 
almost immediately, ambitious civil servants—and many charities and 
voluntary movement leaders themselves—saw this as an opportunity 
to pioneer the wider concept of the “privatised and voluntary state”—
albeit one initially and indeed still mainly reliant on central government 
funding.29
This provocative account suggests this period of housing policy innovation 
inaugurated the now-familiar ‘shadow state’30—the quasi-public ‘third sector’ 
to which our public services are increasingly outsourced. The Housing 
Corporation was resurrected to oversee the outsourcing of public housing 
to (previously independent) non-profit voluntary associations—like MIH and 
LHT in Liverpool. The ‘great breakthrough’ for common ownership co-ops 
came after Labour won the 1974 national election, appointing Reg Freeson 
as Housing Minister and turning the Conservative Bill into the 1974 Housing 
Act. This empowered the Housing Corporation to become the funder and 
regulator of housing associations, administering an extraordinarily generous 
funding regime of 100 per cent capital and revenue Housing Association Grants 
(HAGs) for land acquisition, development costs and ongoing management and 
29 Personal correspondence with Des McConaghy, 2013.
30 Jennifer Wolch, The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition 
(Foundation Centre, 1990).
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maintenance. Labour’s influence on the Conservative bill led to inclusion of 
‘fair rents’, to be fixed by a rents officer, and tenancy allocations according to 
‘need’, which guaranteed affordability for low-income tenants. Cooperatives, 
however, were not initially eligible for funding, as they were not officially 
housing associations. It was only with Freeson’s appointing his political ally 
Harold Campbell as his advisor that co-ops were to be given this vital statutory 
status. Campbell set up a working party on co-ops to report findings just in 
time to amend the 1975 Housing Rents and Subsidies Act, which was to make 
amendments to the 1974 Act. What became known as the Campbell Report 
recommended that co-ops be allowed to register as housing associations with 
the Housing Corporation and therefore gain access to HAGs. Due to their 
inclusion in this regime of ‘fair rents’, co-ops became uniformly affordable to 
those on low incomes for the first time.31
The Campbell Report also recommended the establishment of a national 
representative body for housing co-ops, resulting in the formation within 
the Housing Corporation of the Cooperative Housing Agency—described 
as the “official launch” of the housing cooperative movement “after nearly 
150 years of private experiment”.32 With 10 per cent of the Housing 
Corporation budget, the Cooperative Housing Agency was to fund the 
development of local secondary co-ops and crucially provide education and 
training for primary co-op members. This resulted in the rapid growth 
of co-ops nationwide, a quarter of which were in Liverpool, including 
a further eight rehab co-ops. The Co-ownership Development Society 
went into voluntary liquidation around 1975, following the demise of the 
co-ownership movement. It was nonetheless quickly reincarnated under a 
different guise, Co-operative Housing Services, maintaining its original staff 
and Campbell as its chair. Just as the Co-ownership Development Society 
had been set up by Campbell to support the development of co-ownership 
societies, Co-operative Housing Services was to be the secondary organi-
sation providing services for local primary co-ops. And so the institutional 
architecture of one prevailing collective housing model was transferred to 
the next.
The 1974 Housing Act enabled MIH and LHT, as well as Neighbourhood 
Housing Services, to reposition themselves as leading players just as Liverpool 
Council policy turned increasingly towards rehabilitation. With the 1969 Act 
supporting the establishment of General Improvement Areas and the 1974 Act 
providing the financial and institutional infrastructure for housing associations 
and co-ops to deliver improvements, all the building blocks were in place 
for a large-scale rehabilitation policy. But the impetus was to come from a 
fortuitous change in local politics. In 1973, the Liberals broke the nearly 
31 Birchall, “The Hidden History of Co-operative Housing in Britain”.
32 Michael Hook, “Housing Co-operatives”, Architects’ Journal (29 June 1977), p. 1215.
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two-decade Labour hold.33 In minority control in coalition with the Tories, 
the Liberals pursued an alternative policy of neighbourhood improvement, 
expanding the voluntary rental housing sector and owner-occupation, whilst 
halting demolition and council house building. The result, a former Housing 
Corporation official told me, was that
Liverpool declared the biggest number of Housing Action Areas in the 
country. Probably the most successful and prolific take up of the housing 
association movement was in this city—so major portfolios of private 
stock transferred from the private sector to housing associations in the 
older housing.
By the mid-1970s, Liverpool Council had the largest Housing Action 
Area policy in the UK, covering 23 inner-city nineteenth-century neigh-
bourhoods. At this time, around three thousand terraced houses in south 
inner-city Liverpool suddenly became available for improvement, following 
the bankruptcy and liquidation of a big property investment company, known 
as the ‘Hibernian’ or ‘Realmdeal’ Portfolio. This was divided between 
the housing associations operating in each area, with the council zoning 
whole neighbourhoods over to preferred partner organisations for rehab. 
These council-demarcated zones created natural monopolies for the housing 
associations, thereby ensuring they were the only actors capable of delivering 
improvements under the 1974 legislation. The ‘fair rents’ regime proved too 
stringent for private landlords to cover relatively high costs of rehab, whilst 
the Housing Corporation’s generous HAG funding and tight eligibility require-
ments guaranteed the economic viability of only housing associations. With the 
1975 amendment these powers were extended to co-ops too.
Looking for secondary support to develop its rehabilitation programme, 
Liverpool Council and the Housing Corporation invited Harold Campbell’s 
new London-based body for developing co-ops, Co-operative Housing Services, 
to work with them in Liverpool. But Neighbourhood Housing Services also 
decided to pursue rehabilitation as a means of expanding the co-op sector, and 
lobbied the council to be considered in the zoning policy. As a result, large 
parts of Toxteth and Granby in L8 were zoned for ‘cooperatives’ as part of 
council General Improvement Area strategy, with Neighbourhood Housing 
Services owning and managing the stock. Out of this competition, a Liverpool 
branch of Co-operative Housing Services was established, detaching itself from 
London as an independent organisation in 1977. Specialising specifically in the 
development of Liverpool co-ops, it was named Co-operative Development 
Services—commonly known in Merseyside as CDS. Rather confusingly 
(and ironically, for a movement promoting cooperation and coordination), 
33 Peter Taafe and Tony Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight (Fortress, 1988).
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Co-operative Housing Services in London went on to reconstitute itself as the 
Co-operative Development Society, still operating today as CDS Co-operatives, 
one of the largest co-operative support organisations in the UK. The Liverpool 
CDS (from here on, I will refer to CDS only in its Liverpool incarnation) was 
to spawn dozens of new-build common-ownership co-ops across Merseyside 
as the mother of the movement.34
CDS was now well-placed to capitalise on the Liberals’ rehab policy 
regime, having inherited swathes of land in areas zoned for co-operative devel-
opment originally bought by Co-operative Housing Services in the wake of the 
Realmdeal/Hibernian Portfolio. The majority of CDS’s work initially involved 
improvement—with 823 families helped in total—building on the pioneering 
participatory techniques of SNAP to identify local needs through resident 
committees, meetings and surveys, conducted from a local office. A big change 
was to occur, however, through contact with a particular group of residents 
in an area of Toxteth around Weller Street. Having lived with deteriorating 
housing conditions for several decades, with no inside toilets, baths or gardens, 
and growing draught and damp problems, those residents who had not already 
moved away into more modern accommodation formed an action group in the 
1970s to pressure the council to be rehoused. Despite the Liberals’ preference 
for rehabilitation, by 1976 the council had nonetheless earmarked 57 additional 
neighbourhoods for ‘slum clearance’, “the fifty-seven varieties, somebody called 
them—and the Weller Streets was at the bottom”.35 But being at the bottom of 
the list crucially gave the Weller Street community time to campaign against 
demolition and explore alternatives. Initial action was direct and pointed, as 
community planner Tony Gibson details in his comparative account of neigh-
bourhood alternatives: “They went in procession with most of their neighbours 
balancing tin baths on their heads and carrying leaky umbrellas to make 
their point”36—an early sign of the creativity and resolve the Weller Street 
community would show in their struggle to be rehoused together.
The council’s was not a careful approach to regeneration: knocking down 
whole streets and blocks and rehousing residents wherever they had available 
properties scattered across the city. This meant communities were rehoused 
without being moved together—dispersed as well as displaced—as the council 
simply did not have the empty stock. However, it was generally agreed across 
the 57 clearance areas that the tiny insanitary houses were beyond repair, 
lacking most basic amenities. Indeed, despite nostalgic tendencies among some 
34 Much of this background historical account of the Liverpool co-operative sector I 
owe to one of CDS’s very first employees, Paul Lusk, whom I interviewed and whose 
excellent thesis on the topic I draw upon here. Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in 
the Development of Social Rights”.
35 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 30.
36 Tony Gibson, Counterweight: The Neighbourhood Option (Russell Press, 1984), pp. 20–21.
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residents and populist commentators37 to romanticise life in the old terraces 
there was a real need for state intervention to upgrade such housing, as this 
interviewee recounts:
People’s memories are with tinted glasses, some of those properties 
that they demolished needed demolishing … People remember playing 
ball in the street and they don’t remember playing with the rats in the 
street.
Weller Street residents were thus not against demolition per se but, says a 
CDS worker, “didn’t want to be rehoused by the council, partly because of 
the quality of the housing on offer, but mainly because they would lose their 
community ties”. They wanted to be kept together as a community and so 
approached CDS who, unsurprisingly, suggested they establish a co-op: one 
aiming to develop new-build housing rather than rehabilitate an old terrace. 
Starting with a committee of just eight—mostly young housewives—the 
Weller Street action group researched cooperatives and the local housing 
market, self-funded the creation of informative leaflets, held a public meeting 
in a local church hall and did some door-knocking, and by Autumn 1977 they 
had secured a membership of 61 households who elected a committee of fifteen 
who met monthly and reported back to the community.38 In December that 
year, they registered legally as a co-op—a Friendly Society—and appointed 
CDS as their secondary agency, who helped them negotiate with the council 
for a site and the Housing Corporation for grant funding. Weller Street, like 
many communities across inner-city Liverpool, had a deeply antagonistic 
relationship with the ‘Corpy’ and sought greater autonomy from council 
control. When they finally acquired from the council their new site for the 
co-op in 1979, two years after the first community co-op meeting, a new 
slogan was scrawled across a wall: THIS LAND NOW BELONGS TO THE 
PEOPLE.39
Unlike the early rehab co-ops, the Weller model was fully mutual, with 
all and only residents represented as members, as joint collective owners—the 
most fully realised form of cooperative. Non-mutual rehab co-ops were led 
by local professionals who had indirect personal interests in the rehabilitation 
projects, as a CDS development manager attests:
The early housing associations formed in the early ’70s were actually 
formed by architects and surveyors and lawyers who saw it as being a 
37 Ken Rogers, Lost Tribe: The People’s Memories: 2 (Trinity Mirror North West and North 
Wales, 2012); Rogers, The Lost Tribe of Everton and Scottie Road.
38 Gibson, Counterweight: The Neighbourhood Option, p. 21.
39 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 137.
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pretty good way of getting a load of business, and at that time there 
wasn’t a rule that said that they couldn’t earn money out of it.
This interest often included protecting their own homes from demolition, if 
situated in nearby clearance zones, and furthering their professional careers in 
the housing sector. Tenants were given more choice over the design of archi-
tectural improvements for their homes, and Neighbourhood Housing Services 
was more open and responsive to tenant preferences than their private landlord 
predecessors or housing association competitors. But the secondary organi-
sation effectively maintained a monopoly in architectural and housing services. 
Whilst residents had some say over cosmetic design issues, there was no real 
choice between agencies, nor was education in cooperative principles suffi-
ciently realised. Real power over the process remained with Neighbourhood 
Housing Services and its managing team of professionals rather than with 
residents themselves, treated more like powerless tenants than the collective 
landlords they were meant to be.
During their bid for preferred partner status in rehab zones, Neighbourhood 
Housing Services committee members talked of “buying property over the 
heads of tenants and then pretending that you are a co-op”.40 This top-down 
strategy led to rehab co-ops being scattered or ‘pepper-potted’ throughout an 
area rather than clustered together as a tight-knit community at street scale. 
This resembled the structure developed by housing associations or speculative 
landlords more than by co-ops, which rely on spatial proximity for cooperative 
relations. Corn and Yates Streets Co-op, however, was the exception that 
proved the rule. Residents here were tightly clustered within the two titular 
parallel terraced streets, which they successfully campaigned to save from 
demolition. But the power to exert collective control was to truly assert itself 
with the innovation of the new-build model—co-produced by CDS profes-
sionals and Weller Street residents through a mutual learning process instilling 
dweller control in almost every aspect of housing: from planning and design 
to ownership and management. 
You Hold the Pen, We’ll Tell You What to Draw!
‘The Weller Way’ of doing new-build co-ops relocated control from external 
professionals to users themselves in a process first innovated by CDS with 
Weller Street but later adopted by other secondary organisations and groups:
(1) Residents of slum clearance areas self-organise into cooperatives as 
a means of being rehoused without being displaced.
40 Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”, p. 127.
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(2) A secondary organisation (e.g., CDS) helps the co-op identify a site, 
acquire land and apply for funding from the council or Housing 
Corporation.
(3) The secondary organisation works closely with co-op residents on 
education and training in a range of essential skills and knowledge, 
such as the planning process, interviewing, chairing meetings, 
accounting. 
(4) The secondary organisation advises the co-op on suitable local firms 
and contractors, and co-op residents select a shortlist of competing 
agencies and then personally interviews them. 
(5) Co-op residents are given the chance to select their preferred 
secondary organisation, aside from CDS, as their development 
agency to build, manage and advise on the project, as well as 
choosing their preferred architect. 
(6) Residents work closely with their chosen architect to design a scheme 
according to community preferences through tenant participation. 
(7) The final design reflects local needs but must meet Housing 
Corporation regulations to be eligible for funding, with tenants 
paying ‘fair rents’. 
Whilst this might seem relatively straightforward on paper, in reality it 
involved jumping through multiple hoops in a complex bureaucratic process:
(1) Registering as a friendly society (the legal form of a co-op) under 
Industrial and Provident Societies legislation.
(2) Registering with the Housing Corporation as a housing association 
capable of providing social housing, and receiving state funding.
(3) Making a formal application to the Housing Corporation for HAG 
funding for land acquisition and development.
(4) Negotiating contracts with architects, developers, building suppliers, 
accountants and other professionals.
(5) Negotiating with the council the number of council nominees for 
allocations, which was often set at 50 per cent if the council had 
part-funded development.
(6) Working with architects and developers to design and build the 
scheme according to planning regulations.
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(7) Managing the co-op according to regulations pertaining to public 
grant obligations, such as developing a formal allocations policy 
which houses people according to need and on ‘fair rents’, and 
dealing with rent arrears and other legal complications.
For the Weller Street Co-op, hoop number five proved particularly tricky: 
the sites available were already almost too small to fit enough new homes for 
the entire community to live together, let alone additional council nominees. 
CDS chief executive, Catherine Meredith, ardently supported the co-op in 
council meetings, persuading them to give Weller Street full control over 
their own allocations. This is just one example of how secondaries like CDS 
were vitally important for helping co-op groups navigate the many pitfalls in 
this bureaucratic journey. Much of the political brokering, technical expertise 
and administrative oversight came from CDS. They became an indispensable 
source of professional prowess and cooperative idealism for helping Weller 
Street residents—and, subsequently, dozens of other communities—achieve 
their goal of collective dweller control. 
Notwithstanding the crucial administrative, educational and support role 
played by CDS in the successful development of new-build co-ops, the energy 
for the Weller Street campaign grew from the grassroots. The community 
was determined to be rehoused locally, together, rather than displaced to an 
outer estate by the council slum clearance programme. Developing a co-op 
in your neighbourhood required extraordinary energy, time and dedication 
throughout a long and arduous process, which could often take four years 
to complete. This was an all-consuming and exhausting process for many 
involved, but one which produced some amazing unforeseen benefits. In The 
Weller Way,41 Alan McDonald, a CDS worker who worked with Weller Street 
residents (and whose first-hand account I draw on as my main secondary 
source), renders a rich description of the campaign process: attending 
countless seemingly endless meetings after work; piling into cars in search of 
suitable empty sites across the locality; presenting site surveys to the council; 
petitioning local Labour councillors to back bids to acquire public land. Then 
there were the more formal committee meetings with CDS, interviewing 
architects and builders, and working with them on a weekly basis thereafter. 
According to the Weller Street Co-op’s architect, Bill Halsall, this involved 
“late night debates in the pub … like three nights a week in the pub, getting 
it going in the early phases”. Halsall goes on to reveal how the
Intensity of what people were going through was at one level very 
exciting for all of us, but it was also kind of very destructive, you know, 
destructive of marriages … It was a high pressure cooker. At the time 
41 McDonald, The Weller Way.
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obviously people were living in a slum, so you can imagine a lot of 
domestic tensions and uncertainties.
Maintaining a high level of input over a long period, keeping the whole 
community faithful to the project, whilst also sustaining personal domestic life, 
was all the more stressful what with constant doubt and the niggling feeling that 
it was an experiment, that it might not even work. Tony Gibson concurs: “They 
told me that among the management committee membership there was not a 
single marriage which had not been at risk as a result of the tensions that the 
work imposed”.42 Whilst campaigning placed great strain on people’s lives—the 
threat of burnout or domestic division a lingering presence—it also brought 
people together in solidarity, strengthening the community in common cause. 
It garnered trust between members, forged new friendships and deepened 
old ties—helping the co-op survive and flourish long after the more exciting 
development period was over. It also created mutually beneficial relationships 
between residents and professionals—each exposed to different perspectives 
and ways of working. This was helped by the fact that Weller Street, and the 
following first few new-build co-ops, were established exclusively in cohesive 
working-class communities with strong familial, kinship, cultural and religious 
ties, of overwhelmingly English, Welsh and Irish ethnic origin. There are 
sharp divisions between Granby—renowned for being the most multicultural 
area of the city, with the oldest black community in the UK—and the Dingle 
part of Toxteth, nearer the Mersey and the docks, where Weller Street and 
many of the new builds are located. No new-build co-op ever developed in 
Granby—perhaps because the early work of SNAP helped save and rehabilitate 
the artisanal housing stock, of higher quality than the smaller, denser terraces 
in the Dingle. More multicultural and diverse campaigns for mutual housing 
were to emerge several decades later, with Granby CLT.
Central to the success of Weller Street Co-op was strong leadership. A tradi-
tionally gendered image of a strong male leader silhouetted a common military 
metaphor used to describe new-build co-op campaigning. Many participants I 
spoke to likened the campaign process to a “battle” with the authorities; their 
male activists to “dictators” or “war leaders”. McDonald cites similar examples 
in his study: the transition from campaign to management characterised as that 
“from the ‘military’ administration to the ‘civil’ one”.43 Once the war was over, 
the skills of leadership required would be very different, calling for peacetime 
leaders to take over day-to-day management: “Like Churchill, he [Billy Floyd, 
Weller Street’s Chairman] was a warmonger; he was all right while the battle 
was going on; in peacetime maybe somebody else should lead”.44 
42 Gibson, Counterweight: The Neighbourhood Option, p. 23.
43 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 203.
44 Weller Street resident, quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 177.
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Such wartime leaders were crucial to the success of co-ops, using their 
authority to persuade powerful political figures to support their respective 
campaigns as well as convincing key gatekeepers to open doors to land, 
funding and planning permission. These ‘warmongers’ were strong-willed 
men with untapped skills in organisation and leadership, often employed 
on the docks—or whose fathers had been—and infused in local traditions 
of worker organisation and trade unionism, proving transferable talents 
for community organising. A fascinating possibility—implied by Liverpool 
scholars such as John Belchem,45 Mark O’Brien,46 Tony Lane47 and Alan 
Southern48 but requiring deeper historical investigation—is that Liverpool’s 
encounter with anarcho-syndicalism, brought here in the early twentieth 
century through maritime contact with Spain’s anarchist movement and the 
Industrial Workers of the World in the USA, had influenced local culture and 
traditions of political revolt and trade unionism (in the sphere of production) 
and, in turn, community organising and housing activism (in the sphere 
of social reproduction). What else could account for the radical edge of 
Liverpool’s distinctive working-class culture, versed in spontaneous direct 
action and anti-authoritarian contrariness?
If such an influence can be seen to animate the co-op campaigns, it is 
less direct than indirect. Weller Street leader Billy Floyd was not a docker 
but a milkman, who, Bill Halsall told me, was “up at four in the morning 
delivering milk, and then finishing eleven or twelve at night, after the end of 
meetings: long, alcohol-fuelled meetings”. Men like Billy were suddenly given 
the chance to flex their dormant skills and capabilities, wasted in their previous 
life. As one professional working closely with Weller Street remarks, co-op 
campaigners had been “lost in their day jobs until they found a vehicle. So the 
co-op process was a kind of a university for some people. In the same way that 
the trade union movement was a university for other people”.
This process of empowerment and political awakening is evident throughout 
the rank-and-file members and remains one of the most remarkable and lasting 
contributions co-ops made to life in Liverpool. However, many of the benefits, 
and certainly the power, accrued to those in leadership positions: sitting 
45 John Belchem and Bryan Biggs, eds, Liverpool: City of Radicals (Liverpool University 
Press, 2011). 
46 Mark O’Brien, “Liverpool 1911 and Its Era: Foundational Myth or Authentic 
Tradition”, in John Belchem and Bryan Biggs, eds, Liverpool: City of Radicals (Liverpool 
University Press, 2011), pp. 140–158.
47 Tony Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, 2nd ed. (Liverpool University Press, 1997).
48 Alan Southern, “Enterprise, Wealth Creation and Place: A Case Study of the Liverpool 
City-Region”, in Lee Pugalis and Joyce Liddle, eds, Enterprising Places: Leadership and 
Governance Networks, Contemporary Issues in Entrepreneurship Research, 3 (Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited, 2014), pp. 227–257.
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awkwardly, incompatibly even, with cooperative principles of participation, 
democracy and equity. Weller Street was marked by a problematic division 
between general membership and leadership, the self-appointed representa-
tives speaking and acting on behalf of the rest: “The co-op, in its development 
period, was clearly more a ‘collective’ than a broadly-based democratic organi-
sation. Members put their trust in a leadership, an inner cabinet that they 
believed represented them”.49
This ‘inner cabinet’—or ‘war cabinet’—was composed of a management 
committee led by Billy Floyd, with three main specialist sub-committees, 
each deciding on different design and development issues. Despite efforts, 
largely on the part of women, to encourage other residents to get involved, 
the committee failed to inspire much interest from the general membership, 
resulting in Weller Street “operating on two levels: the committee involved in 
the ‘co-op idea’ [and] the general membership in it for a house”.50 But it was 
the female members who played a fundamentally important role in holding the 
co-op together despite this bifurcation. They tended to run the committees, 
rally the community, communicate information, gather opinion and sustain 
the tight-knit communitarianism “connected with the women’s network on 
the streets”51 that would nourish the lifeblood of cooperative governance. 
True of most co-ops across Liverpool, “generally speaking the men were the 
figureheads … the women were the people who made it work”.52 A Liberal 
councillor at the time concurs, in interview, that Liverpool in the 1970s, 
particularly neighbourhoods in the south end, was a “matriarchal society”. 
Whilst the community, spearheaded by strong leadership, was the driving 
force of co-op campaigns, it was their interaction with key professionals 
committed to cooperative ideals that would prove so fertile a ground for 
social innovation. CDS was central to the development of an intensive 
participatory design process unprecedented in public housing. Its small team 
of architects, housing officers and community workers were, according to 
an outside observer from a housing association, “sparky individuals with 
enquiring minds”, passionate about cooperative housing, carefully selected by 
Catherine Meredith, who had become director of the Liverpool branch before 
its independence. Meredith’s management philosophy was to bring a diverse 
group of creative people together for a uniquely inventive and resourceful 
working culture in finding solutions to tough housing problems. One of those 
recruited was Paul Lusk, who “took on most of the ‘educational’ work with the 
[Weller Street] co-op”.53 Such an inquisitive and experimental problem-solving 
49 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 201.
50 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 104.
51 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 175.
52 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 104.
53 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 73.
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style was critically important in the task of developing new-build co-ops from 
a blank page. 
The learning process was ad hoc, auto-didactical, driven through mutual 
exchange between CDS workers and co-op residents. Lusk admits that “none 
of us knew anything about new-build. We were sitting there desperately 
trying to find books about new-build”.54 Whilst the initial co-op idea came 
from CDS, the design of the housing development process was the result 
of a creative collision with resident needs and desires. Residents demanded 
they appoint their own architect. This not only put working-class people in a 
newly powerful position as clients, but also radically redrew the coordinates 
of the traditional architect–client professional relationship. CDS’s role, says a 
contemporaneous housing association officer, was “not to provide residents all 
the assistance they wanted, it was actually to provide them with mentoring 
guidance, so that they were able to organise themselves as entities”. Thus CDS 
was more ‘enabler’ than ‘adviser’. 
The agency had a seminal role to play in educating and training residents 
with the requisite skills and confidence to ‘do-it-themselves’. A CDS devel-
opment manager explains how they “developed a set of training packages for 
doing architect interviews; because how does someone without any background 
in that sort of stuff interview an architect?” Four local architectural practices 
were involved in bidding for and delivering co-op schemes, including Brock 
Carmichael Associates, Innes Wilkin Ainsley Gommon, McDonnell Hughes 
and Wilkinson, Hindle and Partners. The last were chosen by Weller Street, 
and one young recruit in particular, Bill Halsall, was to be their architect 
and go on to design many of Liverpool’s new-build co-ops, including the 
Eldonians. Bill was brought up in Liverpool with a loyal sense of place, not 
long out of Liverpool University, influenced by radical ideas associated with 
the emerging ‘community architecture’ movement. This was a loose coalition 
of minority interests within the architecture profession but with strong links 
into wider community resistance and alternative experiments in cooperative 
and self-help housing of the early 1970s, including SNAP and Neighbourhood 
Housing Services in Granby.55 Probably the leading figure in Liverpool’s 
new-build co-op participatory design methods, Halsall’s thinking was shaped 
early on by SNAP. He describes how his “former partner Dave Wilkinson was 
the architect with SNAP, and as a young idealistic student I got involved with 
SNAP, on a voluntary basis”. Indeed, SNAP was a fecund seedbed for co-op 
activists and professionals, as a co-op officer explains: “A lot of the architects, 
landscape architects—the ‘urban discontents’—all worked for SNAP; and the 
54 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 73.
55 Towers, Building Democracy: Community Architecture in the Inner Cities; Nick Wates and 
Charles Knevitt, Community Architecture: How People Are Creating Their Own Environment 
(Penguin Books, 1987). 
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early generation of all those people who worked then with the co-ops were 
around and were graduates of the SNAP programme”.
With the election of self-build pioneer Rod Hackney as Royal Institute 
of British Architects (RIBA) President in 1987, coupled with (or perhaps in 
spite of) Prince Charles’ endorsement, the community architecture movement 
gained considerable influence.56 Prince Charles, surprisingly enough, was a key 
ally of Liverpool’s co-ops, writing the foreword to McDonald’s The Weller Way, 
for instance. However, the label was not something consciously identified with 
at the time, as Halsall explains: “Community architecture was not a phrase 
that we used, because we wanted to be architects, real architects … I always 
felt community architecture was a way to say, ‘well you do that bit, we’ll get 
on with the main act’”. 
Participatory design was about architecture being self-designed, self-built 
and self-defined—by users themselves—not labelled condescendingly as a 
‘community’ offshoot of an elite profession. Nonetheless, the community 
architecture movement was to gain much of its shape from cooperative 
experiments in Liverpool. Halsall’s work with Weller Street Co-op pioneered 
the radical participatory design process with which community architecture 
sought to associate itself. This involved participatory techniques and ‘planning 
for real’ exercises aiming to traverse the wall—for so long maintained by 
the architecture profession, not least RIBA—between technical architectural 
knowledge and lived experience of residents. 
Just as the CDS–co-op relationship involved an intensive mutual learning 
process, so too was the architectural education more a dialogical interaction 
than didactical lecture. The architect was to learn as much about residents’ 
needs and desires as the latter were to understand design possibilities and 
constraints. This enabled particular obstacles in understanding to be easily 
surmounted. A common confusion was the location of the ‘kitchen’ in two-up 
two-down terraces, which in working-class Liverpool could refer to either the 
living room, the ‘front kitchen’, where the cooking was traditionally done, or 
the ‘back kitchen’, which was more of a scullery. By simply engaging residents 
in modelling exercises such misunderstandings were easily overcome. The 
resulting design (see Figure 2) reflected residents’ desires and aspirations, and 
better responded to their need for more durable and manageable dwellings.
Skills learnt in the co-op campaigns could be life-changing. Working-class 
people otherwise denied access to the professional discourses and mores of 
architects and planners were suddenly immersed in these alien worlds, picking 
up new knowledge and skills which would help them in their own lives. 
What might have initially seemed alienating and intimidating jargon—‘cost 
yardsticks’ and the like—was absorbed and put to good use in negotiations 
with professionals. Turning power relations on their head, individual members 
56 Wates and Knevitt, Community Architecture.
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grasped the tools to expand their aptitudes and open opportunities to new 
areas of employment. The secretary of Mill Street Co-op, for instance, 
explains how a CDS development manager
Got a secretarial job in an architect’s office, not the architect who had 
done the work, but a different architect, because of what she learned: 
she’d minuted meetings, she’d explored the options for bricks and joist 
and roof tiles and goodness knows what.
Empowerment was not simply a matter of education and skills, but also of 
power, confidence, self-belief, identity and personal growth. Co-op devel-
opment was like a “kind of political school” for many members who, inspired 
by co-op campaigning to enter politics full-time, stood for local election 
to represent the interests of their communities as councillors. One of the 
significant examples was Phil Hughes, the Treasurer of Weller Street, who 
was elected as a Labour councillor and eventually Chair of Housing following 
the fall of the Militant-led administration, helping later co-op campaigns to 
acquire public land.57 I explore this remarkable turn of events in the final 
chapter of this part.
57 Tim Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, ROOF 12.6 (1987).
Figure 2 “Utalitarian” community architecture of the Weller Street Co-op.
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Competition: The Counterintuitive Component of Cooperativism
Another key innovation of the new-build model was the level of choice 
residents enjoyed in selecting their own agents and architects from competing 
firms. “A really big factor in the new-build co-ops was”, Paul Lusk claims, “the 
competitive market”. He continues:
If we had been reliant on the architectural services that were provided 
by the CDS in London, and then by Neighbourhood Housing Services, 
the new-build co-ops would never have got off the ground. Those guys 
would never have gone out to evening meetings and listen to a bunch 
of residents … The competitive market has got to be intrinsic to 
empowerment. It was because those private architects were competing 
with each other for the work, that they were prepared to go so far out 
of their way.
Lusk’s seemingly contradictory assessment—that competitive markets played 
a central role in achieving greater user control in cooperative development—
does not necessarily imply a capitalist model of competition based on the profit 
motive alone. The motivations of firms involved appeared to be a strange mix 
of political idealism and seeking status and prestige. Architects in particular 
placed themselves under great pressure to deliver participatory design, which 
involved countless extra hours and voluntary work from staff, generally working 
for nothing until the site was purchased. Some firms worked for two years 
without fees returned.58 Most did not receive any payment until at least ten 
meetings into the process, with 15 per cent greater costs than their average 
housing projects.59 New-build co-ops required great personal dedication and 
time commitments from their architects and co-op development workers alike. 
Yet local architects nonetheless competed for the work, believing the process to 
be worthwhile and enjoyable, for releasing the architectural imagination from 
the straitjacket of council housing and placing it in the service of the user.
Moreover, CDS’s introduction of a market in architectural services was 
not only important for user choice but for the financial viability of secondary 
agencies themselves. Neighbourhood Housing Services, which used a monopoly 
model for secondary services, employing in-house architects and surveyors, was 
left dependent on its original rehab co-ops. In failing to expand and diversify 
its customer base, develop its own assets or compete for new contracts with 
the new-build co-ops, Neighbourhood Housing Services eventually went 
under.60 Closing in 1987, its clients were shared out amongst Merseyside 
58 Wates, “The Liverpool Breakthrough: Or Public Sector Housing Phase 2”.
59 Hugh Anderson, “Co-op Dividends”, Architects’ Journal (18 July 1984).
60 Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”.
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Improved Houses (MIH) and Liverpool Housing Trust (LHT), as well as 
CDS. These housing associations were, however, keen to compete for the 
new business CDS had initially opened up, despite the commonly held belief, 
according to a former LHT officer, that “CDS were quite territorial about the 
idea”. CDS’s main rival was MIH, whose chief executive, Barry Natton, was 
locked into a competitive rivalry for prestige with CDS’s Catherine Meredith. 
Tom Clay, who had started his career as in-house architect for Neighbourhood 
Housing Services, left the organisation for its lack of interest in competing for 
new business, and joined MIH, becoming Development Director, and bringing 
with him experience and commitment in co-op development. Another key 
figure was Jack McBane, a Canadian community development worker who told 
me he had his first glimpse of how co-ops could revolutionise public housing 
whilst working in London borough councils before being hired by MIH. He 
went on to help develop the Eldonian Village, writing the principal historical 
account of their achievements.61 I explore their co-op campaign and successful 
development of a Community Development Trust in Part III. Jack explains that
one of the critical things about MIH—and they weren’t alone—was 
they were willing to use some of their surplus money (there was a lot 
of surplus money around in those days for housing associations to do 
innovative stuff) and they were really quite courageous in allowing that 
to happen. So they had for example a special projects team that I was 
put in, I was hired as co-op project manager.
After visiting the Weller Street Co-op and south end co-ops for inspiration, 
McBane realised that “the deal here is new-build, and it was pretty much 
agreed [with Natton] that the MIH co-ops would be in north Liverpool”. 
Unlike the first new-build co-ops, who approached CDS for help, McBane 
claims how, at least for MIH co-ops, the “very initial push came from me”, 
knocking on doors of council tenants in clearance areas and asking, “Would 
you like to be involved in what your house looks like?” These residents were 
already organising against the threat of displacement, but it was Jack’s enthu-
siasm for, coupled with MIH’s commitment to, the co-op idea that opened this 
up as a realistic possibility. Thirlmere Co-op was established in 1980, and this 
helped persuade from their initial scepticism residents of another clearance 
zone, in Leta and Claudia Streets. Leta-Claudia Co-op was established in the 
same year—both based on the Weller Way model and likewise designed by 
Bill Halsall. 
The new-build co-op model was so successful that within a few years of 
Weller Street’s completion a further ten co-ops were replicating the model. 
61 Jack McBane, The Rebirth of Liverpool: The Eldonian Way (Liverpool University Press, 
2008).
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Hot on their heels was Hesketh Street, another CDS-supported co-op built 
on land that the council had initially offered to Weller Street residents, who 
turned it down due to size constraints. Hesketh Street residents had likewise 
come from slum terraces assigned for demolition and were funded directly 
by the Housing Corporation, relying on support from the Director of its 
northwest regional division, Max Steinberg. Together, Weller and Hesketh 
represented the vanguard of new-build co-ops, with a strong communal 
identity and collective will, headed by an ideologically motivated leadership, 
to stay together as a community and become politically self-governing.
The later new-build co-ops, however, tended to emerge from different 
housing contexts from the nineteenth-century terraced streets of Hesketh, 
Weller, Thirlmere and Leta-Claudia. This second wave of new-build co-op 
campaigning arose in the municipal tenements built in roughly four phases.62 
The first phase were pre-war perimeter block tenements, including one of the 
world’s first examples of prefabricated concrete housing, at Eldon Street in 
1905. The second, inter-war period, during the 1930s, saw the construction 
of monumental art deco tenement blocks, inspired by site visits made by 
Liverpool’s city architect and housing director to Vienna. Third, the post-war 
phase consisted of three-storey ‘walk-up’ tenements built in the 1940s and 
1950s on infill sites left over by war damage or pre-war clearance. The fourth 
and final phase comprised the four- and five-storey flats and notorious tower 
blocks, such as the Piggeries, built to replace terraced housing in the compre-
hensive redevelopment of the 1960s. Although much of the terraced housing 
was in good enough condition to rehabilitate, tenement blocks were by the 
1970s in need of a drastic overhaul, and so the ‘slum clearance programme’ 
was rearticulated as the Liberals’ ‘tenement rehousing programme’.63 Out of 
this came the second wave of new-build co-ops. Unlike the earlier and more 
recent collective housing activism, such as the rehab co-ops and contem-
porary CLTs, these co-op initiatives were almost unanimously pro-demolition. 
The first was Prince Albert Gardens in the south end, formed in 1979 and 
completed in 1983; shortly followed by other tenement-based co-ops, such 
as Dingle and Mill Street and Shorefields. Bill Taylor, a CDS manager in the 
1980s, explains:
The people on these two [Mill Street and Shorefields co-ops] were 
living in really appalling conditions—mostly four or five storey walk 
up deck access flats. I’m from a northern steel town and I’d previously 
worked in St Ann’s in Nottingham and in Brixton, but these flats really 
62 Tim Mars, “Housing in Liverpool 8”, ROOF 6.5 (1981); Mars, “Mersey Tunnel 
Vision?”; Anne Grosskurth, “Bringing Back the Braddocks”, ROOF 10.1 (1985): 19–23; 
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63 McBane, The Rebirth of Liverpool.
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shocked me. To be frank, they were inhuman, and the council had not 
invested in them through lack of resources or whatever. Although the 
brick structures were probably sound, though in disrepair, their facil-
ities, like kitchens, and heating systems, were really poor—probably 
not much better than the Victorian slums that people had left to move 
into them originally.
In part, the cooperative movement was a pragmatic popular response to 
these conditions. An ex-council officer believes that, during this new-build 
second-wave period, “The co-operative movement grew because our housing 
offer was just awful: the waiting lists were huge, we had squatters coming out 
of our ears and we couldn’t manage voids”. Her colleague agrees, indicating 
the scale of unmet housing needs and remembering how would-be tenants 
turned to desperate measures:
Well, people on the waiting list used to just open up voids and just let 
themselves in. At one stage we had three or four hundred squatters … 
it was madness! So you can see why the co-operative movement was 
ripe really: “these won’t do it for us, let’s do it ourselves!”
Two relatively distinct phases therefore mark the new-build co-op movement: 
the first arising from ‘slum’ terraces among tightly knit communities who 
wanted above all to be rehoused together; the second emanating from dissat-
isfaction with housing conditions in the tenements built only a few decades 
earlier. Why had the municipal tenements deteriorated so rapidly? A large part 
of the problem was insufficient public funding for maintenance. This was not 
a flaw in the architecture itself or the design per se, but the result of careless 
treatment and deficient investment following construction. Depending on your 
political perspective, you can lay the blame at either too much public inter-
vention in housing or too little. Owing to unique circumstances in Liverpool 
in the 1970s, in which neither perspective was able to hold sway over public 




Diluting the Cooperative Revolution? 
5: Liberal Compromises 
Through the 1970s, Liverpool suffered political inertia—lacking majority 
party control or clear leadership in the ‘hung’ council administrations of 
1973–83. In what has been dubbed Liverpool’s ‘lost decade’, too little 
was done to rectify the city’s worsening economic and housing problems.1 
The Liberals exercised some overall control over this decade, but did 
little to abate deteriorating council-housing conditions, pursuing a policy 
of municipal retrenchment. By 1979, all new council house building was 
completely halted by the Liberals—despite 12,000 people on council 
waiting lists and 10,000 awaiting transfer;2 and around 25,000 increasingly 
dilapidated dwellings, a third of the stock, classified as ‘hard to let’.3 Given 
such worsening conditions, there is an obvious question to ask: why did the 
Liberals let this happen?
After nearly two decades of Labour control, the Liberals came out of 
nowhere in 1973 to beat both main parties as the controlling force on 
Liverpool City Council. This extraordinary electoral success was largely 
founded on Labour’s failures, yet it was also down to clever tactics of capturing 
votes where the main parties were weakest, thereby making housing the main 
political battleground, as Michael Parkinson suggests: “The in-joke went that 
the Liberals had only one housing strategy—to build houses for sale in Labour 
wards and houses for rent in Tory wards”.4
Resources were consequently concentrated into a private sector renewal 
strategy complemented by housing co-ops in potential Liberal wards, diverting 
limited funds away from existing public sector housing to do so. Yet there is 
no evidence that co-operative membership itself secured the Liberals any more 
votes. Most co-op members were traditional Labour voters and remained so 
after establishing a co-op; a few even went on to become Labour councillors, 
1 Michael Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts 
(Policy Journals Ltd, 1985).
2 Anne Grosskurth, “Bringing Back the Braddocks”, ROOF 10.1 (1985): 19–23.
3 Nick Wates, “Co-op Consolidation”, Architectural Review (Apr. 1985).
4 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts, p. 21.
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notably Weller Street’s Phil Hughes and Peter Tyrell and the Eldonians’ 
Margaret Clark and John Livingstone.5
A more convincing explanation—than policy distorted by the Liberal’s 
electoral ambitions—is the lack of policy altogether. Council housing strategy 
was paralysed by the peculiar political settlement—or unsettlement—
produced by electoral stalemate. The ‘lost decade’, in which no one party 
had an absolute majority, resulted in minority administrations having to forge 
precarious coalitions. For the Liberals this meant the Conservatives. For four 
of these years, Labour was the largest party but refused to take control of a 
minority administration, leaving a fragile Liberal–Tory alliance to rule, but 
without sufficiently shared politics or coherent an agenda to push through 
necessary reforms. Conflict between parties over budgets meant that plans 
could not be made. Particularly controversial was the Liberal’s 1975/76 
budget, which used some of the additional £21 million central government 
funds allocated to Liverpool to top up revenue from local ‘rates’ actually to 
cut council taxes instead of supporting services like council housing.6 The 
anger this instilled on the Left helped sow the seeds for the backlash within 
the Labour Party, ushering in a Militant Tendency-led Labour Council which 
pursued a high-spending municipal socialist programme7—including the 
municipalisation of co-ops—a subject I explore in the next chapter.
The reasons for this curious turn of events are revealed as we dig deeper 
into the party politics of the era. The Liberals were opposed to the notion 
of a unitary bureaucratic authority meeting housing needs for all. They 
opposed council control over tenant choices and monopolisation of mainte-
nance services—believing this to be costly, inefficient and paternalistic and 
damaging to citizen capabilities to manage their own lives. Liberals such as 
Richard Kemp, who was Chair of the Housing Committee from 1979 to 
1981, and Chris Davies, Kemp’s Deputy who succeeded him as Chair, laid the 
housing crisis at the door of a bloated bureaucracy. This was held to be too 
unwieldy and distant to manage properly the ninety thousand or so properties 
owned by the council, which, according to Parkinson, “had virtually become 
a ‘slumlord’”.8 Specifically, they located the problem in the heavily unionised 
and politically powerful Works Department—“the inefficient and poorly-
managed direct labour organisation which maintains council houses”9—which 
5 Paul Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights: The 
Liverpool New-Build Housing Co-operative Movement”, unpublished thesis, Salford 
University, 1998.
6 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts, p. 28.
7 Diane Frost and Peter North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013).
8 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts, p. 19.
9 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts, p. 23.
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was leaving a backlog of repairs and failing to deliver decent services for 
tenants. Richard Kemp admits to me that “repairs cost us a fortune, we didn’t 
manage our stock properly”, and that such a state of affairs contributed to the 
Liberals’ refusal to build more council housing: 
I used to go to public meetings and say, “We’re such a bad landlord I’m 
not going to build anymore except special needs and specific ones”, and 
that’s what we did for three years … Everything that we then put in 
new was housing cooperatives.
For a city substantially housed by the council and relying on in-house services 
for the upkeep of their homes, the Works Department enjoyed a surprisingly 
powerful position in city politics—threatening strike if its budget was cut, 
which in turn might inspire mass protest, or at the least incite the city’s other 
trade unions to strike. This was at a time when public sector employment had 
become a crucial counterweight to Liverpool’s evaporating port economy. Over 
a third of the city’s working population was employed by the public sector; a 
third of these in turn employed directly by the council.10 “Every 100th person 
in Liverpool”, Kemp exclaims, “was employed in the Works Department!” 
Whilst the housing revenue budget for maintenance went mostly to the 
Works Department, the capital budget for new building was controlled by 
council committees. This apportionment of political control over public 
resources created an interesting dynamic for co-op housing. The Works 
Department was understandably opposed to working on rehabilitating council-
owned terraced housing for co-ops, funded out of the revenue budget. This 
diversion of funds out of council housing and into the third sector translated 
into a loss of future work. Tenants of the rehab co-ops would no longer be 
tied into maintenance jobs with the Works Department—they could choose 
their own contractors. The Liverpool Labour Party—alongside the labour 
movement—opposed co-ops precisely for this reason: their potential power 
to weaken the trade unions and liberate what was once guaranteed work 
for the public sector into open competition with the private and voluntary 
sectors. Thus the Works Department, according to Chris Davies, “threatened 
to go on strike immediately if we did this [diverted council budgets towards 
rehab co-op housing] because it would be a chink in their armour”. This made 
rehabilitation politically difficult—and may account for the policy shift away 
from rehab co-ops towards new build, funded out of the Liberal-controlled 
capital budget rather than union-controlled revenue budget. So long as the 
Liberals could win a vote in the housing committee through their loose 
alliance with the Conservatives, Davies concludes, the capital budget could 
nonetheless be diverted to co-operative and housing association schemes.
10 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts, p. 13.
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You Can Have Any House You Like  
So Long as It’s a New-Build Co-op
Thus Liberal policy came to be geared around circumventing problems 
associated with council management of housing by expanding alternative 
forms. Moreover, they had come to power on the back of Labour losing 
working-class voters opposed to the slum clearance programme and frustrated 
with the poor service of council house maintenance. Liberal housing policy 
was a three-pronged approach. First, they promoted the development of 
private houses for sale on council-owned land around the city centre, for the 
first time since the 1920s, in a bid to end the council’s century-long obsession 
with tenement-building. Aiming to instil a new social mix, this was augmented 
by a policy of selling off council homes to tenants, presaging Thatcher’s 
Right to Buy and New Labour’s Mixed Communities agenda. Second, they 
shifted from demolition to rehabilitation. Building on the work of SNAP and 
utilising the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts, the Liberals rehabilitated over thirty 
thousand terraced homes though the country’s largest Housing Action Area 
programme and housing association sector outside London. Third, as part of 
this strategy, housing co-operatives were to be, says Chris Davies, the “icing 
on the cake, they were the Public Sector 2.0—a Liberal approach to public 
sector housing in the inner city”. 
However, the Liberals’ policy approach was by no means a coherent or 
systematic programme: described by Parkinson as “one-legged only”11 for its 
overemphasis on developing the private sector at the expense—neglect even—
of municipal ownership. On the other hand, it was passionately informed by 
liberal ideals for dweller control, choice and self-government—and this trans-
lated into one of the most favourable co-op housing regimes in the UK. But 
such a lucid ideology was strangely distorted by a lopsided housing strategy. 
Richard Kemp acknowledges their motivations were an incongruous mix of “a 
high blown Liberal viewpoint that people can and should be able to run their 
own lives”, and a “response to the practicalities”. He continues: “We didn’t 
want to throw good money after bad; we knew that if we provided more 
council housing it would be useful, but it wouldn’t be as cost effective or as 
good as finding other ways of doing it”. 
In this way, the Liberals gradually abandoned council house building, 
switching the ‘tenement rehousing programme’ towards new-build co-ops. 
Their inability to reform the Works Department for better maintenance 
services further fuelled the physical deterioration of the tenements. An 
increased demand for rehousing coincided with a diminution of options to 
just one, with perverse consequences. By presenting co-ops as the only route 
for Corpy tenants to be rehoused, the Liberals inadvertently created a surge 
11 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts, p. 21.
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in demand that slammed up against tight fiscal limits. Chris Davies reveals 
the impact:
It started to snowball … more and more groups started to come to us 
in the course of this period, saying “We’d like a new house please, we 
know that if we form a co-op, we can get one”. OK that goes so far, 
but there’s also a limited amount of money.
Money was limited for a number of reasons.12 First, new-build co-ops 
were much more expensive than rehab, owing to greater costs incurred in 
demolition, design, land assembly, construction and development. Second, the 
Housing Corporation’s budget was cut and the Cooperative Housing Agency—
the subsidiary agency Harold Campbell set up to support co-op growth—was 
closed down in 1979. Third, this meant funding for the co-ops had to come 
increasingly from the council, with only Weller and Hesketh Street getting 
through the Housing Corporation funding process before an expenditure 
moratorium was imposed in 1980 by the new Conservative government. 
Hesketh Street found itself caught up in the uncertainty, with development put 
on hold whilst replacement funding streams were secured from the council. 
From then on, all co-ops were funded predominantly by Liverpool City 
Council, but whose housing budget was tightly constricted by the Liberals, 
responding to these strange and complicated political circumstances unique 
to Liverpool in the 1970s. 
Despite the principle of choice underpinning the Liberal overhaul of 
public housing, their policies had the paradoxical effect of reducing choice 
to just one underfunded alternative. This undermined the foundations of the 
entire co-op movement—built on the ethos of co-operability and the active 
cooperation among members. This is formulated in the Campbell Report—
the seminal document written by Harold Campbell that ensured co-ops were 
included as housing associations in the 1975 amendments to the 1974 Housing 
Act—which recommended that co-ops be developed only where “it can be 
clearly established that the tenants really want to take part in a cooperative 
venture and are not simply anxious to be rehoused”.13 Yet due to the failure 
of Liberal policies to overcome the distortions of coalition politics, co-op 
housing was now almost the only way council tenants of crumbling tenements 
could get rehoused.
What had started out as a radical—and marginal—movement for cooper-
ative dweller control was watered down as the new mainstream. Ironically, 
the success of the new-build model had a ‘bandwagon effect’ that created a 
12 Anderson, “Co-op Dividends”; Birchall, Building Communities the Co-operative Way.
13 Quotation from Campbell Report, cited in Hook, “Housing Co-operatives”, Architects’ 
Journal (29 June 1977).
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groundswell for undiscerning co-op development. In response, CDS made sure 
that potential co-operators were sufficiently motivated. A CDS development 
manager recalls that
People used to ring CDS quite a lot and say—especially if they’d 
seen their friend move into one—“I want to form one of these co-op 
things”, and the standard line was “No you can’t, it’s too hard, go away”, 
put the phone down virtually; and if they rang back like three times 
then you thought they were quite serious … But you would actually 
challenge them in the early days just to see if they had the nous to go 
away and do this stuff, because the resilience it takes to see it through 
was incredible!
Popularity diluted the original principles of dweller control, reducing 
co-ops to little more than glorified housing associations, and splintering 
the movement into factions. On the one side you had Weller Street, who 
were vehemently political and thought of themselves as the pioneers. In his 
first-hand account of the co-op, McDonald notes that “to the likes of Billy, 
Steve, Rory and Kevin the co-op seemed to be a socialist idea: bringing 
‘power and control’ that unions wielded in the workplace to bear on people’s 
housing”.14 They were a “group that was ‘high on an idea’, the idea of a fight, 
a mission, a mini-revolution, not merely a way of getting decent housing for 
themselves”.15 Such ambitions were not limited to internal debate but often 
publicly stated: 
The intention of the Cooperative is that we should eventually become a 
completely autonomous organisation, responsible for running our own 
affairs. … With the services of a grant-aided worker, we can work 
towards our goal of establishing a self-sufficient community16
Their aspirations for radical self-government distinguished Weller Street 
from most that followed, inflating their sense of ideological righteousness and 
collective confidence to go it alone. They eventually severed ties with CDS 
and set up their own independent secondary co-op as “an anti-professional 
alternative to the likes of CDS”, which aimed:
1. To encourage co-operative housing
14 Alan McDonald, The Weller Way: The Story of the Weller Street Housing Cooperative (Faber 
& Faber, 1986), p. 49.
15 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 69.
16 Billy Floyd, letter to Minister for Housing of new Conservative government, quoted 
in McDonald, The Weller Way, pp. 162–163.
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2. To offer mutual support between co-ops and strengthen the 
movement.
By:
(a) Offering Weller Streets’ experience to other co-operatives.
(b) Teaching co-operatives how to become self-sufficient.
(c) Providing an alternative style of education with co-op members 
teaching one another.17 
Without the professional expertise of CDS, however, the Weller Street’s 
secondary experiment failed within a matter of months—partly attributable 
to their fiercely independent, sometimes violent approach to getting what 
they wanted. This brought them into repeated conflict with their professional 
partners, culminating in a bitter feud with CDS—an organisation marked by 
an “odd mixture of business and idealism” and run by “middle-class student 
types” and “trendy left-wingers” with whom Weller Street residents had always 
harboured a sceptical mistrust.18 
CDS did indeed have financial interests in the scheme, asking for 90 per 
cent of the co-op’s administrative allowances provided as part of Housing 
Corporation funding. Yet the organisation relied on such income for survival 
as a business—and they certainly earned their fees. Almost all the admin-
istrative work was done by CDS, albeit increasingly entrusted to the co-op 
committee themselves, but who were initially trained by CDS. It is highly 
likely that without CDS neither the co-op nor the movement would have 
developed. They supported progress from conception through gestation, 
birth and early life: overseeing the full arc of growth and development. This 
was important, for the residents “never understood the problem as a whole. 
They only ever saw it in stages”.19 Despite these debts to their ‘mother’ 
agency—and the close relationship cultivated—Weller Street was quick to 
sever the umbilical cord. The split culminated in residents storming CDS 
offices to recover all ‘their’ files, provoking a prolonged legal battle. Weller 
Street promoted their new secondary to other co-ops at the Liverpool 
Federation of Housing Co-ops in 1980—a city-wide member organisation 
recently established on the suggestion of CDS—but were regarded as 
“oddballs, the socialists, the sometimes rather arrogant pioneers”.20 What 
set Weller Street apart from the rest were their belligerently political 
17 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 186.
18 Weller Street resident members, quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, pp. 70–78.
19 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 65.
20 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 209.
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motivations, expressed by a committee member as being about “Mainly the 
fight, mainly the idea: let’s take them on, let’s see who they are—’cause your 
life had been fucking dominated by people you never knew … Let’s have a 
go at them”.21 
Such a fighting spirit earned them a reputation. Weller Street got drunk on 
their own story of success, reflected in the common belief that they were the 
“only real co-op”.22 Their aggressive and uncompromising style of campaigning 
and political lobbying unsurprisingly alienated potential allies. In November 
1980, McDonald recounts, they invaded a private dinner party hosted by Hugh 
Cubitt, then chairman of the Housing Corporation, to protest at possible cuts 
to housing co-operative schemes; climaxing in one of the members sticking 
their finger into Cubitt’s soup and saying, “You won’t eat that will you? It’s 
contaminated. That’s what our places are: contaminated”.23 
Ironically, Weller Street’s single-minded defence of cooperative principles 
undermined cooperation with outsiders. Such an obstinate stance explains 
their dramatic fall out with CDS. This escalated from their specific opposition 
to CDS offering advice to the council on how to set up local authority co-ops. 
Weller Street’s gripe was not with new co-ops per se—they were all for 
expanding the movement through their own secondary. Indeed, members 
were happy to be held up as the demonstration project for the likes of Paul 
Lusk to show the (Weller) way to budding co-op groups. Says Lusk: “Once 
they got big … I was very keen we should use the Weller as a demonstration 
project, the model, the teacher for others”.24 What Weller Street opposed, 
rather, was CDS’s idea of forming co-ops among council tenants, which, 
according to a leading member, was “assisting the Corpy to manage their 
fucking shite”.25 They saw council tenants as less deserving, having not earned 
their right to form a co-op, and whose “‘housing need’ was less urgent than the 
need of the Weller Streets members living in clearance”.26 Thus a division was 
cut between, on the one hand, the politically principled Weller Street—joined 
by close cousins, Hesketh, Thirlmere and Leta-Claudia—and, on the other, 
those that followed in their wake, forming co-ops with council support and 
funding as a means to get better housing. 
21 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 207.
22 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 184.
23 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 182.
24 Quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 181.
25 Quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 208.
26 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 181.
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Utalitarianism (Utilitarian plus Totalitarian):  
On Form Following Function
Co-op design outcomes reflected distinctions between factions. Weller Street’s 
design was for ten identical courts of six houses each wrapped around a 
communal landscaped area. Rob MacDonald, now an architecture academic 
at Liverpool John Moores University who once worked with the community 
as a student, explained to me the layout:
A series of L-shaped courtyards, very different from all the other 
co-ops … I actually thought almost Japanese really in its logic. Each 
northwest-facing courtyard, in terms of landscaping and management, 
each cluster was supposed to be responsible for their own courtyard, 
and then at the back you had the private gardens, individual gardens.
These courtyards were conceived as the replicable cell structure for cooperative 
self-governance, with management devolved down to what was thought the 
optimal spatial unit for everyone to get involved in organising collective life:
Self-management will mostly be organised around the activities of 
individual courts, with each group of people co-operating amongst 
themselves. The overseeing and overall control of management and 
maintenance will remain with our management committee.27
The cell-like layout of identical courtyard units was the material expression 
of a uniquely egalitarian political philosophy. One of the leading members 
explains how “the idea of the design was to make the courts, to make them 
more intimate, packed away, everyone the same, no one having more’”.28 
Bill Halsall remembers the internal debates between residents arguing for 
individual design choices set against the more puritanical committee: 
One of the co-op members dared to say, “Could people have different 
coloured baths?” which was debated round and round and round, and 
stamped on firmly, on the basis that this was like a bourgeois tendency 
coming out—to have an avocado bath. So the answer to him at the end 
was “You can have white with a grey ring around it like everybody else!” 
Such an ideological commitment to egalitarianism produced what some 
observers describe as ‘Stalinist’ tendencies. Citing the Scouse propensity 
to “invent words on the hoof out of other words”, Halsall fondly recounts 
27 Letter to rent officer July 1981, quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 191.
28 Quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 98.
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how members dreamt up a neologism for the Weller Street’s distinctive 
blend of totalitarianism and utilitarianism: “our ‘utalitarian’ style—a sort of 
Mersey-propism”.
The co-op leadership were acutely aware of the political sensitivity 
surrounding co-ops, anticipating the controversy they would help kick up 
during the Militant period, accused of being elitist and exclusive. Seeing as 
“half the co-op was related to somebody else in the co-op” and “two-thirds 
of committee members had a relative among the general membership”, there 
was a concerted effort to “look to be fair. It couldn’t be houses for the boys 
or the girls”.29 The ‘utalitarian’ design was intended to ensure that everybody 
had exactly the same housing—allocated according to need regardless of who 
they knew or how much effort they put in. This principle was taken to its 
extreme, with uniformity across almost all aspects, from bricks to letterboxes 
to internal fittings. Says Halsall: “Everybody had to have the same share of 
sunlight … no frills. It’s like what socialist housing might have looked like”.
Weller Street was an anomaly, an imposter, a mutation of the cooper-
ative model into something more akin to state socialism, albeit at the 
neighbourhood scale. The principle of equality was taken so far as to 
contradict other key components of cooperativism: individual autonomy 
and choice. Weller Street was unusual for its persistent insistence on the 
principles of uniformity and utility. Responding to the opportunity to have 
different colour bricks for different courts, and different internal fittings 
for each household, questionnaire surveys revealed “an amazing degree of 
unanimity” among residents, despite individual choice not costing any more 
or causing any delay.30 Uniformity was the answer because “uniformity 
would avoid arguments”31—an important rationale for ‘utalitarianism’. But 
some members were understandably concerned that “some degree of ‘choice’ 
ought to be possible, otherwise how would the co-op be different from the 
Corpy?”32 A significant strand in the motivational matrix was indeed choice. 
This not only included collective choice as a community—to stay together 
and not be displaced—but also as an individual, over the design of personal 
living space. Colin Ward’s conception of dweller control is as much about 
individual as it is collective self-governance. What are presented in anarchist 
thought as complementary notions came into conflict in the Weller Street 
Co-op. The inner cabinet did not tolerate much individual expression, 
leading some members eventually to choose to leave the co-op, which they 
characterised as a clique. 
29 McDonald, The Weller Way.
30 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 175.
31 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 160.
32 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 104.
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Contradictions of Choice: Defensive Urbanism  
or (Extra)Ordinary Sub-urbanism?
Hesketh Street was different. Residents chose a variety of individualised 
designs, with a resulting 25 or so different porch choices in a scheme of some 
40 houses. It was derided by architectural critics for being “cluttered” and “not 
particularly outstanding”, incorporating 
Many of the vernacular themes popular at the end of the ’70s … Like 
other “landscaped” schemes of this sort, it blends awkwardly with its 
urban surroundings and its design is somewhat inappropriate to an 
urban infill site.33 
This reflected the striking incongruity—of the Liverpool co-ops in general—
between their political radicalism and the ordinary, conservative, suburban 
design outcomes (see Figure 3 for an indicative example). The same critics, 
however, also acknowledge that “to be revolutionary doesn’t mean that you 
have to lose sight of common sense”.34 The common sense of co-op members 
was for warm, dry, clean, spacious houses, arranged to promote social inter-
action among neighbours, where their children could play safely in secluded 
streets sheltered from encroaching dereliction. Having lived for so long in a 
state of neglect, amidst decay, dereliction, vandalism and crime, communities 
were adamant to enclose themselves off from the city. One of the leading 
Weller Street activists explains how they “all wanted to leave them streets; 
get down here; surround ourselves with a fucking wall and gun-turrets. We’d 
lived in that shite, we wanted to protect ourselves.35 But such extreme fantasies 
were partly counterbalanced by their architect: 
Bill pointed out that “as soon as you have a wall, you get people wanting 
to get over it”. They began to look at ways of making the scheme 
uninviting to outsiders without a wall: screening with trees, houses not 
looking directly out on to Miles Street.36
This defensive instinct arose from a strong desire to escape harsh inner-city 
conditions, combined with aspirations for something better than council 
housing, something more akin to a wealthy suburban housing estate: “They 
didn’t want to live in terraced blocks put it that way, ’cause they associated 
that with slums. They wanted something detached or semi-detached and that 
33 Anderson, “Co-op Dividends”, p. 45.
34 Anderson, “Co-op Dividends”.
35 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 96.
36 McDonald, The Weller Way.
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was the nearest we could give ’em”.37 Having lived in poorly managed council 
houses all their lives, the first thing co-op residents would tell their architect 
was that they wanted homes as different from ‘Corpy housing’ as possible.38 
Weller Street initially toyed with the idea of creating a village green as the focal 
point; their fantasy was the rural idyll of English village life. “Our intention”, 
said Billy Floyd, “is to build a rural village in the heart of a dilapidated inner 
city area and rehabilitate a community”.39 This anti-urbanism was taken to 
its extreme by some of community architecture’s highest-profile supporters, 
notably Prince Charles, who advocated turning the derelict sites of “crushed 
tower blocks” in inner-city Liverpool “back into countryside”.40 However, 
due to the physical constraints of their site, requiring a dense design in which 
to fit the entire community, Weller Street took on a more urban quality, 
of courtyard squares. Most of the other co-ops, by contrast, were typically 
37 Billy Floyd, quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 92.
38 Nick Wates, “The Liverpool Breakthrough: Or Public Sector Housing Phase 2”, 
Architects’ Journal (8 Sept. 1982).
39 Quoted in McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 133.
40 Quoted in Patrick Wright, A Journey Through Ruins: The Last Days of London (Radius, 
1991), p. 246.
Figure 3 Typical Eldonian Village streetscape, overshadowed by the world’s 
largest brick warehouse at Stanley Dock.
5: Liberal Compromises 101
cul-de-sacs, which Bill Taylor likens to “a sort of wagon train when they’re 
stopped for the night”, arranged in a tight, inward-facing circle. For instance, 
Leta-Claudia’s curved terraced layout is, according to architect-academic Rob 
MacDonald, “like a very organic snake”—created by residents asking for more 
curves when their architect Bill Halsall presented right-angled layouts. At the 
end of the snake, in the middle of the co-op, MacDonald continues, is “a circle 
of bungalows for the elderly people and in the middle of the circle there’s a 
little pyramid, like a community facility” with flexible communal space and 
toilet and kitchen amenities for shared use by all co-op residents. But without a 
masterplan connecting these wagon trains at a higher scale they are “like oases 
in a desert of dereliction”.41 Indeed, a Weller Street annual report describes the 
co-op as an “oasis in the desert”.42 The overall pattern is, for Rob MacDonald, 
“mini clusters of garden cities that are disconnected”. What appear internally 
connected schemes are externally cut off from the wider city—a dialectic of 
simultaneous inward inclusion and outward exclusion.
This is not for want of city planners trying to assert their professional 
expertise. Residents’ desires came into conflict with the professional mores 
of planners, who feared the creation of isolated, exclusionary ghettos discon-
nected from the urban fabric, lacking connectivity and permeability. A 
participant recited to me a showdown between planners and Thirlmere co-op, 
whose chairman, Reg Cummings, a generally “quiet, peaceful man”, spoke 
up against professional aversions to their cul-de-sac design of inward-facing 
houses:
“I tell you what mate, you either change your fucking mind right now 
or I’ll get on that phone … There’s a bus load of people down on the 
dock road, they’re going to fucking come in here and sit in this fucking 
office until you fucking change your mind all right?!” And the planner 
said, “Well, what do you mean? Mine is a professional decision”. He 
said, “Stick your profession, I have to live here, and I come from here, 
and I’m telling you, we’re going to sit in this office until you change 
your mind and see it from our perspective!”
Ironically, it was planning decisions that first created the urban conditions 
against which residents turned. Understandably not wanting to “look out 
onto an empty derelict site”, with “no faith in the council ever rebuilding 
here”, co-ops literally turned their backs on the city, preferring, explains an 
MIH co-op development worker, the “security of looking inwards so we can 
keep an eye on each other”. In being given a voice for the first time, residents 
41 Graham Towers, Building Democracy: Community Architecture in the Inner Cities (Routledge, 
1995), p. 230.
42 McDonald, The Weller Way, p. 108.
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were empowered to challenge professional decision-makers and contest their 
knowledge claims.
Not only did large-scale municipal urban renewal incite cooperative desires 
for defensible space: religious sectarianism played its part, too. The historical 
conflict between Protestants and Catholics produced divisive forms of urban 
design. Owing to council housing policy allocating on the basis of need 
alone, many tenements were, according to a co-op development manager, 
“mixed Catholic and Protestant, so there were disputes all the time, religious 
disputes”. Two particular co-ops in the south end, Shorefields and Mill Street, 
had formed out of a group of residents occupying four- and five-storey walk-up 
tenements, but split into two along religious lines: Protestant Shorefields; 
Catholic Mill Street. This produced some interesting results: two separate 
cul-de-sac developments by two different architects, sharing the same entrance 
road, but spatially distinct and divided by back garden fences fixing firmly in 
space sectarian divisions (Shorefields opting for semi-detached layout; Mill 
Street for denser terraces). Yet even in the more celebrated examples of co-op 
design, problems still persist. Orienting co-op housing around an inward 
focal point—a community anchor or communal area—is great for internal 
community cohesion, but has the simultaneous effect of enclosing co-ops, 
cutting them off from the city, discouraging through-flow, and imposing 
spatial barriers between surrounding neighbourhoods.
In summing up this chapter, whilst the new-build co-op model produced 
so many benefits for those residents lucky enough to be a part of it, it 
also required painstaking efforts and considerable investment of time and 
resources—demands which made it difficult for the minority Liberal council, 
constrained by problematic political circumstances during the ‘lost decade’, 
to support new co-ops to a significant degree such that even a majority could 
benefit. Without this political and financial support, the co-op movement 
failed to grow beyond a marginal sector for a privileged minority. But what 
gave those fortunate few residents the right to reap the rewards of new co-op 
housing when most other council tenants had to put up with deteriorating 
conditions? Was it their ability and opportunity to organise proactively as a 
community and vocally express demands for better housing to the right organi-
sation at the right time, coupled with the willingness and capacity to carry a 
campaign through to the bitter end? Should adequate shelter not be a social 
right granted to everyone regardless of their inclination to be entrepreneurial, 
to ‘do it themselves’? These were precisely the questions the Labour Party, led 
by certain key figures associated with the radical left Militant Tendency, were 
asking when elected to the council in 1983, largely on the back of campaign 
promises to fix the housing crisis, left to spiral out of control through the 
1970s. The following chapter explores this battle of ideas, and its concrete 
consequences for the co-op movement.
CHAPTER 6 
Municipalisation
A Militant Response to the Housing Question
6: Municipalisation
By the end of the 1970s, towards the end of the lost decade in which the 
Liberals did too little to address the housing question, council housing in 
Liverpool was in a dire condition. It also still housed a large proportion of 
the city’s population and therefore remained a hot topic in local elections. 
Popular concern with housing helped secure the election victory of the 
Militant Tendency-controlled Labour administration in May 1983.1 The 
Militant Tendency was a far-left entryist group within the national Labour 
Party, embodying a peculiar strain of hard-line socialism, shaped locally 
by Liverpool’s history of radical politics.2 Militant were able to inspire and 
mobilise large sections of the Left, many of whom had become disillusioned 
with the local Labour Party’s historical connections with the Labour Right, 
carved by traditional sectarian loyalties. For some Labour councillors, such as 
Peter Kilfoyle, the Militant Tendency offered a “clear and simple analysis of 
the political condition, together with soundbite solutions, which struck a chord 
with the young, the idealistic and the naïve”.3 For others, they simply captured 
the mood of the city at a time, particularly among the young Left, when 
the Labour Party had forgotten its roots as the party of working people and 
needed to be reformed from the inside.4 Through this initial appeal, Militant 
built support in the District Labour Party, which in turn exercised its power 
in selecting council candidates and developing the policies that would then 
be implemented by councillors once in office. By using the District Labour 
Party as a conduit to power, Militant intended to short-circuit the infamous 
‘boss politics’ of personal favours that secured power for many ward-elected 
councillors. This meant Militant put forward District Labour Party delegates 
1 Peter Taafe and Tony Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight (Fortress, 1988).
2 Jonny Ball, “‘Militant Liverpool’ as Liverpool Exceptionalism: The Rise, Fall and 
Character of the City Council, 1983–1987”, Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire 
and Cheshire 166 (2017): 145–186.
3 Peter Kilfoyle, Left Behind: Winning Back a Labour Heartland and the Defeat of Militant 
(Politico’s Publishing, 2000), p. 39.
4 Diane Frost and Peter North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013), p. 44.
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rather than elected representatives as council candidates, which critics saw as 
bypassing the democratic process. The strategy worked: by 1978, there were 
seven Militant-supporting councillors on the council, and by the early 1980s, 
the Liberals were campaigning against what they saw as a poisonous infiltration 
of Marxists into the Labour Party.
Militant were excellent at mobilising the trade union movement and the 
broader Left into a Labour group which shared political priorities—anti-cuts, 
anti-rent rises, pro-public spending on schools, housing and public services. 
Labour went into the local election of 1983 with a manifesto that promised 
no job losses or council tax rises—proving very popular among voters. The 
promise of investment in housing, jobs and services was appealing after a 
decade of underinvestment in public services and a decline in employment by a 
third.5 By 1983, unemployment was 24 per cent, double the national average.6 
Liberal Councillor Chris Davies, Chair of Housing at the time, recalls how 
“we’d lost sixty thousand jobs in Liverpool, across Merseyside, in those first 
Thatcher years … Labour had this massive surge—it was a bit of a revolution 
really”. Labour’s famous political strapline—‘no cuts in jobs and services’—
was a straightforward vote catcher. A leading co-op activist, who fought 
against Militant policies before becoming a Labour councillor herself, explains 
the powerful process galvanised by Militant’s political message: “People can 
gather around very quickly … You get people on the streets, you get people 
energised, you get people politicised, you get people out there, you control 
that agenda, you move it forward”. When Labour won the council election in 
May 1983, they secured an unprecedented 46 per cent of the vote.7 Only nine 
of the 51 Labour councillors elected that year supported Militant, yet they 
exercised extraordinary power over the council’s policies for the five years 
they remained in effective control.
Following election, the council announced a budget with a £30 million 
deficit to pay for their ambitious municipal socialist programme of rebuilding 
the economy and built environment. A large component of the budget was 
additional government funding for the appalling housing situation. The council 
argued this was a unique problem, under-recognised by government, which 
had cut spending on housing from £61 million to £38 million since 1979.8 
Central government contributions to Liverpool Council’s budget had fallen 
from 62 per cent in 1980 to just 44 per cent in 1983 due to a recalculation of 
the block grant based upon previous expenditure, which had been lower than 
in other comparable major urban authorities.9 Labour accused the Liberals 
5 Frost and North, Militant Liverpool.
6 Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts.
7 Hilary Wainwright, Labour: A Tale of Two Parties (Hogarth Press, 1987).
8 Frost and North, Militant Liverpool, p. 62.
9 Wainwright, Labour: A Tale of Two Parties, p. 127.
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of running down the budget and setting (council tax) rates intentionally low 
in order to appease potential Liberal voters.10 To implement their ambitious 
programme of municipal socialism, the council would either have to raise rates 
by 170 per cent—and by 60 per cent just to maintain existing services—or 
run a deficit, which would bring them into confrontation with the government. 
The Militant-led council not only pursued the latter but argued that this was 
owed anyway—that £270 million had been “stolen” from Liverpool by the 
government in response to Liberal under-spending. This created an enemy in 
the Thatcher government, which then sought to bypass local authority control 
to fund Liverpool’s regeneration via centrally directed measures, such as the 
Merseyside Development Corporation, and support alternative schemes (such 
as the Eldonian Community Trust) that were either sidelined or outright 
opposed by Militant.
A central policy of the new Militant-led council was a radical programme of 
urban renewal—the Urban Regeneration Strategy (URS)—which, according 
to prominent Militants Peter Taafe and Tony Mulhearn, in their appropriately 
titled account, The City that Dared to Fight, “represented a complete rupture 
with all previous housing schemes in Liverpool”.11 The URS was a bold and 
ambitious £350 million programme of council housebuilding, centred on 
17 Priority Areas, with a target of a thousand new homes built per year up 
to 1988—a remarkable figure for a time when, nationally, municipal house-
building had all but come to a standstill.12 The new homes—replacing over five 
thousand dwellings in dilapidated tenements and tower blocks—were to be 
simple suburban semi-detached two-storey houses with gardens; whilst fifteen 
thousand remaining council houses were to be upgraded through conversion, 
improvement and repair.13 Housing was only one, albeit central, component 
of the URS, which adopted a ‘Total Approach’ to regeneration, including 
provision of new leisure centres, schools, parks and other public infrastruc-
tures and environmental improvements.
Despite highly critical commentary in the voluntary housing press,14 the 
URS was undeniably popular among residents, especially Liverpool’s large 
council tenant population. Workers too—including some fifteen thousand 
unemployed construction workers—were generally very supportive of the 
Urban Regeneration Strategy, which promised new homes as well as jobs for 
10 Kilfoyle, Left Behind: Winning Back a Labour Heartland and the Defeat of Militant.
11 Taafe and Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight, p. 158.
12 Robert Cowan, P. Hannay and R. Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel, in 
Vauxhall Victors: Eldonians Special Issue”, Architects’ Journal (23 Mar. 1988): 37–66.
13 Anne Grosskurth, “Bringing Back the Braddocks”, ROOF 10.1 (1985): 19–23.
14 Tim Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, ROOF 12.6 (1987); Robert Cowan, “Co-op or 
Cop-Out?”, ROOF 11.4 (1986); Cowan, Hannay and Owens, “The Light on Top of the 
Tunnel”; Grosskurth, “Bringing Back the Braddocks”.
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those who would build, maintain and manage them. But the URS was bad 
news for the growing co-op housing movement in Liverpool—for its apparent 
ideological incompatibility. 
Rightly or wrongly, Militant associated co-ops with the privatisation of 
public housing. They accused the Liberals of diverting public funds into a priva-
tised sector of housing provision incapable of addressing the structural issues 
facing the city. In contrast to the huge scale of the problem—with over ten 
thousand people on waiting lists needing to be housed—the tiny capacity of 
the marginal co-op movement was inadequate to meet the challenge: estimates 
ranged from just eight hundred families housed by co-ops15 to around two 
thousand homes built in the six years up to 1985.16 Even staunch supporters, 
such as Bill Halsall, the pioneering architect of the Weller Street Co-op and 
Eldonian Village, nonetheless recognises that 
The Liberals’ housing policy was “if you want a new house, form a 
co-op”. So they kind of forced it … and when it all blew up in 1983 one 
of the things that the Militants were saying was “your housing policy 
is elitist”, because the people who formed a co-op get the new houses, 
the people who aren’t in co-ops don’t get a new house—and that was 
actually true, they had a point.
Indeed, Militant’s more deeply held ideological opposition to co-ops—as 
an elitist, exclusionary and nepotistic form of housing—was grounded in 
experience. Co-ops were not open to new members on the basis of need 
alone and so in this respect fell far short of the socialist ideal of universality. 
The pre-allocations process, requiring that residents be selected before design 
or construction commenced, was a fundamental part of co-op development, 
ensuring that residents were centrally involved in the process of creating 
their own homes—an intrinsic part of dweller control. Yet this also gave 
legitimacy to the lever by which close-knit communities ensured only their 
own kind—those sharing similar ethnic, religious and cultural identities, if 
not literally friends and families—would be included within the resulting 
co-ops. Self-selection is visible in the sharply divided yet adjoining Mill Street 
and Shorefields Co-ops, each exclusively catering for Catholic and Protestant 
residents respectively. There was also a co-op actually called ‘Friends and 
Neighbours’ and, adds a CDS development manager, “they were friends and 
neighbours”. Even those supportive of co-ops nonetheless acknowledge that, 
for instance, “the reasons Militant—and this is actually quite justifiable I 
think—had a problem with it was you formed it from your mates”. Max 
Steinberg at the Housing Corporation, a life-long supporter of co-ops, admits 
15 Nick Wates, “Co-op Consolidation”, Architectural Review (Apr. 1985).
16 Grosskurth, “Bringing Back the Braddocks”.
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that “we began to wonder as years went by, was this causing allocation policies 
to be controlled in a paternalistic way—was it creating little enclaves?” 
Despite the fact that all co-op members were sourced from poor working-
class communities, with many in severe housing need, the co-ops were, if not 
elitist, then certainly exclusionary.
A Tory–Liberal Plot: The Gravedigger of Municipal Housing?
Whilst Militant had a point about the shortcomings of co-op housing, their 
reaction against the movement was not commensurate with the threat posed 
to socialist values. First, they assumed co-ops were a threat rather than an 
ally. They assumed that co-ops were incompatible with other forms of public 
housing and conflated the model with the Liberals’ ‘bourgeois’ approach to 
housing policy. Militant animosity to co-ops as a form of nepotistic, even 
elitist, public housing, diverting resources away from universal municipal 
provision, is made explicit in a District Labour Party policy statement from 
1984, entitled “The Co-op Issue”.17 I cite it here in full as a stark and candid 
insight into their thinking:
The co-op issue has been the most controversial one as far as housing 
is concerned. The question to be asked is:
(a) Did co-ops in Liverpool start as a spontaneous desire by people for 
an alternative form of tenure which is compatible with municipal 
housing, or,
(b) Were co-ops part of a deliberate and calculated attack on municipal 
housing by the Tory Party nationally, aided and abetted by the local 
Liberal/Tory alliance?
The Housing Sub Committee holds the view that the latter is the 
answer to the question. That is not to say that individual families were 
of that mind but that was clearly government’s, both local and national, 
intention. There is also little doubt that the Housing Associations and 
leading advocates involved in the issue knew full well the consequences 
on public housing of the policies being pursued. The co-ops which have 
been part of the controversy were all formed since 1979.
This policy statement discloses Militant’s deeply held suspicion of cooperatives 
as a Tory conspiracy rather than the pragmatic form of democratic socialism 
17 Quoted in Paul Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social 
Rights: The Liverpool New-Build Housing Co-operative Movement”, unpublished thesis, 
Salford University, 1998, p. 161.
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as they are conventionally perceived. Writing in his account of the period, 
co-op advocate and former CDS worker Paul Lusk makes the strong claim 
that the District Labour Party’s “opposition to co-ops could only be justified 
by a paranoid conspiracy theory of Stalinist intensity”.18 Rather than see co-ops 
as the natural ally of socialism—or simply a compatible and complementary 
sector of public housing, catering to a minority desiring more dweller control 
and choice—Militant associated the movement with the failings of the Liberal 
administration, as an integral part of a Tory plot; holding it accountable as the 
“gravedigger of municipal housing”.19 
The Liberals, of course, saw things differently. There is no evidence that 
co-op membership persuaded people to vote for the Liberals, who “gained 
nothing politically by building co-ops in inner-city wards for loyal socialists”.20 
If anything, co-ops strengthened the socialist leanings of what were largely 
traditional working-class Labour voters. The co-op campaign process politi-
cised members into more active involvement in the Labour Party—evident 
by the surprising number of co-op members who went on to become Labour 
councillors and leading lights in a later reformed District Labour Party. Some 
were radicalised further to the left. Frank Carroll from Prince Albert Gardens 
Co-op, for instance, was a regular councillor candidate for the Communist Party. 
Those professionals promoting co-ops were also affiliated with socialist politics. 
George Howarth, former Labour councillor and now Labour MP for Knowsley, 
was responsible for seeding the idea of co-ops into Kirkby while he worked for 
CDS in the early 1980s. Several CDS staff were members of the Communist 
Party. The Liverpool co-operators saw co-ops as the cell form of a socialist 
society in the tradition of mutualism and libertarian socialism—celebrating the 
collective self-sufficiency, dignity and autonomy of working-class culture. The 
Militant view, a more extreme variant of the traditional Labour perspective, 
saw co-ops as an alternative middle-class lifestyle choice, less about need than 
want, and therefore incompatible with their socialist agenda of ensuring needs 
are met through universal provision of all public services.
Despite Militant conspiracy claims, no explicit link was made between the 
cooperative movement and the Liberal Party, other than a vague ideological 
belief in choice and autonomy. The principal supporters were driven more 
by disinterested political principles than by electoral interests. Chris Davies, 
Chair of Housing during the new-build co-op revolution before becoming an 
MEP for Northwest England, explains how 
There was an upsurge of hatred for Liberals … Labour had very cleverly 
portrayed us as the Liberal–Tory alliance, and it was quite true that 
18 Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”, p. 162.
19 Cowan, “Co-op or Cop-Out?”.
20 Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”, p. 177.
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we were dependent on Tory votes because we couldn’t get any votes 
at all, even for sort of socialist measures … So it was the Lib–Con 
Alliance, only there was no alliance … every vote was see which way 
the cookie crumbles.
When Labour councillors from Glasgow—the other notable city council of 
the era pioneering cooperative housing development—came to Liverpool 
on a study tour of the co-ops, they were, according to Davies, “horrified at 
their Liverpool counterparts’ attitude”. He continues: “They were saying ‘but 
co-operatives are a good thing, you know it’s socialism, it’s proper socialism, 
it’s people in charge—it doesn’t have to be all this top down stuff’. But the 
Militants were having none of it”.
Not all in the Labour-led Council—far from it—bought into the hard line 
on co-ops as a conspiracy against municipal housing. Conspiracy theories cut 
both ways. There is certainly a sense in which co-op advocates and activists 
exaggerated—perhaps understandably, in feeling the full force of municipali-
sation—the hostility from Militant. Some observers, such as Bill Halsall here, 
saw the decision to municipalise as much as a pragmatic strategy to deliver 
the URS as it was an ideological project: “The deal was: the council wanted 
numbers. Militants wanted to be able to say that ‘we built five thousand houses 
over three years’, and the co-ops would just be added onto that total; they 
became part of building council houses”.
Leading Militant activists Peter Taafe and Tony Mulhearn explain the 
practical financial reasons behind municipalisation: that “to have given housing 
co-ops the £6.5 million being demanded would have meant severely cutting 
the council’s housebuilding programme”.21 The council was under great 
pressure to deliver its promised URS plans with diminishing budgetary alloca-
tions from hard-won funds, and so diverting scarce resources away from the 
main priority areas and towards what some of its socialist leaders saw as petit 
bourgeois housing was politically untenable. 
The most powerful players in the Militant-led council had diverse motiva-
tions for their stance against co-ops: split between socialist convictions, loyalty 
to their constituencies and shrewd political self-interest. Towards the latter 
end of the spectrum was Derek Hatton, the prominent public face of the 
Militant Tendency and Deputy Leader of the council—whose Leader, John 
Hamilton, was Labour but not Militant. At the other extreme was Tony Byrne, 
the principal architect of URS but avowedly ‘non-Militant’, whose policy ideas 
gained support in the District Labour Party and who later became Chair of the 
council’s powerful Housing and Finance Committees. The differences between 
Byrne and Hatton are neatly captured by a co-op activist who would become 
a Labour councillor through her experience of campaigning:
21 Taafe and Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight, p. 161.
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Tony Byrne particularly—very, very bright guy, very sharp, took no 
prisoners, just went for it, Exocet missiles kind of stuff. Apparently, he 
was going to be a Jesuit priest at one stage and then stepped back from 
that—very, very principled. He was the one guy that I would say didn’t 
change, so you know, he’d always turn up in a trackie and his plassie 
bag to carry his papers in; he wouldn’t go a Hatton route of getting 
smart and booted, and using the money and kudos and status and all 
of that. So Byrne was quite scary; he had this vision and the council 
had this vision of municipal housing, getting that back on the agenda, 
they would provide for the people, you know, false consciousness of the 
working class and all of that stuff.
Byrne famously stated his position in a local newspaper interview:
I am a Socialist. I believe in public ownership, control and account-
ability for housing through the elected council. It is the local authority 
who must satisfy the needs of the working class. Working-class organi-
sation in this city lies in the Labour Party and the unions, and not in 
housing associations.22
This fundamentalist view of socialism, in which power is to be firmly 
invested in the centralised state—a representative ‘dictatorship of the prole-
tariat’, elected by the people, working for the people, making decisions in 
the interests of the people (but all too often without their further input or 
participation)—is, as Byrne makes clear above, strictly opposed to all forms of 
decentralised public provision through housing associations, however popular, 
democratic and free from capitalist relations they may prove to be. Byrne’s 
belief in the universalist socialist state—that people have a right to a decent 
home regardless of political participation or social engagement—rested on 
a concomitant suspicion of community control as just another form of petit 
bourgeois privatism. 
Defensible Principles and (Policy) Design Disadvantagement
Not least due to his ideological opposition to capitalism, Tony Byrne believed 
the council’s ability to influence the private sector was limited. Municipal 
power lay in harnessing the public sector for socioeconomic recovery: “I can’t 
do anything to locate a new factory in Speke or anywhere else, but what 
we can do is to deal with unemployment, and the environment and living 
22 Quoted in Alan McDonald, The Weller Way: The Story of the Weller Street Housing 
Cooperative (Faber & Faber, 1986), p. 211.
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conditions within the limits of our capabilities”.23 For Byrne, the answer was 
large-scale municipal housebuilding, which would provide jobs and decent 
homes for all and improve the urban environment in the process. But in 
promoting municipal housing as a panacea to urban ills Byrne became seduced 
by a form of design determinism that sat awkwardly next to socialist beliefs 
in controlling the material means of production. The URS rationale was to 
target 17 (later extended to 22) “Priority Areas” of modernist ‘hard-to-let’ 
flats and tenements built between the 1930s and 1970s, which had become 
unpopular sites marked by crime, vandalism, squalor and dereliction.24 Byrne’s 
assessment of council house designs revealed one promising inter-war period of 
problem-free semi-detached housing and concluded that this was the pinnacle 
of British council housing design. This insight, according to commentator Tim 
Mars, “was the germ of the URS housing programme”.25
At around the same time, the geographer Alice Coleman was popularising 
her ideas on the ‘design disadvantagement’ of modernist council housing 
estates, which she had adapted from Oscar Newman’s theory of defensible 
space developed in North America.26 In her provocatively named book Utopia 
on Trial, Coleman recommended that ‘corrective measures’ should modify 
the worst features of existing council blocks; that no further council flats 
should be built; and that in their place should be semi-detached houses with 
front and back gardens, bounded territorially by walls or fences.27 These ideas 
were taken up by Thatcher’s government, informing the Right to Buy policy 
and the general trend towards the privatisation of council estates and the 
‘responsibilisation’ of tenants. This made Coleman perhaps the most politi-
cally influential academic geographer of her and subsequent generations. The 
Prince of Wales was also very impressed and met Coleman, incorporating 
some of her ideas into his advocacy of community architecture. In this way, 
Coleman became, ironically enough, one of the ideological bedfellows of the 
new co-op movement and participatory design process.28 The Liverpool co-ops 
have indeed adopted some defensible space principles in their design, especially 
23 Tony Byrne, quoted in Richard Meegan, “Merseyside in Crisis and in Conflict”, in 
Michael Harloe, Chris Pickvance and John Urry, eds, Place, Policy and Politics: Do Localities 
Matter? (Routledge, 1990), pp. 67–83 (p. 94).
24 Taafe and Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight.
25 Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, p. 26.
26 Jane M. Jacobs and Loretta Lees, “Defensible Space on the Move: Revisiting the 
Urban Geography of Alice Coleman”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
37.5 (2013): 1559–1583.
27 Alice Coleman, Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing (Hilary Shipman 
Ltd, 1985).
28 Nick Wates and Charles Knevitt, Community Architecture: How People Are Creating Their 
Own Environment (Penguin Books, 1987). 
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in the wagon circle enclosures, overlooked gardens and external boundary 
fencing. In a counterintuitive convergence with Militant council housing 
design, the co-ops also embodied, wittingly or not, Alice Coleman’s defensible 
space principles. A CDS development manager describes how:
So you’ve got loads of overlooking, you’ve got shared surfaces, you’ve 
got good strong boundaries at the back, you’ve got very little perme-
ability through the site—they’ve got all those aspects of defensible 
space, so from Alice’s point of view that’s good.
Despite the surprising connections between Alice Coleman and Militant’s 
most despised ideological opponents—Thatcherism and cooperativism, each 
also opposing the other—Byrne was adamant that Coleman was on to 
something and invited her up to Liverpool for a site visit.29 In a strange twist, 
Coleman gave her seal of approval to Militant housing policy, proclaiming 
that, in an interview with the Liverpool Daily Post in 1985, “Liverpool has got it 
right”.30 Leading Militant members were proud to report that “she completely 
concurred with the main thrust of the URS and of the council’s conviction 
that the majority of people preferred to live in traditional houses”.31 The URS 
development principles that Coleman praised had been published in 1984 
as new development guidelines, ensuring only houses and bungalows, semi-
detached where possible, were to be built. Amongst the many prescriptions, 
certain phrases stand out—“no shared surfaces”; “generally conventional 
with through routes rather than cul-de-sacs”; “no clusters”; “short streets”; 
“dwellings to face roads”; “solely private gardens and pavements”; “no common 
areas; no play spaces”32—conditions which would have devastating effects on 
the co-ops.
Militant believed they were giving people what they truly wanted; and in 
many respects they had accurately captured the mood of many tenants, alienated 
by dysfunctional and decaying council flats. Owing to fiscal constraints on the 
URS imposed by the ongoing budget battle, however, the new housing—
nicknamed ‘Hatton houses’, quite simply because, a former LHT officer tells 
me, “they were directly controlled by Derek Hatton”—was often of a lower 
design quality than the council housing it replaced. The HAG-funded co-ops 
were in fact the last form of public sector housing to benefit from generous 
Parker Morris standards, and so remained more spacious and fit to live in than 
Hatton houses—often not big enough for new tenants to fit in the furniture 
29 Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”
30 Taafe and Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight, p. 159.
31 Taafe and Mulhearn, Liverpool. A City That Dared to Fight.
32 Quoted in Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”, 
p. 157.
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from their old houses. Little wonder, then, that local Labour politician Peter 
Kilfoyle—albeit a vociferous critic of Militant—described them as “stupid 
little doll’s houses”.33 More recent critiques have been no less scathing. In his 
architectural dérive of Liverpool, Owen Hatherley points to “bizarre” effects 
on Liverpool’s impressive urban landscape: 
They [the council] built the sort of story book look of what a house was 
supposed to look like, in a way entirely wrong for a hundred yards from 
here. … It’s not dignified for the city centre to mimic the ’burbs. It 
leads to depressing juxtapositions … the scale is preposterous, with the 
houses seeming to desperately want to be somewhere less dramatic … 
It becomes a tragicomedy.34
From construction process to final design the comedy continued. Despite 
definite gains made by the URS in creating an extra ten thousand jobs in the 
construction industry, the council’s rather contradictory political partnership 
with private building companies had adverse consequences. Here’s a common 
view amongst observers:
They did deals with Wimpey’s where the quality was just crap. They 
had very high voids because they had real maintenance problems in 
those properties that they’d built that were supposed to be better … 
Terribly designed housing is no better than terribly designed flats—you 
have to manage and maintain them in the right way.
Byrne’s critics found him guilty of a ‘monomania’ for housing—an 
obsession not just with housing policy per se but with a very specific 
architectural model, reflected in the stringent URS prescriptions, which 
bordered on a kind of design determinism not dissimilar to Coleman’s design 
disadvantagement theory. CDS chief executive Catherine Meredith accused 
Byrne of a “megalomaniac belief in housing type” and of failing to recognise 
the importance of dweller control in the management and maintenance of 
housing.35 The Coleman/Byrne design modification approach worked on the 
assumption that people wanted semi-detached houses arranged along streets 
with through-flow, overlooking the fact that in the co-op participatory design 
process residents had opted for terraces, enclosed courtyards, cul-de-sacs and 
communal features. In many ways, the URS made the same mistake as the 
post-war modernist council designs it critiqued: a top-down focus on form 
33 Kilfoyle, Left Behind, p. 91.
34 Owen Hatherley, A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain (Verso Books, 2011), 
pp. 335–338.
35 Quoted in Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, p. 27.
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over function, on housing type over any consideration of tenant participation 
in its design, management or ownership. The URS replaced many alienating 
high-rise flats and council estates with more-popular, human-scale traditional 
houses, but the rigid, distant paternalistic management structure remained 
unmoved.
Keeping the Cooperative Spirit Alive: The Movement Migrates 
to Knowsley
Militant came to power with a manifesto promise to permit co-ops so 
long as they did not divert resources from the URS. In practice, however, 
Militant pursued an aggressive campaign against co-ops, going so far as 
actively to move URS Priority Area boundaries to include a block of flats 
they had initially agreed to transfer to local residents to renovate as a co-op, 
so as to build new council houses instead. Quickly after the election, the 
council decided to place a moratorium on all further funding of co-ops and 
to take into municipal control those already started. What did this mean 
for the co-ops? If a co-op had already signed a contractual commitment 
with the council to acquire land, then it was left to complete the scheme 
under cooperative ownership. Six HAG-funded co-ops—including the MIH 
co-ops in the north end, Leta-Claudia and Thirlmere—were safe, building 
170 homes in total.36 However, for those already started on design work 
but yet to exchange contracts, this meant municipalisation. At least eight 
co-ops were affected: six small CDS co-ops in the south end, totalling 220 
dwellings; a new LHT co-op at Gerrard Gardens in Vauxhall, with over a 
hundred homes; and the Eldonians’ project at Portland Gardens, also over a 
hundred. A few co-ops were shielded by being built on land not owned by 
the council—notably by the Merseyside Development Corporation—but the 
standard development model utilised council land. Part of the problem was 
that the co-ops could not exchange contracts until formal approval of the 
outline design proposals had been granted by the government Department 
of Environment. However, there were other reasons why so many had yet 
to sign contracts, which, with hindsight, as this community housing trust 
director and ex-council officer reflects, was
Probably a mistake. The idea was that the land was owned by the 
city, the finance was coming through the city to do the development, 
and the co-op would buy the units back at the end, when they were 
completed … And the reason why that was done was to save everyone 
the VAT. Because the co-ops weren’t VAT registered (they were too 
small to be VAT registered) and the local authority didn’t charge VAT 
36 Lusk, Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights.
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on development of houses, so it was getting done the most economical 
way. But it still meant that the council owned the land and they were 
paying for the development initially, which is why in ’83 the initial 
co-ops that we’d started were able to be municipalised because the 
council owned the land, were putting the money in. The Militants who 
took over were not interested in selling them back to the communities.
What had seemed an ingenious idea—exploiting a loophole in the tax 
system to improve economic viability—was exposed as a fatal flaw, rendering 
new-build co-ops vulnerable to the whims of electoral politics. Through its 
legal powers, the council was able to take full control of the eight co-ops 
lacking contracts. Their chosen architects would be kept on by the council 
but CDS and MIH would receive no compensation for their work, and it 
was unclear whether co-ops would be allowed to proceed on the designs 
co-produced by residents. The URS design guidelines meant that all new 
developments had to accord with standardised through-road semi-detached 
housing layouts, foreclosing all possibility of cooperative designs that incor-
porated communal spaces or courtyards. The loss of central communal play 
spaces, gardens and community centres—the heart of cooperative housing—
was particularly problematic for the successful functioning of co-ops unlucky 
enough to be caught up in municipalisation. 
Except in rare cases of resistance—which I explore below—the Militants 
brought the cooperative movement to a standstill in Liverpool at a time when 
they received unprecedented policy support nationally. In local jurisdictions 
outside Militant influence, however, prospects were different. Knowsley, a 
neighbouring Metropolitan Borough Council within Merseyside (now one 
of six local authorities comprising the Liverpool City Region) is constituted 
mainly of overspill outer estates and new towns such as Kirkby, built during 
post-war urban renewal to house many of those Liverpudlians displaced by 
the slum clearances. Knowsley residents still had familial connections to the 
neighbourhoods in which the co-ops were springing up, and so just as residents 
were exported out to Kirkby so too was the co-op idea: seeding the second 
generation of new-build co-ops. Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council was 
a non-Militant Labour administration with links into the co-op movement, 
perhaps the most pivotal of which being George Howarth—now a Labour 
MP for Knowsley, then a Labour councillor and Chair of Knowsley’s Housing 
Committee as well as a CDS co-op development officer. Howarth talks of 
the unusual political partnership between Liverpool’s Liberal councillors and 
Knowsley’s Labour councillors against the Militants of their own party. In the 
early 1980s, Knowsley was likewise dealing with an oversupply of unpopular 
hard-to-let flats, and had a strategy to clear some of the three-storey walk-up 
flats and ‘top down’ some of the maisonettes, essentially knocking storeys off 
to create two-storey houses. CDS had begun working with some of the tenants 
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being rehoused, and Howarth saw similar opportunities here as in Liverpool’s 
tenements. Alongside other CDS workers he began a more proactive approach 
of dropping leaflets through front doors, headlined ‘design your own homes’, 
in an attempt to rally co-op groups. 
Much of the initial interest in Kirkby was drummed up through neighbourly 
pressure, despite less entrenched community ties or defined neighbourhood 
identities than in inner-city Liverpool due to the relative newness and ration-
alised nature of the urban environment, lacking the convivial density of the 
terraces or the 1930s tenements. For the first Kirkby co-op, Southdene, it 
was more a case of proactively recruiting co-op members from across Kirkby, 
scattered in isolated blocks, than reacting as a pre-existing community wanting 
to stay together. The remaining members were hand-picked from high-rise 
flats (families and elderly residents who wanted a garden) to eventually form 
a total of seventeen—much smaller than the Liverpool new-builds reflecting 
a general trend across Kirkby.
This mobilisation was facilitated by CDS armed with pictures of the 
first new-build co-ops such as Weller Street. The principal proponents of 
the Kirkby movement, however, were young single mothers, who often felt 
isolated in the flats and wanted something better for their children. Max 
Steinberg, Northwest Regional Director of the Housing Corporation at the 
time, described to me how
So many of the housing cooperatives I dealt with in Kirkby were 
being promoted, negotiated through the requirements of the Housing 
Corporation, by women, who were often their leaders. They became 
very powerful figures who wanted to see improvements in their 
neighbourhood … very much the sort of dominant household figure 
regarding the future of the households in the area.
Kirkby co-ops shared with the south end Liverpool co-ops this charac-
teristic—of being dominated by women in their everyday practices—but, 
unlike Weller Street, were also led by women who took the role of outward 
leader and figurehead. Female empowerment was a major feature of the 
Kirkby co-ops. Women like Jackie Harris, a founding member of Southdene, 
threw themselves into running campaigns, mobilising their communities, and 
lobbying authorities for support—a stepping stone into successful political 
careers. Harris is now a Labour councillor for Knowsley, leading on Crime 
and Disorder for the council, and involved in numerous community initiatives. 
Her experience as arguably the leading co-op proponent in Kirkby took her 
around the country as a consultant and lobbyist, speaking at political party 
events and housing conferences. Jackie often travelled to London to lobby the 
Housing Corporation for funding further co-ops, including others in Kirkby.
The empowering effect of co-ops was not limited to formal politics. 
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When Southdene was formally registered in 1983, all seventeen members 
were unemployed, but by the time the houses were built and occupied—with 
additional tenants moving in by 1987—around 90 per cent were employed. 
This is seen by many of those involved as the product of training and skills 
learnt in co-op campaigning and development. Many of the single mothers 
were very young when they first started, around 21–22 years old, and the 
co-op development process proved invaluable for their own personal devel-
opment as well as an inadvertent educational experience for their children, 
who were often involved in the design and decoration of campaign materials 
and later the houses themselves.
By this point, co-ops had begun to take over from CDS the role of 
organising the process of education, training and knowledge transfer. First, 
the Kirkby co-ops would go on site visits to the more established Liverpool 
new-builds to learn from the ‘pioneers’: “to speak to them”, as Jackie 
explains, “about the early stages, how they got where they were, designing 
the co-ops, campaigning—they did give you a lot of guidance”. Second, the 
Liverpool Federation of Housing Cooperatives, established by CDS several 
years earlier, was in 1984 reincorporated into the Merseyside Federation by 
its membership to include the Kirkby co-ops. Each co-op would send repre-
sentatives to monthly meetings to share experiences, trade knowledge, develop 
best practice, build solidarity in a difficult economic period and socialise with 
fellow co-operators. For Harris, it became
The meeting place where you got your better ideas … As a group 
of co-ops, our Federation, that was where we discussed the political 
side: of how we get funding, where we go, if we had to go to London, 
if we were putting Federation stuff into the co-ops to adopt, you 
know, strategic planning on co-ops all being a part of the same one 
constitution.
Co-op members would pay £1 ‘subs’ at weekly co-op meetings, which would 
go towards helping fund bus fares for representatives to travel to Merseyside 
Federation meetings, as well as small fees to CDS for their administrative 
work and advice and capital reserves for useful items like a typewriter to 
type up minutes and publish newsletters and leaflets. The Federation was the 
beginning of a more outward-facing, self-organised and collaborative process 
of movement-building through cooperative education, support and knowledge 
transfer. It could have become a successful self-governing membership organ-
isation—a kind of democratically governed secondary development agency to 
Weller Street’s unilaterally oriented failed experiment. However, Militant’s 
opposition to co-ops in Liverpool hindered this by shifting the focus from 
creative institution-building to defensive protection of existing assets. Co-ops, 
at least in Liverpool, became more combative—forced to focus on protecting 
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immediate interests from the Militant threat rather than building bridges with 
others.
Whilst the Kirkby co-ops were strengthening institutional ties, the 
Liverpool co-ops were galvanised into contentious political action. The 
Merseyside Federation organised public demonstrations in 1984, with over a 
thousand co-operators marching from the heartland of south-end co-ops in 
the Dingle to the town hall in the city centre, alongside various prominent 
political allies, such as the then Liberal Chair of Housing, Richard Kemp. The 
public campaign drew on media sympathy, and supportive commentary in the 
Architects’ Journal and Shelter’s ROOF magazine.37 An open letter to Tony Byrne 
pleaded for concessions towards “principles of tenant control”, and was signed 
by four of the municipalised co-ops.38 Others pursued successful legal appeals 
and managed to stay in the homes they had helped design but only under 
the condition of remaining council tenants without taking collective action 
for a co-op any further. Some co-ops were able to use arm’s-length planning 
instruments controlled by central government to bypass council opposition. 
CDS negotiated a site for two co-ops in the south end, Mill Street and 
Shorefields from the Merseyside Development Corporation just before munici-
palisation hit. CDS also managed to secure payment of remediation costs 
from the Merseyside Development Corporation for what was contaminated 
land near the docks. Located on land owned by the Merseyside Development 
Corporation, these and several smaller co-ops were safe. Using this tactic, 
the Eldonians were also able to bypass council opposition: a unique struggle 
against adversity which will be examined in the following chapter. 
One example of direct action contesting Militant municipalisation was 
the Langrove Community Housing Co-op. Langrove Street was situated in 
the West Everton community straddling the ridge that forms a bowl around 
Liverpool city centre broadly marking the historical urban division between 
the Catholic neighbourhoods nearer the docks and the Protestants who moved 
up the hill. The community faced demolition threats from Tony Byrne’s vision 
for Everton Park: a “magnificent park on traditional Victorian lines” by way of 
clearing “unsatisfactory post-war housing”.39 Some of this housing was deeply 
unpopular—decaying high-rise flats pockmarked the area—but a collection of 
two-storey four-bed parlour houses built in the 1950s were in high demand. 
Resistance mounted to their planned demolition. The community had a strong 
identity unusually united by the involvement of both Anglican Protestants 
37 Cowan, “Co-op or Cop-Out?”; Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”; Cowan, Hannay and 
Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel”; Grosskurth, “Bringing Back the Braddocks”; 
Wates, “Co-op Consolidation”.
38 Quoted in Lusk, “Citizenship and Consumption in the Development of Social Rights”, 
p. 156.
39 URS document, quoted in Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”
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and Catholics in churches that spanned sectarian divides, garnering a strong 
culture of working together, evident in the active influence of the West 
Everton Community Council since 1965. As the city council began decanting 
tenants and demolishing houses, the community resorted to desperate 
measures—deciding to squat in the last house left standing on Arkwright 
Street and establishing the Langrove Street Action Group in 1986.40 A 24-hour 
occupation commenced; protesting residents barricaded in against demolition. 
Langrove Street Action Group made sure, as one activist put it, to “learn the 
rules” of the game, and got Shelter and CDS involved to advise on campaign 
strategy. Representatives from the two organisations ran a crash course on 
non-violent direct action, inspired by Martin Luther King and adapting Paulo 
Freire’s emancipatory ideas on critical pedagogy and community develop-
ment.41 The resulting fusion of radical secular politics and deep Christian 
faith was reflected in the banners displayed on the occupied house, which 
juxtaposed familiar activist slogans (‘Occupation Not Demolition’; ‘Council 
Vandalism’; ‘Save These Houses’) with verses from the Bible—“Love does not 
delight in evil but rejoices with the truth. It always protects, always trusts, 
always hopes, always perseveres. Love never fails”.42
While occupying the houses, Langrove Street Action Group set in motion a 
court case against the Militant decision, with pro bono support from a sympa-
thetic local barrister. The political situation in Liverpool was about to change 
dramatically. The battle between Militant and Thatcher came to a head and 
47 Labour councillors were disqualified from office, with surcharges against 
them, leaving the council run by a ‘caretaker’ Liberal administration for just 
six weeks until the forthcoming elections in 1987. In May that year, Labour 
was re-elected. Despite opposition from countless community groups and 
cooperatives, the URS had been broadly popular with voters for attempting to 
tackle the deep socioeconomic and environmental challenges facing Liverpool. 
Interestingly, Weller Street’s Treasurer, Phil Hughes—politicised by the co-op 
campaign into becoming a Labour councillor—was elected as the new Chair 
of Housing to replace Tony Byrne. Hughes was upfront about his only quali-
fication for the job being membership of the Weller Street Co-op, and Tony 
Byrne asserted that “Labour fought and won the local election on the Urban 
Regeneration Strategy, so it seems strange to choose Phil Hughes as a chair of 
housing”.43 His tenure was indeed odd. Although there was no outward change 
of policy—Hughes admitting “it can’t be stopped”—he nonetheless vowed to 
40 For a first-person account of the campaign, see Henry Corbett, “Langrove Action 
Story: A Community and a Council at Odds”, Together for the Common Good, 2012: http://
togetherforthecommongood.co.uk/case-studies/articles/the-langrove-action-story.html.
41 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Continuum, 1970).
42 Corinthians 13:6–8.
43 Quoted in Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, p. 25.
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‘humanise’ the URS and make it compatible with co-ops.44 Hughes agreed to 
sell the remaining thirty Langrove houses to the community co-op and, in 
fact, amended the URS plan so that the park would be developed around the 
community, as a green urban village. In a twist of fate, the early pioneers of 
Liverpool’s co-op movement were enabled to exercise direct positive influence 
on the future of several cooperative schemes, such as Langrove, through their 
empowerment to powerful positions on the council coinciding and colliding 
with an extraordinary turn of political events. Indeed, the leading Langrove 
activist, Jane Corbett—herself politicised by the campaign to become a 
Labour councillor—now exerts influence in her present position (at the time 
of writing) as Assistant Mayor of Liverpool and Mayoral Lead for Fairness and 
Tackling Poverty.
Langrove members have since capitalised on their experience with 
community development to pursue a more ambitious vision for neighbourhood 
regeneration—with aspirations for eco-homes, a park café, new shops, allot-
ments and self-sufficiency in energy and food—and are now working in 
partnership with public agencies on the latest regeneration plans for Everton 
Park. Since their initial success in saving the four-bed parlour houses, they 
have developed further phases of co-op housing, attracting CDS to develop 
their own scheme locally as well as developers of private housing. They have 
sought partnerships with other housing associations, most recently with 
Riverside—previously MIH—on the first new housing co-op development in 
the city in over a decade. Riverside are converting a block of flats into five 
homes for rent, having negotiated with Langrove to transfer at a pre-agreed 
below-market price rather than sell on the open market. These homes have 
been pre-allocated to new Langrove co-op members, who are involved 
in some of the design work. Coming full circle from their MIH roots in 
co-op development, Riverside are transferring the properties to Langrove 
at cost, driven forward by staff who were often involved personally in the 
cooperative movement, through either CDS or MIH as part of a strategy of 
giving something back to the local area and potentially rejuvenating the co-op 
movement after decades of dormancy. In the meantime, a different model of 
collective housing and community-led regeneration was being developed by the 
Eldonians. Like Langrove, they pushed for a more holistic and comprehensive 
form of local economic redevelopment than just housing alone, going much 
further in pursuing collective ownership over an entire neighbourhood. The 
next Part, the Neighbourhood Question, tells their story.
44 Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, p. 25.
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CHAPTER 7
Locating the Neighbourhood Question
7: Locating the Neighbourhood Question
In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method of solving the 
housing question after its fashion—that is to say, of solving it in 
such a way that the solution continually reproduces the question 
anew. This method is called “Haussmann” … 
By “Haussmann” I mean the practice which has now become 
general of making breaches in the working class quarters of our 
big towns, and particularly in those which are centrally situated, 
quite apart from whether this is done from considerations of 
public health and for beautifying the town, or owing to the 
demand for big centrally situated business premises, or owing 
to traffic requirements, such as the laying down of railways, 
streets, etc. No matter how different the reasons may be, the 
result is everywhere the same: the scandalous alleys and lanes 
disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise from the 
bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they 
appear again immediately somewhere else and often in the 
immediate neighbourhood.1
Since Engels first identified the method of urban renewal he names after 
Baron Haussmann, who remade Paris at the dawn of industrial modernity, 
these structural processes of creating, destroying and recreating urban 
spaces through successive bouts of state intervention punctuating but never 
fully arresting capital flow and flight have become all too familiar. Although 
prescient in his prognosis of uneven urban development, Engels was writing 
at the peak of British industrialisation—at the forefront of a nascent and 
expanding colonial-capitalism—and so his critique of capitalist urban devel-
opment was focused on the ill-effects of full-throttled growth, capital’s 
unbridled thirst for revalorising investments through creative destruction. He 
therefore failed to consider the impacts of economic decline, capital flight and 
blight. We can see this in his characterisation of the ‘Haussmannisation’ of 
working-class housing:
1 Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question (Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 71.
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But the spirit of Haussmann has also been abroad in London, Manchester 
and Liverpool … The result is that the workers are forced out of the 
centre of the towns towards the outskirts; that workers’ dwellings, 
and small dwellings in general, become rare and expensive and often 
altogether unobtainable, for under these circumstances the building 
industry, which is offered a much better field for speculation by more 
expensive houses, builds workers’ dwellings only by way of exception.2
Here, Engels appears to anticipate several forces that have come to bear 
on urban life in late modernity, not least gentrification. He identifies the 
essential shortcoming of Haussmannisation: that it simply displaces the 
problem (capitalism’s production of scarcity) rather than resolves it in situ. 
These processes of displacement and dispossession—whether driven by 
capital flows and gentrification or else augmented by the capitalist state 
through Haussmannisation—are the levers through which capital accumu-
lation revalorises land for growth, pushing workers into socio-spatial 
peripheries in a seemingly endless process resulting in an uneven development 
within and between cities. Since Engels wrote these passages, capitalism has 
gone global and the process that he describes as operating within cities has 
been scaled up to planetary proportions, flooding some global urban regions 
with capital and leaving others in drought. Something that Engels could not 
anticipate at the time he was writing, perhaps, was the eventuality that some 
cities, neighbourhoods and their inhabitants were not simply left behind by 
uneven urban development, still awaiting investment, but came to suffer 
from disinvestment, devalorisation and decline—after a period of capitalist 
growth. What if Patrick Keiller’s conundrum of capitalism’s production of 
the dilapidated dwelling were reconstituted as the dilapidated neighbourhood or 
even the dilapidated city? What would Engels make of the economic condi-
tions that motivated the spirit of Haussmann all but evacuating Liverpool (if 
not London)? 
Liverpool’s Second Blitz
Perhaps nowhere better exemplifies the neighbourhood question than the 
city of Liverpool. Foreshadowing a general trend across the old heartlands of 
global industrial production—from Detroit to Leipzig—Liverpool suffered 
brutal deindustrialisation and economic decline, as globalisation enabled the 
smoother flow of capital elsewhere. The rapid rise of Liverpool as a world-
leading seaport—at the apex of the British Empire—is matched only by the 
rate and depth of its fall from grace. By the late 1970s, political commentators 
were reporting, in astonishment, that
2 Engels, The Housing Question, pp. 20–21.
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Liverpool, at the heart of the region, has been ravaged. From a thriving 
merchant city, with more millionaires than any other provincial city, 
it has become an “unwanted mausoleum”. People are leaving Liverpool 
at an alarming rate—12,000 a year. Many see no hope for the future.3
The seeds of decline were sown in the early twentieth century as the British 
Empire began to dissolve and Britain’s trading partners shifted from Atlantic-
facing colonies to Europe and Asia, thereby leaving Liverpool, in historian 
Tony Lane’s oft-quoted maritime metaphor, “marooned on the wrong side of 
the country”.4 This long-term structural shift slowly devastated the maritime 
economy upon which Liverpool’s wealth and purpose were built: from the 
1960s to the 1980s, Liverpool’s port activity all but collapsed; the seven-
and-a-half-mile-long southern dock system closing entirely in 1971. Within 
Liverpool, economic decline was dramatically unevenly distributed: felt far 
more keenly in the inner-city dockside communities, being so dependent on 
the largely unskilled casualised jobs associated with the docks. Liverpool’s 
experience puts a new spin on Keiller’s formulation: placing the dilapidated 
neighbourhood or the dilapidated city within a narrative of uneven urban 
development in which deindustrialised rustbelt ‘old space’ is increasingly 
peripheralised by the ‘new space’ of growth regions.
This, however, was by no means a structural process alone. Haussmannisation 
in the post-war era played its part too. A “traumatic combination” of 
brute economic decline combined with “major self-inflicted public policy 
mistakes”—the removal of much of the city’s workforce to peripheral new 
towns and outer estates in the 1960s slum clearances—resulted in a dramatic 
population loss from a peak of some 870,000 in the 1930s to around 400,000 
today.5 Some estimates put the number of residents removed from the inner 
city to the new towns and outer estates through comprehensive redevelopment 
as high as 160,000.6 As a result, Liverpool has attracted much academic and 
policy attention as a ‘shrinking city’ with an especially acute housing vacancy 
problem—part of a global trend of urban shrinkage in deindustrialising 
regions.7 
3 Merseyside Socialist Research Group, Merseyside in Crisis (Manchester Free Press, 1980), 
p. 7.
4 Tony Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, 2nd ed. (Liverpool University Press, 1997), 
p. 46.
5 Olivier Sykes, Jonathan Brown, Matthew Cocks et al., “A City Profile of Liverpool”, 
Cities 35 (2013): 299–318 (p. 307).
6 Sykes, Brown, Cocks et al., “A City Profile of Liverpool”.
7 Matthew Cocks and Chris Couch, “The Governance of a Shrinking City: Housing 
Renewal in the Liverpool Conurbation, UK”, International Planning Studies 17.3 (2012): 
277–301; Chris Couch and Matthew Cocks, “Housing Vacancy and the Shrinking City: 
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The dual effect of economic restructuring and state-led urban renewal has 
been described by Tony Lane as “a sort of latter-day urban equivalent of the 
Highland clearances of several hundred years ago”.8 Such impassioned language 
is echoed by the Merseyside Socialist Research Group in Merseyside in Crisis:
Between 1966 and 1977 the heart was torn out of Liverpool … 15% 
of land is either vacant or derelict. The largest amount of open space 
in any city in Britain. A testimony to the folly of politicians and 
planners … Clear the slums, build a motorway system to the docks, 
rehouse people on the estates … The population of the inner city was 
cut by half in these ‘boom’ years—800,000 to 500,000 … The people 
of Liverpool have to live with the devastation that remains.9
It is important to stress that such figures should be read in light of the 
limited power of the local state vis-à-vis the brute economic reality—even 
with this internal metropolitan migration taken into account, the population 
of the overall Merseyside conurbation still fell as a consequence of more 
structural processes of capital flight and unemployment from a peak of 1.8 
million to around 1.3 million today.10 Nonetheless, the specific effects of 
Haussmannisation were devastating for the city as a whole as much as for 
the directly impacted dockside neighbourhoods. Although the council had 
attempted to extend the city of Liverpool’s boundaries several times during the 
post-war years, they had been unsuccessful, so the effect of shipping thousands 
of the active, if then underemployed, workforce out of the city beyond the tax 
base was to remove a large proportion of the council’s income stream from 
rates, or council tax, to pay for the services for those left behind.11 The conse-
quent “reduction in population”, Tony Lane explains, “was not accompanied 
by a pro rata reduction in the cost of services and so the gap between costs 
and rate revenue grew steadily wider”.12 This left Liverpool with a black hole 
in its finances for decades to come. 
Such a Gordian knot helped carve the ensuing economic blight deeper 
into the city’s fabric, tipping some particularly hard-hit neighbourhoods 
Trends and Policies in the UK and the City of Liverpool”, Housing Studies 28.3 (2013): 
499–519; Justin B. Hollander and Jeremy Németh, “The Bounds of Smart Decline: A 
Foundational Theory for Planning Shrinking Cities”, Housing Policy Debate 21.3 (2011): 
349–367.
8 Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, p. 140.
9 Merseyside Socialist Research Group, Merseyside in Crisis, p. 57.
10 Cocks and Couch, “The Governance of a Shrinking City”.
11 Tony Lane, “We Are The Champions: Liverpool vs the 1980s”, Marxism Today 
(Jan. 1986): 8–11.
12 Lane, “We Are The Champions, p. 11.
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into a spiral of decline. The weakening of collective consumption capacity 
and spending power on local goods and services by this loss of working-
age population left large parts of the city without the critical mass to keep 
local shops, businesses and communities alive. This precipitated a vicious 
spiral in which population loss and unemployment conspired to create a 
self-reinforcing cycle resulting in poverty, housing vacancies, environmental 
neglect, dereliction, crime, social unrest and eventually neighbourhood 
abandonment. “Parts of this city, it is no exaggeration to say”, said Lane in 
1981, “are the European equivalents of the shanty towns of Rio de Janeiro, 
Lima and Santiago”.13 How to deal with these consequences is the subject of 
the neighbourhood question. Building on Engels, this can be seen as a more 
spatialised version of the housing question—a question for which Liverpool 
has long been trying to answer.
One of the earliest (and most radical) attempts to answer the neigh-
bourhood question, the Community Development Project (CDP) programme 
of the late 1960s, provides a lesson in how state-led regeneration is not enough 
to transform the capitalist structures at its root. Like its close cousin SNAP 
in Granby, the CDP in the Vauxhall neighbourhood of north Liverpool was 
launched with the intention of understanding more about the causes of poverty 
whilst at the same time helping resolve it through social action.14 However, 
as community workers and academic researchers began working with local 
people and became embedded in communities, they developed a critical 
analysis of the complex systemic problems productive of place-based poverty. 
They criticised the programme, and others like it, for doing little to combat 
entrenched structural problems, for merely Gilding the Ghetto, as the title of 
the 1977 final report for the CDP programme put it:
The poverty initiatives then have clearly not made any great inroads 
on inner-Liverpool’s real material problems. All they have done is to 
restate, usually in academic terms, what the people who live there have 
known for a long time. If you live on Merseyside you have a better than 
average chance of being made redundant, being on the dole for a long 
time, living in slum conditions, being evicted, and forced to wait over 
six months for hospital treatment. Your children are more likely to die 
in infancy, or when, after getting no nursery schooling, they finally get 
to school, of being in larger classes in worse buildings, only to emerge 
finally onto the dole. Over 10,000 people leave Liverpool each year as 
a way of avoiding these problems. Those who are left can debate them 
13 Tony Lane, “Merseyside under the Hammer”, Marxism Today (Feb. 1981): 18–21 
(p. 18).
14 Diane Frost and Peter North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013).
Part III: The Neighbourhood Question128
in the neighbourhood councils and area management experiments left 
behind by the “poverty projects”.15
Their suggestions to government—of radical restructuring of industrial 
policy, public housing management, education, health and welfare—fell on 
deaf ears; and it soon became apparent that central government departments 
were less interested in necessary structural reforms than in communities’ 
capabilities to pull themselves up (by their bootstraps, as the saying goes) out 
of poverty through localised self-help. But without redistribution of economic 
assets, the participatory approaches embodied in programmes like SNAP and 
the CDPs were not enough alone to combat socio-economic problems rooted 
in structural inequalities. Interestingly, as a measure of their radicalisation 
and rejection of the government’s agenda, those professionals involved in the 
Vauxhall CDP helped tenants organise various resistances to welfare cuts and 
council housing rent rises, leading up to Liverpool’s 1972 Rent Strike.
An enduring legacy of the Vauxhall CDP is the development of community 
development trusts in north Liverpool. The Eldonian Community Trust in 
Vauxhall, the same neighbourhood as the CDP, has proven a successful 
example of how a community development trust can regenerate declining 
inner-city areas suffering from mass unemployment and extreme derelic-
tion.16 The key difference with the initiatives emanating from the CDP is that 
the Eldonians gained collective ownership of assets, including but not limited 
to housing, maintaining community control of local services to this day. The 
Eldonians have radically transformed a large area of north Liverpool from a 
state of decay into a thriving community with a promising future—despite 
prevailing economic headwinds pushing against them. The extent to which 
the community development trust model as mobilised by the Eldonians can 
resolve the neighbourhood question is one of the issues that I try to answer 
below. 
How to Make Water Flow Uphill
In 1981, the neighbourhood question made its indelible mark on the city and 
the nation in the violent social unrest that became known as the Toxteth Riots. 
Partly reacting to skyrocketing unemployment levels, the black community 
15 CDP (Community Development Project), Gilding the Ghetto: The State and the Poverty 
Experiments (CDP Inter-Project Editorial Team, 1977).
16 Peter Roberts, “Social Innovation, Spatial Transformation and Sustainable 
Communities: Liverpool and the ‘Eldonians’”, in Paul Drewe, Juan-Luis Klein and 
Edward Hulsbergen, eds, The Challenge of Social Innovation in Urban Revitalization (Techne 
Press, 2008); Jack McBane, The Rebirth of Liverpool: The Eldonian Way (Liverpool 
University Press, 2008).
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in and around Granby protested for nine consecutive nights against racial 
discrimination in public jobs and against police brutality—actions resulting 
in 70 buildings burnt to the ground, 500 arrests, 470 police officers injured, 
and a disabled man killed by a police vehicle.17 The government was forced to 
respond. The nature of that response seemed to hinge upon the imputed causes 
of the unrest—whether it was a moral issue or one related to the terrible social 
and economic conditions endured in Liverpool for so many years. It also pivoted 
upon how that decline in Granby was perceived—was it one of political and 
economic decisions taken at multiple levels that could therefore be reversed or 
one of inexorable deterioration in the economy of Liverpool and character of its 
people? The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, wrote to the Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher arguing the “need to be careful not to over-commit 
scare resources to Liverpool”. The letter concludes with the astounding lines: 
It would be even more regrettable if some of the brighter ideas for 
renewing economic activity were to be sown only on relatively stony 
ground on the banks of the Mersey. I cannot help feeling that the 
option of managed decline, which the CPRS rejected in its study of 
Merseyside, is one which we should not forget altogether. We must not 
expend all our resources in trying to make water flow uphill.18 
Howe was not alone amongst his Cabinet colleagues for such extreme 
views. The arch-neoliberal, Sir Keith Joseph, has likewise been revealed 
as favouring the “managed rundown” of Merseyside.19 Howe and Joseph 
were effectively arguing for what some critics have recently described as 
urban ‘autotomy’—“the conscious abandonment of a damaged or diseased 
part of the body politic in order to preserve the healthy remainder”20—a 
practice first emerging in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s as a strategy 
of containment of Irish Republican communities.21 Such views appear to 
express a very traditional notion of urban-economic change as natural—just 
17 Diane Frost and Richard Phillips, Liverpool ’81: Remembering the Riots (Liverpool 
University Press, 2011).
18 Geoffrey Howe, letter dated 11 Aug. 1981, quoted in Simon Parker and Rowland 
Atkinson, “Disorderly Cities and the Policy-Making Field: The 1981 English Riots and 
the Management of Urban Decline”, British Politics 15 (2020): 160–177.
19 Parker and Atkinson, “Disorderly Cities”.
20 Simon Parker, “The Leaving of Liverpool: Managed Decline and the Enduring 
Legacy of Thatcherism’s Urban Policy”, LSE Blog, 17 Jan. 2019: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
politicsandpolicy/the-leaving-of-liverpool/. 
21 Rowland Atkinson, Simon Parker and Emma Regina Morales, “Non-State Space: The 
Strategic Ejection of Dangerous and High Maintenance Urban Space”, Territory, Politics, 
Governance 5.4 (2017): 443–458.
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a feature of a neighbourhood’s or city’s natural progression from birth to 
death. Trying to counter water flowing downhill, as Howe put it, by inter-
vening in the ‘natural’ course of things by, say, building a dam or planting 
trees downstream to encourage the hydrological cycle to replenish water 
upstream, at its source, was simply unthinkable for the likes of Howe and 
Joseph. Whether we are persuaded by this metaphor or not, it is clear that 
this policy position of ‘managed decline’ or ‘managed rundown’ has proven 
very influential in Liverpool’s recent history. As late as the 1990s, according 
to a council officer I interviewed, Managed Decline was the name of a 
council budget tasked with (dis)investments in certain declining inner-city 
neighbourhoods, such as Granby. I explore the damage done to Granby by 
this policy discourse in Part IV.
Fatalistic belief in the natural decline of certain cities or neighbour-
hoods reflects the ‘urban lifecycle’ theory that has proven popular among 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. This emphasises the transitions 
commonly experienced by urban agglomerations as a combination of various 
interacting structural processes—economic shifts from industrialisation 
through deindustrialisation; changing demographic structures, such as ageing 
populations, placing different demands on housing types and locations; the 
introduction of new technologies (e.g., cars) and changing cultural preferences 
for different lifestyles—with inner-city decline partly attributed to these 
factors. We see a similar account operating at the more micro-scale in the 
‘neighbourhood life-cycle’ theory. This view holds that neighbourhoods have 
a natural lifecycle, much as human beings do, whereby as the housing stock 
gets older—just as biological cells age—the neighbourhood goes through a 
series of succession stages, ultimately leading to death. Lifecycle theory—
which various critics have shown to be highly influential in American urban 
development policy22—goes so far as to claim that this decline is an inevitable 
end state of the natural process of ageing building stock. On this reading, the 
causal factors and spatial symptoms of neighbourhood decline—such as rising 
poverty, low demand, housing vacancy, dereliction, neglect, stigma, crime, 
social disorder and eventual abandonment—are simply natural consequences 
to which all urban neighbourhoods eventually succumb. It thereby under-
plays if not completely overlooks the effects on urban space of the actions 
and interactions of various economic agents and the political decisions made 
by policymakers and, indeed, the entire discipline of urban regeneration as 
a concerted attempt made by urban policy to resuscitate or give new life to 
places. 
22 John T. Metzger, “Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and 
National Urban Policy”, Housing Policy Debate 11.1 (2000): 7–40; Manuel B. Aalbers, “Do 
Maps Make Geography? Part 1: Redlining, Planned Shrinkage, and the Places of Decline”, 
ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 13.4 (2014): 525–556.
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We might see such a lifecycle view as misapprehending the nature of the 
neighbourhood or the city as a noun rather than a verb—as a given abstract 
container of distinct territorial content and identity rather than, following 
Lefebvre,23 as a socially performed and materially mediated space of flows 
produced and reproduced through the actions and interactions of various 
actors. A dialectical approach to urban change acknowledges both the more 
structural processes—demographic, technological, architectural, economic 
shifts—but, importantly, foregrounds other factors of change emanating from 
human agency, collective action, political decisions and cultural practices. 
Such a perspectival refocus allows us to see neighbourhood decline not 
simply as the result of inevitable processes beyond our capacity to modify 
(for example, buildings of a certain age coming to the end of their life) but as 
the cumulative consequence of willed political decisions and socioeconomic 
activities that enact particular perceptions of space, inscribing a vision of place 
into its material fabric.
Thus politicians, policymakers, academics and commentators are torn 
between two opposing views on the nature of the neighbourhood question. 
On one side are those who believe the neighbourhood question is posed 
purely by the ‘natural’ forces of urban-economic change and that the best 
we can hope for is to encourage growth or minimise the pain of inevi-
table decline—embodied in Howe’s and Joseph’s managed decline. On the 
other are those who contend that, through collective decision-making over 
resources, we can have a performative impact on the direction of urban 
change and that the fate of place is the product of political choices as much 
as structural forces. 
At its most extreme, a belief in the natural lifecycle of neighbourhoods and 
cities may even evolve, rather ironically, into a more proactive policy of ‘planned 
shrinkage’, in which decisions are made to rationalise and redirect scarce public 
resources away from declining areas to those supposed to be on the up, in ways 
which may actually precipitate and perform that decline. American urbanist 
Roberta Brandes Gratz describes planned shrinkage as a policy of
selectively abandoning old neighborhoods in unpopular areas of a city, 
while continuing to build new ones in popular sections; selectively 
allowing old parks and other public amenities to continue to deteri-
orate, while building new ones elsewhere; selectively allowing mass 
transit, old streets, sewer lines and other elements of a city’s infra-
structure to continue to decay, while building highways to encourage 
more of the cars that choke cities and creating new neighborhoods or 
23 Lefebvre, The Production of Space. See also David Madden, “Neighborhood as Spatial 
Project: Making the Urban Order on the Downtown Brooklyn Waterfront”, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.2 (2014): 471–497.
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“new towns” that require new infrastructures and the disruption of 
existing networks.24 
Critical health scholars have demonstrated the devastating effects for 
marginalised black communities in particular when planned shrinkage 
combines with racist urban policies in a process Mindy Thompson Fullilove 
describes as ‘root shock’.25 Here, a biological metaphor evokes collective 
trauma. Root shock is also perceptible in Granby, the neighbourhood of 
SNAP where collective alternatives have grown in spite of state-administered 
violence—an experience I dissect below, in Part IV.
There is certainly a sense in which Tory Cabinet Ministers in the early 
1980s were toying with the idea of selectively abandoning to brute economic 
forces not just specific neighbourhoods in Liverpool but the entire city 
itself. The Labour Council administration directing resources into the slum 
clearance programme of the 1960s, in moving tenants and resources from 
inner-city areas to new towns on the periphery, might also be seen in this light. 
Although this was not a conscious policy of selectively abandoning inner-city 
areas, its effects suggest otherwise. The most damning critics of Liverpool’s 
post-war planning policies go so far as to draw analogies with the Blitz rained 
down upon the city during the Second World War:
Liverpool … has suffered two blitzes in the last 30 years. The first left 
the whole city ruined but defiant. The second has picked off areas with 
equally devastating results. The new enemy is faceless.
The peace-time blitz of Liverpool does not simply consist of waste-
land where buildings once stood: it consists also of publicly-owned 
dwellings, none of them more than 50 years old and most a good deal 
newer, in an advanced state of decay.26
Liverpool was left with the largest amount of “open-space” of any city in 
Britain. The decline of Liverpool is not simply statistical—it is visible. 
“It looks as if it’s been bombed” is a favourite local expression that does 
not exaggerate.27
Planned shrinkage may be the proactive American equivalent of a seemingly 
more passive British tradition of managed decline, founded on an apparent 
inability to do anything other than manage an ‘inevitable’ regression. Yet 
24 Roberta Brandes Gratz, The Living City (Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 156.
25 Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, 
and What We Can Do about It (One World/Ballantine Books, 2004).
26 Merseyside Socialist Research Group, Merseyside in Crisis, pp. 67 and 338.
27 Lane, “Liverpool—City of Harder Times to Come”, p. 337.
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both inflections connote a belief in decline as natural and outside the power 
of people to change. All such ideas can be incredibly destructive once entered 
into policy discourse. This is acknowledged in Howe’s subsequent corre-
spondence with Thatcher, stating that, in reference to managed decline, “This 
is not a term for use, even privately”.28
As it rather fortuitously turned out, Howe’s extremist position did 
not win out in Cabinet discussions and Thatcher eventually endorsed the 
alternative, more moderate perspective of (now Lord) Michael Heseltine, 
who argued for renewed government intervention and public investment in 
Liverpool, albeit through the imposition of anti-democratic, pro-market, 
property-led mechanisms of central state control over local development. 
In the self-styled Minister for Merseyside’s personal crusade to turn the 
city around, Liverpool found itself at the centre of experimentation with a 
neoliberal urban policy regime in which the state took an interventionist role 
in stimulating private demand, attracting inward investment and boosting 
property-led development. In 1981, in the aftermath of the Toxteth Riots, 
Merseyside became the site of one of the country’s first Enterprise Zones, in 
the southern outer estate of Speke, as well as, alongside London Docklands, 
one of the pioneering Urban Development Corporations, tasked with 
regenerating Liverpool’s derelict docks and overseen by a specialist quango, 
the Merseyside Task Force. These top-down planning prescriptions were 
amongst the first of their kind to be tried and tested in the UK but ultimately 
failed to do much more than successfully restore or redevelop specific sites, 
such as the historic Albert Dock, due to their narrow, noun-like focus on 
property-led redevelopment as opposed to a more holistic approach (such 
as SNAP and the CDPs) considering deeper socioeconomic structures 
and processes, such as skills, health, housing, resource redistribution and 
economic ownership.
The failure of regeneration projects funded by the central state to resolve the 
neighbourhood question was perhaps one reason why the people of Liverpool 
turned their attention to the local state. In electing a Labour Council in 
the mid-1980s strongly influenced by the Trotskyist faction of the Militant 
Tendency, Liverpool experimented with a radical agenda of municipal socialism 
promising massive public investment in new council housing, infrastructure, 
parks, leisure facilities and associated new jobs. Along with only a handful 
of other Labour-led localities around the country pursing municipal socialist 
experiments,29 Liverpool City Council clashed fiercely with central government 
under Thatcher but, unlike the others, also came into conflict with its potential 
28 Letter, Geoffrey Howe, 4 Sept. 1981, quoted in Parker and Atkinson, “Disorderly 
Cities and the Policy-Making Field: The 1981 English Riots and the Management of 
Urban Decline”.
29 Wainwright, Labour: A Tale of Two Parties.
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local ally, Liverpool’s growing housing cooperative movement. Unfortunately, 
the renewed municipal socialism of the 1980s proved ultimately incapable 
of challenging the capitalist consensus: local governments struggled to fund 
ambitious social programmes amidst tightening fiscal constraints. Militant 
councillors, as we have seen in the previous chapter, were eventually disbarred 
from office for setting an illegal budget.30 Moreover, municipal socialist 
programmes were not just politically unsustainable. The very same concerns 
motivating resistance to state bureaucracy shared by urban communities and 
the intellectual New Left, in such actions as urban renewal protests and anti-
demolition campaigns, likewise alienated residents, especially those involved 
in smaller-scale grassroots innovations like the co-ops. The flirtation with 
municipal socialism in the 1980s may have revealed the flaws in top-down state 
solutions to uneven urban development but also showed that localities could act 
against wider structural and political forces—actions which brought Liverpool 
back from the brink of devastation and, arguably, did far more to propel the 
city ‘beyond the brink’ than any of the neoliberal urban-entrepreneurial policies 
following in its wake and celebrated in conventionally boosterist fashion.31
Militant’s municipal socialism, the Eldonians’ ‘self-regenerating community’ 
and Heseltine’s Task Force were three creative solutions to the neighbourhood 
question—three distinct strands spun from the vortex of economic restruc-
turing in which Liverpool was so tightly caught in the 1980s. In this context 
of urban experimentation, Liverpool found itself at the centre of a heated 
academic debate in geography in the 1980s, known as the locality debate. 
Critical geographer Doreen Massey’s classic text Spatial Division of Labour 
helped shape the debate, which hinged on the relative power of localities to 
respond positively to the effects of structural economic shifts.32 Merseyside 
was one of seven key case studies in the localities studies research conducted in 
the late 1980s and which sought to show how localities could proactively shape 
their fates in the face of intense global forces.33 Richard Meegan’s study of 
Merseyside emphasised the resistance and policy innovations made in response 
to the swift destruction of the city’s raison d’être.34 Despite being criticised by 
30 Frost and North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge.
31 Michael Parkinson, Liverpool Beyond the Brink: The Remaking of a Post-Imperial City 
(Liverpool University Press, 2019).
32 Doreen Massey, Spatial Division of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 1984).
33 Philip Cooke, ed., Localities: Changing Face of Urban Britain (Routledge, 1989); Michael 
Harloe, Chris Pickvance and John Urry, eds, Place, Policy and Politics: Do Localities Matter? 
(Routledge, 1990).
34 Richard Meegan, “Merseyside in Crisis and in Conflict”, in Michael Harloe, Chris 
Pickvance and John Urry, eds, Place, Policy and Politics: Do Localities Matter? (Routledge, 
1990).
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Marxist geographers35 for their spatial fetishism and dense empiricism, these 
studies showed how structural processes had to be grounded somewhere, to 
manifest their effects in one spatial setting or another, and that the converse 
held true: global forces could in turn be countered and potentially altered—if 
only minutely—by changes occurring at the local level, initiated by political 
resistance or proactive experimentation with different policies and projects. In 
many ways this was yet another rehash of the classic debate between Marxists 
and anarchists around the nature of social change and the most effective scale 
of resistance.
What the Eldonians, Militant and the Minister for Merseyside all had 
in common—notwithstanding deep ideological differences—was their 
unflinching belief that they could positively impact the fate of neighbour-
hoods and, indeed, an entire city despite popular influential political narratives 
to the contrary. But their approaches to delivering their respective visions 
for Liverpool were highly divergent. Except, that is, for a striking similarity 
between the otherwise diametrically opposed Militant URS and the Minister 
for Merseyside’s Task Force. Each cared more about what was delivered than 
how it was delivered. They cared more about ends than means. These policy 
agendas were done more for or to people than with them. The Eldonian model, 
on the other hand, represents an alternative, community-led approach more 
grounded in democratic self-governance. Although some of their aspira-
tions were in reality never more than that and their governing structures 
were deeply flawed and riven by internal contradictions, as will be explored 
in the following chapter, it nonetheless prefigures something qualitatively 
different from the state–market, public–private dichotomy represented by the 
Militant-led Council and Thatcher’s government—something inhering more 
in the social economy than the public or private sector; in the commons rather 
than the socialist state or the capitalist market.
Can Collective Housing Save the City?
So how can a more social economy begin to resolve the neighbourhood 
question? This is the subject of a growing field of research around ‘territorial 
social innovation’ that poses its own question: can neighbourhoods save the 
city?36 One of its leading theorists Frank Moulaert provides some answers as to 
why the neighbourhood scale has become important for both urban policy and 
social action over recent decades. Partly because economic restructuring and 
35 David Harvey, “Three myths in search of a reality in urban studies”, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 5 (1987): 367–376; Neil Smith, “Dangers of the Empirical 
Turn: Some Comments on the CURS Initiative”, Antipode 19.1 (1987): 59–68.
36 Frank Moulaert, Flavia Martinelli, Erik Swyngedouw and Sara González, Can 
Neighbourhoods Save the City?: Community Development and Social Innovation (Routledge, 2010).
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urban decline are most tangible in neighbourhoods: “social relations, governance 
dynamics and agents ‘responsible for’ the decline are more easily identifiable 
in urban neighbourhoods than in lower density areas or at higher spatial 
scales”.37 Partly because the spatial concentration of exclusion factors in these 
places simultaneously creates a downward spiral of neglect and hopelessness: 
“proximity feeds depression, fatalism, localised déjà-vus” and state agencies and 
investors gradually withdraw, as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, but which 
simultaneously acts as a catalyst and opportunity for alternatives to develop.
But what exactly creates this catalyst for change? Human needs being 
left unmet by the state and the market leaves a vacuum to be filled by other 
actors, who reach towards alternative solutions through a process of social 
innovation. In terms of Liverpool, market failure can be discerned in the 
collapse of its maritime economy; state failure in the way in which post-war 
urban renewal efforts only exacerbated the problem, by removing much of the 
workforce to outer estates, where jobs also failed to materialise. But human 
needs are not only economic or ‘material’—they amount to more than having 
a job and a house in which to live. For social innovation scholars, needs also 
include at least two other dimensions: cultural or ‘existential’ needs of self-
expression and creativity; and ‘political’ needs of participatory citizenship and 
self-government.38 In this way, social innovation moves beyond any supposed 
one-dimensional solution to the housing question critiqued by Engels, where 
deprivation is too narrowly conceived as simply material exploitation. These 
various forms—alienation from existential deprivation, social exclusion from 
political deprivation, as well as exploitation from material deprivation—can be 
seen to spark reactions amongst affected citizens who, under the right condi-
tions, may self-organise and mobilise for change. 
Social innovation builds on traditions of self-organisation in civil 
society stretching back centuries to practices of commoning and guild 
socialism through mutualism and cooperativism. Since capitalist institu-
tions were constructed to commodify land, labour, capital and knowledge, 
these movements have sought to innovate new institutional forms that 
de-commodify, decentralise and democratise these domains. In the domain 
of knowledge we see the recent innovation of cooperative, peer-to-peer and 
open source digital platforms; in capital, we see credit unions and building 
societies; in labour, we see worker-owned cooperatives; and, most impor-
tantly for our purposes, in land, we see the innovation of housing cooperatives, 
mutual ownership societies and community land trusts. Innovations in the 
37 Frank Moulaert, “Social Innovation: Institutionally Embedded, Territorially (Re)
Produced”, in Diana MacCullum, Frank Moulaert, Jean Hillier and Serena Vicari Haddock 
(eds), Social Innovation and Territorial Development (Ashgate, 2009), pp. 11–24 (p. 16). 
38 Frank Moulaert, Flavia Martinelli, Erik Swyngedouw and Sara González, “Towards 
Alternative Model(s) of Local Innovation”, Urban Studies 42.11 (2005): 1969–1990.
7: Locating the Neighbourhood Question 137
institutions that govern social and economic life for the creation of greater 
social value and community benefit have thus been conceptualised as ‘social 
innovations’.39 Taken together, social innovations help bring about a distinct 
kind of economy, known variously as the social economy, the community 
economy or the solidarity economy.40 This describes a different form of 
economic relationship to either capitalist market exchange or state redistri-
bution—one founded on voluntary association, cooperation, gift exchange, 
mutual aid and solidarity. It is a ‘social’ rather than public (state) or private 
(market) logic. The social economy organises economic functions primarily 
according to democratic, co-operative and reciprocal principles; aims for high 
levels of equality, redistribution and empowerment of marginalised citizens; 
and works towards the satisfaction of unmet human needs.
Social innovation is defined as social change that achieves conditions of 
empowerment in three domains: the satisfaction of human needs previously 
left unmet; changes in the social relations of governance that enable full 
participation in society; and increased socio-political capabilities to access 
the resources required to satisfy needs and enable participation. In terms 
of housing, we can see how collective housing alternatives such as co-ops 
can—in theory at least—achieve these three conditions of empowerment. 
In these alternative models, the ownership of economic assets (e.g., land and 
buildings) is radically redistributed so that previously deprived groups gain 
access to shelter but also to the economic benefits that accrue from having 
a stake in common property. Democratised development and management 
processes restructure power relations both between residents and with 
other stakeholders, as we have seen in the radical equalisation of power with 
architects and developers in the Liverpool new-build co-ops. Cooperative 
governance structures enable the participation of members in decision-
making and, as we have seen in the generation of councillors from the 
new-build co-ops in Liverpool, empower people to become more involved 
in the politics of wider society.
However, achieving social innovation in the realm of housing alone is not 
enough to revitalise neighbourhoods, let alone stem the tide of decline. What 
about enterprise? What about jobs? What about access to finance? The relative 
success or impact of social innovations such as cooperatives depends on their 
ability to construct relatively autonomous local ‘circuits of value’ in which 
39 Moulaert, Martinelli, Swyngedouw and González, Can Neighbourhoods Save the City?
40 Frank Moulaert and Oana Ailenei, “Social Economy, Third Sector and Solidarity 
Relations: A Conceptual Synthesis from History to Present”, Urban Studies 42.11 (2005): 
2037–2054; Ethan Miller, “Community Economy: Ontology, Ethics, and Politics for 
Radically Democratic Economic Organizing”, Rethinking Marxism 25.4 (2013): 518–533; 
Peter North and Molly Scott Cato, eds, Towards Just and Sustainable Economies: The Social 
and Solidarity Economy North and South (Policy Press, 2017).
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resources flow between domains within communities rather than siphoned off 
into global circuits of capital.41 The idea is to develop local democratic insti-
tutional structures “organised around the goal of ‘reclaiming’ that capital by 
limiting its potential mobility by anchoring it within localities”.42 Community 
development scholar James DeFilippis43 categorises the different types of 
autonomous local development corresponding to three spheres in circuits 
of value: community control over the means of production (labour), such as 
worker cooperatives; the means of exchange (capital), such as credit unions 
and community-owned shops; and the means of social reproduction (land), the 
domestic spaces of the home and neighbourhood, through mutual ownership of 
housing such as cooperatives and community land trusts. The aim is not only 
to build wealth but to fix it in place and lock it within democratic ownership 
models that plug the gaps in leaking local economies and enable the recycling 
and reinvestment of wealth locally.
Viewing the neighbourhood or city as a holistic ‘circuit of value’ plugged 
into wider regional, national and global circuits allows us to see that reappro-
priating just one sphere of the economy—housing—is not enough to build a 
sustainable alternative. This is where a particular collective model comes in—
the ‘community development trust’—a model distinct from housing co-ops 
in a number of ways but fundamentally because it develops more than just 
housing. Community development trusts originated in 1960s campaigns against 
inner urban renewal—paralleling the housing cooperative movement.44 They 
share a great deal with the more established ‘community development corpora-
tions’ in the USA, which grew up as ‘coordinating agents’ for a whole range 
of community-owned activities, not just housing.45 Community development 
trusts aim to acquire land and assets as means of protection from demolition, 
speculation or public disinvestment, for more sustainable and participatory 
community-led property development and, crucially, as incubating hubs for the 
development of other community businesses and social enterprises—i.e., the 
41 Roger Lee, Andrew Leyshon, Theresa Aldridge et al., “Making Geographies and 
Histories? Constructing Local Circuits of Value”, Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 22.4 (2004): 595–617.
42 James DeFilippis, “Alternatives to the ‘New Urban Politics’: Finding Locality and 
Autonomy in Local Economic Development”, Political Geography 18 (1999): 973–990 
(p. 983).
43 DeFilippis, “Alternatives to the ‘New Urban Politics’”; James DeFilippis, Unmaking 
Goliath: Community Control in the Face of Global Capital (Routledge, 2004).
44 Nick Bailey, “The Role, Organisation and Contribution of Community Enterprise to 
Urban Regeneration Policy in the UK”, Progress in Planning 77.1 (2012): 1–35.
45 David Imbroscio, Reconstructing City Politics: Alternative Economic Development and Urban 
Regimes (SAGE, 1997); Severyn Bruyn and James Meehan, Beyond the Market and the State: 
New Directions in Community Development (Temple University Press, 1987).
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social economy. They have been characterised as ‘community anchors’ for their 
anchoring role in communities—as hubs of social and economic activity, growing 
wealth from the grassroots and anchoring it in place.46 Early exemplars of local 
struggles that successfully campaigned for the transfer of public land and assets 
into community ownership include Coin Street Community Builders, estab-
lished in 1984 to manage land for cooperative housing and community facilities 
on London’s South Bank.47 Coin Street was one of the founding members 
of the national umbrella group (or secondary organisation) for community 
development trusts, the Development Trust Association, now named Locality. 
And in Liverpool we have the Eldonian Community Trust, still the country’s 
largest community-owned housing trust and enterprise and seen as a pioneering 
example of social innovation.48 Whereas Coin Street was supported by the local 
state—in fact, one of the final acts of the Greater London Council before its 
abolition by Thatcher’s government was the gifting of prime real estate to the 
Community Builders—in the case of the Eldonians, Liverpool City Council 
was dead set against them. The story of how they got to where they are today, 
despite such challenges, is the subject of the next chapter.
46 James Henderson and Christopher McWilliams, “The UK Community Anchor Model 
and Its Challenges for Community Sector Theory and Practice”, Urban Studies 54.16 
(2017): 3826–3842.
47 Guy Baeten, “From Community Planning to Partnership Planning: Urban Regeneration 
and Shifting Power Geometries on the South Bank, London”, GeoJournal 51 (2000): 
293–300; Guy Baeten, “Urban Regeneration, Social Exclusion and Shifting Power 
Geometries on the South Bank, London”, Geographische Zeitschrift 89.2/3 (2001): 104–113.
48 Roberts, “Social Innovation, Spatial Transformation and Sustainable Communities: 
Liverpool and the ‘Eldonians’”.
CHAPTER 8
The Eldonians
From Parish Politics to Global Exemplar 
8: The Eldonians
The story of the Eldonians is an epic struggle against adversity. This is a story 
that has been told comprehensively elsewhere, notably by Jack McBane, the 
MIH co-op development officer who worked very closely with the Eldonians 
and whose historical account, The Rebirth of Liverpool: The Eldonian Way, I 
draw on extensively in what follows, triangulating with my own research, 
comprising observation and interviews with residents, activists, politicians, 
housing professionals and community leaders, as well as with other commen-
taries.1 Like most other co-op communities in Liverpool, the Eldonians are 
a homogeneous white working-class community, but unlike many of the 
co-ops in the south end, rooted in Protestantism, the Eldonians are staunchly 
Catholic, descendants of Irish migrants, many of whom came to Liverpool 
to escape the Potato Famine of 1845–47. Of the hundreds of thousands of 
migrants that fled the famine for Liverpool—over half of whom were desig-
nated by the authorities as ‘paupers’—tens of thousands stayed, many settling 
in slums built behind the docks in the inner north end. Most of these back-
to-back tenements were concentrated around the north docks in areas like 
Vauxhall, close to the employment opportunities, far away from much of the 
wealthy merchant and artisan housing further inland and in the south end, 
in areas like Granby. Vauxhall became increasingly overcrowded and housing 
conditions worsened as ‘Jerry-built’ terraces were thrown up. 
Amidst these terrible conditions, people turned to each other and to the 
church for solace and support. The Catholic Church was a central component 
of people’s lives and a powerful presence in the somewhat parochial politics 
of Vauxhall, which alone had around fourteen parish churches. Irish Catholic 
1 Tim Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”, ROOF 12.6 (1987); Peter Roberts, “Social 
Innovation, Spatial Transformation and Sustainable Communities: Liverpool and the 
‘Eldonians’”, in Paul Drewe, Juan-Luis Klein and Edward Hulsbergen, eds, The Challenge 
of Social Innovation in Urban Revitalization (Techne Press, 2008); Ken Rogers, The Lost 
Tribe of Everton and Scottie Road (Trinity Mirror Sport Media, 2010); Ken Rogers, Lost 
Tribe: The People’s Memories: 2 (Trinity Mirror North West and North Wales, 2012); David 
Sheppard and Derek Worlock, Better Together: Christian Partnership in a Hurt City (Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1988).
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migrants displaced existing Protestant communities, who moved further up 
the ridge that frames Liverpool, away from the docks, heightening sectarian 
resentments. A former council housing officer describes them as “really old, 
well-established communities” with strong communal identities, in which 
“families know each other”. She explains that “you didn’t cross parishes really, 
you didn’t go to St Marys, ’cause although you could spit that far it felt like you 
needed a passport to go there”. But this was not a sectarian issue, for all these 
parishes were Catholic, with fiercely loyal, “parochial” internal attachments. 
Liverpool has often been described to me as a “city of a thousand villages”, 
each looking no further across so many imagined boundaries. The depth of 
such attachments can be seen in the very name of the Eldonians, derived from 
Eldon Street, where the local parish church, Our Lady of Reconciliation, was 
located, defining the centre of the community, as well as the church social 
club, in which community meetings were held. An alternative explanation 
is the name of the football team that Paul Orr, the local Labour councillor 
and Eldonian ally, played for as a youngster.2 Football and religion: defining 
features of Liverpudlian identity.
Despite the obvious challenges for building broader civic cohesion and 
‘bridging’ social capital,3 these parish-based communities had the advantage 
of strong ‘bonding’ capital—internal solidarity, networks of mutual aid, 
communality and togetherness—which would prove invaluable in keeping the 
Eldonians unified in their campaign for better housing. In a recent populist 
history of the north end, an edited collection of “the people’s memories” prior 
to slum clearance, journalist and historian Ken Rogers, addresses his audience 
directly: “You speak with one voice. It’s as if you all come from the same 
group, the same family, dare I say it, the same TRIBE”.4 Written to express 
the feelings of residents, the book laments the 1960s slum clearance policies 
for displacing and breaking up communities, even if supportive of the need 
to improve the terrible conditions besetting the tenements. One such episode 
in this tragic history was particularly disruptive and became an important 
lesson in the formation of the Eldonians. Constructed from 1968 to 1971 and 
described by Rogers as the “biggest hole in the ground ever dug in Liverpool”,5 
the Kingsway Mersey Tunnel required the demolition of most housing in the 
immediate area, including five hundred dwellings built just five years earlier by 
the council to rehouse people from the slums. Local resident Tony McGann, 
who would later become the leader of the Eldonians, describes to me how 
2 Peter Kilfoyle, Left Behind: Winning Back a Labour Heartland and the Defeat of Militant 
(Politico’s Publishing, 2000).
3 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & 
Schuster, 2000).
4 Rogers, Lost Tribe: The People’s Memories: 2, p. 174; original emphasis.
5 Rogers, Lost Tribe: The People’s Memories: 2, p. 177.
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“we lived in really bad conditions, ten of us in two rooms … and we had no 
running water”. Urban renewal of some sort was therefore welcome, but in 
the event
Thousands of people were put out their homes and sent all over the 
place … People had no say. And what went down that hole was my 
home, my home and thousands of others and all the small firms went 
down that hole in the ground, and people were scattered to the four 
winds.
Not only did countless small family-run businesses and local jobs ‘go down 
the hole’ of the Mersey Tunnel but the community as a whole—charac-
terised by Tony as “heartbroken”—was fragmented. This was the principal 
motivation behind the Eldonians’ campaign for a co-op. In 1978, the council 
decided to demolish the tenement blocks around Eldon and Burlington Streets, 
affecting 1,500 people in the heart of the parish, as part of the Liberals’ 
Tenement Rehousing Programme. McGann, who had managed to secure a 
new tenancy in the Eldon Street area, quickly became the community contact 
for housing issues—a ‘go to man’ or an ‘unpaid councillor’6—and, inspired 
by his personal experience of displacement, used his new leadership role to 
rally tenants around opposing the plans. An infamous meeting called by the 
council planners was attended by local councillors, the priesthood and 250 
local residents. Parish priest Father O’Reilly questioned for the first time 
the authority of the planners to dictate tenement demolition. This sparked 
dissent from the community, and local councillor, Paul Orr, suggested a 
survey of residents’ views should be conducted. Implemented by McGann, 
the survey discovered that some 90 per cent did not want to move away but 
nonetheless wanted demolition or improvement. This was the first time the 
people of Vauxhall had ever been asked what they actually wanted. It provided 
a community mandate for an alternative to council rehousing which led to the 
formation of the Eldonian Community Association in the early 1980s, with 
McGann elected as chair. The Eldonians then began negotiating with city 
councillors and housing officers, leading to contact with Chris Davies, the 
council’s Chair of Housing, who explained to me the proactive attitude of the 
Eldonians compared with other groups fighting displacement he encountered:
The thing about the Eldonians was they were always so positive! Other 
people would come in and whinge and say, “This should be done for 
us” … and Tony would come along with his people and say, “Look, we 
know you’re doing your best, and you’re facing difficulties; now what if 
6 Jack McBane, The Rebirth of Liverpool: The Eldonian Way (Liverpool University Press, 
2008).
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we were to do this; could you do that?” Just positive and good feedback, 
and you wanted to work with them—I did anyway.
The Eldonians had heard about other groups facing similar challenges 
establishing themselves as co-ops as a means to contest displacement, and it 
was during these negotiations with Davies that the Eldonians first learned how 
to run a co-op campaign. Between the five hundred or so families living in the 
various 1930s-built tenements around Eldon Street who were involved in the 
Eldonian Community Association, it was agreed in 1982 that Portland Gardens 
was the priority. Of the Portland Gardens tenants, 140 opted to stay with the 
council, in a conversion scheme around the old blocks, whilst 326 voted for a 
co-op.7 The council agreed to a ‘top-downing’ improvement scheme, reducing 
Portland Gardens from four to two storeys. At this point, the Eldonians 
sought the advice of the leading co-op development agencies and Chris Davies 
put them in touch with Jack McBane at MIH. McBane describes how, upon 
first meeting the Eldonians, he fell “instantly in love” with the people and, in 
particular, Tony’s “mix of aggression with humour and charm”. He explains 
to me how he was asked to interview along with CDS and Neighbourhood 
Housing Services:
So the interview panel was like 30 people and I’ll never forget it. They 
had a big social hall, they had an organisation, and they were used to 
running things, and I said, “I don’t think you’re thinking big enough. 
This place is a shithole, you know that, why don’t you take on the whole 
neighbourhood?” And at this McGann’s eyes began to light up … I said, 
“Nobody else cares for this place. It’s been abandoned by the council, 
the businesses have already left town, housing associations aren’t even 
active here. The only thing that’s alive and well here is you. What’s 
the point in doing a housing co-op surrounded by this? Because you’re 
going to waste a huge amount of resources and my time and the archi-
tect’s time doing a co-op—why don’t we just change the whole thing 
and gear it up?” 
McBane got the job on the back of a personal ‘click’ with the Eldonians and 
for his ambitious ideas for local economic development beyond just housing. 
This was the genesis of a grander vision for a self-regenerating community 
which would transform the project into a community development trust 
aimed at wholesale neighbourhood regeneration and community ownership 
of multiple assets. These aspirations for self-government were reflected in 
the tagline for the first exhibition and brochures presenting the Portland 
7 Robert Cowan, P. Hannay and R. Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel, in Vauxhall 
Victors: Eldonians Special Issue”, Architects’ Journal (23 Mar. 1988).
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Gardens Co-op: ‘We’ll do a better job ourselves!’8 With the help of McBane 
and MIH, the co-op appointed two architects for four smaller and one larger 
site—Bill Halsall for the former; for the latter Vernon Gracie, who had 
worked on Byker Wall in Newcastle, an exemplar of participatory design and 
community architecture.9 Divvying up the project between different architects 
was intended to inspire, says Halsall, some “creative competition”. For his four 
sites, Halsall employed the principles of the Weller Way. From January 1983, 
there proceeded four months of intensive weekly participatory design meetings 
between the architects, MIH and resident representatives.
Militant Tactics, Boss Politics, Tribal Loyalties,  
Friends in High Places
The Eldonians’ participatory planning process was suddenly cut short, however, 
by the election of the Militant-controlled council in May. Whatever Militant’s 
justification for opposing the co-ops—fiscal, political, ethical—their decision 
to municipalise was disastrous for Portland Gardens. The co-op was registered 
with the Housing Corporation, but the land had yet to be transferred from the 
council, who were also the main funders. Portland Gardens Co-op rejected 
the offer made to them that would mean the council receiving full nomination 
rights and the Works Department being guaranteed all maintenance work. 
Eventually, the council agreed that co-op members would be able to move into 
their new homes—co-designed to suit their needs—only later to withdraw 
this offer and demand that houses go onto the council waiting list. The original 
design, too, had to be changed, with the communal elements removed in favour 
of a more traditional layout as dictated by the new URS guidelines. MIH was 
dismissed without compensation for the work already completed, amounting 
to tens of thousands of pounds in losses—no small sum for a secondary agency 
in the 1970s. MIH chief executive Barry Natton nonetheless continued to 
support McBane’s involvement despite the uncertainty and with no payment 
forthcoming. McBane describes Natton as “willing to stick his neck out in a very 
big way” for the prestige of supporting what was at the time the biggest housing 
cooperative development project in Western Europe, and for the satisfaction of 
getting “one up on Catherine”, his counterpart at CDS.
During this process, residents hoping to move into the first eleven 
completed homes were forcibly prevented by council officers. An ex-council 
officer explains how in “being an officer, stuck in the middle of that, you 
had to make sure you didn’t get caught in the crossfire. It was a deliberate 
intention of my own to get to know Tony McGann and to work with the local 
8 McBane, The Rebirth of Liverpool: The Eldonian Way.
9 Graham Towers, Building Democracy: Community Architecture in the Inner Cities (Routledge, 
1995).
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councillors there, in the north Vauxhall area”. Sympathy from the officers was 
not enough to secure tenants their houses and so the Eldonians took more 
radical measures. McGann describes how 
The next day the tenant turned up with the council but, in the 
meantime, we’d moved our one in, put all her furniture in and we had 
a big Alsatian there and we had all the neighbours around, and I said, 
“Go on then get passed us, this is her house” … So he said, “Oh you’re 
just squatting! You’ve got 28 days’ notice” … The following week they 
were ready, the council, they put security in and everything now and 
the lad who was the vice chairman [Billy Little], great fella, he went 
round with a camera and said, “I’m from a magazine”, went on the site 
and he started taking photos, looking at all the locks, and we got keys 
to some of the houses and then we moved some more in … We were 
running rings round them!
The Eldonians successfully occupied 37 of the 55 dwellings on the larger site 
and 45 out of 51 on the smaller sites. This enabled those residents who had 
co-designed them to move into their new homes, and bought time—extra-
legally—until the judicial review eventually ruled in their favour. Their 
successful legal challenge against Militant mirrors other campaigns in similar 
tenements, as a former council officer explains: “We had to take possession 
proceedings against those people, because they wouldn’t move … A number 
of the groups took action against not allocating the properties on other sites, 
and the judge effectively supported those groups”.
Setting the Eldonians apart was their use of direct action, squatting and 
legal challenges as stepping stones to more ambitious political ends. The local 
ward Labour Party was dominated by Militant, who held meetings in an old 
school down a back alley to discourage attendance. McGann realised that the 
best way to challenge municipalisation was to join the Labour Party, fight them 
from the inside and take control of the ward. The Eldonians mobilised their 
members in large numbers—some 150—to attend local party meetings but 
it quickly transpired that it would be difficult to sustain those numbers. The 
next tactic was to move the meetings onto “home territory”. The Eldonians 
have effectively controlled the local Labour Party ever since. 
The scale of this achievement can only be understood in context. Local 
politics in the late 1970s was marked by a rift between the “two Labour 
parties of Liverpool at the time”, explains a Liberal councillor: one of which 
was the “old Catholic mafia”; the other, Militant. Each saw the other as not 
truly representative of Labour politics. These internal differences reflected 
the sectarianism that divided Liverpool more broadly.10 The Tories were 
10 Sheppard and Worlock, Better Together: Christian Partnership in a Hurt City.
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 traditionally the party of the Protestants; Labour of Catholic. The incursion of 
Militant, as a broadly secular socialist faction, was a break with this tradition, 
upsetting the established working order of the so-called ‘Catholic mafia’ 
associated with the Liverpudlian tradition of ‘boss politics’.11 This tradition-
alist right-wing Catholic wing of the local Labour Party was rooted socially 
in Vauxhall. When Militant were eventually removed in 1987—47 Labour 
councillors disbarred from public office for voting for an illegal budget—six 
Labour councillors escaped disqualification in voting against their party, 
known as the ‘scabby’ or ‘sensible six’. Three of the six were councillors 
for Vauxhall, including Paul Orr and an Eldonian resident John Livingstone, 
whose traditional views, including anti-abortion, placed them in almost polar 
opposition to Militant. Embedded in his tight-knit Catholic community as 
the principal community organiser, Tony McGann had in many respects also 
become a boss. Indeed, many I spoke with see Tony as a “tribal leader”. This is 
reflected in the main office building for the Eldonian Community Trust named 
after him, the Tony McGann Centre. Such a tribal loyalty and reverence 
for leaders may seem incongruous next to the egalitarianism of cooperative 
principles. Nonetheless, it has enabled the Eldonians to establish a successful 
community housing scheme against political opposition through trust in 
strong leadership, an established hierarchy, internal cohesion and commitment 
to a common cause. Critics acknowledge that the Eldonians could not have 
achieved what they did without the “pragmatic alliances, their politics, their 
chauvinism or their macho style”.12
McGann played a pivotal role in driving forward the Eldonian campaign, 
attracting loyal partners and building crucial alliances with powerful elites 
who would support their cause against Militant—much like Billy Floyd for 
Weller Street. Two agents of change were recruited from MIH: Jack McBane 
to work on co-op development and George Evans as housing manager. An 
outsider like McBane, Evans likewise describes to me how he “just got an 
affinity for the people, and then they asked me if I’d be their first housing 
manager, and I agreed, and I’ve been here ever since”. One co-op development 
worker distinguishes the difference between CDS’s work in the south end from 
MIH’s for the Eldonians:
Jack McBane was more a vanguardist if that makes sense, and I don’t 
think Jack necessarily distinguishes his own role from that of the 
Eldonians, who were—I use this word in a very loose way—more 
Stalinist: “We’ll decide, and the rest will follow”. The leadership were 
very effective, though it was very kind of centrally directed, and I think 
Jack was more a part of that than a servant.
11 Tony Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, 2nd ed. (Liverpool University Press, 1997).
12 Cowan, Hannay and Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel”, p. 43.
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Jack and George supported Tony to comprise the unofficial Eldonians 
leadership. But it was Tony’s exceptional capability to attract people to the 
cause that was so crucial in the eventual success of the campaign. Bill Halsall 
puts it plainly: 
Tony McGann is a very persuasive man; you can’t take the individual 
factor out of it … He has an ability—a unique ability in my 
experience—he can go in all guns blazing to have a big argument with 
somebody and come out with a lifelong friend. Max [Steinberg] is his 
best mate, and the number of times he’s stormed into Max’s office … 
I’m sure Max will say he’s a very hard man to say no to.
Tony used these skills to make friends in high places, not just locally—
notably Max Steinberg (at the Housing Corporation) and the two bishops of 
Liverpool (Catholic Archbishop Worlock and Anglican Bishop Sheppard)—
but also nationally. This included a diverse, and rather incongruous, panoply 
of powerful individuals. Prince Charles—“a good friend of ours”, says 
McGann—visited the Eldonians and later officially opened the village. Then 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, with whom McGann had dinner at 
Downing Street, succumbed to Tony’s charm and agreed to fund the Eldonian 
Village against the advice of her aides. And also Neil Kinnock, then Leader 
of the Labour Party, who personally advised McGann, in Tony’s recollection, 
to “stay in the trenches son”, around the time of Kinnock’s infamous Labour 
Party Conference speech in October 1985 in which he railed against Militant 
and ushered in the ensuing age of New Labour. 
We Do It Better Together: Towards a Self-Regenerating Community
With strong leadership and alliances in place, the Eldonians were able to 
capitalise on the tumultuous events of the early 1980s. Deep structural shifts in 
the British economy left Liverpool’s maritime industries in a state of terminal 
decline, with severe impacts for Vauxhall. Here, unemployment reached 36 per 
cent by the end of the 1970s, twice the Liverpool average.13 Then, in 1981, Tate 
& Lyle, the biggest local employer, closed its sugar refinery, causing a further 
1,700 job losses, leaving many of the Eldonians without work. Exacerbating this 
was the closure of the British American Tobacco factory in 1984, with knock-on 
bankruptcies of local feeder firms. The site was just outside Merseyside 
Development Corporation boundaries, but Heseltine’s Task Force secured 
the transfer of the Tate & Lyle site to English Estates (a quasi-governmental 
agency for industrial property development) and opened an ideas competition 
13 Chris Couch, City of Change and Challenge: Urban Planning and Regeneration in Liverpool 
(Ashgate, 2003), p. 75.
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for the site in 1982. The Eldonians’ bid for a Self-Regenerating Community built 
on the previous work of Bill Halsall and MIH with a vision of self-sustaining 
economic development and plans for new housing, jobs, training, social enter-
prises, community facilities and heritage conservation—the revitalisation of 
the Leeds–Liverpool canal—all managed by a community-owned development 
trust. The main aim was to house the 145 remaining families who were not 
part of the Portland Gardens scheme. Although the bid was disqualified from 
the ideas competition, for being leaked to the press by Tony, English Estates 
were impressed and sought to explore it further.
Over a period of eighteen months, the Eldonian campaign leadership—
McGann, Orr, McBane and Halsall—met with the Task Force, English 
Estates, the Department of Environment and the Housing Corporation to 
negotiate an option on the site. Through their lobbying, with the political 
support of Thatcher, the Eldonians managed to secure the site and the funding 
required for remediation. McGann was critical in this process in personally 
persuading British Waterways—who owned the ‘ransom strip’ of the canal 
part of the site—to sell their land at a price reasonable enough to make it 
viable. Due to centuries of heavy industrial use the land was highly contami-
nated, requiring £2.1 million of Derelict Land Grant, signed off by Heseltine’s 
Task Force.14 Max Steinberg secured the rest of the funding through the 
Housing Corporation in 1984. Site acquisition and remediation alone took over 
five years and £2.2 million of public investment. The total cost of just the first 
phase of the village was £6.6 million. In being wholly reliant on government 
subsidy, the scheme would fail the conventional viability test of leveraging at 
least match funding from private sector investment. This was an incredibly 
high price to pay for just 145 households in a city in which thousands were 
in need of better housing. It suggests that the project was first and foremost 
of political value to its funders, which were all arms of central government.
The true worth of the project is revealed by the wider political context. 
Whilst Militant were in negotiations with the Tory government to secure a 
greater budget allocation for URS expenditure, the Eldonians were likewise 
visiting key politicians to secure their own ends. In July 1984, Tony McGann 
visited Patrick Jenkin, then Secretary of State for Environment, to lobby for 
government funding. Just the day before McGann’s visit was the “infamous 
confrontation” between Militant and Jenkin, in which the ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ of government funding for the £130 million shortfall to complete 
the URS was used by Militant as political ammunition—made public to 
embarrass and effectively blackmail central government into acquiescence.15 
14 The following figures in this section have been sourced from McBane, The Rebirth of 
Liverpool: The Eldonian Way; Cowan, Hannay and Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel”; 
Mars, “Mersey Tunnel Vision?”
15 Cowan, Hannay and Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel”.
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Jenkin then visited Liverpool to witness the work of the URS in tackling 
the housing situation, stating his shock at “families living in conditions the 
like I have never seen before … They are very grim indeed [and] beggar 
description”.16 Angered by Militant’s manoeuvring, however, Jenkin cut 
his tour short to visit the Eldonians instead, on Tony’s offer. Jenkin was 
impressed and pledged his support for the scheme, signing off in October 1984 
the £6.5 million of Housing Corporation funding Steinberg had earmarked. 
The Eldonian Housing Cooperative was established in the same year, with 
McGann as chairman. A representative committee drawn from the 145 
families appointed Bill Halsall as architect, who convened a participatory 
design process with a core design committee of fifteen.
It seemed the hand was won for the Eldonians to begin development 
on site, but the Militants had one last card to play. Despite the Eldonians’ 
bypassing council control, via central government ownership and funding of 
the land, the council still retained power over the planning process. An appli-
cation for ‘change of use’ from industrial to residential was required before 
development could commence, but the submission in early 1985 was refused 
by planning officers, under effective command of Militant, on grounds of 
health risk from noxious smells from nearby factories. The Eldonians appealed 
and requested a planning inquiry. English Estates advised the hiring of the best 
planning QC in the country and paid the £35,000 fee. In court, the council’s 
defence collapsed into farce upon the Eldonians’ barrister pointing out that the 
map—purportedly showing the transmission of noxious factory fumes into the 
planned site according to prevailing winds—was actually upside down. The 
depth of support and common feeling felt for the Eldonians by the public and 
high profile allies alike is captured by Archbishop Derek Worlock’s words in 
the inquiry: “If you move these people on against their will, I’m going to stand 
shoulder to shoulder with them in the street”.17 
Upon winning the public inquiry, the Eldonians celebrated in the tradi-
tional manner: a huge street party and brass band procession to the Eldonian 
village site emblazoned with the banner ‘we did it better together’.18 This 
would later morph into the new Eldonian motto, ‘we do it better together’—
softening the message of their earlier slogan ‘we’ll do a better job ourselves’. 
This discursive shift signals a subtle but deep-felt change in the Eldonian 
mindset from a more independent and embattled stance against the council 
towards a realisation that collaborative partnerships are the only way to make 
things happen. ‘We do it better together’ not only captures the collective 
nature of the campaign and internally tight togetherness of the community 
16 Diane Frost and Peter North, Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013), p. 81.
17 Quoted in Rogers, Lost Tribe: The People’s Memories: 2, p. 185.
18 McBane, The Rebirth of Liverpool: The Eldonian Way.
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but also expresses appropriately their new partnership style of working, 
their forging of pragmatic alliances and, perhaps, their promiscuous seeking 
of support from whoever would offer it, even those they would normally 
count as ideological enemies. Catholic Archbishop Worlock and Anglican 
Bishop Sheppard—very active at the time in bridging denominational divides 
across Liverpool—celebrated and adopted the Eldonians’ motto in titling 
their joint-authored book on healing sectarianism Better Together.19 In return, 
the Eldonians memorialised their two biggest local supporters by naming 
two roads in the Eldonian village after them—Bishop Sheppard Court and 
Archbishop Worlock Court. In fact, they have honoured all their significant 
partners, allies and supporters in this way. Many of the cul-de-sac ‘Courts’ 
adjoining Eldonian Way are prefixed with ‘Jack McBane’, ‘Paul Orr’, 
‘O’Reilly’, ‘Steinberg’. Such cultic veneration does not, however, extend so 
far as Jenkin Drive or Thatcher Close. 
This is not to say that the Eldonians are unaware of the debt they owe to 
Thatcher—or, indeed, in a roundabout way, Militant, for provoking the Tories 
into uncharacteristic policy moves. George Evans is certainly not fooled:
Right, £6.4 million, £2.1 million derelict land grants for a piece of 
land which was highly contaminated and had been valued at just over 
a quarter of a million—you’re not telling me that there wasn’t some 
politics in that! We then get within a couple of weeks an appeal set 
up, a top barrister from London representing us, and we get a finding 
within a month! Well, there’s got to be some political pressure hasn’t 
there otherwise you got to be so naïve … I mean if Margaret Thatcher 
wanted it done it was going to get done.
In the context of an intensifying battle between the Tory government and 
Militant-controlled Liverpool Council over the city’s budget, Thatcher was 
looking to undermine their authority and reassert central control. The 
Eldonian scheme was the perfect pawn to play. By using arm’s-length instru-
ments and experimental regeneration programmes, such as the Merseyside 
Development Corporation and Task Force, central government was able 
effectively to bypass the city council, who not only stood in opposition to the 
scheme but also presented a very real risk to the government’s credibility and 
the stability of central–local state relations. In 1988, Merseyside Development 
Corporation boundaries were extended to include the Tate & Lyle site within 
its remit—the crucial move that circumvented council control and guaranteed 
planning permission for housing. By 1990, the site had been cleared and 
remediated, 145 houses built, and the first tenants moving in. This was the 
first time any substantial community-led or residential development had been 
19 Sheppard and Worlock, Better Together: Christian Partnership in a Hurt City.
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incorporated within an urban development corporation zone, which were 
fundamentally for commercial redevelopment.20 The counterintuitive support 
offered by the Conservative government to a Labour-voting, socialist-leaning 
community housing cooperative can be explained as a political tactic to “drive 
a wedge between a municipal housing authority and the people who would 
normally have been its natural constituency”.21 In Bill Halsall’s final analysis, 
the “Eldonians became a bit of a political football—but they got what they 
wanted”.
The Eldonians are adamant, however, that they would have succeeded in 
redeveloping their neighbourhood with or without Thatcher’s support, just 
on a more incremental and piecemeal scale. They had originally envisioned 
Portland Gardens as the first of many smaller federated co-ops, had it not been 
so suddenly municipalised. What the political battle with Militant enabled was 
far greater levels of political support for the (too) costly redevelopment of the 
Tate & Lyle site and the wholesale transformation of an area that would most 
likely have otherwise remained derelict and contaminated ex-industrial land 
for decades to come. This unique set of circumstances casts doubt on whether 
such a process of local economic development and regeneration of declining 
industrial areas is a sustainable or replicable model—at least within conven-
tional parameters of politically acceptable costs. Most importantly, it highlights 
the necessity of state funding where private investment is non-existent. 
The Eldonians’ ‘self-regenerating’ achievements—contradictions notwith-
standing—have been recognised internationally. In 2004, the Eldonian Village 
was awarded the UN World Habitat Award for Sustainable Development, and 
in 2017 the Eldonian community-based housing association was awarded the 
Freedom of Liverpool, alongside Tony McGann, who has also been honoured 
with an OBE for his community leadership.
Eldonia: An Independent Micro-State?
The Eldonians have since built on initial successes to pursue a more holistic 
neighbourhood planning approach, proactively forging new partnerships to 
develop further the Eldonian Village and the surrounding urban area. Phase 
Two was completed in 1994, involving 150 more homes and the decontami-
nation and landscaping of the Leeds–Liverpool canal that flows through the site, 
later extended into the city centre docks. This was financed by another Housing 
Corporation grant of £5.5 million and a £1.5 million loan from the Co-operative 
20 Richard Meegan, “Urban Development Corporations, Urban Entrepreneurialism, and 
Locality: The Merseyside Development Corporation”, in Rob Imrie and Huw Thomas, 
eds, British Urban Policy: An Evaluation of the Urban Development Corporations (SAGE, 1999), 
pp. 64–105.
21 Robert Cowan, “Co-op or Cop-Out?”, ROOF 11.4 (1986), p. 22.
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Bank. The village now has over 2,500 residents and over a hundred staff are 
employed by associated community-owned organisations. In the early 1990s, 
shortly after the completion of Phase One, the Eldonian Housing Cooperative 
was reconstituted as the Eldonian Community Based Housing Association. The 
Association was registered with the Housing Corporation as a social landlord, 
but remained under the direct control of the community through an overarching 
charitable body, the Eldonian Community Trust, whose board directors are 
democratically elected by members. The trust is described by George Evans as 
the “charitable arm, a registered charity that looks after the social aspects within 
the area—looking after the elderly, arranging activities, summer activities for 
the children, community transport”—as well as overseeing, as an umbrella 
body, the two operational organisations, the housing association and the devel-
opment trust. The Eldonian Development Trust was established in 1987 by the 
Eldonian Community Trust as a community-based social enterprise and business 
arm of the Eldonians and since renamed the Eldonian Group Ltd. EGL’s remit is 
socioeconomic development broadly defined and the provision and management 
of various services and on-site facilities, including the Tony McGann Centre, 
village hall, sports centre, day nursery, extra-care facility, residential elderly 
care home and several community enterprises. It remains directly accountable 
to the Eldonian Community Trust, governed by a board originally comprising 
four selected local businessmen and seven Eldonian residents—a ratio later 
weakened to 5 : 6, such that the residents need to vote together, in consensus, 
in order to retain overall control over board decisions.
Indeed, residents hold EGL to account more through informal networks. 
EGL is located in an old school next to the Eldonian Village, and EGL staff are 
often met after work, or confronted in the street, an EGL employee tells me, 
by Eldonian residents asking about future plans and particular programmes. 
The Community Trust board regularly provides feedback in formal meetings 
with the EGL board—to “inform us what is happening on the street, what’re 
the needs on the street”. George Evans explains how “there’s a common 
denominator in that some board members are on both; and they [the two 
organisations] have the same name. Other than that we’re totally separate 
structures, but we try to help each other”. Through EGL’s economic devel-
opment work, the Eldonians are fast becoming self-sufficient in most public 
services and basic needs. Housing has always been the lynchpin of the project 
but, as Tony McGann remarks, “you can’t just look at housing in isolation!” 
What separates the Eldonians from the Liverpool co-ops is their ambition 
to look at more than just housing—at training, jobs, enterprise, energy, 
transport, social care and community activities—as a means to create a truly 
self-regenerating community.
The Eldonians have become powerful economic players on Merseyside. 
EGL are in negotiation with various local and multinational companies to 
forge new partnerships for ambitious development schemes. They now have a 
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partnership agreement with Peel Holdings for various redevelopment projects 
connected to Peel’s ‘Atlantic Gateway’ vision for the Merseyside–Manchester 
conurbation corridor—Europe’s first private-led regional spatial strategy.22 
EGL’s decision to explore the prospects for local energy production in a 
combined heat and power (CHP) system led them to consider retrofitting the 
Eldonian Community Based Housing Association’s stock, because, an EGL 
officer explains, “if we’re going to produce our own energy, we can’t put it into 
houses that are sieves”. They set up a non-profit energy service company, the 
Eldonian Energy Partnership (with E.ON, the massive multinational European 
energy provider, and Peel Holdings as junior partner) and developed a CHP 
energy centre and district heating network (DHN)—the first of its kind to 
be delivered by a social enterprise. This could create 180 local jobs, with 
apprenticeship opportunities for young people, as well as “generating heating 
and power that can then be sold on to the community at an advantageous 
rate”. The Eldonians were partners in developing the Strategic Regeneration 
Framework for north Liverpool with the council. The CHP-DHN centre is 
the flagship project of a larger strategic plan to transform north Liverpool into 
a leading centre for green industry through the creation of an eco-park and 
an environmental technologies zone, which Liverpool Mayor Joe Anderson 
has stated as a Mayoral pledge. To this end, EGL have been exploring ways 
to consolidate the city’s recycling industry in the area, as well as possibilities 
of developing broadband infrastructure. EGL have also been very active in 
developing spin-off social enterprises as well as supporting other local start-ups 
through local enterprise programmes. An EGL representative is proud that 
“we have used seed grants to start companies up; we’ve got 23 businesses 
under this Group”.
In housing, too, the Eldonians are involved in several development 
projects locally, working with big companies such as Barratt and Wimpey 
to deliver new homes. Whilst losing ‘Eldonian’ in the organisation’s name 
purportedly helped EGL gain professional credibility in their dealings with 
larger commercial companies, the opposite is true for attracting homeowners. 
Private developers have piggybacked on the success and reputation of the 
Eldonians by naming after them nearby streets with new homes for sale. “It’s 
got ‘Eldon’ on it, it’s called ‘Eldon Way’ or ‘Eldon Grove’ or something like 
that”, explains George Evans, “but they’ve used the name Eldon as a selling 
point—as did the people who built the houses for sale just in the corner of the 
22 Sebastian Dembski, “Structure and Imagination of Changing Cities: Manchester, 
Liverpool and the Spatial in-Between”, Urban Studies 52.9 (2015): 1647–1664; Iain Deas, 
Graham Haughton and Stephen Hincks, “‘A Good Geography Is Whatever It Needs to 
Be’: Evolving Spatial Imaginaries in North West England”, in Phil Allmendinger, Graham 
Haughton, Jörg Knieling and Frank Othengrafen, eds, Soft Spaces in Europe: Re-Negotiating 
Governance, Boundaries and Borders (Routledge, 2014), pp. 25–44.
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village”. Shrewd branding is a big part of the success. George continues: “the 
cleverest thing we ever did was to call this a ‘village’. It’s a dead simple word 
but it gives you a picture—as opposed to the ‘Eldonian Estate’, of burnt out 
cars and kids running all over the place—of a village green, trees all over the 
place, and a nice place to live”.
Through their community-based housing association, the Eldonians have 
increasingly adopted the role of facilitator, or expert development agent, 
opening up possibilities for private profit as ways to spur economic devel-
opment and redevelop some of the local residential sites. They are keen to 
point out that their role is to ensure the local community benefits from any 
such deals with private investors. A plot of land owned by the Eldonians 
has been sold to an American investor planning to redevelop the site into 
22 apartments and four shops, including a post office, cash machine and 
grocery store, which the local community—previously located in a ‘food 
desert’—desperately needed. In such deals the Eldonians’ method is to 
take only a down payment for the land and retain the right to withdraw 
the offer unless the development is built within two years so as to insure 
against land banking in the interests of delivering community benefit. Most 
recently, the housing association is planning a sheltered scheme for elderly 
residents consisting of 40 apartments and is working with the council on 
creating a gateway  development to the Ten Streets cultural and creative 
quarter on the docks.
Embodying the logic of a self-regenerating community, EGL orient their 
activities, lock their assets and recycle their surpluses for community benefit. 
An EGL manager is upfront about their making profit from contracts with 
big business and consultancy work delivered elsewhere around the country: 
Profit’s not a dirty word to us, but we make profit, we bring it back 
here and we then use that money to subsidise services we want to 
provide here, so “dads’ and lads’ clubs”—costing us fifty grand each a 
year—“after school clubs”, things like that where the local authority 
will fund to a level, but we want it to be a decent level.
Such a high degree of self-provision suggests that the Eldonians have, if not 
fully seceded from local authority control, at least partly replaced the council 
as primary provider of basic services. Amongst EGL staff, a manager reveals 
there is an 
In-joke in here … and we do laugh because I’ve done it for God knows 
how many presentations, and people go “How would you describe the 
Eldonians?”, and I go: “Listen, you go down through the wardrobe, 
down to the back of Narnia and there’s another wardrobe, you go 
through that wardrobe, and you end up in Eldonia”. 
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Asked whether ‘Eldonia’ is an alternative model to local government, this EGL 
manager replied:
It probably would be. We would always work with the powers that 
be, we’ve not got a problem with that … We’re not going to declare 
UDI [unilateral declaration of independence], we’re not an independent 
state. I think some of them would love to be but we’re not.
The mere suggestion of UDI, however comically intended, demonstrates 
the Eldonians’ separation from their urban surroundings—in both self-presen-
tation and public perception. Although they work very closely with the council 
now—especially since Labour’s Joe Anderson took office as Liverpool’s first 
Mayor—partnership arrangements, as with economic contracts, are sought 
primarily to serve the needs of the village. This sometimes provokes local 
hostility, despite claims of positive spillover effects and benefits for neigh-
bouring areas. One such partnership is with the police, to which the Eldonians 
pay an annual fee for extra services, including a direct private phone line to 
the local station for residents to call in case of crime or nuisance, as well as 
police officer patrols around the village—daily and nightly—signing in to the 
Tony McGann Centre as if it were a police station. Tony assures me this is 
neither creating a “shortfall anywhere else” in the city nor “depriving anyone 
else”—as they do their Eldonian rounds on overtime—and in fact it increases 
safety for the surrounding areas, often added into the extra patrols. Tony is 
adamant that “you can’t live on an island”. Yet the perception nonetheless 
exists that the Eldonians receive special treatment and isolate themselves from 
their neighbours’ problems. An ex-council housing manager recalls a common 
(mis)perception that
If you moved into the Eldonians you were fine: there’s no anti-social 
behaviour ’cause they won’t tolerate it; but there’s a perception from 
the people who lived the other side of the road that the kids from the 
Eldonians used to do their anti-social behaviour elsewhere … because 
they couldn’t do anything on their own doorstep, so they’d go and—for 
want of a better phrase—shit on someone else’s.
A large part of this perception may be a reaction to the fortress-like design 
of the village, whose defensive urbanism is intentional. An interview with 
the police community liaison officer published by the Eldonians explains the 
deliberate logic of protecting against crime “in the context of a ‘Them and 
Us’ situation, with incidents of petty burglary, car theft, and vandalism being 
amongst the highest in Liverpool”.23 The design chosen by residents, therefore, 
23 Eldonians, The Eldonians … An Insight (Eldonian Community Trust, 1996), pp. 6–7.
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explains the police officer, aimed purposefully to minimise crime by deterring 
outsiders from coming in:
Cul-de-sacs were created with only one entry/exit leading onto the 
main road through the village. Houses overlook one another offering 
natural surveillance. Further features include symbolic barriers, such as 
change of road surfaces, promoting safety and close territory.
In sum, this went much further than the URS in incorporating defensible 
space principles promulgated by the likes of Alice Coleman. In many ways, as 
Bill Halsall has professed in a recent retrospective,24 the Eldonians anticipated 
and influenced emerging trends in ‘sustainable’ urbanism towards secured-
by-design, home zones and other neighbourhood safety initiatives. Take 
secured-by-design, for instance: it is now a legal requirement that planning 
documents for all new social housing are submitted to the police, who make 
sure they accord with defensible space principles to reduce the potential for 
crime.
Threat of crime was one motivation for the Eldonians’ defensive design 
inclinations. These were also a spatial manifestation of conflict with the 
council as well as tribal hostilities towards neighbouring parishes. Despite 
working closely with counterpart community development trusts, social 
enterprises and co-ops—among them Vauxhall Neighbourhood Council, Athol 
Village Co-op and Everton Development Trust—EGL has been careful not to 
publicise to Eldonian residents that they are helping or even visiting any one of 
them, or vice versa. Rivalries between these organisations are rooted in parish 
politics, deeply divided by clan. One EGL manager believes “they’re jealous” 
of the Eldonians for their comparative success in securing long-term contracts 
with companies over mere grants from government—generating stable and 
growing income with greater long-term security and economic self-sufficiency 
than one-off grants provide. Vauxhall Neighbourhood Council, in particular, 
has a rivalry as old as the organisations themselves. Having emerged out of 
the Vauxhall CDP of 1967–72, Vauxhall Neighbourhood Council precedes the 
Eldonians yet has imitated many of their practices by, for example, establishing 
their own nearby housing cooperative, Athol Village, completed in 1994 also 
by MIH. An ex-housing manager remembers “when the first member of the 
Eldonian staff went—ever went—into Vauxhall Neighbourhood Council 
premises, it was like the end of the Cold War!” With this historical tribalism 
in place it is understandable why the Eldonians have prioritised supporting 
their own even if this means guarding against their neighbours. By the same 
24 Bill Halsall, Alternative Third Wave Housing Futures, presented at “Housing—A Critical 
Perspective”, Conference 8–9 Apr. 2015, Liverpool (Architecture Media Politics Society, 
2015).
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token, it is extraordinary just how proactive and collaborative they have been 
in developing partnerships with other organisations to deliver socioeconomic 
change not just in their neighbourhood but across the city.
CHAPTER 9
Cooperative by Name  
If Not by Nature
9: Cooperative by Name If Not by Nature
In assessing the achievements of the Eldonians today it is clear there is a 
relative lack of resident participation or internal democracy, at least compared 
with some of the new-build co-ops. The sheer size of the village alone—160 
families—is enough to make direct participation near impossible, with repre-
sentative democracy favoured over more participatory forms. The Eldonians are 
upfront about not being a co-op; they are rather a community-based housing 
association and community development trust, having changed their legal 
structure as soon as the first houses were built. It is questionable whether the 
Eldonians were ever really seriously interested in cooperative principles or, 
rather, simply saw the co-op model as a useful tool with funding opportunities 
and political support attached to get them where they wanted to go. During the 
1970s, there was a broad consensus in the wider cooperative movement that the 
upper functional limit to co-op membership size was around 40 families or 40 
houses. Most co-ops in Liverpool were indeed around this size. Weller Street 
breached that theory with 60 households yet seemed to work relatively success-
fully as an integrated, cohesive, participatory co-operative—albeit one with a 
central committee. Beyond this it was doubtful whether a co-op could sustain 
or even manage in a practical sense the active involvement of all members. 
Originally at 150 families, the Eldonians received much criticism from 
the movement for being far too big to constitute a co-op. Initially, they were 
looking at splitting the tenements into three smaller, 50-person co-ops, which 
could then be federated into an overarching housing management group to take 
advantage of pooling resources through economies of scale, with representa-
tives elected by members from each co-op. “When it came down to it”, recalls 
George Evans, “our thinking was that naturally by demolishing a tenement, 
which sometimes had three hundred units in, you couldn’t split an estate in 
half just because of numbers”. Jack McBane was one of the renegade voices 
who questioned this “magical figure” of 50—daring the community to think 
bigger still, bigger than even the resulting figure of 112. Their quibbling appears 
to have been a factor of the Eldonians’ lack of genuine enthusiasm—beyond 
pragmatic opportunism—for the co-operative ideal. Bill Halsall imparts a 
little-known fact:
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They started off not as a co-op at all, and the original scheme was 
part home ownership and part housing association, but that collapsed 
because unemployment was astronomical … So then there weren’t 
enough people in employment to get mortgages to do the for-sale 
element of the scheme, so it was suggested, “why not be a co-op?”
Although Portland Gardens had originally been planned as a co-op, after 
its municipalisation the Eldonian leadership were not necessarily out to 
form another one but find the best way to regenerate their neighbourhood 
and provide decent housing for all their people. Once built, the inclusion of 
democratic decision-making in the management process was not so important 
so long as it effectively met needs. This approach raises questions over the 
democratic legitimacy of the Eldonians as a community trust. Members of the 
Community Based Housing Association have a nominal £1 share and get a vote 
in the general meetings; they elect tenant representatives annually to the trust 
board; but there has been a relatively “static board for over ten years”, admits 
Evans. It remains unclear whether this is more attributable to a democratic 
deficit or to their success at meeting needs. McGann and his ‘lieutenants’, 
notably Evans—who together have exercised a tight grip on the Eldonians long 
after the campaign required it—have been instrumental in delivering effective 
housing management and neighbourhood services for residents. However, 
fears are growing that if the unofficial central committee does not relinquish 
some control then there will be no one coming through to take their place. 
The Eldonian Village is perhaps more akin, as one observer likens it, to a 
“community dictatorship” than a community-based cooperative.
Nonetheless, many efforts have been made over the years to ensure parity 
and transparency between the leadership and community. In the bingo ballot 
impartially adjudicated by the parish priest that decided the order of choice 
in the original housing allocations, Tony’s ball came up last—perhaps not by 
accident—and he was the very final resident to move out of his decaying flat 
into his new home in the village. At great personal pain, he ruthlessly ensured 
fair treatment when his own son was found dealing drugs on the village and 
was consequently thrown out of his home. Moreover, the centrally directed 
structure seems to work very effectively for most residents—so responsive to 
local needs that EGL staff warn of Eldonia becoming a “nanny state”. They 
complain they sometimes have to act like the “nasty stepfather” with some 
residents, who expect help with all sorts of civic and everyday issues, like 
schooling for their children. One manager felt the need to say to a resident “I’m 
not your dad!” Such a paternalistic dependency culture is the other side of the 
coin to the Eldonians’ renowned strength, pride and extraordinary self-belief, 
as a community that fought a successful campaign against all odds. Whilst a 
testament to the success of the Eldonian structure in delivering local services, 
this might also stem from a peculiar sense of entitlement that has arisen on 
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the back of ‘winning the war’. Many Eldonians are still very proud of their 
achievements in fighting Militant, as this EGL employee testifies:
We had a presentation once of how “we won the war” … I was looking 
at this person and was thinking, “You weren’t around in the war!” 
What they actually meant was the war for the Eldonians—guerrilla 
tactics and all this sort of thing, quite revolutionary … And they see 
themselves like guerrilla fighters. There’s a lot of them there that think 
because they’ve done that they deserve everything, somebody should 
be doing it for them, even though you still got to live your own life … 
And you say to them: “Do revolutionaries ever retire?”
Singing the Post-Development Blues:  
On Revolutionaries Retiring
Taking a step back from the Eldonians to take in the wider historical landscape 
of Liverpool’s co-op movement, of which they were arguably the last signif-
icant example, we can see that this shift in energy—revolutionaries retiring 
after the battle is won—is not unique to the Eldonians. It cannot be easily 
attributed to their effective if rather authoritarian leadership style making 
free-riding possible. A common phenomenon, experienced by co-op activists 
and professionals alike, was for what was known as the ‘post-development 
blues’—a kind of anti-climactic melancholy and exhaustion—to take hold 
once the excitement of the campaign victory had finally dissipated. Bill Taylor, 
formerly of CDS, puts it like this:
There was always a bit called the “post-development blues” when 
you’d been working for four years towards this thing and, finally, 
“bloody hell, practical completion, move in!” And then the people 
who have really led the co-op through that gestation period and the 
delivery period go “phhhhheeeewwww, right I just want a break now, I’m 
going to resign …” It’s almost like post-natal depression. You’ve been 
looking forward to this thing for so long, it comes along and actually 
then you’ve got a whole set of different challenges because you’ve got 
something that’s alive and squawking—things like collecting rent, and 
tackling people who’ve been your friends and neighbours and who live 
next door about their rent arrears …
Unlike in the case of Tony McGann, most of the co-op ‘war leaders’ 
did indeed retire to let peacetime managers take over the very different 
tasks of day-to-day management—described by McDonald as the “transition 
from development to management; from the ‘military’ administration to 
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the ‘civil’ one”.1 This, however, created difficulties for both parties. The old 
guard would often become bitter and overly critical of their successors, whom 
they saw as untested or unaware of the challenges of campaigning, whilst the 
new committee members would struggle with the thankless, unending tasks of 
long-term financial planning and regulatory assessments as well as the tricky 
job of allocations. It is little surprise, then, to find that many co-ops contracted 
out most of their administration and housing management tasks to a secondary 
co-op, principally CDS, which later became North West Housing Services 
(NWHS). Today the majority of the remaining 50 or so Liverpool co-ops are 
managed by NWHS, in ways which make it difficult for tenants to feel part 
of the project of housing themselves. Unusually, the Eldonians have retained 
their housing management services in-house—their much larger membership 
base enabling economies of scale. This has no doubt contributed to their goal of 
becoming a self-regenerating community through job creation for local residents. 
Whether it has enabled residents to feel part of the project is another question.
Motivations tend to weaken with each transition from one generation 
to the next. As new members necessarily replace old, they come with very 
different perceptions, attitudes and expectations. Not having lived through or 
personally experienced the intense political campaigning, as did the founders, 
new generations are often more dismissive of the value of cooperative 
governance and do not share the same commitments in keeping the enterprise 
alive. There is perhaps an inevitable trade-off between, on the one hand, the 
kind of radical political energy, risk-taking and collective commitment to the 
cooperative cause that first animates resistance and, on the other, the patience, 
perseverance and technical expertise required collectively to manage housing 
over time. As maintenance costs rise, new technologies are introduced and 
regulatory and policy environments are renewed, and as generations come 
and go, with varying personal commitments, professional outsourcing and 
managerial procedures look more and more attractive as measures to put in 
place to maintain a consistent housing service. And so, over time, co-ops come 
to resemble just that—a housing service. Revolutionary hopes and dreams are 
well and truly retired.
Third Sector Empire-Building
Following the largest movement of new-build housing cooperative devel-
opment in the country, Liverpool experienced several decades of relative 
inactivity in collective housing activism. Some of this can be explained by post-
development blues but the primary constraint was legislative reforms enacted 
in the 1988 Housing Act, making it almost impossible for housing co-ops 
1 Alan McDonald, The Weller Way: The Story of the Weller Street Housing Cooperative (Faber 
& Faber, 1986), p. 203.
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to develop anew.2 First, the generous funding system of grants paid directly 
from the Housing Corporation to co-ops to finance development and ongoing 
revenue deficits was replaced by one increasingly geared towards private 
finance, requiring housing associations (including co-ops) to borrow capital 
on private markets to finance development. Second, the 1988 Act introduced 
new requirements for new housing providers to demonstrate a successful track 
record of management before being registered with the Housing Corporation 
as a registered provider of social housing. Together, these changes forced 
small community-led co-ops, reliant on state support but otherwise relatively 
autonomous, to seek formal development and management agreements with 
larger housing associations in order to demonstrate competency and make it at 
all economically viable to develop expensive new housing. This threatened the 
independence and credibility of the co-op movement—at least in Liverpool’s 
incarnation—as a collective housing alternative.
Another effect of the 1988 Housing Act was to strengthen the role of housing 
associations in public provision, which in many ways helped Liverpool Council 
meet its housing challenges. Conditions have improved since the days when the 
council was the single largest landlord and struggled physically to maintain—or 
manage in a socially responsive way—its 55,000 stock. Partly these improve-
ments can be attributed to Militant Labour. Despite criticism of ‘Hatton houses’ 
and the damage to future fiscal viability of the local state, the URS had done a 
great deal to address the severe problems of the 1970s, by demolishing tower 
blocks, building relatively decent semi-detached houses amenable to upkeep, and 
investing in parks and leisure centres. Militant’s URS was a housing-led strategy 
that has been in many ways continued with successive policies. Liverpool Housing 
Action Trust—one of six rolled out across the country, running from 1993 to 
2008—seemed to blend lessons from the new-build co-op participatory design 
approach with the scale and ambition of the URS. Working closely with residents 
to refurbish 13 tower blocks and demolish 54 across the city, replacing these 
with 1,536 low-rise dwellings according to tenant preferences, the Liverpool 
Housing Action Trust has been described by housing academic Chris Couch as 
“not so much bottom-up community activism but a more altruistic state machine 
choosing to work with the community”.3 Relatively effective interventions such 
as this help explain why Liverpool saw a diminution in housing activism for 
collective alternatives through the 1990s.
More instrumental, perhaps, was the transfer and decentralisation of public 
stock to a multitudinous group of housing associations, empowered by the 
2 Peter Malpass, “The Discontinuous History of Housing Associations in England”, 
Housing Studies 15.2 (2000): 195–212; Peter Malpass and Ceri Victory, “The Modernisation 
of Social Housing in England”, International Journal of Housing Policy 10.1 (2010): 3–18.
3 Chris Couch, “Housing Renewal and the Community in a Shrinking City”, Town 
Planning Review 79.6 (2008): 695–703 (p. 701).
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1988 Act to access private capital markets, cross-subsidise expensive rehabili-
tation work and invest in new social housing and maintenance of old stock in 
ways of which the council was made increasingly incapable. The pressure on 
local authorities—from both government legislation and tenant demands—to 
transfer their remaining stock into the hands of the growing third sector can be 
seen in Liverpool Council’s last and largest stock transfer of its 15,000 remaining 
properties, in 2008, to newly created Liverpool Mutual Homes—the youngest 
of the largest Liverpool-born housing associations in the city today. Council 
tenants voted overwhelmingly in favour of transfer into Liverpool Mutual 
Homes’ management, which is now a tenant-led organisation priding itself on 
tenant participation and a generally high level of tenant satisfaction, at least 
compared with the ‘bad old days’ of the Corpy. One of the officers managing 
the transfer process remembers that amongst all the tenant groups consulted
There was an application for them to do something cooperative that 
was already on the books, but anyway it didn’t come off, so all those 
people voted to go into Liverpool Mutual Homes housing association … 
So there was no drive really for independence.
The fact that conditions have improved through professionalised services 
is perhaps explanation enough for the lack of collective housing activism: 
there was simply no longer the need. This perspective is supported by the 
housing managers I interviewed—some of whom had worked in Liverpool 
through the cooperative movement; others for the council to implement the 
URS; most now working for some of the city’s leading housing associations. 
They believe the lack of interest in, or emergence of, collective alternatives 
to public housing is explicable by placation with better housing conditions 
delivered by more responsive and accountable housing associations, which 
tend to have resident representation on their boards and certainly have more 
effective mechanisms for responding to tenant demands than did the council 
during the darkest days of the late 1970s.
Today, organisations like MIH and LHT—starting out as small place-
based organisations—now rival Liverpool Council at its peak in the scale of 
their operations and, arguably, in the distance from and lack of accountability 
to the tenants they are meant to serve. By the turn of the millennium, the 
city’s leading housing associations were engaged in a process of growth and 
expansion through mergers, acquisitions and stock transfer. LHT, for instance, 
has witnessed many mergers over the last few decades and is now part of the 
recently amalgamated Onward Homes, with 35,000 homes across the north-
west. Few have escaped this fate—certainly not CDS, which merged with 
another small association, Hornby Homes, to become Plus, and then later 
with Cheshire-based Dane to become Plus Dane Group, which now owns and 
manages 18,000 homes not just in Merseyside but also across Cheshire. This 
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logic of expansion and commercialisation increasingly marginalised the co-op 
side of the business within Plus Dane and led to what was formerly CDS 
splitting and seeking independence as North West Housing Services (NWHS), 
which today still manages the maintenance and finance services for the 
majority of co-ops across Merseyside. A leading figure within NWHS explains: 
When I joined [in 1987] they had 300 properties that belonged to CDS 
and 600 properties that belonged to co-ops; then they got tempted and 
put down a transfer and they got 900 units out of that so it suddenly 
became a 1,400 unit organisation. Then there was a transfer of local 
authority stock, so they became 6,000 units, and then they wanted to 
build an empire … 
Empire building started for CDS when it registered with the Housing 
Corporation as a Registered Provider, which enabled the organisation to 
utilise the new housing association powers, granted in the 1988 Act, to 
borrow capital, build houses and administer social housing—moving away 
from its more modest, bespoke role as a cooperative development agency. 
Commercialisation has certainly separated the Liverpool housing associations 
from their original ideological purpose of helping people house themselves. 
The founder of NWHS sees this as the root of the problem:
I didn’t register North West [Housing Services] with the HCA [Homes 
and Communities Agency, formerly the Housing Corporation, now 
Homes England] because I didn’t want the temptation of saying “Oh 
we’ll buy two houses in our own name …” and then we become a 
straightforward housing association.
This process of expansion is accompanied by a geographical decoupling 
from place, reflected in the change of organisational identity: from names 
identified with a specific place to increasingly abstracted and placeless 
regional brands. MIH is an interesting example of this trend: starting out 
in 1928 as a small charitable trust called Liverpool Improved Homes, it 
later expanded its remit to become Merseyside Improved Houses, and now 
operates as Riverside, having dropped all reference to the Mersey but for 
the generic signifier of River. Today, Riverside manages over fifty thousand 
properties across the country. A Housing Corporation manager reasons 
that ‘dis-placing’ the brand is “also a better way of attracting partners, and 
moving into other areas”. She continues: “Riverside stopped being Merseyside 
Improved Houses because it wanted to go beyond Merseyside and when you 
go into partnership with people, they don’t want the Merseyside tag”.
There are now fears in the smaller community-based housing and co-op 
sector that these housing associations have mutated into the same monolithic 
9: Cooperative by Name If Not by Nature 165
behemoths as the municipal bureaucracies they replaced, repeating many of 
the same mistakes. Says a housing manager:
If you take Riverside, it had fifty thousand houses. If you go and ask 
any officer how many voids they have they don’t even sometimes know, 
because it’s so big and it’s become so impersonal … The board manages 
properties from London to Newcastle to Wales … They’ve become so 
big that very few agenda items cover what is actually needed for the 
tenants. It’s become like a local authority. 
This phenomenon is not restricted to housing associations. The Eldonian 
Development Trust, which grew out of a grassroots campaign, has shed much 
of its community connection, in first becoming Eldonian Group Ltd and then 
just EGL. According to one EGL employee, this makes it more amenable to 
work with large multinationals without the “weight of history around your 
shoulders” or the “baggage” of the Eldonian affiliation: 
It’s good for us to use the Eldonians when we need it, but when we 
don’t, we’re EGL … But occasionally you think they’ll appreciate 
the Eldonian brand, and we’ll turn around and we’ll say, “Well, as 
the Eldonians”, and you’re not lying ’cause we are still the bloody 
Eldonians … and you can see the seismic change in their attitude to us.
The new name, bleached of place identity and history, reflects EGL’s increas-
ingly independent, detached, inter-regional business culture. The only thing 
apparently preventing EGL from flying the nest altogether is the unique trust 
structure, which ties to place the Eldonian organisations—including the 
community-based housing association—and makes them directly accountable 
to the democratically elected community trust. Or so it seemed, until events 
proved otherwise.
Recent signs suggest that EGL has overreached itself; that its business model 
is unsustainable. Following an application for a consumer credit licence, EGL 
have been issued several warning notices by the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA). Upon reviewing EGL’s application, the FCA had concerns over the 
viability of EGL business practices and after no responses were received to 
repeated requests for further information the FCA conducted an audit, issuing 
a Final Notice, stating its “concerns over whether Eldonian Group Ltd can be 
effectively supervised, has appropriate resources, is suitable and has a suitable 
business model having regard to all the circumstances”.4 Since the FCA audit 
began, the chief executive and most of the staff, including at least one of those 
4 FCA, “Final Notice 2015: Eldonian Group Ltd” (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015): 
www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2015/eldonian-group-ltd, p. 2.
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interviewed for this study, have all resigned from EGL. Many of its project 
partners, including those from the University of Liverpool, have not heard 
from them since. EGL has all but dissolved. Yet nothing has been reported 
in the local press—strange considering the Eldonians’ prominent role in 
Liverpool’s politics and economy. From what little detail those willing to talk 
disclosed to me, it seems that the organisation fell prey to a takeover following 
financial difficulties. It came to the attention of the Eldonian leadership that 
EGL had debts mounting up—over a million pounds, one source claimed—
with higher staff overheads than revenue coming in. Others have argued that 
these ‘debts’ were time-limited and showed up on the spreadsheet due to 
the kind of contracts EGL was winning with big companies, often paying 
only in quarters, and would show as surpluses in the long run. Either way, 
the Eldonian leadership invited a group of local property speculators to take 
on EGL’s debts in the hope of retaining staff. This group was linked to the 
Eldonians through their business connections—partners in various property 
redevelopment schemes in the area and also through Tony McGann’s son, 
evicted from the village for drug dealing. 
Soon after brokering this arrangement, it became apparent that the 
new owners were not all that interested in fulfilling EGL’s original ethos of 
community enterprise and reinvestment for social value. Instead, EGL was 
stripped of its assets—siphoned off through a number of shell companies. 
Staff numbers fell from over two hundred to around 50. The sports centre 
in the Eldonian Village was closed down and demolished. The site awaits 
profitable redevelopment as residential flats, outside of Eldonian management. 
The disused primary school in which EGL was once headquartered caught fire 
and burnt down. One of the new directors committed suicide. Prominent 
board members of EGL, such as former Labour Councillor and Lord Mayor 
of Liverpool Sharon Sullivan, duly resigned. All of the projects and activities 
funded by EGL have since been suspended. Many of the community enter-
prises and local firms supported by EGL have suffered the same fate although 
some have continued to survive under new management, often former EGL 
staff, such as with six of the eight children’s nurseries. The various EGL 
offices located around the city—thirteen venues at its peak—have all shut 
down. EGL has been all but dissolved: a victim of predatory asset-stripping 
by countervailing interests.
This raises grave doubts over just how viable and sustainable the self-asser-
tively ‘dynamic’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ approach of EGL really was. It also raises 
questions over the relationship with the Eldonians: the extent to which the 
Eldonian Community Trust is implicated. Is failure attributable to the distinct 
business culture of EGL, which had become increasingly detached from the 
ethos of not-for-profit social enterprise and its roots in a place-based community? 
Was EGL allowed to stray too far from its mother organisation? Some fellow 
travellers suggest it could have happened to anyone—a misfortune and a hard 
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lesson to learn. Others suggest that it was the Eldonians’ prominent position 
within local politics and in the property industry that made it attractive for 
predatory investment and money laundering—activities for which Liverpool, an 
anarchic port city, has long been renowned. If indeed this is true, why was EGL 
so vulnerable to corruption? Asset stripping is precisely the kind of problem 
which the community development trust model is designed to preclude. In the 
mid-2000s, around the time Eldonian Group Ltd was renamed EGL, released 
from its place-based identity, its chief executive loosened many of the checks 
and balances of the trust structure, including the asset lock, and reoriented 
the organisation in a more commercial direction. This enabled EGL to shed 
its obligations to the Eldonian community, expand across the country and 
make large surpluses (and debts), but which also left the organisation without 
collective accountability and vulnerable to hostile takeover and asset-stripping. 
EGL’s demise can be read as a product of mission drift and local corruption 
more than any fundamental flaw in the community development trust model. 
It shows that governance structures and legal rules are never completely imper-
vious to being bent out of shape; that these are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for sustaining a strong community business ethic.
The Story So Far: How Self-Regenerating, Really?
Despite recent events, the Eldonian Village remains an excellent example of 
what a community development trust can do to reverse the fortunes of a blighted 
place. This model seemed to work so well in Vauxhall due largely to the will 
of the people involved in envisioning and campaigning for a localist collective 
alternative to post-industrial decline. Yet it owes just as much to circumstance. 
The 1980s was a tumultuous time for Liverpool, struggling to deal with the 
housing crisis hanging over from the ‘lost decade’ of the 1970s and reeling 
from growing social unrest, exploding in the Toxteth Riots in 1981. Militant 
came to power on the back of promises to reinvest in council housing and 
other public services—funded by an ‘illegal’ budget—which resulted in direct 
conflict with central government. Fearing a Tory/Liberal plot to privatise and 
undermine municipal housing, Militant opposed the development of co-ops, 
actively municipalising those still in development phase, and created enemies 
of many. Not least of their enemies were the Eldonians, who were fortunate 
enough to be in “the right place at the right time”,5 but also clever enough 
to be able to exploit the political battle going on around them—to attract 
unprecedented levels of government funding and support from the ‘great and 
the good’ for what was a relatively insignificant community housing project 
like many others across the country at that time. Unlike others, however, the 
5 Meegan, “Urban Development Corporations, Urban Entrepreneurialism, and Locality: 
The Merseyside Development Corporation”, p. 79.
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Eldonians were funded by central government to the tune of some £6 million, 
an unprecedented amount of money for a small community-based organisation 
to regenerate derelict land in an era when local authority budgets were being 
slashed. The Eldonians’ vision for a ‘self-regenerating community’ has in some 
respects come to light. But how self-regenerating is the model, really, when 
set in this context of such an unusual local political climate precipitating huge 
financial flows from central government?
What does the Eldonian story say about the possibility of replicating their 
success? In being the product of a unique local history and set of political 
circumstances, it suggests historical ‘place effects’ greatly determine the 
ability of collective housing alternatives to embed themselves in place or to 
inspire urban change. Structural forces do not operate everywhere the same; 
general processes have very distinctive effects based on the way they coalesce 
with other place-based factors with different results according to local condi-
tions and historical path-dependencies. With the requisite will and resources, 
huge progress can be made by relatively small-scale localist interventions to 
challenge and partly reverse the economic fortunes of places confronted by 
economic restructuring. The Eldonians have been the most successful of all 
the Liverpool co-op campaigns in achieving radical urban transformation. 
However, this poses problems for the possibility of replicating the Eldonian 
model, which remains financially unsustainable at least in terms of conven-
tional regeneration costs; a product of politics unlikely to be repeated.
One argument of this book is that such conventions are a question of 
political priorities as opposed to material constraints and are therefore amenable 
to change. The real question here, then, is what lessons can be learned from 
the story of the Eldonians and the co-op movement if and when political 
winds do change? In this concluding section of Part III, I review the story so 
far—drawing out the continuities and differences between the Eldonians and 
the co-op movement and earlier housing history from which they sprang. In 
summarising Parts II and III, I sketch out some answers to the questions posed 
at their outset, evaluating the success of both the co-op and community devel-
opment trust models in resolving the housing and neighbourhood questions.
To recap, bottom-up motivations for cooperative housing in Liverpool had 
two fundamental sources born out of reaction to some negative threat: the 
need for better housing in the face of dire conditions and the fight against 
displacement and community dissolution. Engels’ housing question is perhaps 
most pertinently addressed to Liverpool of all cities—having witnessed dire 
overcrowding and insanitary slum conditions due to rapid urban growth 
and inflows of economic migrants from its maritime connections as well as 
refugees from the Irish Potato Famine. Co-op campaigns were initiated in 
reaction to such appalling conditions as well as the heavy-handed response 
enacted through the slum clearance programme. But so too were the co-ops 
inspired by more positive and proactive desires for individual autonomy and 
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collective control. Weller Street and the Eldonians were pioneering among 
the co-ops for placing great value on radical self-governance—an explicit aim 
for both but most fully realised by the Eldonians. Colin Ward’s manifesto for 
‘collective dweller control’ was highly influential in the gestation of Weller 
Street’s political philosophy. The Eldonians expanded this concept into 
domains beyond housing to take collective control of various public services, 
community enterprise and parts of the foundational economy. 
Both communities were more collectivist than individualist in their orien-
tation to autonomy: driven by a desire to assert community self-determination 
over individual self-actualisation. This is reflected in claims that the Eldonians 
were ‘Stalinist’ in their egalitarianism and also in Weller Street’s ‘utalitarian’ 
(utilitarian-cum-totalitarian) ethos. In others, such as Hesketh Street (derided 
by some as “flower-powery”), individual dweller control was given more room 
to grow, with greater self-expression and creative choice granted over the 
design, decoration and management of housing. Yet, on the whole, Liverpool 
co-ops were distinct from the kind of lifestyle anarchism of more middle-class 
co-op movements—they were more pragmatic than ideological. Indeed, rooted 
as they were in a deeply traditional working-class culture, closely associated 
with the docks, trade unionism, organised religion and the old Labour Party, 
the Liverpool co-operators dissociated themselves from what they saw, so 
one fellow traveller characterised it, as the “brown rice and sandals brigade”. 
Communal principles of shared living have not been so fully realised, perhaps, 
as in co-housing or commune-type arrangements. In the original participatory 
design sessions, popular preferences were for traditional family homes—
although shared spaces for community gatherings, celebrations, children’s play 
and meetings for the collective governance of housing were also highly prized. 
Socialist and communitarian aspects of cooperativism—managing common 
assets as self-governing communities—were major motivations and not only 
for the vanguard co-ops.
Nonetheless, a large proportion of co-operators simply wanted a better 
house. Through viral replication, the co-op movement was in some sense 
co-opted by the Liberal council’s political project of pluralising, decentralising 
and privatising municipal housing. This explains the gradual dilution of cooper-
ative principles and radical autonomy in the growth of the cooperative model 
into a more mainstream tenure of choice, driven by the ‘bandwagon effect’ of 
people seeking to secure better housing rather than by any cooperative ideal or 
practice. Such a tension has severe implications for the integrity of cooperative 
housing. The foundational 1975 Campbell Report recommended that co-ops be 
developed only where “it can be clearly established that the tenants really want 
to take part in a cooperative venture and are not simply anxious to be rehoused”. 
If we do not wish to accept such a social limit on the outward expansion of 
co-ops and their potential to become Public Sector Housing 2.0, more work 
needs to be done on developing the requisite institutional infrastructure that 
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can provide incentives for people to participate whilst also protecting collective 
alternatives from the vagaries of local politics and tendencies towards the 
dilution of cooperative values as they scale up or go viral. 
In evaluating the co-op and community development trust models, it is 
important to bear in mind that they were designed as long-term solutions, with 
thirty- to forty-year maturation cycles in the minds of their initiators. Says one: 
“We always said with the Eldonians, we wouldn’t know their success probably 
until 2010”. So how successful are these collective housing alternatives in 
terms of resolving Liverpool’s housing and neighbourhood questions? First, the 
co-ops have achieved a great deal in personal and collective empowerment: 
attuned to incorporating into the process of development the skills, labour, 
education and imaginative desires of their resident-members. The new-build 
co-ops, following the Weller Way, were talented at carving out the space for 
residents to develop their capacities and personalities through campaigning 
and community organising and to learn such new skills as architectural 
drawing, accountancy and business planning. This was achieved through close 
working relationships with architects and development managers; participatory 
‘planning for real’ techniques; and democratic input into the design process 
itself. Many of the outcomes are intangibles: gains made in self-confidence, 
self-respect and collective purpose. Others are more empirically observable: 
countless residents gained new employment, particularly in architectural and 
planning practices, utilising new-found fluency in professional discourses. 
Many others were politically empowered and radicalised by the campaign 
process, inspired to stand for election as Labour councillors, some becoming 
powerful figures on the council, shaping local politics in pro-mutual direc-
tions, reflecting their earlier experience with the co-op movement.
These benefits for individual empowerment combine with material 
environmental and housing improvements in mutually reinforcing virtuous 
circles to make neighbourhood regeneration more effective, durable and self-
sustaining. Original community aspirations have in large part been realised: 
co-op residents secured better homes and were protected from the dissolution 
of their communities; the Eldonians achieved the regeneration of their neigh-
bourhood and their vision to become a self-regenerating community. In the 
long run, democratically designed co-op housing has proven better able to 
respond to residents’ needs, express desires and be collectively manageable 
than their pre-fabricated, mass-produced counterparts built by profit-making 
developers and even those planned in technocratic-utopian fashion by local 
state bureaucracies. Many of the co-ops came to resemble—or, rather, 
influence—ordinary suburban estates of the 1970s with their defensive 
secured-by-designs, yet received scathing criticism from the architectural 
press. But this is what people wanted: spacious semi-detached housing with a 
garden set in a clean, green, safe environment for children to play and neigh-
bours to meet in the street, arranged in cul-de-sacs around a communal area 
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or community centre, as the anchor for co-op activities. Unlike their mass-
produced imitations, they have stood the test of time. Almost all the co-ops, 
as well as the Eldonian Village, are still here today, in better condition than 
surrounding housing built before or after. One local politician contrasts the 
co-ops favourably with comparable public or private housing:
Not only did they provide much better housing at much better cost, 
but actually because they had this communal ethos, they weathered 
the recession of the early ’80s and the ’90s far better than other parts 
of Liverpool …
Other commentators liken the co-ops to “beacons of hope”—exhibiting 
higher quality housing, cheaper to manage, with higher occupancy rates, 
greater resident involvement, less unemployment and fewer social problems 
than their surrounds.6 Yet such success comes at a price. Many co-ops and 
especially the Eldonians are commonly perceived to be exclusive, inward-
facing tight-knit communities closed-off to surrounding neighbourhoods and 
other potential residents unless they have personal connections. 
Of all the experiments in the 1970s and 1980s, the Eldonians are 
most far-reaching in achieving radical self-governance and delivering urban-
economic transformation. They have transformed a large area of contaminated 
ex-industrial land into a sustainable community—albeit with high levels of 
public subsidy difficult to justify again. In many respects they have replaced 
the council as the dominant arm of the local state—increasingly involved in 
creating jobs, incubating community enterprise and delivering a number of 
localised public services, such as energy, heating, policing, environmental 
management as well as housing. Setting them apart from the rest of the co-op 
movement from which they sprang, as a co-op development worker remarked 
to me, is the fact that they “took over the whole neighbourhood; so they 
aren’t just a housing landlord, not just a social club, not just a social enterprise 
creator, they’re not just a partner—they are the driving force”.
In many ways, the Eldonians anticipated and benefited from the emerging 
era of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ documented by Harvey.7 Despite socialist 
aspirations for collective self-government through community ownership of 
land and housing, the Eldonian model resonated with the enterprising and 
entrepreneurial culture of self-help and resilience then being promoted by the 
Conservatives and which has since become a hallmark of neoliberal ideology 
and urban governance. This was a period in which the concepts of innovation, 
enterprise and entrepreneurialism entered the lexicon of the political Left as 
6 Christopher Holmes, A New Vision for Housing (Routledge, 2005).
7 David Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in 
Urban Governance in Late Capitalism”, Geografiska Annaler 71.1 (1989): 3–17.
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much as they did the Right—if not the Militant Tendency then certainly their 
enemies in the Labour Party, those ‘modernisers’ who would create New 
Labour. Urban entrepreneurialism, social enterprise and sustainable commu-
nities became the new leitmotif of urban regeneration and local economic 
development policy discourses—the final death knell for the modernist dream 
of municipal socialism that was once embodied in the Militant-led Liverpool 
Council.
What set the Eldonians apart from neoliberal urban policy—and that 
which counterintuitively united, despite deep ideological differences, Militant’s 
municipal socialism with Conservative urban policy—was the way in which 
they approached the housing and neighbourhood questions. Both Militant’s 
URS and the emerging neoliberal regime were property-led—that is, fixated 
on the physical, material condition of the housing itself rather than the struc-
tures, flows and processes which go into producing it as an active, lived space. 
Tony Byrne’s URS was predicated on a kind of design determinism, which 
resonated strangely with Thatcher’s policies through the shared reference 
point of Alice Coleman’s work on design disadvantagement. Inverting John 
F.C. Turner’s dictum,8 this amounts to treating dwelling as a noun rather than 
a verb. Taken together, such property-led approaches to the housing question 
are best understood as a form of housing fetishism, which therefore fails to get 
at the root of the problem. The Eldonians, like the new-build co-op movement 
in general, understood the benefits of engaging in the process of designing 
housing as much as the overall design itself. But, unlike the other co-ops, 
they aimed at more than just housing, incorporating other key elements of 
economic development into their vision for a self-regenerating community. To 
get there, the Eldonians had to secure partnerships with a whole range of local, 
regional and national agencies—revealing how a partnership-based approach 
to regeneration can take different guises.
At the same time, the Eldonians—and Langrove Street Co-op too—
employed political tactics of direct action, insurgency and illegal occupation, 
and fought fierce battles with the council. This suggests that successful 
campaigns for collective housing alternatives—whose success depends on 
actively engaging with the state and other professional partners further down 
the line—must first be forcefully claimed through insurgent methods which 
challenge, subvert and circumvent as much as utilise the law. Whereas earlier 
new-build co-op campaigns were pro-demolition and in favour of better 
housing conditions, these later campaigns—particularly Langrove—set off a 
trend for anti-demolition activism that defended communities’ right to place, 
culminating in the CLT movement several decades later. By this point, in the 
twenty-first century, housing conditions were much improved or were at least 
8 John F.C. Turner, “Housing as a Verb”, in John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter, eds, 
Freedom to Build (Collier Macmillan, 1972), pp. 148–175.
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beginning to be managed more effectively by the growing housing association 
sector, having taken over most municipal management. As a result, community 
motivations turned increasingly towards gaining autonomy and choice in the 
design and location of housing rather than its quality per se. 
In order to grow during the period of Militant municipalisation, the co-op 
movement effectively fled the city of Liverpool proper into the neighbouring 
borough of Knowsley. The successful transmission of the co-op model into 
a new jurisdiction allowed it to continue its growth just as political condi-
tions prevented further expansion locally in Liverpool. The transfer agent in 
this process was CDS, illustrating the importance of secondary professional 
networks for the replication of social innovation. Through this process of policy 
mobility, we can see the importance of ‘place effects’ in the development of 
social innovation. Kirkby was in many ways ripe for co-op experimentation 
owing to the residual cultural practices of community organising embedded 
in place by such relatively recent collective action as the 1972 Kirkby Rent 
Strike, which mobilised some three thousand tenants in the area. Just as the 
Rent Strike was organised predominantly by women, so too were the co-ops a 
principally women-led initiative, mostly driven by single mothers who wanted 
better housing conditions for their children than the deteriorating and alien-
ating tenements and tower blocks thrown up to house the ‘overspill’ from 
Liverpool. The co-op model developed here in a different way, shaped by the 
particular urban and social context: smaller in size than the Liverpool co-ops 
and less defined by existing place-based communities.
In contrast to the Kirkby co-ops, the Eldonians show how far collective 
housing models can be stretched. Unlike other co-ops, which were small 
enough—no more than 60 households—to maintain a meaningful level of 
participation among members, fitting their needs around the co-op model 
offered by CDS and MIH as a solution to their problems, the Eldonians did 
it the other way around. They twisted the shape of the model to fit their 
needs, for a much larger structure of community ownership. Ultimately, 
the Eldonians needed a vehicle for regeneration of an entire inner-city area 
and not just for housing, and so the community development trust model 
suggested itself over a co-operative. Although democratic involvement in the 
Eldonians appears to have waned over the years, the mutual ownership of land 
and assets under a community trust umbrella structure has enabled recycling 
of surpluses for community benefit. This distinguishes the Eldonians from 
the co-ops and other housing associations, which—despite delivering better 
housing conditions than the Corpy—have stopped short of the challenge of 
ongoing community-led urban renewal.
The seeming strength—and revealed weakness—of the Eldonian trust 
structure was to allow the separation of functions into a housing arm and a 
business development arm. Each was able to pursue real economic empow-
erment for local residents above and beyond those modest gains made by 
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the new-build co-ops towards collective property ownership and circuitous 
routes to employment: helping provide employment directly for a hundred 
or so local residents and supporting the development of countless other social 
enterprises and community businesses. However, a fatal flaw in the model has 
led to the asset-stripping and dissolution of EGL, explicable through mission 
drift towards commercial over social ends and institutional changes removing 
it from democratic scrutiny and community accountability. 
Moreover, such scaled-up operations and specialisation comes at a social 
cost. The Eldonians’ hard-won sense of ownership over the village has mutated 
down the generations into a more passive sense of entitlement, shored up by 
a bureaucratic paternalism: the hated ‘Corpy’ has been partially replaced by 
another, albeit more effective, landlord at a smaller scale, a “nanny state” in 
community trust clothing. A large part of these problems derives from the 
cultural origins and sheer scale of the scheme. The original community of 150 
families—way bigger than the supposed functional upper limit for co-ops of 
40 households—were not interested in forming a co-op per se so much as an 
ownership model which could accommodate them all, keep the community 
together, and provide greater collective control over their living conditions. 
After their co-op scheme was thwarted by Militant, their plans evolved into 
a community development trust model, which proved most useful as a means 
to achieve their long-term aims for socioeconomic self-sufficiency. To a great 
extent, it worked; but in handing so much power over to the leadership, and 
becoming more ‘state-like’, there has been an inevitable price to pay in the 
domain of democracy.
This story is not unique to the Eldonians, however, and the majority of 
cooperative development agencies and housing associations on Merseyside 
starting out as small charitable trusts have, following the effects of the 
1988 Housing Act, since morphed into huge commercial organisations, losing 
their ties to people and place. This reflects the privatisation and commerciali-
sation of the social housing sector in general.9 The full implications of this 
transition are considered in the next part, Part IV, where I explore how the 
very same housing associations that started the co-op movement in the 1970s 
became centrally involved in the latest round of state-led demolition-and-
rebuild, known as Housing Market Renewal. This placed these organisations 
in conflict with Liverpool’s next generation of collective housing activism, 
growing out of grassroots campaigns for CLTs that sought to defend housing 
from redevelopment and take it into community control.
9 Peter Malpass, “The Discontinuous History of Housing Associations in England”, 
Housing Studies 15.2 (2000): 195–212.
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Housing is the battlefield of our time and the house is its 
monument.
Slogan of Homebaked Community Land Trust.1
Housing is in many respects the political battlefield of our time—a field in 
which the contradictions and injustices of capitalism are once again socially 
and materially manifest. Ours is an age of neoliberal financialisation, in which 
capitalism has exhausted primary avenues for productive investment and is 
now turning towards the ‘secondary’ circuit of capital—fixed assets such as 
the built environment—to make a profit. Indeed, financialisation has been 
nowhere more acute than in land and property: the 2008 global financial 
crash was bound up with sub-prime mortgages, precipitating foreclosure 
crises across Europe and the USA.2 Some believe it is only a matter of 
time before the UK housing mortgage market—for decades state-subsidised 
through tax concessions and record low interest rates—likewise collapses.3 As 
housing becomes increasingly central to global capitalism, liberal-democratic 
citizenship gets ever more entangled with homeownership and national politics 
ever more embroiled by widespread financial interests in inflating housing 
markets.4 Unsustainable property price growth leads to increasingly volatile 
boom–bust cycles. The costs of fuelling this bubble of illusory wealth creation 
are manifold and the social impacts pernicious.5 In the UK, in particular, 
1 Jeanne van Heeswijk and Britt Jurgensen, “Introduction”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2, 
Homebaked: A Perfect Recipe (2014).
2 Michael Edwards, Prospects for Land, Rent and Housing in UK Cities, Foresight Future of 
Cities: Working Paper (Government Office for Science, 2015).
3 Stuart Hodkinson, Paul Watt and Gerry Mooney, “Introduction: Neoliberal Housing 
Policy—Time for a Critical Re-Appraisal”, Critical Social Policy 33.1 (2013): 3–16.
4 Raquel Rolnik, “Late Neoliberalism: The Financialization of Homeownership and 
Housing Rights”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37.3 (2013): 1058–1066.
5 Edwards, Prospects for Land, Rent and Housing in UK Cities; Danny Dorling, All That Is 
Solid: How the Great Housing Disaster Defines Our Times, and What We Can Do About It (Allen 
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housing deprivation and socioeconomic exclusion collude with the privati-
sation and retrenchment of public housing provision to create a homelessness 
crisis—despite thousands of empty homes across the country. Public assets 
are transferred from taxpayers to privileged homeowners as a growing rentier 
class of speculative landlords exploit Generation Rent, who face a future far 
less secure or prosperous than that to which their parents—even grand-
parents—looked forward. 
In Britain, residential property constitutes the largest component of wealth 
yet this is deeply unevenly distributed, both socially and spatially.6 Combined 
with uneven spatial development, such financialisation leads to gross contra-
dictions: ‘housing market failure’ in economically depressed regions—where 
state-funded renewal programmes demolish ‘obsolete’ houses—only a few 
hundred miles away from areas where demand, inflation and speculation are 
so intense that local authorities engage in creative destruction of ex-council 
estates: stripping public assets to plug the gap in squeezed budgets. In 
stark language harking back centuries ago to the original enclosures of the 
commons, this is what critical geographer Stuart Hodkinson has labelled the 
‘new urban enclosures’.7
If in this new battle over the soul of housing, the commons are increasingly 
threatened by intensifying enclosures and financialisation of land and assets, 
then the CLT model is gaining traction as a weapon wielded in the counterof-
fensive. In this opening chapter to Part IV, I explore the power of CLTs to 
contest forces of enclosure and how they might constitute an alternative model 
of providing public housing and managing our neighbourhoods and cities 
before, in chapter 11, delving into the historical detail of how CLTs emerged 
in Liverpool as a tool employed by communities whose homes were threatened 
in the latest round of state-led comprehensive urban redevelopment.
Weapons Wielded against Enclosure of the Commons
Community land trusts can be seen as tools of defence against the new 
urban enclosures—heir to an ancient battle fought out over centuries. Acts 
of enclosure date back to the Roman Empire’s introduction of the juridical 
concept of ownership to Britain to support conquest and slavery, forming 
the basis for feudalism, after which the commons were eradicated in three 
Lane, 2014); Herman Schwartz and Leonard Seabrooke, eds, The Politics of Housing Booms 
and Busts (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
6 Manuel B. Aalbers and Brett Christophers, “Centring Housing in Political Economy”, 
Housing, Theory and Society 31.4 (2014): 373–394.
7 Stuart Hodkinson, “The New Urban Enclosures”, City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, 
Theory, Policy, Action 16.5 (2012): 500–518. See also Brett Christophers, The New Enclosure: 
The Appropriation of Public Land in Neoliberal Britain (Verso, 2018).
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waves: by the Normans, the Tudors, and the Enclosure Acts during the rise 
of industrial capitalism. These initial acts of enclosure—forcing commoners 
from the land and into industrialising cities—constitute what Marx called 
primitive accumulation, which signalled the beginning of capitalist history.8 
Enclosure, dispossession and commodification of common land created the 
capitalist preconditions of mass wage labour—as the ‘midwife’ of the capitalist 
city.9 This has been extended and deepened through capitalist history to the 
present: what Harvey terms ‘accumulation by dispossession’, the ongoing, 
state-led process of enclosing social value for private capital and divorcing 
people from the means of sustaining themselves.10 In neo-Marxist thought, the 
commons is the original condition of humanity—the soil in which capitalism 
then took root.11 It is antithetical to the concepts of property and ownership, 
commodities and capital. 
Countless forms of resistance to the enclosure of the commons have 
sprung up to (re)claim common land rights for the poor and dispossessed. 
Cooperatives are an obvious—albeit historically recent—form of resistance, 
but which have proven vulnerable to co-optation and incapable of protecting 
against subsequent enclosures through common ownership alone. A more 
direct form of defence is through the institutionalisation of trusts, which seek 
to remove land from the market entirely and protect it through a distinctive 
legal framework. The first, prototypical trusts emerged out of the anti-
enclosure revolts of the early modern period, most famously the Levellers and 
the Diggers, whose great advocate Gerrard Winstanley made the powerful 
declaration to the ‘Lords of the Land’ that 
The earth was not made purposely for you, to be Lords of it, and we to 
be your Slaves, Servants, and Beggars; but it was made to be a common 
Livelihood to all, without respect of persons.12 
The Diggers’ occupation of St George’s Hill in Surrey in 1649—settling as 
an experimental agrarian commons—suffered violent attacks by the landlord 
and proved short-lived, but their ideas lived on, influencing critical figures 
in the later development of land trusts, such as Henry George, John Ruskin, 
8 Massimo De Angelis, The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital (Pluto 
Press, 2006).
9 Hodkinson, “The New Urban Enclosures”.
10 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford University Press, 2003).
11 Peter Linebaugh, The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All (University 
of California Press, 2009); De Angelis, The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global 
Capital; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Harvard University Press, 
2009).
12 Gerrard Winstanley, A Common Treasury (Verso, 2011).
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William Morris and Ebenezer Howard. In 1871, Ruskin founded the Guild 
of St George as a non-profit association holding land in trust—pioneering the 
concept of a ‘trusteeship company’, securing ‘enduring community benefit’ 
rather than profit. In the UK, the most ambitious articulation of this idea was 
Howard’s Garden Cities,13 whilst in the USA it influenced the development of 
the contemporary community land trust movement, later imported (back) to 
Britain, where CLT advocates see early experiments by Winstanley, Ruskin 
and Howard as embryonic forms of modern CLTs.14
One of the greatest advocates for common ownership, and the first 
American influence on the contemporary CLT movement, was Henry George, 
who claimed—contra Engels’ position in The Housing Question—that land, 
not capital, was the source of the deepest antagonism in modern society. For 
George, the appropriation of land by economic elites was the primary cause 
of urban injustice, inequality and poverty, by diverting land away from the 
production of benefits for the common good into the unproductive generation 
of profits from rents. George argued that 
To extirpate poverty, to make wages what justice commands they 
should be, the full earnings of the laborer, we must therefore substitute 
for the individual ownership of land a common ownership. … The 
unequal ownership of land necessitates the unequal distribution of 
wealth.15
What has since been called the ‘tyranny of property’16 operates to produce 
a cumulative concentration of wealth and power in the hands of elites, who 
exercise their advantage in political and economic power to accumulate 
ever-greater swathes of property for its financial benefits, thereby further 
excluding the poor from land and asset ownership and their associated 
social benefits. Unproductive ownership of land not only excludes the poor 
from its productive use, but also creates the motivation for financial specu-
lation, contributing to inflationary bubbles—and their inevitable deflationary 
collapse—with severe impacts on tenants, rendered precariously vulnerable 
to such instability by their neo-feudal status of dependence on landlords. As a 
13 Ebenezer Howard, To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Town And Country Planning 
(Cambridge University Press, 1898).
14 Such as Pat Conaty and Martin Large, eds, Commons Sense: Co-operative Place Making and 
the Capturing of Land Value for 21st Century Garden Cities (Hawthorn Press, 2014).
15 Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of 
Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth. The Remedy (Doubleday, Page & Co., 1879), p. 194.
16 Emmanuel Midheme and Frank Moulaert, “Pushing Back the Frontiers of Property: 
Community Land Trusts and Low-Income Housing in Urban Kenya”, Land Use Policy 35 
(2013): 73–84.
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solution to the tyranny of property, George advocated for the long-term goal 
of common ownership of land and interim policy measures such as a single tax 
on all increases in land value to remove the motive for speculation.17 
George portrayed land as existing independently of labour in nature, as the 
original source of wealth and autonomy, as opposed to the ownership of the 
means of production, for these must be located on land anyway. This departed 
from the Marxian labour theory of value, which holds that the actions of human 
labour on nature—as opposed to nature (or land) in and of itself—is the source 
of value. Regardless of which is deemed a more accurate reflection of reality, 
this idea was picked up by Ralph Borsodi, one of the founders of the American 
CLT movement, in his distinction between property commonly understood, 
as deriving from human labour, and what he calls ‘trusterty’, things existing 
by other means, i.e., nature.18 Land, existing independently of labour, should 
therefore not be owned but only ‘entrusted’, as in a parent’s relationship to their 
child, thereby bringing to fruition the concept of trusteeship, or stewardship. 
The latter is a concept distinct from ‘ownership’ in whatever form it may 
take—be it public, private or common—in that civil title to land is never 
absolute but held in ‘trust’ for other and future users, with duties of care and 
social responsibility at its core.19 This is the ethical principle underpinning the 
rejection of the individual’s ‘right to transfer’ and the ‘right to speculate’ in the 
contemporary CLT model. Although part of the property owner’s full stake in 
the equity is ‘earned’ through their own sweat, labour and personal investment, 
the larger part is actually ‘unearned’, being a product of the community and 
wider social relations. On the intuitive understanding of ‘just deserts’ based on 
proportionality, the leading American CLT advocate, John Emmeus Davis, calls 
for a reallocation of equity so that “to the individual goes the fruits of individual 
labour; to the community goes the social increment”.20 
Borsodi attempted to implement the trusterty concept in experiments 
with prototypical land trusts, notably the ‘homestead model’, which separated 
the ownership of land from buildings, and effectively put a floor under tenants 
as a micro-scale welfare state—thereby defining the first two pillars of CLTs: 
cooperative ownership and individual leaseholds.21 But it was only through 
the involvement of Robert Swann—a conscientious Second World War 
17 John Emmeus Davis, ed., The Community Land Trust Reader (Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, 2010).
18 James Meehan, “Reinventing Real Estate: The Community Land Trust and the Social 
Market in Land”, Journal of Applied Social Science 8.2 (2014): 113–133.
19 Charles Geisler and Gail Daneker, Property and Values: Alternatives to Public and Private 
Ownership (Island Press, 2000).
20 Davis, Community Land Trust Reader, p. 363.
21 Meehan, “Reinventing Real Estate: The Community Land Trust and the Social Market 
in Land”.
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objector influenced by Gandhi and the Civil Rights movement—that the CLT 
model gained its distinctive third pillar. Swann observed some of Borsodi’s 
cooperative homestead communities and critiqued their inward-looking 
closure as ‘enclaves’, with no means to reach out beyond the membership to 
society. He therefore introduced a governance mechanism that would ensure 
openness to the locality and wider publics and provide the basis for mobilising 
a social movement. The CLT tripartite governance structure—with equal 
parts resident-members, wider community representatives and expert stake-
holders—is the result of this innovation.22 Thus CLTs are unique among 
collective forms of ownership for engaging with and recycling surpluses for 
the wider community, and not just for member-residents, as in the case of 
co-ops.
A further elaboration in the CLT model developed through the practical 
application of Swann’s introduction of stewardship.23 These early rural CLTs 
in the late 1970s were influenced by the Catholic theology of their founders, 
established as vehicles to empower politically and economically excluded, 
low-income people, with an in-built ‘preferential option for the poor’—not 
simply building houses protected from the market, but “building a community 
of the dispossessed”.24 Thus the CLT movement moved from Borsodi’s concept 
of trusterty towards Gandhi’s trusteeship. The first urban CLT, Community 
Land Cooperative of Cincinnati, built on this heritage, developing out of 
grassroots organising by church-based community organisations, helped by 
key activists and infrastructures of the national American CLT movement, to 
adapt the CLT model as a vehicle for community empowerment and urban 
regeneration in an impoverished inner-city neighbourhood.25 Earlier experi-
ments following Borsodi had not imposed long-term contractual controls over 
the resale of buildings on leased land, but the Community Land Cooperative 
of Cincinnati had to contend with unstable urban property markets and the 
threat of gentrification, thus introducing resale limits into the CLT consti-
tution—institutionalising the principle of permanent affordability. These 
innovations opened up opportunities to use CLTs to address post-industrial 
urban issues of decline, disinvestment, gentrification and speculation. The 
next wave in the late 1980s included the world’s largest CLT today, the 
city-wide municipal housing programme in Burlington, Vermont—supported 
22 Davis, Community Land Trust Reader.
23 John Emmeus Davis, “Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the 
United States”, in Davis, Community Land Trust Reader, pp. 3–47.
24 Davis, “Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the United States”, 
p. 20.
25 John Emmeus Davis, Contested Ground: Collective Action and the Urban Neighborhood 
(Cornell University Press, 1990).
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by the then socialist Mayor of Burlington Bernie Sanders26—and in the 1990s 
notable grassroots inner-city community campaigns, Cooper Square in New 
York City27 and Dudley Street in Boston.28
Through this combination of institutional covenants, CLTs have the practical 
potential to address pernicious effects of markets both too ‘hot’ (affordability 
crises, absentee landlordism, speculative development and gentrification) and 
those too ‘cold’ (capital flight, spirals of decline, poverty, inequality, depri-
vation, dereliction, abandonment).29 They also have the potential to resolve 
problems of state management of these issues: the alienation of public 
landlordism and the displacement pressures from municipal urban renewal 
schemes. However, CLTs have mostly been developed for the provision and local 
collective control of affordable housing, with growing international application 
in, amongst others, the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Belgium and Kenya.30 
The CLT model was first imported to the UK from the USA in the 1990s by 
British land reform advocates seeking to resolve issues of rural housing afford-
ability. The government-funded National CLT Demonstration Programme 
from 2006 to 2008 piloted fourteen CLT projects leading to the formation in 
2010 of the National CLT Network, an umbrella organisation that connects 
and supports member CLTs. The model was first adapted to help resolve rural 
affordability crises, especially in the south-west of England, but has since been 
mobilised by advocates across diverse domains, from rural to urban contexts, 
from core to periphery, from land markets too hot to markets too cold. Two 
cities in particular—two sides of the same coin: London and Liverpool—
now lead the way in British CLT experimentation, applying the model as 
an innovative solution to respective divergent problems: to provide access to 
affordable housing arising from gentrification and financial speculation in the 
overheated capital; to resist urban blight and heavy-handed state redevelopment 
programmes and as a vehicle for environmental improvement, urban regen-
eration, socioeconomic empowerment and political participation in Liverpool.
26 James DeFilippis, Unmaking Goliath: Community Control in the Face of Global Capital 
(Routledge, 2004); Steven D. Soifer, “The Burlington Community Land Trust: A Socialist 
Approach to Affordable Housing?”, Journal of Urban Affairs 12.3 (1990): 237–252.
27 Tom Angotti, New York for Sale: Community Planning Confronts Global Real Estate (MIT 
Press, 2007).
28 Peter Medoff and Holly Sklar, Streets of Hope: The Fall and Rise of an Urban Neighborhood 
(South End Press, 1994).
29 DeFilippis, Unmaking Goliath; Davis, Community Land Trust Reader; Udi Engelsman, 
Mike Rowe and Alan Southern, “Community Land Trusts—A Radical or Reformist 
Response to the Housing Question Today?”, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical 
Geographies 15.3 (2016): 590–615.
30 Tom Moore and Kim McKee, “Empowering Local Communities? An International
Review of Community Land Trusts”, Housing Studies 27.2 (2012): 280–290.
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On the one hand, CLTs have found support right across the political 
spectrum, not least in Conservative policy: Boris Johnson’s 2008 manifesto 
for his successful Mayor of London campaign included the promise of “creating 
a network of CLTs across London”.31 Yet on the other hand, CLTs are being 
mobilised by activists—and critically evaluated by researchers—as radical 
campaigns for the reappropriation of our ‘housing commons’,32 especially in 
the UK’s first urban CLT, in East London,33 and in the Granby Four Streets and 
Homebaked CLTs in Liverpool, which I discuss in detail in chapters 11 and 12. 
London’s urban CLT movement in particular is fast expanding and at a critical 
stage in its early development and consolidation as a social movement, including 
a growing number of embryonic projects in East London, West Kensington, 
Brixton and Lewisham. The first forays into its urban application, having been 
a rural movement in Britain for many years, were by public–private regen-
eration partnerships, particularly ex-New Deal for Communities organisations 
like the Shoreditch Trust, as ‘legacy vehicles’ to take on and manage assets 
for enduring community control and benefit long after these programmes 
have ended.34 There were also early experiments by tenants’ associations to 
challenge the large-scale stock transfer, privatisation and state-led redevel-
opment of social housing estates: unsuccessfully at the Heygate Estate in 
Elephant and Castle,35 and most recently by West Kensington and Gibbs Green 
Community Homes, pioneering the application of the Right to Transfer to ‘buy 
back’ two estates being compulsorily purchased for redevelopment as luxury 
flats by an international conglomerate. This latter struggle against enclosure 
and displacement turns on its head government legislation published in 2013 
for the ‘Right to Transfer from a Local Authority Landlord’—using it not 
simply to galvanise stock transfer from the council to a private registered 
landlord but to establish a CLT as a community-controlled landlord for local 
democratic protection of the estate. Likewise in the case of the successfully 
institutionalised East London CLT, the rights of residents appear to form the 
31 Boris Johnson, “Building a Better London: Manifesto for Mayor of London” (2008), 
p. 13.
32 Stuart Hodkinson, “Housing in Common: In Search of Strategy for Housing Alterity 
in England in the 21st Century”, in Duncan Fuller, Andrew Jonas and Roger Lee, eds, 
Interrogating Alterity (Ashgate, 2010), pp. 241–258.
33 Susannah Bunce, “Pursuing Urban Commons: Politics and Alliances in Community 
Land Trust Activism in East London”, Antipode 478.1 (2016): 134–150.
34 Stephanie Saulter, Alison Masterman and Anna Eagar, The Community Equity Trust: A 
Report on a Community-Based Self-Funding Urban Regeneration Model Developed by the Shoreditch 
Trust (The Shoreditch Trust, 2008).
35 James DeFilippis and Peter North, “The Emancipatory Community? Place, Politics 
and Collective Action in Cities”, in Loretta Lees, ed., The Emancipatory City? Paradoxes and 
Possibilities (SAGE, 2004), pp. 72–88.
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main motivation for campaigning for the model led by London Citizens.36 
Both mobilise the CLT model as a potential institutional vehicle for the reali-
sation of common rights to centrally located affordable housing currently left 
unmet or unprotected by the state. In this way, they tentatively assert a Right 
to Stay Put,37 as part of the Right to Place,38 or, indeed, more expansively, 
the Right to the City.39
There are thus real prospects for using the CLT model for neighbourhood 
regeneration in the UK. In contrast to London, the Liverpool campaigns are 
motivated by the threat of disinvestment and demolition in a shrinking city, 
rather than the pressures of speculative investment, offering a potentially 
powerful antidote to problems of capital flight, public disinvestment and neigh-
bourhood decline. They are among the first attempts successfully to utilise the 
CLT model as an institutional vehicle for neighbourhood rehabilitation, with 
an emphasis on collective control of assets that contrasts with the narrower 
focus on housing affordability of the more established rural CLT movement.40 
It is their focus on the stewardship of land rather than ownership of assets 
that sets the CLT model apart as especially capable of responding to the new 
urban enclosures that would sweep through post-industrial cities, including 
Liverpool, as the state became increasingly involved in redeveloping urban 
land.
Grounding Capitalism in the Land Question
Henry George’s contention, in the 1870s, that land—and not capital per 
se—is primary to deprivation dynamics has proven remarkably insightful as 
urbanisation has intensified. Turning back once again to The Housing Question 
we can see how changing conditions in the way capitalism operates have not 
only moved the goalposts but perhaps even overturned the very rules of the 
game. For Marx and Engels, production and reproduction—the factory/
office and the home/neighbourhood—were sharply delineated such that the 
housing question was merely a secondary contradiction to the primary conflict 
36 Bunce, “Pursuing Urban Commons: Politics and Alliances in Community Land Trust 
Activism in East London”; Conaty and Large, Commons Sense.
37 Chester Hartman, “The Right to Stay Put”, in Chester Hartman, ed., Between Eminence 
and Notoriety: Four Decades of Radical Urban Planning (CUPR Press, 1984), pp. 304–318.
38 David Imbroscio, “Can We Grant a Right to Place?”, Politics & Society 32.4 (2004): 
575–609.
39 Kafui Attoh, “What Kind of Right Is the Right to the City?”, Progress in Human 
Geography 35.5 (2011): 669–685; Mark Purcell, “Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the 
City and Its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant”, GeoJournal 58.2–3 (2002): 99–108.
40 Tom Moore and Kim McKee, “Empowering Local Communities? An International 
Review of Community Land Trusts”, Housing Studies 27.2 (2012): 280–290.
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of exploitation in the labour–capital relation or, as Harvey puts it, a ‘displaced’ 
form of class struggle.41 It was only through the sphere of production, through 
syndicalism, trade unionism and direct action in the workplace, that labour 
could challenge the power of capital and, in turn, ever hope to resolve the 
housing question. However, writing when they did, Marx and Engels simply 
could not see that the urban would become an increasingly central site for 
capitalist development and resistance over the coming century or so. This 
trend can be understood as the deterritorialisation and fragmentation of 
production away from tangible, localised factory-based sites where labour 
could once organise and directly challenge capital—towards more mobile 
and flexibilised operations at a regional and increasingly global scale through 
the rise of multinational corporations, communications technologies and 
global financial trade agreements, with decreasing control at a local level. 
When coupled with the growing importance of the urban scale as a site for 
not only social reproduction and consumption but so too for accumulation of 
capital—through speculative property investment, for instance—we can see 
how Engels’ original formulation of the housing question is too simplistic and 
reductive.
Observing the rising frequency of urban struggles over collective 
consumption issues, such as housing, Manuel Castells sought to reformulate 
the housing question as The Urban Question, arguing that the ‘secondary’ nature 
of social reproduction was fast becoming primary:
But this does not mean that urban struggles are necessarily relegated to 
the world of administrative reformism. Quite the reverse; their decisive 
importance in certain political conjunctures has been determined, for 
a structurally secondary issue can be a conjuncturally principal one.42
Castells pointed out that public goods, services and collective consumption 
activities—together supporting social reproduction—were governed and 
accessed at the urban scale. The urban was the key site of intervention in 
everyday life: first by the state, through public service provision, urban 
planning, redevelopment and political organisation; second by citizens in the 
form of community groups and civil society organisations aiming to challenge 
or lobby for greater state interventions, or campaign for alternatives. This was 
the era of the second cycle of contention of which Liverpool’s housing co-op 
movement was a quintessential example.
Writing during the 1970s crisis of Fordism—the waning of the post-war 
golden age of prosperity—Castells had identified the importance of ‘the urban’ 
as a site for collective consumption and resistance, but, like Engels, could not 
41 Quoted in Andy Merrifield, The New Urban Question (Pluto Press, 2014), p. 104.
42 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (MIT Press, 1977), p. 377.
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predict its increasing importance in the Post-Fordist era as a site of accumu-
lation itself. As capital gradually began to exhaust opportunities for productive 
investment in the primary circuit (manufacturing) through the latter half of 
the twentieth century it turned to new potential sources in the secondary 
circuit—that is, the asset base of buildings, fixed infrastructure and land. 
Harvey has more recently identified the built environment as a ‘spatial fix’ for 
the ‘over-accumulation’ of capital—oversupply, devaluation, falling profits 
and exhaustion of new opportunities for profitable investment in the primary 
circuit of productive industries—in which the switching of capital into the 
secondary circuit of the built environment provides new opportunities for 
investment to absorb over-accumulation elsewhere.43 Harvey’s theory is based 
on Lefebvre’s insight that 
“Real property” (along with “construction”) is no longer a secondary 
form of circulation, no longer the auxiliary and backward branch of 
industrial and financial capitalism that it once was. Instead it has a 
leading role, albeit in an uneven way … Capitalism has taken possession 
of the land, and mobilized it to the point where this sector is fast 
becoming central. Why? Because it is a new sector—and hence less 
beset by the obstacles, surfeits, and miscellaneous problems that slow 
down old industries. Capital has thus rushed into the production of 
space in preference to the classical forms of production—in preference 
to the production of the means of production (machinery) and that of 
consumer goods. This process accelerates whenever “classical” sectors 
show the slightest sign of flagging.44 
‘Spatial fix’ has multiple meanings: providing a temporary solution to the 
crisis tendencies of capitalism; ‘fixing’ capital in space as a means to realise 
profits and as a sponge to soak up excess mobile capital sloshing around the 
global markets; and as the next injection—a narcotic ‘fix’—for the rapacious, 
insatiable cravings of profit addiction built into the logic of capitalism.45 
The contradictions of capital are displaced into the secondary circuit: the 
long ‘amortisation’ time in fixing capital in space through the expensive 
and time-consuming construction of new buildings and infrastructure—and 
their relative resilience and longevity as physical structures—creates sturdy 
new barriers to further accumulation, leading to pressures for intensified 
processes of creative destruction and the demolition of old structures that have 
43 Harvey, The New Imperialism.
44 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Blackwell, 1991), p. 335.
45 John Lovering, “The Relationship between Urban Regeneration and Neoliberalism: 
Two Presumptuous Theories and a Research Agenda”, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 12.4 (2007): 343–366.
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exhausted their profitability to make way for shiny new profit opportunities.46 
When devalorisation of urban assets makes returns on existing uses lower than 
possible future uses, capital will seek the support of the state either to raze 
former investments to the ground or to upgrade them for a new population 
of more affluent consumers, who in turn may consume the goods produced 
in the primary circuit at a fast enough rate to resolve over-accumulation.47 
The resulting pattern of capital investment and disinvestment as it restlessly 
roves the planet in search of profit differentials is described by Neil Smith as 
the ‘locational see-saw’:
the successive development, underdevelopment, and redevelopment of 
given areas as capital jumps from one place to another, then back again, 
both creating and destroying its own opportunities for development.48
The ‘locational see-saw’ between capital fixity and flight creates a pattern 
of uneven urban development, leaving some areas derelict and vacant until the 
economic conditions are right for reinvestment, and others in a continual process 
of redevelopment due to localised overheated speculative property markets. This 
turns urban land from a simple site of productive industries, housing, retail and 
civic spaces into the locus of struggle and conflict, as residents resist attempts by 
speculative investors either to redevelop and displace them or to disinvest and 
undermine the conditions for their survival.49 The stakes are raised further still 
when the state gets involved in this process of ‘spatially fixing’ capital, under 
ostensible public policy auspices variously described as ‘urban redevelopment’, 
‘urban regeneration’, ‘urban renewal’, ‘urban revitalisation’ and, in Britain, 
New Labour’s ‘urban renaissance’ agenda.50 
As all this was beginning to emerge in the 1990s, particularly in post-
industrial cities of the global North, local politics likewise took a turn towards 
the territorial. Two forms of a ‘politics of turf’ emerged in this period, 
catalysed by the locational see-saw.51 The first was a class- or community-based 
struggle within localities where local homeowners or ex-council tenants, for 
46 David Harvey, Limits to Capital (Verso Books, 2007).
47 Davis, Contested Ground: Collective Action and the Urban Neighborhood.
48 Neil Smith, “Gentrification and Uneven Development”, Economic Geography 58.2 
(1982): 139–155 (p. 151).
49 Davis, Contested Ground: Collective Action and the Urban Neighborhood.
50 Mike Raco and Robert Imrie, Urban Renaissance?: New Labour, Community and Urban 
Policy (Policy Press, 2003); Loretta Lees, “Policy (Re)Turns: Gentrification Research and 
Urban Policy—Urban Policy and Gentrification Research”, Environment and Planning A 
35.4 (2003): 571–574.
51 Kevin R. Cox, “The Local and the Global in the New Urban Politics: A Critical View”, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 11.4 (1993): 433–448.
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instance, mobilised against developers to protect their neighbourhoods against 
state-led renewal. The second fed off parallel trends in globalisation—cities 
set against each other in an intensified inter-urban competition for mobile 
capital—to create a struggle between localities in which cross-class coalitions, 
or ‘growth coalitions’, attempted to kick-start urban regeneration and drive 
forward economic growth.
At the other end of the locational see-saw, in cities suffering from 
deindustrialisation and capital flight, ‘grant coalitions’ or ‘grant regimes’ have 
emerged in post-industrial cities to compete and lobby for state funding of 
large-scale renewal programmes to tackle inner-city deprivation. Put simply, 
where growth coalitions compete for private capital investment, grant regimes 
compete for state subsidies. Grant regimes are public–private partnerships 
formed to protect their territories and constituencies from further decline, 
safeguard their assets from depreciation, transform dilapidated neighbour-
hoods into spaces that would attract creative professionals, kick-start economic 
regeneration and potentially make surpluses from new funding streams for 
redevelopment. It is through this lens that we can understand the recent 
history of housing redevelopment in Liverpool.
Housing Market Renewal, Neo-Haussmannisation  
and the New Urban Enclosures
For the governing elite of a city like Liverpool in the late 1990s—scarred, 
as it was, from decades of economic decline and population loss—forming 
a grant regime to attract government funding to address its worst housing 
problems seemed like an obvious solution. Local planners and policymakers 
had identified a pattern of what they called ‘housing market failure’ emerging 
across parts of inner-city Liverpool—mirroring trends towards empty homes 
and neighbourhood abandonment in post-industrial cities across the country, 
particularly in the north, catalogued by sociologists and geographers such as 
Anne Power.52 Liverpool City Council—controlled by the Liberal Democrats 
from 1998 until 2010—became centrally involved in designing and securing 
government backing for a new regeneration scheme called the Housing Market 
Renewal Pathfinder programme. Council officers commissioned the original 
research53 into housing market failure that would become the evidence base 
for the HMR national policy intervention—a £2.3 billion programme rolled 
52 Anne Power and Katharine Mumford, The Slow Death of Great Cities? Urban Abandonment 
or Urban Renaissance (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1999).
53 Brendan Nevin, Peter Lee, Jenny Phillimore, Alex Burfitt and Lisa Goodson, 
Measuring the Sustainability of Neighbourhoods in Liverpool (Centre for Urban and Regional 
Studies, University of Birmingham, 1999).
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out across deindustrialised inner-city areas in nine northern cities from 2003 
to 2011.54
HMR Pathfinders are exemplars of grant regimes, initiated by councils and 
their ‘natural allies’—housing associations, and also mass house-builders—in 
shrinking cities. In seeking to renew the market for housing—not just the 
houses themselves—HMR represents a rupture with previous modes of regen-
eration that sought to make improvements to the urban environment, housing 
and its management and offer skills training and other routes of empowerment 
for residents. The main research report justifying HMR—the so-called 
M62 Study, for identifying housing market failure along the M62 motorway 
corridor—identified the problem facing ‘difficult-to-let’ neighbourhoods with 
“voids” of boarded-up houses as one of “failing” markets.55 HMR was designed 
to intervene in failing local housing markets to reverse neighbourhood decline 
and attract new residents by replacing ‘obsolete’ and largely vacant terraced 
housing with new desirable housing products.56 This was a major shift from a 
focus on improving either the physical condition of homes or the life chances 
of their inhabitants—an ‘inward-looking’ approach—towards an ‘outward-
looking’ approach that sought to reconnect those buildings and people with 
others elsewhere, but which sometimes meant replacing them entirely.
Whilst inward-looking approaches to the urban renewal of housing estates, 
in planning theorist Peter Hall’s typology,57 focus on compositional character-
istics of the targeted neighbourhoods and their populations, outward-looking 
approaches account for spatial and socioeconomic relations with wider society. 
The former is easy to critique for drawing an artificial line around a 
neighbourhood and treating it as a container of which supposed negative 
features—such as urban design or poor environmental quality—are all 
too often held responsible for determining psychological and socioeconomic 
outcomes. Outward-looking approaches, by contrast, seek to connect neigh-
bourhoods with their wider socioeconomic context, and which Hall saw as 
replacing inward-looking approaches from the late 1990s, which we see in the 
emergence of market restructuring policies like HMR. In many ways this is a 
progressive move: understanding blight as a relational, market-driven outcome 
54 Philip Leather and Brendan Nevin, “The Housing Market Renewal Programme: 
Origins, Outcomes and the Effectiveness of Public Policy Interventions in a Volatile 
Market”, Urban Studies 50.5 (2013): 856–875.
55 David Webb, “Rethinking the Role of Markets in Urban Renewal: The Housing 
Market Renewal Initiative in England”, Housing, Theory and Society 27.4 (2010): 313–331.
56 Ian Cole, “Housing Market Renewal and Demolition in England in the 2000s: The 
Governance of ‘Wicked Problems’”, International Journal of Housing Policy 12.3 (2012): 
347–366.
57 Peter Hall, “Regeneration Policies for Peripheral Housing Estates: Inward- and 
Outward-Looking Approaches”, Urban Studies 34.5 (1997): 873–890.
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of uneven development—as a ‘space of flows’, reflecting advances in urban 
geography towards a relational perspective58—rather than an internal failure of 
the neighbourhood or residents themselves.59 Thus HMR sought to regenerate 
failing local housing markets by restructuring and reconnecting sub-regional 
markets with more functional regional and national markets. Like much of the 
New Labour government’s regeneration policy agenda, HMR was an ambitious 
attempt to rejuvenate the state’s role in urban renewal, mimicking the compre-
hensive redevelopment of the 1960s but with market-oriented objectives.60
However, this entailed new problems. Despite flexible strategies, multi-
layered partnership-working, and a sophisticated understanding of scale, HMR 
was limited in problematic ways: for its economistic and abstract conceptu-
alisation of neighbourhoods as housing markets; for its narrow focus on the 
single issue of housing alone; and for its one-size-fits-all monolithic approach 
to restructuring, centring on comprehensive redevelopment.61 This has 
provoked a number of critiques. First, as a policy programme that attempts 
to regenerate neighbourhoods by attracting a new mix of residential tenures 
(and thus residents of different social classes), HMR is seen as an archetype of 
the ‘mixed communities’ agenda, with all that this entails. This is a distinctly 
New Labour discourse but with parallels around the world, particularly in 
Anglophone and Northern European neo-liberalising contexts,62 and with 
historical antecedents in early town and country planning.63 In its explicit aim, 
through demolition and displacement, to inject deprived areas with a more 
sustainable mix of residential tenures—a crude proxy for social classes64—
58 Joseph Pierce, Deborah Martin and James Murphy, “Relational Place-Making: The 
Networked Politics of Place”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36.1 (2011): 54–70.
59 Simon Pinnegar, “The Question of Scale in Housing-Led Regeneration: Tied to the 
Neighbourhood?”, Environment and Planning A 41.12 (2009): 2911–2928.
60 John Flint, “Housing Policy, the Right to the City and the Construction of Knowledge”, 
International Journal of Housing Policy 12.3 (2012): 253–261.
61 Pinnegar, “The Question of Scale in Housing-Led Regeneration: Tied to the 
Neighbourhood?”; Cole, “Housing Market Renewal and Demolition in England in the 
2000s: The Governance of ‘Wicked Problems’”.
62 For Dutch, American and Australian examples see: Gideon Bolt and Ronald 
Van Kempen, “Successful Mixing? Effects of Urban Restructuring Policies in Dutch 
Neighbourhoods”, Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 102.3 (2011): 361–368; 
Katherine T. Jones and Jeff Popke, “Re-Envisioning the City: Lefebvre, HOPE VI, and the 
Neoliberalization of Urban Space”, Urban Geography 31.1 (2010): 114–133; Michael Darcy, 
“De-Concentration of Disadvantage and Mixed Income Housing: A Critical Discourse 
Approach”, Housing, Theory and Society 27.1 (2010): 1–22.
63 Wendy Sarkissian, “The Idea of Social Mix in Town Planning: An Historical Review”, 
Urban Studies 13.3 (1976): 231–246.
64 Rebecca Tunstall, “‘Mixed Tenure’ Policy in the UK: Privatisation, Pluralism or 
Euphemism?”, Housing, Theory and Society 20.3 (2003): 153–159.
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the mixed communities agenda has been criticised for enacting a state-led 
form of gentrification—or ‘gentrification by stealth’.65 By this, critics imply 
the hidden, indirect way in which gentrification is brought about through a 
government policy ostensibly intended to revitalise dilapidated housing and 
thereby help the urban poor—as opposed to classical gentrification, which 
involves the gradual replacement of poorer populations by richer through the 
colonisation of urban space and residential sorting over time. In the USA, 
this approach has been critiqued as the ‘Dispersal Consensus’, part of a new 
‘mobility paradigm’ in neoliberal urban policy, which has a “heavy reliance 
on moving people through metropolitan space as a means of addressing urban 
social problems” rather than improving the lives of the poor directly.66 
Whilst this all appears detached when viewed from a bird’s-eye policy 
perspective, it has serious implications for those affected on the ground. 
HMR’s most vehement critics see it as a form of symbolic violence—violently 
erasing working-class lived space and radically transforming place in the image 
of a target middle-class population attracted through an improved ‘residential 
offer’.67 According to these critics, HMR logic represents a narrowly aspira-
tional, market-based perspective on housing as a ‘space of positions’ in which 
middle-class consumers vie for position on the housing ladder—disregarding 
use values for exchange value. In aiming to reposition whole neighbourhoods 
within a ‘space of positions’ in the wider metropolitan housing market, HMR 
Pathfinders marginalise alternative ways of valuing housing—as an end in 
itself, for shelter, collective use, emotional attachment and belonging—which 
urban sociologist Chris Allen has shown are bound up in the lives of Liverpool’s 
existing working-class residents, who, by virtue of proximity to necessity, live 
largely outside the positional market for housing consumption.68 In extensive 
interviews in Liverpool HMR areas, Allen established that existing residents 
were ‘unable to see the point’ of demolishing ‘perfectly good houses’, which 
are simply ‘bricks and mortar’ as opposed to an investment opportunity, and 
‘just there’ for living in. 
Second, HMR stands accused of failing to account for the human scale 
of everyday life, as a policy that instrumentalises homes and neighbourhoods 
65 Gary Bridge, Tim Butler and Loretta Lees, eds, Mixed Communities: Gentrification by 
Stealth? (Policy Press, 2012).
66 David Imbroscio, “Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy”, Journal of 
Urban Affairs 34.1 (2012): 1–20 (p. 2).
67 Chris Allen, Housing Market Renewal and Social Class (Routledge, 2008); Anna 
Minton, Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty-First-Century City (Penguin, 
2012); Chris Allen and Lee Crookes, “Fables of the Reconstruction: A Phenomenology 
of ‘Place Shaping’ in the North of England”, Town Planning Review 80.4 (2009): 
455–480.
68 Allen, Housing Market Renewal and Social Class.
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for abstract ends: one which conceives of the ‘city-as-property’ rather than 
the ‘city-as-inhabited’.69 Merseyside’s HMR Pathfinder area, named New 
Heartlands, covered inner urban areas of Sefton and Wirral boroughs as well 
as Liverpool and was divided into four ‘Zones of Opportunity’. Presumably 
by accident, this created the unfortunate acronym ZOO—the perfect 
ammunition for activists and critics (myself included) to deride the policy for 
its mistreatment of residents, framed by policymakers as if animals cruelly 
held in captivity.70 Each ZOO was appointed a single preferred developer to 
work in partnership with existing housing associations, made accountable 
to a governing board of stakeholders, which, unlike previous regeneration 
programmes, included no representation from local residents. Perhaps the lack 
of diversity and democratic deficit created the conditions for the monolithic 
approach of earmarking for demolition entire street blocks rather than 
individual piecemeal plots.
In turn, ZOOs were cut up into individual renewal areas. These 
‘regeneration zones’ are marked by signs welcoming visitors to the ‘[Insert 
neighbourhood here] Regeneration Zone’, repeated across the city in the same 
generic format, font and pictorial style, with the tagline: ‘creating neighbour-
hoods for the future’—as if to emphasise the idea that these neighbourhoods 
are not for present (working-class) residents but for future (middle-class) 
occupants. Regeneration zones encompassed large residential blocks, including 
houses worth saving, in order to create large enough ‘land banks’ and 
economies of scale for profitable redevelopment by the grant regime partners. 
The centralised systematic and large-scale approach of the British housing 
development industry means that developers will only take on land for redevel-
opment above a certain spatial scale, which leads to a questionable approach 
akin, as planning researcher Andreas Schulze Bäing attested in a public inquiry 
into HMR, to “pulling out all teeth and replacing them with dentures even 
if only a few teeth show signs of caries, rather than keeping and repairing all 
teeth as long as possible by fillings or root canal treatments”.71 Indeed, assets 
of architectural and social value remaining in these cordoned off areas have 
been described as “collateral damage” by a politically prominent proponent 
of HMR whom I interviewed in 2014. According to another interviewee, a 
regeneration consultant, these zones were treated not as lived spaces but as 
abstract sites in a “chessboard” of strategic land parcels, to be stripped bare of 
69 Simon Pinnegar, “For the City? The Difficult Spaces of Market Restructuring Policy 
for the City?”, International Journal of Housing Policy 12.3 (2012): 281–297.
70 Matthew Thompson, “LIFE in a ZOO: Henri Lefebvre and the (Social) Production of 
(Abstract) Space in Liverpool”, City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 
21.2 (2017): 104–126.
71 Andreas Schulze Bäing, The Welsh Streets: A Written Statement to the Welsh Streets Inquiry 
(University of Liverpool, 2014).
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residents and packaged up for redevelopment, so the HMR partnership may 
“shift pieces around” to be activated at different stages according to changing 
dynamics of market profitability and resident opposition. This was the start 
of the abstract monolithic one-size-fits-all approach that characterised HMR. 
Third, building on these two critiques, HMR is framed as a process 
of accumulation by dispossession72—by virtue of spending public funds to 
dispossess public tenants and homeowners from their homes for redevelopment 
and produce profits for private developers and quasi-privatised housing associa-
tions. Harvey defines ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as
The continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx 
had treated of as “primitive” or “original” during the rise of capitalism. 
These include the commodification and privatization of land and the 
forceful expulsion of peasant populations … [and] colonial, neo-colonial 
and imperial processes of appropriation of assets … particularly of 
land … The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of 
legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these 
processes and in many instances has resorted to violence.73
From this perspective, the HMR grant coalition dispossessed poor residents 
of their homes—through compulsory purchase orders and compensation 
or rehousing by the state—and then revalorised the land so that the grant 
coalition partners could pocket the difference in value from what Neil Smith 
terms the ‘rent gap’.74 Indeed, an unconscious recognition of the violence 
played out in the accumulative asset-stripping in Liverpool is expressed in 
the aggressive standardised signs put up on CPO’d property in HMR zones 
to dissuade thieves and squatters—“ALL ITEMS OF VALUE HAVE BEEN 
REMOVED FROM THIS PROPERTY”. Might this unwittingly signify 
the violent removal of human beings? Or is it a reflection of an abstract 
perspective that only sees value in items or objects—physical commodities—
that can be exchanged?
Based on these three critiques, we can characterise HMR alterna-
tively as part of what Hodkinson calls the ‘new urban enclosures’75 and 
what Merrifield—rather pertinently—dubs Neo-Haussmannisation. This, 
72 Gordon MacLeod and Craig Johnstone, “Stretching Urban Renaissance: Privatizing 
Space, Civilizing Place, Summoning ‘Community’”, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 36.1 (2012): 1–28.
73 David Harvey, “Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction”, Geografiska Annaler, Series B: 
Human Geography 88.2 (2006): 145–158 (p. 153).
74 Neil Smith, “Gentrification, the Frontier, and Restructuring of Urban Space”, in Neil 
Smith and Peter Williams, eds, Gentrification of the City (Allen & Unwin, 1989).
75 Hodkinson, “The New Urban Enclosures”.
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Merrifield argues, is the contemporary incarnation and intensification of 
that classic urban strategy first identified by Engels (in the opening quote to 
chapter 7) and embodied in Baron Haussmann’s restructuring of Paris in the 
eighteenth century:
A process that likewise integrates financial, corporate and state 
interests, yet tears into the globe and seizes land through forcible slum 
clearance and a handy vehicle for dispossession known as “eminent 
domain”. Once, seemingly long ago, this latter act of public seques-
tration was done, albeit disruptively, in the name of some greater 
common good … Now, it expresses the public sector expropriating 
land and then giving it away for upscale private re-appropriation, letting 
private economic interests cash in on legalized looting.76
These are strong words from Marxist critics with which we would be hard-
pressed to describe the full story of HMR in Liverpool. However, whilst the 
reality is, as always, rather more granular and complicated, they certainly 
contain more than a grain of truth. This brings us to the fourth critique—one 
which locates the violence and abstraction of HMR not so much in a delib-
erate strategy of state-led gentrification as in a more subtle perversion of a 
seemingly impersonally abstract programme for the financial interests of key 
grant coalition partners. The story is long and complex but leads inexorably 
to a final conclusion: that HMR enacted a kind of accumulation by dispos-
session on Merseyside for the financial benefit of the grant coalition. HMR 
adopted an ‘objective’ research approach to identify neighbourhoods ripe for 
intervention through pseudo-scientific methods based on quantification and 
statistical comparison.77 An economistic perspective was built into the very 
objectives of the original research commissioned by Liverpool Council. In his 
critical comparison of HMR as it developed in Whitefield, Lancashire and in 
Liverpool, critical planner David Webb reveals how the approach was seen to 
be ‘objective’. The most undervalued, least-occupied housing with the lowest 
market demand became the highest priority for demolition, so the logic goes, 
because market price—“an imperfect proxy for democratic approval”—was 
assumed to reflect popularity and therefore viability.78 Indicators of decline 
were then abstracted from international academic data and used to ‘rate’ 
76 Merrifield, The New Urban Question, pp. 72–73.
77 David Webb, “Conceptualising the Bounded Agency of Housing Researchers: The 
Case of Housing Market Renewal in England”, International Journal of Housing Policy 12.3 
(2012): 315–330.
78 David Webb, “‘Problem Neighbourhoods’ in a Part-Linear, Part-Network Regime: 
Problems with, and Possible Responses to, the Housing Market Renewal Leviathan” 
(unpublished PhD thesis, Newcastle University, 2011), p. 5.
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different neighbourhoods based on their relative popularity and projected 
sustainability, so as to identify ‘problem areas’ for intervention. However, 
affected communities themselves were not invited to contribute to this 
process of problem definition, and so the evidence reflected only the biases 
of researchers and broader cultural trends in the wider policy environment. 
Moreover, once these ‘problem areas’ were identified through statistical 
measurement, policymakers were able to delineate distinct zones earmarked 
for demolition or refurbishment. This was the basis by which the four Zones 
of Opportunity (ZOOs) of the New Heartlands Pathfinder were delineated.
Most in need of intervention in Liverpool—according to the indicators 
of decline concocted to identify ‘problem areas’—were the mono-tenure 
concentrations of social housing in the peripheral estates built in the post-war 
years on the southern and eastern metropolitan fringe. This reflected national 
trends towards the stigmatisation and residualisation of mono-tenure council 
estates and was therefore relatively uncontroversial in recommending inter-
vention. However, at this point the researchers liaised with the key property 
players in these problem areas—the principal partners in the HMR grant 
coalition, the council and housing associations, which now owned most of 
the city’s social housing stock—to incorporate their views and interests into 
this problematisation process and to negotiate a shared vision for what would 
replace cleared housing.79 At the same time that these organisations were 
brought more centrally into decision-making, those residents and commu-
nities targeted by the programme were sidelined. Their exclusion resulted in 
a definition of the ‘problem’ that narrowly reflected the views and interests 
of the council commissioners and researchers and the housing association and 
developer partners.
This move towards incorporating the views of grant coalition partners—
notably housing associations—was radically to alter the design and outcomes 
of the HMR programme. Fundamentally, this meant a socio-spatial shift in 
problematisation of target areas—away from outer estates of mono-tenure 
social housing and towards mixed tenure inner-city terraced neighbourhoods, 
like Anfield, Granby, Kensington and Little Klondyke (whose experiences with 
HMR I explore in chapter 11). This inner-city focus is reflected in the name 
of the Merseyside Pathfinder Partnership, New Heartlands—a label, inciden-
tally, that was soon mockingly redubbed by locals as the ‘New Heartbreak’ or 
‘New Wastelands’.80 Traditionally, these were areas with high levels of private 
rented housing and some owner-occupation—remaining difficult, therefore, 
due to multiple diverse stakeholders, for the state to manage or regenerate. 
Increasingly, however, this housing stock has been taken over by housing 
79 Webb, “‘Problem Neighbourhoods’”.
80 Jonathan Brown, “Why Were the Four Streets Emptied out Anyway? A Granby Back 
Story”, in Assemble, eds, Granby Workshop Catalogue 2015, p. 11.
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associations as properties have become unpopular and owners have moved 
on to escape the blight caused by local economic decline. Housing associa-
tions were by the 1990s the largest managers of social housing in Liverpool, 
following the transfer and decentralisation of public stock to a multitudinous 
group of organisations, which had been empowered by the 1988 Housing 
Act to access private capital markets, cross-subsidise expensive rehabilitation 
work and invest in new social housing and maintenance of old in ways which 
local authorities were—for various reasons: political, economic and organi-
sational—made incapable. Coupled to this were legislative reforms following 
the 1988 Housing Act that placed increased commercial pressures on housing 
associations to procure the funds needed for managing and rehabilitating stock 
from private loans and market lenders, thereby making them increasingly 
reliant on the value of their stock in order to borrow capital. It was therefore in 
the housing associations’ direct financial interests to see Merseyside’s inner-city 
terraced housing—which they now had responsibility for managing—either 
dramatically improved or demolished and replaced entirely with higher-value 
housing. This would turn what were low-value assets, often liabilities, on their 
spreadsheets into high-value assets and enable greater borrowing capacities for 
further housing development, asset growth and organisational expansion—in 
other words, empire building. There were also strong motivations among city 
councillors and planners to build an evidence base for a policy of well-funded 
large-scale intervention that could enable newly empowered housing associa-
tions finally to resolve the longstanding problem of inner-city dilapidation. 
It was the job of HMR, therefore, to provide the means—both the financial 
resources and the political legitimacy through central government support—
for the public and third sectors to wrest control of these fragmented areas by 
way of compulsory purchase orders, tenancy evictions, site preparation and 
land assembly for large-scale redevelopment.
The strength of these motivations is illuminated by the lengths HMR’s 
researchers had to go to in order to justify this shift in objectives, warping the 
rationale for intervention. The third commissioned research report in 2001, as 
Webb has demonstrated,81 identified the student accommodation construction 
boom in the city centre as a causal factor in the supply and demand imbalance 
in low-demand inner-city areas, whereby a speculative rash of new flats were 
being successfully marketed to students, key workers and economic migrants, 
who otherwise would have settled in the inner-city terraced neighbourhoods. 
If HMR was to stay true to its original objective of rationalising the structure 
of housing markets—to rebalance supply and demand so as to reconnect failing 
markets with sustainable regional markets—then surely a key recommendation 
of the report would be to stop the building of flats that were directly creating 
an oversupply of accommodation in central areas adjacent to the low-demand 
81 Webb, “‘Problem Neighbourhoods’”.
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neighbourhoods, which were themselves often located within walking distance 
of the city centre and these new student flats. Such a holistic, integrated 
strategy would most likely have worked well to correct this supply/demand 
imbalance and recreate demand for inner-city terraced houses, but, against 
all common sense, an integrated approach was not adopted. The city council 
refused to retract their policy of city centre repopulation through student 
flat construction and instead sought a synthesis with the incompatible policy 
of inner-city redevelopment. For the HMR rationale to be at all consistent, 
it required a new narrative to explain away the contradictions between flat 
construction in the centre and housing demolition around it. 
That new narrative is the object of the fifth and final critique of HMR—a 
narrative that marked a transition in the problematisation of vacant unpopular 
housing from a structural issue of equalising supply and demand towards a 
simplified focus on the age, type and tenure of the housing stock itself, thereby 
reducing the complexities of the problem to one of the housing ‘product’. 
In other words, the issue was reproblematised from one of failing markets 
to one of failed product. The terraced house was blamed, in the language of 
HMR researchers, as ‘obsolete’ and incapable of attracting the right residents 
who would revalorise declining neighbourhoods and who preferred the 
modern flats down the road. This internalised the problem into the terraced 
house itself, which fitted in neatly with the increasingly marketised and 
abstract logic of HMR—subjectifying residents as ‘consumers’ looking for 
quality and choice, and the terraced house as a ‘product’ unfit for modern 
consumption preferences. Thus the M62 Study assumed a linear model of 
urban history: statistically linking rising prosperity with suburbanisation as 
a means to denounce inner-city terraced housing as defunct and obsolete for 
the ambitions of a post-industrial city. Old ‘back-to-back’ terraced housing 
was framed as unsuitable for contemporary flexibilities; framed as creating 
the ‘wrong’ image through association with the old industrial working 
class—something which must be overcome through reimaging the city to 
attract the likes of the so-called ‘creative class’ championed by self-styled 
urban guru Richard Florida.82 In elevating housing type, design and image 
over more complex socioeconomic and spatial explanations, HMR can be 
critiqued for committing a kind of ‘housing fetishism’ or ‘spatial deter-
minism’—not unlike the design determinism of Militant’s URS or Alice 
Coleman’s defensive urbanism.83
82 Jamie Peck, “Struggling with the Creative Class”, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 29.4 (2005): 740–770.
83 I explore these ideas in relation to commodity fetishism in Thompson, “Contesting 
Dilapidated Dwelling”, in Graham Cairns, Georgios Artopoulos and Kirsten Day, eds, 
From Conflict to Inclusion in Housing: Interaction of Communities, Residents and Activists (UCL 
Press, 2017), pp. 199–226.
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Five critiques—some quite simplistic; others more complex; all interre-
lated; all, fairly or unfairly, damning of HMR. These five charges set against 
it—state-led gentrification; monolithic development logic; accumulation by 
dispossession; distorted incentive structures; housing type fetishism—may 
well be overstated in some cases, simplified in others and, in almost every 
instance, hotly contested. But what cannot be disputed is the huge controversy 
provoked in the media and in public opinion—both locally, in the Liverpool 
Echo,84 and nationally85—and the huge hostility felt towards HMR, despite 
broad-based popularity, in so many of the neighbourhoods it targeted. Whilst 
for the majority of residents HMR was welcomed for redeveloping deterio-
rating, poorly insulated terraced housing long in need of renewal, for others 
it was fiercely contested for mistakenly targeting good-quality houses of great 
architectural merit, historical interest and social value. Much of this resistance 
to HMR grew in tandem with, or evolved slowly into, more proactive forms 
of collective housing activism. In what follows I explore case studies of where 
residents attempted, to greater or lesser effect, not only to challenge the logic 
of HMR but also to experiment with regeneration alternatives, which most 
often took shape as community land trusts. Where some CLT campaigns 
failed, in Little Klondyke and Kensington, for example, others succeeded 
elsewhere, in Homebaked and Granby Four Streets CLTs.
The story of one particular neighbourhood in south Liverpool, Granby, 
provides the best example of how urban decline, public policy, social unrest 
and community activism all came together to produce a unique reaction to 
HMR demolition. This reaction began as anti-demolition campaigning and 
evolved into more proactive demonstrations of how the neighbourhood’s houses 
and streets could be managed differently, more collectively and imaginatively. 
As documented in Part II, Granby was the site of the original experiment—
SNAP, led by Shelter—that paved the way for the Council’s policy switch from 
demolition to rehabilitation of terraced housing and the transfer of dilapidated 
council stock into housing association and co-op ownership. Today it is also 
84 Gary Stewart, “Anger as Toxteth Granby Triangle House ‘Damaged’ by 
Contractors”, Liverpool Echo (29 Sept. 2011); Tom Duffy, “Peaceful Protest 
on Toxteth Street Forces Demolition Men to Down Tools”, Liverpool Echo 
(12 July 2011); David Bartlett, “Council Leader Warren Bradley: We Ripped Heart 
out of Liverpool Communities”, Liverpool Echo (26 Apr. 2010); Marc Waddington, “88- 
Year-Old Bootle Woman Evicted from Her Home to Make Way for the Bulldozers”, 
Liverpool Echo (9 Mar. 2012).
85 Charles Clover, “Nightmare on Lime Street”, Daily Telegraph (21 May 2005); Rowan 
Moore, “Liverpool Biennial—Review”, The Guardian (23 Sept. 2012); Lynsey Hanley, 
“This Is How We Can Solve the Housing Crisis—One Home at a Time”, The Guardian 
(13 Aug. 2012); Owen Hatherley, “Liverpool’s Rotting, Shocking ‘Housing Renewal’: 
How Did It Come to This?”, The Guardian (27 Mar. 2013).
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the site of the city’s first CLT on the very same four streets—hence the name 
Granby Four Streets—that SNAP first saved from demolition and which CLT 
activists would likewise later save from HMR. But before delving into these 
developments, I first explore Granby’s history of redevelopment efforts in the 
interim period between SNAP and the CLT to reveal other more-contextual 
and place-based explanatory factors for understanding the particular direction 
taken by HMR in Liverpool.
CHAPTER 11
Growing Granby from the Grassroots
A (Plant) Potted History
11: Growing Granby from the Grassroots
Despite the work of SNAP in rehabilitating Granby’s terraced housing 
stock and providing new routes through to socioeconomic regeneration, the 
neighbourhood eventually succumbed to the fate befalling Liverpool as a 
whole. Through the 1970s and 1980s, as Liverpool lost its economic raison 
d’être, Granby once again fell on hard times. By the 1990s, concludes Andy 
Merrifield, Granby was a “battleground for a whole gamut of urban ills”.1 The 
once bustling central shopping avenue, Granby Street, was almost entirely 
vacant and derelict, its Post Office closing in 1994 owing to successive 
hold-ups. According to the 1981 census, 39.6 per cent of men in Granby ward 
were jobless, a figure reaching as high as 90 per cent for black teenagers.2 By 
the early 1980s, Granby had effectively become, in the words of historian 
Andy Beckett, “Liverpool’s ghetto”.3 The coincidence of unemployment and 
poverty with certain ethnic and demographic groups, notably young black 
men, compounded by racial discrimination against the local black community, 
the most established in the UK, had severe repercussions in 1981 when rioting 
erupted in reaction to police brutality.4 The so-called Toxteth Riots—or what 
locals prefer to call the 1981 Uprising—resulted in street combat with police, 
cars set alight, the burning down of the Rialto Theatre (an imposing early 
twentieth-century cinema on Upper Parliament Street) and violent repression 
from the state—the unprecedented use of CS gas upon citizens on mainland 
Britain.
Not only did the Uprising create a cycle of mutual mistrust between locals 
and city authorities, which still haunts Granby today, it also imprinted the 
area with a social stigma, thereby reinforcing the spiral of decline. Informal 
economic activity, minor criminality, street gangs and drug dealing became 
common responses to the sheer lack of formal economic opportunities. In 
1 Andy Merrifield, “Social Justice and Communities of Difference: A Snapshot from 
Liverpool”, in The Urbanization of Injustice, ed. Andy Merrifield and Erik Swyngedouw 
(New York University Press, 1996), pp. 256–285 (p. 206).
2 Merrifield, “Them and Us: Rebuilding the Ruins in Liverpool”, p. 59.
3 Andy Beckett, Promised You a Miracle: UK 80–82 (Penguin Books, 2015).
4 Frost and Phillips, Liverpool ’81: Remembering the Riots.
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his mid-1990s study of Granby’s politics,5 Merrifield notes the prevalence of 
conspiracy theories among locals of police intentionally allowing stolen cars 
into Granby Street as an excuse to move in with force; of the council’s abject 
neglect; of their repeated attempts to demolish streets and force people to 
leave as a kind of punishment for the riots. Resentment lingers two decades 
on, when I spoke with a number of locals. A former housing association officer 
turned community enterprise developer characterises the problem as one of 
reputational damage:
I think the decline really had begun after the 1981 Riots. There was a 
general feeling in Liverpool that Granby itself ended up getting blamed 
for the riots and that the best thing to do was to clear it; so most of the 
streets were gone by the end of the 1980s and replaced by new neigh-
bourhoods, the typical low-level, low-density, low-quality housing.
Another interviewee, a leading activist in the CLT campaign, suggests some 
sort of institutional racism is at the root of the neighbourhood’s problems:
In Granby it’s the general Corpy thing, but there is also definitely a race 
element as well, as that was always the most mixed area of the city, and 
especially after the riots in the early ’80s … “They want us to just fuck 
off and die”, was what people felt was the council attitude; “You’re just 
too much trouble, we’re not going to give you any services …” Things 
like bins not being cleaned for a couple of years, that kind of general 
neglect, street lights not being kept on.
Basic public services such as street lighting, cleaning and rubbish collection 
were on all accounts much neglected by the council. Local residents have long 
believed that the actions—or inaction—of the city council in response to the 
riots has been an intentional policy of wilful neglect or managed decline, as 
this longstanding resident muses:
So after the riots you’d have thought that a huge investment would 
be made to kind of patch things over wouldn’t you? But nobody gave 
a shit actually. You’d have thought that a lot of effort—government, 
council—would have gone into putting an Elastoplast over, cleaning 
it up, making it at least look okay, and the exact opposite was done. 
Absolutely nothing happened except twenty years of boarded up 
housing and filthy, really incredibly degraded environment … You can 
see why people would deduce punishment, because what happened—or 
didn’t happen—was quite extraordinary.
5 Merrifield, “Social Justice and Communities of Difference”.
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Whether Granby’s terminal decline is best explained by institutional racism 
or structural economic processes—or a combination of both—the result is 
a kind of ‘root shock’,6 damaging for residents and built environment alike. 
As people left the neighbourhood, ‘hard-to-let’ properties fell into disrepair, 
made worse once improvement grants disappeared, leaving housing associa-
tions struggling to maintain their stock. A general shift in tenure composition 
from one dominated by private renters and owner-occupiers to social renters 
had implications. Liverpool’s rising unemployment coupled with the national 
trend towards residualisation of social housing translated into increased 
poverty for housing association tenants, leaving less disposable income to 
be circulated through local shops and services. The council’s response was 
to change approach from the rehabilitation model pioneered by SNAP—
successful for some time, especially with co-ops, but constrained under more 
austere funding regimes—towards a more interventionist policy of wholesale 
demolition and rebuild. It was hoped that replacement of dilapidated ‘hard-to-
let’ terraces—too expensive to repair and too numerous to repopulate—with 
lower density modern housing with lower maintenance costs would at least 
help kick-start the physical regeneration of the area and resolve the immediate 
issues of vacancy and decay. However, this logic was challenged by many 
housing association staff and owner-occupiers, who felt it only sped up the 
downward spiral as a policy of managed decline. One former LHT officer 
divulges his qualms:
I left Liverpool Housing Trust in 1996, and I remember in those late 
days there, there was the beginning of talk that Granby was getting 
“hard to let”, and once housing associations start labelling the place 
“hard to let” it stops really trying, and so what had happened from those 
days onwards—so well before Housing Market Renewal—was that 
the housing associations were tinning the properties up. That began to 
atrophy the area, and the city council then started buying up all the 
empty properties so they would eventually have the power to decide 
what to do … And then when Housing Market Renewal came in, that 
accelerated it, but they accelerated something that had already started.
Owing to the complexity of urban change it is difficult to identify causal 
mechanisms or, indeed, impute blame. The council cannot be criticised for 
want of trying nor accused of underinvestment. One ex-council officer claims 
that she “once did a kind of reckoning up of how much money had gone into 
Granby from the 1980s, early 1980s onwards, and it was huge, it was like £25 
to £30 million, and people keep saying managed decline, but if you look there’s 
6 Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, and What We Can 
Do about It.
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been quite a lot of new stuff built there”. But this still leaves unexplained the 
council budget earmarked specifically for ‘managed decline’. 
Since the late 1970s, the council had been fighting a losing battle. The 
initial private sector grants recommended by SNAP were written into Housing 
Action Areas in the 1970s, in which the council offered generous funding 
to private landlords and owner-occupiers to refurbish their properties. As a 
secondary move, the council would use its compulsory purchase order (CPO) 
powers to buy up any under-maintained property and transfer to the growing 
housing association sector, a dual approach described by an ex-council officer 
as “Offering the carrot—which was a grant to the landlord—and the stick 
was CPO if they didn’t take that up; and the ultimate sanction was that the 
properties were CPO’d and transferred to co-ops or housing associations”. 
Despite worsening local socioeconomic conditions and accusations of 
neglect from local residents, the housing stock was effectively sustained by this 
dual system: council grants to private landlords and owner-occupiers alongside 
government grants via the Housing Corporation to co-ops and housing associa-
tions. In this way, housing associations would become the largest landlords in 
the area through a process of council CPO and stock transfer of those properties 
failing to be maintained by private owners. However, the 1988 Housing Act 
radically restructured public housing provision, virtually removing the grant 
system, thereby leaving associations without these additional state funding 
streams to deal with worsening housing conditions and having to fund any 
improvements out of rent revenues alone. This came at a time when the 
original private rehab work completed in the 1970s was coming to the end 
of its proposed lifespan, long after pre-1919 speculative ‘Jerry-built’ houses 
were ever intended to last.7 A former council officer explains that the rehab 
grant system was never intended to be “a forever solution; it was a sticking 
plaster, and it was twenty year life standards we talked about, and that was 
going back to the ’70s”. 
Several decades on, terraces saved from clearance through the private 
sector grant rehab programme were unsurprisingly in poor condition; made 
worse by a context of rising unemployment and falling population leading to 
housing vacancies, dereliction and abandonment. Housing associations were 
faced with severe structural maintenance problems and tenants with dwindling 
employment prospects who, for instance, wanted smaller modern flats with 
lower heating bills. As a result, many of Granby’s grander Georgian and 
Victorian properties became vacant and housing associations began boarding 
up the area. This only contributed to the general perception of decline, 
dissuading any prospective tenants or buyers from investing their lives in the 
area. A housing condition survey conducted in 1992 by the council found 
that 25 per cent of the wards’ properties were vacant, 5 per cent derelict and 
7 Cowan, Hannay and Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel”.
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boarded up, and another 50 per cent ‘unfit’ or ‘seriously unfit’ for human 
habitation.8 
Without the necessary state funding to finance refurbishment, the council 
took action by declaring Granby a Renewal Area in 1992 and successfully 
lobbied for £9.4 million funding, mostly as government subsidy from the 
Merseyside Special Allocation set up by Heseltine alongside the Merseyside 
Development Corporation.9 Following initial consultation exercises with 
local housing associations and residents the latter formed Granby Residents 
Association. The council planned to demolish and rebuild and began strategi-
cally buying up private properties and requesting that housing associations 
transfer their properties back into council ownership, emptying the area of 
residents to prepare for redevelopment. A council officer working on the 
project explained to me that
The council decided the best way of dealing with that area—I’m not 
saying they were right—was to try and get control of the properties, so 
that at least then they would have the ability to make a decision about 
the long term future, whether it be improving them all or demolishing 
them all. But it was doing it on a voluntary basis, and you can’t ever 
get control like that on a voluntary basis: you need some kind of CPO 
action if you’re going to be successful.
Meanwhile, Granby Residents Association—increasingly composed of stalwart 
homeowners as public tenants were being evicted from their homes—began 
to resist council plans, and started the Granby Residents Against Demolition 
campaign. With house prices bottoming out at £20,000 to as low as £8,000,10 
homeowners were forced either to sell up fast, absorbing a loss, or, trapped 
in negative equity, to stick it out until the market regained strength. Initial 
resistance to council-led demolition was driven by a minority of remaining 
homeowners seeking to protect their investments. And not just financial 
investments—they had invested their lives in the area, developed attachments 
to community and place, only to see it get run down. Place attachment grew 
all the stronger as the decline deepened; an embattled, belligerent, stubborn 
loyalty in response to what many perceived as “punishment” dished out by the 
council. Anger simmered on from the 1981 Uprising, from police and council 
treatment of the local black community, many of whom had been evicted out 
of the area. Other residents, however, in surrounding streets not immediately 
earmarked for demolition, were more supportive of council plans, relieved 
something was finally happening to arrest decline.
8 Merrifield, “Them and Us: Rebuilding the Ruins in Liverpool”, p. 61.
9 Merrifield, “Them and Us: Rebuilding the Ruins in Liverpool”.
10 Merrifield, “Social Justice and Communities of Difference”.
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The anti-demolition campaign was successful in preventing demolition and 
bringing the council to public inquiry in 1997, yet this ruled in favour of a CPO 
for all units along Granby Street. Owner-occupied housing was bought up by 
the council at an average price of £17,000, not enough to buy a similar property 
elsewhere in Liverpool.11 Having replaced most of the terraces with lower density 
estates, this left intact only four original streets—the ‘Granby Triangle’—in 
which the council had to contend with fierce resistance from a small minority 
of remaining homeowners organised as the Granby Residents Association. In 
2013, there were 128 vacant boarded-up houses and shops, leaving only around 
60 households still occupied. These four streets map precisely onto SNAP’s 
original boundaries, suggesting that early rehabilitation efforts had secured a 
longer life for the buildings and empowered the community to fight for their 
neighbourhood several decades later. Described by an ex-council officer as the 
“final battleground”, these four streets became centre-stage to a bitter process 
of fraught negotiations, direct action, occupations, street demos, and creative 
community activism that helped pave the way for the successful CLT campaign. 
The resistance attracted the support of national lobby organisations, Empty 
Homes Agency and SAVE Britain’s Heritage, helping raise the media profile of 
efforts to rehabilitate rather than demolish empty terraces. 
The deadlock in decision-making over the area was a testament to the 
collective power and successful community organising of a small group 
of passionate homeowners who wanted to see something different from 
demolition; but it also reflected the lack of overall control, coordination or 
direction offered by any one competing agency and the messy disorganisation 
of a range of stakeholders, housing associations and council departments. A 
council report from the mid-1990s stated that “If no clear programme is put in 
place for the whole area this resource will be lost … It is felt that the loss of 
the MSA [Merseyside Special Allocation] funding would be disastrous for the 
area without which any solution would be impossible”.12 It was the council’s 
difficult experience of working in neighbourhoods like Granby that led to a 
game-changing policy for bringing clearer leadership and greater coordination 
to addressing such complicated regeneration dilemmas. The Liberal Democrats 
took council control in 1998 and initiated a new Housing Strategy and the 
Liverpool Strategic Housing Partnership to bring about more coordinated 
collaboration between council, housing association, developer and community 
group plans for each neighbourhood; creating more joined-up strategic regen-
eration in contexts where multiple tenures, owners and interests overlap, 
collide and conflict to produce stalemate.13 In this new Housing Strategy, stock 
11 Merrifield, “Them and Us: Rebuilding the Ruins in Liverpool”.
12 Quoted in Merrifield, “Them and Us: Rebuilding the Ruins in Liverpool”, p. 61.
13 Inside Housing Awards, “Good Practice in Partnership Working: Liverpool Strategic 
Housing Partnership for the LIFE Model”, Inside Housing (12 Nov. 2004).
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transfer to housing associations was promoted as the “only realistic option”.14 
At its heart was the so-called ‘LIFE model’, which aimed to rationalise inner-
city neighbourhoods into five distinct zones, or ‘areas of opportunity’ (sound 
familiar?) assigning one lead housing association to each. This was a response to 
the confusion of too many agencies operating in one area duplicating processes. 
Under the LIFE model, each housing association would assign itself a clearly 
defined role within each area, following L-I-F-E: Lead in an area; Influence 
what happens; Follow by collaborating with others; or Exit where presence is 
minimal. In Granby, as for the entire L8 postal district, Plus Dane—then the 
host organisation of CDS—became the Lead association and began developing 
plans for holistic neighbourhood management, working more closely with the 
council to plan redevelopment. Winning an Inside Housing award in 2004, the 
logic of the LIFE model was such that
Without the LIFE model, the council, private developers and other 
partners would have had to consult, negotiate and collaborate with 
around 40 associations operating across the market renewal pathfinder 
area. Residents and other stakeholders would be confused by the 
range of partners and effective delivery of the programme could be 
hampered.15
This is where the monolithic logic behind HMR Pathfinders can be seen to 
derive. The impetus for strategic demolition-and-rebuild schemes in particular 
zones of empty homes was already beginning to emerge in Liverpool Council 
thinking as far back as the early 1970s, with the creation of monopoly regen-
eration zones for housing associations in General Improvement Areas and 
Housing Action Areas and later given greater coherence as a joined-up policy 
initiative in the Liverpool Strategic Housing Partnership and the LIFE model. 
This constructed the operational muscle tissue ready to be fully flexed once 
HMR funding was secured. Liverpool led a group of northern city councils 
to lobby central government for funding intervention in failing housing 
markets. Early reports commissioned by Liverpool council recommended 
that Liverpool’s inner city could be a pilot for government funding of housing 
market restructuring, becoming one of the largest recipients of funding when 
HMR Pathfinders were launched in 2002.16 
The rationale for HMR was radical in its multi-scalar focus on regional 
market restructuring, bringing together and rationalising the confusing 
14 Richard Kemp, then Executive Member for Housing, quoted in Holmes, A New Vision 
for Housing, p. 131.
15 Liverpool Council’s group manager for neighbourhood services, quoted in Inside 
Housing Awards, “Good Practice in Partnership Working”.
16 Cocks and Couch, “The Governance of a Shrinking City”.
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number of previous and ongoing projects. An HMR manager working with 
Liverpool Council at the time explains:
We’d been here before, we just keep coming back—Housing Action 
Areas, General Improvement Areas in these areas years ago, all these 
government-funded regen’ schemes back in the ’70s and ’80s, then 
Neighbourhood Renewal Areas, New Deal for Communities, ERDF 
[European Regional Development Fund]—there were all sorts of 
regeneration schemes, all looking at their own little bits, but there was 
never this massive comprehensive approach to dealing with a whole 
area, looking at doing something quite radical in terms of transforming 
areas.
This is where HMR came in. Once given the green light, Liverpool was 
in the perfect position to get a head start and hit the ground running. The 
‘areas of opportunity’ formatted by the LIFE model were straightforwardly 
translated into ZOOs. The monolithic, abstract nature of redevelopment 
implemented through ZOOs—and the regeneration zones within them—was 
not necessarily a bad thing; it was a means by which public authorities and 
their partners could rationalise space and render manageable an otherwise 
confusing array of different agents and interests in a complex regeneration 
process to achieve practical results in the most simplified, efficient and 
effective way possible. However, the approach appeared to favour certain 
ways of working that ran counter to residents’ lives and foreclosed all other 
possibilities that may have produced better results. Smaller-scale, more 
experimental, piecemeal, incremental or participatory approaches were all 
but suppressed by this singular focus on preferred developer and housing 
association partners and the preference for large-scale zoning and land 
banking. Moreover, when working in concert with other, more pernicious 
logics, this visited what can only be described as violence upon the residents 
and built environment of Granby. Here, amongst other mistreated neighbour-
hoods across Merseyside, HMR has been a deeply traumatic experience for 
those who have stayed on to resist it. Whilst the violence has not always been 
direct (e.g., the use of physical force)—although it has in some cases been 
so, in the instances of forcible removal from their homes of a minority of 
resistant residents—it has nonetheless always been keenly felt by people and 
place, accumulating and intensifying slowly over time.
Living through Hell: On the Violence of Managed Decline
Many residents of the Granby Triangle were glad to move out of their 
crumbling homes and into housing newly built by HMR; others were not. 
In Anfield—an ex-HMR neighbourhood now home to Liverpool’s other 
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successful urban CLT, Homebaked—demolition was more widely supported 
by the local community.17 In the Granby Triangle, however, the building stock 
was generally seen to be of a much higher architectural quality. Many believed 
the council was needlessly demolishing good housing as part of the large-scale 
zoning conditions required by the Pathfinder partners for profitable devel-
opment—or else as part of a long-term punitive strategy for the 1981 Uprising 
and subsequent Granby Residents Association anti-demolition campaigning. 
Having evicted most remaining public tenants from housing association stock 
before its transfer into council ownership for consolidation, only those defiant 
homeowners—those with the security of tenure and embattled commitments 
to place—remained to resist HMR. 
Despite the full weight of the grant coalition set against them, Granby 
residents pushed back successive attempts to demolish the four remaining 
streets of the Granby Triangle. The council had for years tried to buy out 
these defiant homeowners with arguments about the structural condition of 
properties, deemed too unsafe to inhabit. One common claim was that the 
bay windows—striking architectural features of larger properties—were 
‘structurally unsound’, that they were coming away from the wall and 
therefore a health and safety danger. Official surveys recommended that these 
bays be pulled down and bricked in, but residents challenged this, seeking 
an independent assessment, which advised the bays could indeed be ‘tied-in’ 
thereby saving the houses and confirming suspicions that the council was 
hell-bent on demolition. One of the most dramatic confrontations came in 
2011 when residents engaged in picketing and direct action to blockade Cairns 
Street with cars against approaching bulldozers. They alerted the local press 
so that the resulting stand-off was publicised18—a successful strategy that 
further galvanised the spirit of resistance. The council eventually earmarked 
for demolition the two end houses, numbers 67 and 69 Cairns Street. 
Residents organised a peaceful protest outside the buildings as they were 
scaffolded. These represented the first ever instances of direct action to 
challenge demolition in the Granby Triangle.
Despite modest numbers, around twenty residents armed with banners 
and placards picketed numbers 67 and 69 and prevented contractors from 
entering the houses to carry out demolition. This attracted further coverage 
in the Liverpool Echo.19 Several activists super-glued locks shut and painted 
17 Hugh Ellis and Kate Henderson, Planning Out Poverty: The Reinvention of Social Town 
Planning (Town and Country Planning Association, 2013).
18 Tom Duffy, “Peaceful Protest on Toxteth Street Forces Demolition Men to Down 
Tools”, Liverpool Echo (12 July 2011).
19 Gary Stewart, “Anger as Toxteth Granby Triangle House ‘Damaged’ by Contractors”, 
Liverpool Echo (29 Sept. 2011); Tom Duffy, “Set Back for Granby Four Streets Trust after 
Builders’ Early Start”, Liverpool Echo (14 July 2011).
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scaffolding with ‘anti-vandal paint’—an ironic signifier of what they saw as 
“civic vandalism”. But the builders beat them to it, arriving before sunrise to 
begin stripping out interiors and, in the process, causing structural damage to 
adjoining property 65 scheduled for refurbishment. A council spokesperson 
dismissed it as “unfortunate” collateral damage.20 Residents accused the builders 
of intentionally damaging the structure to leave no choice but demolition. 
Private contractors employed by the grant coalition partners were seen to 
mistreat, damage and thereby make amenable for demolition housing that they 
were actually tasked with securing against crime and weathering for possible 
future refurbishment. I was told by a number of activists that they had witnessed 
workmen throwing bricks through wooden floors—to “test their strength”—
collapsing into cellars and thereby helping bring about the very degradation they 
were employed to prevent. Such contractors strengthened one thing only: the 
case for demolition. This put paid to local efforts to save 65–69 Cairns Street.
This was a trend repeated again and again by private contractors for the 
remaining unoccupied terraces. A longstanding resident-activist recounts to 
me the actions of a private contractor hired by local housing association LHT:
As soon as people left, they bricked them up from the inside—so if you 
looked from the street, they had all this oozing kind of concrete—then 
they walked outside and smashed all the windows, leaving you with 
jaggy bits of glass.
By bricking up the windows, the contractors were able to secure—against 
crime, squatting and the elements—houses which were already in a dangerous 
state of disrepair through wilful neglect. But to remaining residents it revealed 
the assumptions made about their neighbourhood, left in a visually vandalised 
condition as a scar for the community daily to endure. The same resident 
continues:
I think it shows that you actually despise the people who are living here, 
that you don’t even rate them as fully human; because it’s what you’d 
do if there was nobody there isn’t it? It’s what you’d do if it was like 
an old military site, say, or somewhere that nobody lived.
The violence enacted was most acute in instances where—particularly 
reported in Anfield—the bricking up of houses was initiated on the very 
same day residents were moving their belongings out. In direct response to 
the bricking up of voids, locals subverted these images of violence through 
artistic expression (Figure 4). Colourful pigeons carved out of wood perched, 
in various poses, on window ledges to brighten up the bleak view and, 
20 Stewart, “Anger as Toxteth Granby Triangle House ‘Damaged’ by Contractors”.
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perhaps, point to a brighter, alternative future for the neighbourhood. The 
most prominent window infills of grey breezeblocks were boarded over and 
emblazoned with messages of hope and resilience: “DON’T GIVE UP!” 
An enduring graffito reads “GAMES (PLEASE)”—a playful subversion of 
conventional signs banning ball games and a symbol of the carnivalesque spirit 
imbuing Granby’s activism. 
Figure 4 Subverting “target hardening” with artistic symbols of hope.
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New Heartlands’ rather heartless approach to securing empty properties 
nonetheless appears in accordance with guidelines in the Council’s ‘Living 
Through Change’ programme for HMR delivery. This aimed “to make 
clearance areas and their surrounding area, safe, secure, clean and well 
managed”, through what was called ‘Target Hardening’, “fitting extra security 
measures (e.g., doors, locks, etc.) to occupied properties and around the 
clearance areas”; and ‘Enhanced Void Security’, “ensuring that empty properties 
are appropriately secured to reduce the risk of vandalism and anti-social 
behaviour”.21 Such impersonal, abstract and technocratic language emphasises 
the principles of bureaucratic rationalisation, safety and security over any 
aesthetic and psycho-social effects on existing residents who, unsurprisingly, 
refer to the programme as ‘Living through Hell’. With official policy written 
in such terms, underhand practices of invoking—often actively performing—
structural damage to make the case for the bulldozer was a familiar story in 
Granby. 
Shortly before their dissolution, the Granby Residents Association was told 
by the council that their base in a disused office on one of Granby Street’s 
corner buildings was likewise structurally unsafe. They were consequently 
evicted, leaving them without a headquarters from which to plan campaigns. 
Just as with the technical argument for the bay windows, many residents 
believed this to be a lie, an excuse to suppress any possible resistance to 
demolition plans. This suspicion was confirmed by the fact that the very same 
office space was later offered as a base—without any extra work to make it 
safe—to the builders working on the redevelopment of Beaconsfield Street 
for Plus Dane. Incidentally, this is the same building that SNAP had originally 
rehabilitated from a ruin into the Granby Centre, with various functions as 
a community anchor over the years: as a Housing Aid Centre, and later as a 
Community Resource Centre with a neighbourhood police station based there, 
known locally as the ‘cop shop’. More recently, in 2014, the cop shop became 
home to a weekly ‘drop in’ surgery run by Plus Dane to provide residents 
with up-to-date information about how some of the four streets were being 
regenerated, following the adoption of the CLT vision, and to share memories 
and views about the area’s historical development. Such a sudden turnaround 
taken by housing associations and the council—from a situation where all 
alternative ideas were asphyxiated through legalistic suppression to one in 
which residents were openly invited to comment and contribute to new plans 
for rehabilitation—represents a radical shift in perspective. So what changed?
The 2008 global financial crisis effectively pulled the plug on large-scale, 
well-funded state-led regeneration programmes like HMR. In 2011, the 
incoming Conservative Coalition government, under its austerity agenda, 
21 Liverpool City Council, Housing Market Renewal in Liverpool Annual Report 
2006/07 (Liverpool City Council, 2007), p. 28.
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prematurely cut short HMR, abandoning almost the very concept of urban 
regeneration policy.22 For some buildings, 2011 came just a little too late. 
Whilst campaigners saved the four streets—their layouts and most housing—
some demolition could not be stopped. The elegant southern terrace of Ducie 
Street (its remaining terrace is depicted on the front cover) was demolished in 
preparation for redevelopment only to find little funds forthcoming after the 
withdrawal of central government funding. Some refurbishment work had also 
already been completed—the facade of Beaconsfield Street’s southern terrace 
retained as a preserved shell for otherwise new buildings behind—but most of 
the area was simply left to crumble into dereliction, still in council ownership 
but without the funds for either demolition or refurbishment.
Fortunately, 2011 was also the year that residents in Granby began to 
dream big—when a radical new vision for the neighbourhood, shared by a 
loose local alliance of activists, social financiers and architects, was coming 
together in the shape of the Granby Four Streets Community Land Trust. This 
was an institutional vehicle intended to drive forward community-led rehabili-
tation rather than profit-led demolition, for the common ownership of land 
and democratic management of perpetually affordable homes for local people. 
Granby CLT, formally established as an organisation in 2011—just like its 
counterpart Homebaked CLT—has proven a great success in turning around 
Granby’s fortunes. In 2013, the Granby Triangle had 128 vacant boarded-up 
houses and shops, with around 60 households occupied.23 By 2019, only one 
of the four streets, Ducie Street, remained derelict, possibly too far gone to 
save, whilst Cairns Street and Jermyn Street have been almost completely 
refurbished and repopulated. The next section narrates the background of how 
the CLT came into existence to transform Granby.
Putting the T into CLT; Finishing the Work that SNAP Started
Granby residents had fought vigorously against demolition plans since the 
1990s, mostly under the auspices of the local homeowners’ organisation, the 
Granby Residents’ Association. Conflict intensified with the arrival of the more 
systematic and well-funded HMR Pathfinder, with Granby located in the City 
Centre South ZOO, allocated to preferred developer Lovell in partnership 
with preferred housing association Plus Dane. During the anti-demolition 
campaign, a national Empty Homes Agency campaigner, John Earnshaw, was 
invited to present ideas about potential rehabilitation solutions. John helped 
establish in 2007, as its first chair, the Granby Community Partnership, the 
first formal communication channel between council and community since the 
22 Dave O’Brien and Peter Matthews, After Urban Regeneration: Communities, Policy and 
Place (Policy Press, 2015).
23 Assemble, The Granby Four Streets (HD Social Investments, 2013), p. 4.
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1981 Uprising. The Granby Residents Association entered into agreement with 
the council and Lovell to build 70 new homes and remodel 165 existing homes, 
but this angered other residents. The council agreed to fund the community to 
the annual tune of £10,000, which residents used to research their own vision 
for the area through fact-finding site visits and conferences as well as funding 
various community activities such as a regular local newsletter, The Jangler.
All this attracted the attention of local groups. A small but influential 
collective of idealistic young professionals, students and creatives looking for 
empty homes to retrofit for an ecologically sustainable mutualised co-op—
amongst them Ed Gommon, Marianne Heaslip and Gemma Jerome, organised 
initially as the Northern Alliance Housing Co-operative and later rebranded 
Terrace 21—tried to convince Granby residents to adopt their co-op idea. 
Ronnie Hughes (a former senior manager at LHT turned community organiser 
and acclaimed Liverpool blogger)24 became increasingly involved in helping the 
community channel divergent creative energies into a common vision. This 
sudden injection of people and ideas created what many have characterised as 
tense internal politics. It was into this fray that the CLT idea was first floated 
by a leading Granby Residents Association member, Dorothy Kuya. Born and 
bred in L8 and deeply embedded in the oldest black community in the country, 
Dorothy was actively involved in race equality and black cultural history 
throughout her life, becoming the first Community Relations Officer on 
Merseyside in the 1960s—seen as “Liverpool’s greatest fighter against racism 
and racial intolerance”.25 She was also a lifelong member of the Communist 
Party and a tireless campaigner for the Granby Residents Association—her 
house on Jermyn Street was amongst those she was fighting to save from 
demolition. Before she sadly passed away in 2014, Dorothy helped introduce 
the CLT idea into the community whilst in contact with John Earnshaw, a 
freelancer who, by virtue of his work with Granby, was to become a technical 
advisory consultant for the National CLT Network. 
The introduction of so many ideas, however, created a split in the community 
between a co-op and a CLT faction. This contributed to the dissolution of the 
Granby Residents Association. So too was the Granby Community Partnership 
officially disbanded, in 2010, after residents became increasingly frustrated 
with the council’s broken promises and inaction over considering alternatives 
whilst empty homes were literally falling in. But the CLT idea stuck and a small 
group of committed activists became the key protagonists in driving it forward. 
24 Ronnie’s photo blog ‘A Sense of Place’ is a great resource on Granby and Liverpool’s 
housing history more broadly: https://asenseofplace.com/.
25 David Fleming, Director of National Museums Liverpool: www.liverpoolmuseums.
org.uk/about/mediacentre/2014/dorothy-kuya-memorial.aspx. See also Louis Julienne, 
“Dorothy Kuya—Obituary”, Nerve Magazine (14 Jan. 2014): www.catalystmedia.org.uk/
archive/issues/misc/articles/dorothy_kuya.php.
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These mostly women homeowners associated with the city’s artistic and creative 
milieu—Eleanor Lee, Hazel Tilly and Theresa MacDermott amongst others—
helped move the campaign on from reactive anti-demolition protests towards 
more proactive claims of ownership over the neglected, disinvested and largely 
vacant streets. Out of a state of despair—tenants evicted, properties boarded-
up, streets collecting rubbish, blight setting in—they set about cleaning the 
streets, clearing rubbish, seeding wildflower meadows on vacant land, painting 
house frontages with colourful artistic murals and bringing garden furniture 
and potted plants out onto pavements and into the roads.26 The centre of these 
insurgent acts of ‘guerrilla gardening’ was Cairns Street, where most of the 
green-fingered activists lived. Their vision was to turn the Granby Triangle 
into the ‘Green Triangle’. As early as 2008 ‘That Bloomin’ Cairns Street’ won 
an ‘outstanding award’ in the Royal Horticultural Society’s ‘North West Street 
in Bloom’ competition. 
Working in parallel with the guerrilla gardening, a council-funded adult 
education project about ecology and horticulture called ‘Growing Granby’ 
resulted in a nearby vacant plot of land being entrusted to local residents 
on a short-term lease by the new local housing association Liverpool Mutual 
Homes, for a community garden and allotments. Growing Granby is distin-
guished from the more spontaneous acts that have transformed the streets 
themselves into the Green Triangle, according to one guerrilla gardener, 
“because we work in public space, not behind railings on private land”. Such 
radical collective action has inspired ideas for a ‘DIY People Plan’ reimagining 
Granby as a ‘Backyard Commons’.27 What has actually emerged is more of 
a ‘front garden commons’ spilling out onto the street. The conscious trans-
planting of the greenery, domestic furniture and intimate spaces of the home 
into public space to share it with others I have characterised previously as 
working between boundaries—spatial and legal—constructed by the ownership 
model and which separate the public from the private.28 This represents what 
Nick Blomley calls “creative acts of resistant remapping”.29
Putting Granby firmly on the map is its monthly street market. Since 
its inception—kick-started with the £10,000 council funding but organised 
26 For photos of the Granby Four Streets over this period of transformation, see https://
asenseofplace.com/collections-of-posts/the-story-of-granby-4-streets/ and https://assemble 
studio.co.uk/projects/granby-four-streets-2.
27 Jean Grant, “Backyard Commons”, in Rob MacDonald, ed., DIY City (Liverpool 
University Press, 2011), pp. 51–59.
28 Matthew Thompson, “Between Boundaries: From Commoning and Guerrilla 
Gardening to Community Land Trust Development in Liverpool”, Antipode 47.4 (2015): 
1021–1042.
29 Nicholas Blomley, “Un-Real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public Gardening”, Antipode 
36.4 (2004): 614–641.
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voluntarily by local residents—the market has become a symbol of resistance, 
a self-sustaining community hub for small-scale economic and cultural activity, 
and something of a local legend, attracting people from all over Liverpool and 
beyond (see Figure 5). On the first Saturday of every month, stalls populate 
the street, selling everything from second-hand books to daily essentials, with 
live music and diverse dishes freshly cooked in a festival atmosphere. This 
DIY experiment is a tentative move towards regenerating Granby through 
community control over the means of social reproduction. Such ‘guerrilla’ or 
‘insurgent’ urbanism30 began to attract influential supporters. One such ally, 
Erika Rushton—Neighbourhoods Director at Plus Dane at the time who would 
go on to become a Granby CLT board member and then its chair; a self-styled 
‘cultural economist’ centrally involved in socially innovative urban development 
projects across Liverpool—put it like this, when I interviewed her in late 2013:
The thing that most impressed me was that, you know, actually that 
area has had between 25 and 30 years of engagement, consultations, 
and master plans and competitions to find the best developer who’s 
going to save everybody … And actually what a few particular women 
and a couple of guys there did is they stopped going to the engagement 
meetings, they stopped being consulted; they started sweeping their 
street, painting the tinned up houses so they had something nicer to 
look at, planting flowers and the like—which is where we got involved 
as an organisation, I suppose, helping them do some of that … Then 
the market started as a one-off, and now attracts two hundred people 
a time over the course of a day. The idea that you can get two hundred 
people in the middle of a derelict street in Liverpool on a wet afternoon 
running up to Christmas is pretty phenomenal—and none of that is 
about what will happen to their houses; that is all about people in a 
locality having a relationship with each other and making something 
happen for the better. So that’s what I’m supporting.
This underlines a general feeling—felt in Homebaked, too—that the CLT 
model is merely a vehicle for something deeper, those acts of commoning 
embodied by the guerrilla gardening and street market. Owning houses via 
a CLT was only ever a means to an end for many such activists. At the same 
time, there arose from guerrilla gardening and the street market a collective 
desire and hope for something more substantial and durable in institutional 
form. This began to take shape in November 2011, when Granby Four 
Streets CLT was officially established as a legal entity, providing campaigners 
with the organisational front and credibility required to enter more serious 
30 Kurt Iveson, “Cities within the City: Do-It-Yourself Urbanism and the Right to the 
City”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37.3 (2013): 941–956.
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negotiations with the council over the future of their neighbourhood. Not 
long after, however, in early 2012, the council put the four streets up to 
tender—welcoming the best bids from private developers and housing 
associations—and entered into long negotiations with a private development 
company, Leader One, effectively shunting the CLT off the negotiating table. 
Carrying forward the logic of HMR—the compartmentalisation of Liverpool 
into distinctly bounded ZOOs and ‘regeneration zones’ each with their own 
preferred developer—the council sought a single identifiable organisation to hand 
full responsibility over for regenerating the four streets. Thus the entire area was 
offered up for tender to the highest bidder. The council’s apparent reticence to 
test out alternatives and engage in smaller-scale, finer-grained, experimental 
approaches—a hangover from HMR thinking—seemed to arise as much from 
a fear of uncertainty as from the ideological influence of the ownership model. 
Irrespective of their rationale, council officers were not willing to listen to alter-
native proposals and the CLT had little choice other than to approach Leader 
One to propose a partnership in delivering affordable housing—an idea the 
company seemed initially to entertain. When council negotiations with Leader 
One eventually collapsed around a year later under suspicions of corruption, 
it left in its wake a policy vacuum—inviting a number of variously competing 
Figure 5 Granby Street Market relocated to Ducie Street during 
Cairns Street renovation, 2015.
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or cooperating alternative approaches to fill the space. The Leader One deal 
imploded under unreasonable demands for the council to underwrite any losses: 
effectively to privatise profit and socialise risk. In contrast, the alternatives were 
all, in different ways, socially innovated approaches emanating from civil society 
to rehabilitate rather than demolish and redevelop the four streets.
For the first time the council entered into a more serious conversation 
with local residents and set up a steering group to explore the possibility of 
public asset transfer. However, at the same time, the council announced its 
own ‘Homes for £1’ scheme—its so-called ‘homesteading’ plan—giving away 
houses for a nominal pound to be renovated through self-help sweat equity on 
the proviso that certain conditions were met. Homesteaders must live in the 
house for at least five years without sub-letting and invest capital to match a 
state-backed low-interest loan. CLT campaigners now had a new competitor 
and recount the great difficulty in getting their ideas—cleverly rebranded 
‘community homesteading’—taken at all seriously by the council. For all 
the strengths of homesteading as a small-scale solution to the empty homes 
problem, the council appeared more at home with handing the area over to 
private developers or individual homeowners—even at considerable public 
expense—than with considering more financially and socially sustainable 
options in collective housing alternatives. 
Working alongside the CLT was the co-op. Terrace 21 was so named by 
its members to reflect aspirations to recreate ‘terraced housing for the 21st 
century’. They hoped to retrofit to extremely high ecological standards some 
of the CLT-owned houses and manage these cooperatively through a Mutual 
Home Ownership Society (MHOS).31 The idea of a MHOS is to create a more 
egalitarian distribution of housing costs through mutual aid such that each 
resident pays a fixed affordable percentage of their income on rental shares in 
the scheme—no more than 35 per cent of net household income in the case 
of Terrace 21—so that poorer members are subsidised by richer: from each 
according to their ability to each according to their need. Designed to work 
as a key complementary component of CLTs, the MHOS model has been 
developed by CDS Co-operatives to circumvent the problem of leaseholder 
enfranchisement: leasing buildings from the CLT, which ultimately protects 
the land from private buy-outs. Terrace 21 were inspired by LILAC (Low 
Impact Living Affordable Community) in Leeds, the UK’s pioneering MHOS 
development.32 LILAC, however, is not coupled with a CLT, so Granby Four 
Streets is to be the UK’s first demonstration project of the CLT–MHOS model. 
31 See www.ukmhos.weebly.com and Pat Conaty, Johnston Birchall, Steve Bendle and 
Rosemary Foggitt, Common Ground—for Mutual Home Ownership: Community Land Trusts 
and Shared-Equity Cooperatives to Secure Permanently Affordable Homes for Key Workers (New 
Economics Foundation and CDS Cooperatives, 2003).
32 Paul Chatterton, “Towards an Agenda for Post-Carbon Cities: Lessons from Lilac, the 
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Without other successful examples to evidence—and lacking the legal 
clarity of private freehold—asset transfer was therefore a difficult case for 
Terrace 21 to make to any public body whose responsibilities lie in protecting 
the public interest. The choice to adopt the MHOS model was influenced 
by their dealings with Leader One, when co-op activists had originally 
approached Leader One to propose a partnership on behalf of the CLT. A 
co-founder of Terrace 21 tells me how it was Leader One representatives, 
during their negotiations with the council, who first suggested to him that 
“the council isn’t interested in having a co-operative there. If you can make it 
like some kind of ownership thing, then we might be a bit more interested!” 
A mutual home ownership society, with its semantic associations with classic, 
private, individual homeownership—despite the actual workings of the model 
being more akin to a co-op than its name suggests—thereby became preferable 
as a brand to leverage support from otherwise hostile gatekeepers.
It was at this point that the CLT was approached by a mysterious social 
finance company called HD Social Investments (later rebranded Steinbeck 
Studio) backed personally by John Davey, “the mystery millionaire” as CLT 
members playfully described him before his identity was more publicly revealed. 
This self-styled ‘libertarian economist’ and former stockbroker from Jersey was 
working with Xanthe Hamilton, a filmmaker and the founding director of the 
innovative social investment vehicle Steinbeck Studio, which was to manage 
Davey’s capital. Hamilton was on the search around the country for socially 
worthwhile projects in which to invest finance capital for a small return and 
came across Granby through auspicious links with SAVE Britain’s Heritage via 
local urbanist Jonathan Brown—an interest piqued by the residents’ entrepre-
neurial spirit breathing life back into the faded Victorian grandeur around them. 
Xanthe, who would go on to work closely with the CLT as a board member, then 
persuaded the mystery millionaire Davey to invest a £500,000 interest free loan 
which, according to Xanthe, “unleashed [Granby CLT’s] grant-writing power”.33 
Indeed, by November 2016, the CLT had accessed a total of £900,000 of grant 
funding in addition to the half million interest-free loan from Steinbeck Studio. 
This strategy of zero- or very low-interest social investment was described by 
CLT activists as “philanthropy at four per cent return”, in reference to the early 
housing association trusts of the nineteenth century known as ‘five per cent 
philanthropy orgs’.34 With investment via Steinbeck Studio coupled with their 
successful application to two national grant schemes, the government’s Empty 
UK’s First Ecological, Affordable Cohousing Community”, International Journal for Urban 
and Regional Research 37.5 (2013): 1654–1674.
33 Quoted in Stephen Pritchard, “Complexity, Uncertainty and Scalability: How 
Assemble’s Granby 4 Streets Won 2015 Turner Prize”, Colouring in Culture Blog, 2016: 
http://colouringinculture.org/blog/assemble-complexity-uncertainty-scalability#_ftn4.
34 Malpass, “The Discontinuous History of Housing Associations in England”.
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Homes Fund and that of the Nationwide Foundation, each worth £125,000, CLT 
activists were now well positioned to acquire houses from the council. 
In a presentation given at the London Festival of Architecture 2016, entitled 
Granby 4 Streets: The Ideals of Specificity and Scalability in a Social and Architectural 
Endeavour, Hamilton describes the five models of regeneration that were, around 
2013, “all attempting to exploit [the] swampy ecology of funding, law, insurance 
and so forth” to find a viable solution for Granby’s rehabilitation.35 One was 
the ‘Homes for £1’ scheme the council had been trialling nearby, which utilised 
sweat equity and personal investment but at great public subsidy; another was 
the co-operative scheme emerging around Terrace 21, which could work with 
the CLT as one of its tenants. A third was that of the local housing associations 
such as Plus Dane who had huge capital leveraging power but whose profession-
alised development processes proved the most expensive. Fourth was the CLT 
itself, the democratically governed organisation representing the community 
and able to win grants but which, according to Xanthe, lacked “finance or 
technical managerial skills” although it was a “welcoming committee for other 
models”. Finally, a fifth model was Hamilton’s own Steinbeck Studio—a “social 
investor-backed private developer scheme” with a “pot of ready money” and 
highly networked into professional and artistic circles but ineligible for grants—
the perfect complement to the CLT. The genius—and ultimate success—of the 
CLT was in bringing all these otherwise competing factions together around a 
common vision with the CLT as its anchor.
Together, the CLT, Steinbeck Studio and Terrace 21 are working as joint 
partners to realise the community-led vision: a tight-knit partnership that 
aims to share the assets and the workload involved in such a complex project 
by providing a range of specialist skills and interests. This has also helped 
convince the council of the project’s viability and social value. Within the 
partnership, the CLT is both an interest group itself and the ultimate structure 
under which all other stakeholders are organised: the overarching umbrella 
institution intended to acquire legal ownership of all the land for long-term 
collective stewardship, with the use of buildings leased out to partners and 
residents. Of the 27 initial houses, the CLT has taken on ten itself to rent out 
at affordable sub-market rates, in addition to acting as stewards for the local 
area as a whole, recently completing ‘Our First 10 Homes’, with first tenants 
settling in. Terrace 21 are in the process of finalising the asset transfer of 
five houses, which they will retrofit and manage as an MHOS co-op under 
CLT stewardship. Steinbeck Studio initially hoped to refurbish and internally 
restructure the twelve larger and grander houses on Ducie Street to provide 
a mix of one- to five-bedroom market-rate houses that will help subsidise the 
rest; but long-term structural damage to the properties and indecision over 
35 Quoted in Pritchard, “Complexity, Uncertainty and Scalability: How Assemble’s 
Granby 4 Streets Won 2015 Turner Prize”.
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their fate have all but scuppered this plan. Importantly, the CLT vision for the 
entire neighbourhood has been adopted by development partners, Plus Dane 
and Liverpool Mutual Homes, who have refurbished—or rebuilt meticulously 
to the same design specification, in cases where structural damage was too 
great—all the remaining houses across the four streets.
One important piece of the puzzle remained: who would do the design 
and construction for the CLT? Through Xanthe Hamilton’s creative networks 
the CLT found its architects: an innovative London-based architecture and 
design collective renowned for their hands-on DIY approach to regeneration, 
appropriately called Assemble.36 In 2013, Steinbeck Studio commissioned 
Assemble to write a persuasive design statement—a beautifully illustrated 
brochure locally lauded for its ingenuity—setting out a vision and practical 
plan to acquire and refurbish 27 of the 128 vacant boarded-up properties as 
a mix of affordable homes, as part of a long-term vision to rehabilitate the 
113 other empty homes and revive the neighbourhood’s economic backbone, 
Granby Street, as the bustling shop-filled high street it once was, with plans 
for community-owned enterprise and facilities.37 Assemble’s design statement 
proved critical in persuading the council to consider the scheme as a viable 
and attractive option. In it they explain their method:
The three strands of our vision are bound together by a hands-on 
approach for delivery that builds on the enterprise, initiative and 
commitment that the community had shown over the last twenty 
years … We seek to maximise local employment and involvement in 
the construction process. Our approaches are based around simple, 
accessible methods of construction that can be delivered locally—
where the physical act of rebuilding is not only a way of boosting the 
local economy but a public act that offers residents a direct hand in 
shaping the area’s development.38
Since setting up shop on site in Granby, Assemble has undertaken a pioneering 
do-it-together approach to the rehabilitation of the CLT houses they have 
named ‘community homesteading’. This was partly inspired by Assemble’s 
previous work across the UK, such as the Cineroleum in Clerkenwell, London, 
a disused petrol station that was transformed into a cinema by hundreds 
of volunteers working together in a self-initiated, experimental design and 
construction process. Like much of their work, this was an experiment in 
creative reuse of an obsolete site but also in the spontaneous and improvised 
36 Oliver Wainwright, “The Street That Might Win the Turner Prize: How Assemble 
Are Transforming Toxteth”, The Guardian (12 May 2015).
37 See https://assemblestudio.co.uk/projects/granby-four-streets-2.
38 Assemble, The Granby Four Streets (HD Social Investments, 2013), p. 26.
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collective learning process of building together. It was also inspired by a white 
paper Xanthe and leading Assemble architect Lewis Jones wrote together 
in which they coin ‘community homesteading’ as a concept specifically for 
Granby—to “expand the houses for a pound model to a larger chunk and 
community rather than individual ownership”.39 Assemble’s vision takes 
the logic of the self-help do-it-yourself homesteading approach utilised in 
the council’s parallel ‘Homes for £1’ project but applies it more socially so 
as to bring together the accumulated skills and wisdom of the community 
through collective action. During renovation, Lewis Jones and other Assemble 
members lived on site and worked closely with residents to renovate their own 
and others’ homes, training up local people who can then use their skills for 
do-it-yourself refurbishment of further houses. The idea is that once Assemble 
move onto their next brief the regeneration becomes self-sustaining. Through 
this method, the CLT houses on Cairns Street have by all accounts been beauti-
fully redesigned; the window rendering on each individual facade painted in 
different shades of bright colour—juxtaposed starkly against the standardised 
terrace opposite renovated by Liverpool Mutual Homes. Construction costs 
are much lower than their housing association counterparts: the previously 
built Plus Dane houses on Beaconsfield Street cost £109,000 per unit and the 
Liverpool Mutual Homes £120,000, while the CLT aims to spend just £75,000 
per house.40 
Notwithstanding palpable success, the choice of community homesteading 
as a label is not quite so straightforwardly positive. Assemble’s design statement 
is illustrated with a stylised photograph of Victorian barn-raising.41 Influenced 
by the barn-raising traditions of North America and the homesteading of 
settlers going west creates problematic connotations, perhaps, for a multi-
cultural inner-city neighbourhood in which indigeneity is claimed by various 
ethnic groups subject to a new kind of settler-colonialism in the form of 
arts-led gentrification. Despite all the creative interventions they have 
initiated, there is certainly a sense amongst some more longstanding residents 
that the trendy newcomers—Assemble and Terrace 21 included—do not 
possess quite the same right to place as they do. This tension between rights 
based on longevity of inhabitancy (occupation and biographical attachment to 
place) versus rights derived from productive contribution to place (improve-
ments made through active labour) will not be an easy issue to resolve in 
the CLT’s formalised property relations and housing allocations policy. Such 
conflicting claims between original occupation/appropriation and ongoing 
39 Quoted in Pritchard, “Complexity, Uncertainty and Scalability: How Assemble’s 
Granby 4 Streets Won 2015 Turner Prize”.
40 Figures from a presentation at the northern launch of the National CLT Network’s 
Urban CLT Fund hosted by Homebaked in Liverpool, 2014.
41 Assemble, The Granby Four Streets, p. 27.
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contribution/improvement run deep in debates around common property 
and indigenous land rights.42 It is also a sensitive issue for the global CLT 
movement to address, particularly in settler-colonial contexts such as the 
USA, Canada and Australia, as evident in its leading advocate John Emmeus 
Davis’ eventual decision, upon reflection, to drop his original idea of entitling 
the updated edition of his classic Community Land Trust Reader as “This Land is 
Ours”.43 In Granby, there is a definite presumption among residents that the 
local black community are its original or indigenous inhabitants: possessing 
a strong cultural identity firmly rooted in a particular history and geography 
and strengthened by the adversity associated with the ’81 Uprising. How the 
CLT works to represent and express these ownership rights will be a defining 
issue of its future.
The CLT’s stewardship role has the potential to negotiate these tensions. 
It has not only brought otherwise competing development partners together 
but also diverse local people from across traditional cleavages—notably class, 
race and religion—to produce what is arguably a “politics of space”, in which 
a common spatial vision for place overcomes class politics and unites in 
broad consensus otherwise divergent property interests.44 CLT membership 
extends throughout the L8 postal district, beyond the immediate Granby 
Triangle, and so the CLT recognises its scalar contributory relationship 
with surrounding urban areas. Members meet regularly to discuss CLT 
affairs and democratically elect representatives onto the trust management 
board, whose membership of twelve periodically rotates, with tripartite 
representation of three main groups—member residents; the wider local 
community; and key stakeholders. The latter third include representatives 
from the council, housing associations Plus Dane and Liverpool Mutual 
Homes, as well as crucial financial and technical expertise in development. 
The diverse black community are also actively engaged as stakeholders. The 
Men’s and Women’s Somali Groups each have board representation, as does 
the Steve Biko Housing Association, established in 1982 to provide local black 
people access to social housing in the context of racial discrimination, now 
helping develop and deliver the CLT housing allocations policy. Those social 
housing tenants displaced by HMR, meanwhile, are represented in the wider 
community third. A large part of the popular mandate for the CLT model—
despite some tensions emerging within the community—is its capacity to 
incorporate multiple tenure types, integrating divergent property interests, 
and its democratic trust governance structure, enabling wider stakeholder 
42 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City (Routledge, 2004).
43 A fact imparted at a public seminar given by Susannah Bunce on Canadian CLTs in 
October 2019, London.
44 Mark Purcell, “Neighborhood Activism among Homeowners as a Politics of Space”, 
Professional Geographer 53.2 (2001): 178–194.
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participation for long-term place stewardship for wider community benefit 
over resident-member benefit alone.
Trust is the magic ingredient holding the entire CLT endeavour together. It 
relies on trust that the council will not cynically take advantage of community 
aspirations for self-governance to offload public service responsibilities; on 
the trust of local people, who need to feel included in order to give consent 
and democratic legitimacy; on trust between members engaging in collective 
governance; on trust placed in CLT Board members to represent the interests 
of other members fairly; and ultimately on trust in the community trust itself, 
as responsible ‘steward’ of public assets for future generations. Gaining council 
support, as the principal landowner and gatekeeper, was essential to realise 
the CLT partnership’s plans, which hinged on acquisition of the properties. 
Yet this proved somewhat difficult in the context of a long, complicated 
history of mutual mistrust between council and community, first flaring in 
the 1981 Uprising, and intermittently threatening to paralyse collaborative 
decision-making. Residents still feel a powerful sense of resentment and 
injustice about the council’s demolition plans, says a prominent resident-
activist: “People past and present who live here feel that their property has 
been stolen from them, I mean really quite powerfully feel that the area has 
been stolen from quite a tight-knit community, so actually a CLT is quite 
symbolic in returning ownership to the community”.
The moral vocabulary of theft is used in two senses: individual homes 
‘stolen’ by compulsory purchase and forced eviction, and a more collective 
sense of loss of shared history and community ties. The reappropriation of 
houses via the CLT was for many residents and activists a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for realising a broader project of reclaiming community 
control over their neighbourhood after decades of mistreatment, as Erika 
Rushton (then working for Plus Dane) attests:
I think what the residents really wanted was to wrestle some control 
back over the wider area and have some say in its stewardship going 
forward. I think the CLT may give them that, but I think that it’s also 
providing a means of saying, “Well, you can have ten houses because 
that’s all you can afford, now have them and that’s your lot!” And 
actually they never set out wanting any houses; what they wanted was 
to be entrusted with the future of that area. Sitting here as part of an 
organisation [Plus Dane] and looking at it you think, “None of the rest 
of us have done a good job of it for the last thirty years so why on earth 
wouldn’t we trust the residents? Why would you trust them less than 
housing professionals after thirty years of that?”
The CLT is seen as a symbolic reappropriation of place: reclaiming personal 
homes and community space stolen by the council and protecting against 
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future demolition threats. Such an oppositional position, however, posed 
additional barriers to negotiating a mutually satisfactory solution. From the 
council perspective, the burden of proof lay firmly on the CLT to demonstrate 
its social responsibility to manage assets and to convince local government 
of the merits of transferring public assets to an untested community-owned 
organisation. A Granby CLT activist frames the problem thus:
We have to prove that we can do something before people trust, 
because that issue of trust goes both ways—local residents don’t trust 
the city council, the city council don’t trust local residents to do 
anything other than kick up a fuss … Hopefully that would get easier, 
breaking down the barriers that have been built up over the last ten 
years with HMR; and a certain fear at the council level—just trusting 
people to do the best for the neighbourhood—doesn’t really seem to be 
there. I think it’s there now with some of the councillors but it’s still 
not there with all of the officers. That’s an institutional culture thing, 
which I expect takes decades to change.
So how to explain the relatively swift shift in council policy if not institutional 
culture? Part of this was no doubt their sensing of the winds changing in the 
national policy landscape. Government funding was increasingly being made 
available for community self-help and empty homes refurbishment, as part 
of the Conservative’s localism agenda, as opposed to grander programmes 
like HMR. Transitional funding, which had been made available to HMR 
Pathfinders to finish off work already started, was by now drying up. The 
Leader One deal then also evaporated. That left the council in the sticky 
situation of having hundreds of boarded-up empty homes on its balance sheet, 
just sitting there as liabilities, without the funding or ideas forthcoming for 
their transformation into assets. Until, that is, the council was given a little 
push finally to take the leap by a surprising piece of positive press. In May 
2015, Assemble were shortlisted for the Turner Prize, specifically for their 
work with Granby CLT—the first time an architectural design studio has 
ever been nominated.45 This brought a huge amount of favourable though 
unexpected media attention and publicity to Granby Four Streets. Later that 
year, the project won—the first time a housing or architectural intervention 
has ever done so. And awards beget awards. Following in the footsteps of the 
Eldonians, Granby Four Streets CLT was shortlisted as a finalist in the 2016 
UN World Habitat Awards. Also in 2016, the social innovation foundation 
NESTA recognised Granby as one among fifty ‘new radicals’—radically trans-
formative “projects, which, if scaled, could transform the lives of millions of 
45 Wainwright, “The Street That Might Win the Turner Prize”.
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people, and offer us a glimpse of a different kind of society”.46 More recently, 
the New Economics Foundation think tank puts Granby CLT on its ‘new 
economy map’ of ‘inspiring projects’ in its Change the Rules campaign.47
Assemble and CLT activists have capitalised upon this media frenzy by 
establishing a social enterprise specialising in the creative production of archi-
tectural ceramics based on Assemble’s Turner Prize-winning interior designs 
for the CLT houses. Assemble, led by Lewis Jones, have set up an on-site 
workshop in a disused corner building on Granby Street, now selling ceramics 
to international buyers, using the Turner Prize exhibition as a platform to 
showcase their distinctive, elegant aesthetic. The rationale, design ethos and 
historical background behind the Granby Workshop is laid out in what is partly 
a product catalogue and partly a chronicle scrapbook produced collectively by 
Assemble, residents and fellow travellers—myself included, writing on the 
conceptual and historical origins of the CLT model.48 The Granby Workshop 
was initially a pilot project for creating value out of the very business of 
the regeneration process, employing local people in experimental manufac-
turing processes—paid positions as well as volunteers—to design and make 
furniture, house fixtures and architectural features, using reclaimed materials 
recycled from the CLT houses themselves. As a social enterprise, profits are 
reinvested to support programmes to engage local young people (aged 13 to 
18) in creative, practical projects. Assemble’s great investment in Granby has 
attracted others to follow suit. There are already signs of economic recovery 
on Granby Street, now the permanent fixture for the ever-growing street 
market, with new businesses (such as a hairdressers and an eatery) opening 
up for the first time in decades—the first step in the long-term plan for its 
revitalisation as a cultural and retail artery.
The Turner Prize victory has also helped the CLT win large grants for 
further redevelopment. The four grand three-storey corner buildings framing 
Cairns and Granby Streets (Figure 4) have suffered considerable structural 
damage—one of them falling in entirely—but will now be reconstructed 
and brought back to life with the financial support of Power to Change, the 
Co-operative Foundation and Homes England (the quango formerly known 
as the Homes and Communities Agency and, before that, the Housing 
Corporation). The CLT are in the process of engaging their members and 
local residents in participatory design workshops to establish what exactly 
the community wants the CLT-owned four corner buildings eventually to 
house. Ideas have ranged from housing, shops, cafés, co-working spaces and 
46 NESTA chief executive, Geoff Mulgan, ‘Meet the 2016 New Radicals’, NESTA Blog, 
6 July 2016: www.nesta.org.uk/blog/meet-the-2016-new-radicals/.
47 New Economics Foundation, Change the Rules: https://letschangetherules.org/map/
granby-4-streets.
48 Assemble, eds, Granby Workshop Catalogue 2015.
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community enterprise to public space. A prestigious grant of almost £250,000 
was procured from Arts Council England for Assemble to transform two of the 
houses on Cairns Street—too dilapidated to save—into the Granby Winter 
Garden and Common House. Combining an urban garden, meeting space, a 
studio for creative activities and a ‘spare room’ to host artists-in-residence as 
well as paying guests, as a kind of ‘cooperative Airbnb’, the Winter Garden 
is intended as another source of self-sustaining revenue for the CLT in years 
to come. Its first artist-in-residence has been announced as Nina Edge, a 
prominent local artist and leading activist in the adjacent campaign to save 
the Welsh Streets from demolition, who has worked with local people, horti-
cultural experts and Assemble to transform the two terraces into a beautiful 
indoor garden opening the full height of the building up to a glass roof, from 
which a chandelier refracts sunlight onto subtropical plants and greenery. 
In all these many ways, Granby Four Streets comes full circle on the holistic 
approach set out by SNAP. Assemble’s innovative and immersive technique of 
community homesteading is a conduit for local socioeconomic and political 
empowerment, bringing diverse groups together around a hands-on project 
and cultivating new relationships, habits and networks of cooperation and 
mutual support which may help sustain practices of commoning conducive 
to CLT governance in the long run. We can trace this approach back to the 
participatory design processes innovated by the likes of CDS for the new-build 
co-ops and, in turn, to SNAP. Interesting parallels abound. Just as SNAP 
activists inspired the development of Britain’s first rehab co-ops, so too has 
Granby CLT forged an alliance with a local eco-housing co-op, Terrace 21. 
SNAP reimagined regeneration as a holistic endeavour, integrating physical 
rehab and environmental improvements with social, health, education and 
employment programmes; likewise, the CLT vision is for an interrelated 
process of empowering local people, developing their skills through ‘do-it-
together’ training programmes, and improving more than just housing by 
providing new employment opportunities and enhanced green public spaces. 
With such obvious spatial and historical as well as social and philosophical 
connections between the two projects—SNAP mapping directly onto CLT 
boundaries and originally saving the four streets from demolition—it is little 
wonder that CLT activists have drawn on SNAP as a source of inspiration. 
Some of the leading activists (notably, former CLT board member and 
community organiser Ronnie Hughes) have begun to position the CLT as its 
contemporary heir, reading the original SNAP report as a rich repository of 
ideas and historical evidence; they are starting to believe that, in Ronnie’s 
words, “We’re finishing the work that SNAP started!”
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From Success to Failure: A Great British Property Scandal
Little Klondyke in Bootle provides a fascinating, though tragic, counter-
example of how the power of financial interests and abstract logics trumped 
community aspirations, which ultimately failed to save the neighbourhood from 
demolition and redevelopment. This is a very different place to Granby. Located 
in the metropolitan borough of Sefton, several miles north of Liverpool city 
centre, the area suffers from economic isolation far more viscerally. Like the 
renowned Welsh Streets adjacent to the Granby Four Streets in L8—home to 
controversies surrounding the planned, though recently thwarted, demolition 
of Beatles drummer Ringo Starr’s birthplace—Little Klondyke was built by 
Welsh economic migrants, with roads named after Edith, Eleanor and Marion. 
And, like the Welsh Streets, it became one of the most notoriously contested 
neighbourhoods in the New Heartlands Pathfinder, one whose residents fought 
back against extreme measures to evict them.49 Likewise, Little Klondyke 
became one of the main features in various television documentaries about 
HMR, notably Channel 4’s Great British Property Scandal, for which celebrity 
architect George Clarke filmed in the area in February 2012. He then became 
involved in the local anti-demolition campaign that for some years success-
fully stalled demolition plans with the critical support of two national housing 
and conservation charities. Throughout the reign of HMR, the Empty Homes 
Agency and SAVE Britain’s Heritage ran a tireless ten-year national pro-refur-
bishment campaign in opposition to the demolitions of the New Heartlands 
Pathfinder. “These charities”, explains Jonathan Brown, one of SAVE’s most 
vocal campaigners, “helped link the disparate local anti-demolition groups across 
northern England to national media support and opened up lobbying routes to 
MPs and government ministers”.50 Most famously, SAVE had been centrally 
involved in the campaign to save 440 terraced houses in the Welsh Streets 
from demolition—in their successful strategy of buying the two-up two-down 
in which Ringo Starr was born and using their legal resources to challenge 
compulsory purchase as well as helping bring the case to Public Inquiry in 2014. 
With involvement of these expert interests, activism in the Little Klondyke 
evolved into a more forward-looking campaign for a CLT alternative. The Empty 
Homes Agency had experience with developing a do-it-yourself ‘homesteading’ 
model in Stoke-on-Trent, whilst SAVE were connected to comparable events in 
Granby through Brown’s interest in the CLT campaign there. The idea for a CLT 
came together just in time to put in a bid for the government’s Empty Homes 
49 Marc Waddington, “88-Year-Old Bootle Woman Evicted from Her Home to Make 
Way for the Bulldozers”, Liverpool Echo (9 Mar. 2012).
50 Jonathan Brown, “Why Were the Four Streets Emptied out Anyway? A Granby Back 
Story”, in Assemble, eds, Granby Workshop Catalogue 2015, p. 11.
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Fund Community Grants Programme in April 2012. This was a detailed plan 
for refurbishment of 121 homes and restoration of a Welsh Presbyterian Church.
The application was written with the help of the Maritime Community 
Development Agency, established in 1993 as the only organisation dedicated 
to community development in Sefton and, since 2003, involved in anti-HMR 
campaigning. Here, anti-demolition sentiments were much more about socio-
economic survival than architectural heritage. Household income in Bootle is 
still today amongst the lowest in the UK; residents are unable to afford the 
‘affordable rents’ of the new HMR-built properties—some increasing by as 
much as 100 per cent on what was offered before. Owner-occupiers’ compen-
sation for losing their homes often equated to only 50 per cent of a comparable 
new build; many owner-occupiers were forced to become housing association 
tenants following compulsory purchase of their homes under HMR. The CLT 
plan therefore aimed to provide truly affordable housing for local people and 
was closely aligned with other campaigns against austerity, welfare reform and 
the ‘bedroom tax’. It was primarily driven by one particular well-known local 
activist, Juliet Edgar, who also stood in local council elections around the same 
time, as an anti-bedroom tax candidate. Juliet was the lynchpin pulling in all 
the partners, writing grant applications and making things happen. 
Their fully costed scheme included street visualisations and detailed 
architect drawings of proposed layouts and redesigns, with internal remod-
elling of housing to suit diverse local needs. The initial proposal was for 
refurbishment of ‘Little Wall’, with long-term plans to take on the entire 
area as Little Klondyke CLT. In June 2012, they received a positive response 
from the then Department for Communities and Local Government regarding 
their application, which amounted to over £5 million of government grant to 
kick-start the project. The task now was to convince the council and galvanise 
the wider community. The first step towards this goal was the organisation 
of a scoping day with a fete and information stall for local residents to get a 
flavour of what a CLT could do for their neighbourhood. This was funded 
by the National Community Land Trust Network—providing up to £5,000 
seed funding per project—and run by John Earnshaw, the Empty Homes 
Agency and CLT Network Advisor who had worked with Granby in the early 
stages to set up the Granby Community Partnership. Bad weather, however, 
dissuaded many residents from attending and the campaign since struggled to 
attract community support. Earnshaw also helped organise a conference trip 
to Preston for activists to learn more about the model. However, there were 
simply not enough local people involved to run the project from the grassroots. 
John insisted the project required twelve volunteers—to get things set up and 
to constitute an effective CLT board—but he waited in vain for a month for 
activists to find the numbers. Thus the project was driven through the passion 
of Juliet Edgar with too little input from others, which even she acknowledges: 
“We need to ensure there’s a market [demand] there, and we haven’t done 
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that yet. We haven’t had time to do it”. Part of the problem was that, by this 
point, almost all the houses had been emptied of residents, scattered across the 
borough, difficult to reconnect. Granby was lucky enough to have a solid core 
of homeowners to push their project on to success; Little Klondyke lacked this 
stable tenure group. Another part was the sheer lack of resources compared 
with Granby and Homebaked, which, as I explore below, sprung from a well-
funded Liverpool Biennial public arts project.
Activists were nonetheless slowly but surely building connections with 
those people who had been decanted into new houses who said they would 
like to return and get involved in the CLT. Moreover, discussion had begun 
with Bellway—the preferred developer for this ZOO—who were potentially 
interested to become a partner in the project as the development agent for 
refurbishment. The real barrier was the council. Not only did the £5 million 
government grant require final council approval but also more sustained 
municipal support for an area facing severe blight, as a representative from 
the Empty Homes Agency impressed upon me:
I think they would have needed more support than just simply an 
approval letter—a helping hand from the council. Approval is not just 
a letter saying, “Okay yeah you can”—the support is how they release 
land to them, all sorts of resources, not just financial.
Before the Empty Homes Fund bid went in, activists tried to contact Sefton 
Council several times to arrange a meeting to discuss the CLT possibility, now 
that HMR had withdrawn from the area. Yet they were confronted by a hostile 
attitude. Despite this being just an early feasibility discussion to gauge interest, 
activists were requested to produce comprehensive documentation of their 
business plan and a twenty-year strategy before the council were even willing 
to speak with them. The council eventually sent a formal response, which 
activists and their partners alike thought “troubling” for being so “incredibly 
dismissive” of the idea. I asked Alan Lunt, then Strategic Director for the Built 
Environment at Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council and signatory of the 
letter, to participate in this research or at least comment on Little Klondyke 
but I was likewise met with refusal. Participants believe that the council was 
firmly set on “something bigger” and more lucrative than a community refur-
bishment project. Their real intentions are revealed in the tactics employed in 
acquiring and securing local properties.
The council acquired the chapel—then derelict and badly damaged by 
arson attacks—following its last church service in March 2008 and a dimin-
ishing local Presbyterian congregation.51 It was in the council’s interests to 
51 Liverpool Echo, “Klondyke Welsh Presbyterian Chapel Can Be Demolished, High 
Court Rules”, Liverpool Echo (25 July 2013).
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demolish the chapel to make way for large-scale redevelopment, but prior 
approval submissions were required before any demolition could legally 
commence. CLT activists led by Juliet Edgar made regular check-ups of 
the area to make sure no unlawful demolition occurred. One evening they 
discovered contractors were already pulling down the Victorian church 
building before they had been made aware of prior approval. SAVE Britain’s 
Heritage were called in and had their lawyers serve legal papers that very 
night to the demolition contractor and Sefton council. This, however, did not 
prevent the contractors from finishing the job. It was not just the church, Juliet 
recalls, which was targeted by such practices:
We served on the Friday; they continued with the demolition on the 
Saturday. I think it was by one o’clock Monday the council agreed to 
stop. Guess what happened on Monday night? Huge fire in some of 
the properties. Coincidence? So since the day that we filed that legal 
action, I think it was Monday 29th January [2013], until something 
like mid-August, there were fires all the time. I was constantly getting 
phone calls … We were just documenting the lot of them, and that 
was part of the evidence that was presented at the High Court. So I do 
blame them, absolutely, this is the battleground. It’s a war. I mean all 
that time, there’d never been any fires …
SAVE lawyers took the council to court in a high-profile judicial review over 
the demolition of the church, arguing against the ‘salami-slicing’ of the chapel, 
as if it were separable, from its historical neighbourhood context.52 Sefton 
insisted that retaining the chapel was part of its original plan but that had 
to change due to health and safety implications of its derelict condition and 
partially collapsed roof.53 Ultimately, SAVE lost the court case. Without the 
chapel as a community anchor—and with many of the properties structurally 
unsound from fire damage—all hopes of establishing a CLT to rehabilitate 
rather than redevelop the neighbourhood were lost.
52 SAVE, “SAVE Britain’s Heritage Newsletter October 2013” (SAVE Britain’s Heritage, 
2013): www.savebritainsheritage.org/news/newsletters.php.
53 Liverpool Echo, “Klondyke Welsh Presbyterian Chapel Can Be Demolished, High Court 
Rules”.
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Not all local authorities were so dead set against community-led alternatives. 
In Kensington, on the eastern edge of Liverpool city centre, council officers 
flirted briefly with the idea of a CLT before quietly dropping it. Although this 
experiment never really took off with the local community, it is an interesting 
story to tell, if only for the insight into council thinking in the aftermath of 
HMR. In some sense, Kensington is not unlike Granby in being one of the 
more multicultural areas of the city with some truly magnificent Victorian 
architecture that likewise—and rather controversially—came under the 
bulldozer’s shadow cast by HMR. It was also a very poor area suffering from 
multiple deprivation and arguably in need of state intervention. It was thus 
the object of New Labour’s New Deal for Communities (NDC), their flagship 
programme for tackling the central issue of ‘social exclusion’ through a more 
joined-up and multi-sectoral approach that incorporated health, crime and 
education, for instance, as well as housing.1 Kensington Regeneration—the 
largest of 39 NDC partnerships across the country—was set up in 2000. 
The NDC came to an end in 2010 but regeneration work was continued 
by a successor body, Kensington Community Interest Company. HMR, a 
more straightforwardly housing-led regeneration policy, had been working in 
parallel with the NDC until its cancellation in 2011. An independent regen-
eration consultant was brought in by the council, through their connections 
with other HMR Pathfinders that had commissioned CLT options studies, and 
was asked to work with Kensington CIC on exploring the prospects for a CLT 
succession vehicle.
The potential of the CLT model for regeneration of declining neigh-
bourhoods had caught the attention of various agencies and regeneration 
partnerships in the early 2000s, just as HMR was getting formulated. As 
NDC partnerships were being wrapped up, regeneration professionals were 
searching for ways to sustain the gains made and engage communities after 
1 Paul Lawless, Michael Foden, Ian Wilson and Christina Beatty, “Understanding 
Area-Based Regeneration: The New Deal for Communities Programme in England”, 
Urban Studies 47.2 (2009): 257–275.
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the funding dried up—for instance, the Shoreditch NDC’s scoping study 
for a ‘Community Equity Trust’ as a potential succession vehicle.2 Had this 
materialised, it would have amounted to a kind of top-down, policy-driven 
CLT, as opposed to community-led. At the same time, Charlie Baker, a 
Manchester-based co-op activist and regeneration consultant at URBED 
(Urbanism, Environment, Design) Ltd, was thinking about ways to adapt 
the UK-based CLT model—developed by advocate-researcher Bob Paterson 
at Community Finance Solutions in Salford University—to work in an HMR 
Pathfinder context. In their masterplan for the Werneth-Freehold HMR 
area commissioned by the Oldham Local Strategic Partnership in Greater 
Manchester, URBED first introduced the notion of a CLT as an alternative 
vehicle for refurbishment of terraced housing—in contexts where rehabili-
tation over demolition was considered a viable and desirable possibility by 
HMR Pathfinders.3 This alternative route to regeneration through HMR 
was incorporated as a key potential option in Community Finance Solutions’ 
practitioner’s guide on CLTs.4 
The CLT idea was gaining currency and fast becoming fashionable as an 
option considered by HMR partnerships looking for new ideas. An HMR 
manager for Liverpool recalls how when she worked for Salford Council (in 
Greater Manchester) the HMR team seriously explored the option of a CLT 
in Pendleton: “a way of trying to leverage some more money into that area” 
as an alternative to the planned Private Finance Initiative bid which remained 
“really hard to make stack up financially”. This plan was even included as a case 
study in a Community Finance Solutions guide on urban CLTs5 but ultimately 
never taken forward. Yet the research gathered on the options study—and 
others like it—helped create a “buzz” around the concept as well as to lay 
some preliminary groundwork for seeing it delivered as a viable institutional 
vehicle. The same HMR manager explained to me how her experience with 
the Salford project and exposure to URBED ideas helped seed the CLT idea in 
Liverpool; she put the council in touch with the consultant who would pitch 
the CLT idea in Kensington. Interest in the CLT idea came from four council 
officers from different departments, whose motivations are described by the 
consultant thus:
2 Stephanie Saulter, Alison Masterman and Anna Eagar, The Community Equity Trust: A 
Report on a Community-Based Self-Funding Urban Regeneration Model Developed by the Shoreditch 
Trust (The Shoreditch Trust, 2008).
3 URBED, Werneth Freehold: A Masterplan for Housing Market Renewal (Oldham Local 
Strategic Partnership and North West Development Agency, 2004).
4 Community Finance Solutions, Community Land Trusts—A Practitioner’s Guide (University 
of Salford, 2007).
5 Community Finance Solutions, ed., Placeshaping: A Toolkit for Urban Community Land 
Trusts (University of Salford, 2008).
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It was buzzy; they were looking for a vehicle to go forward; they were 
thinking ahead to succession vehicles because they knew the thing 
[HMR] was going; and they wanted a forum to actually be able to grab 
everything, pull it together.
Employed by Kensington Community Interest Company (CIC)—the successor 
body of Kensington Regeneration after the NDC was wound up—and with 
an initial budget of £10,000, the consultant ran a series of workshops, focus 
groups and presentations with the community about the theory behind a CLT, 
receiving a generally warm reception:
I floated the idea several times that if you can early on in the regener-
ation process do a sort of red line around the finally agreed geography of 
the place, and then set up a CLT and move all the publicly available land 
and allow anything that’s compulsory purchase or voluntary purchase 
to move into the CLT; you then put an asset lock on, where any money 
that is made—whether the “profit” is real or not—gets locked in; and 
the residents have got a lot of collective control over the whole regen-
eration process, over what to build and the mix of properties and the 
rest of it—well, residents have often shown a lot of interest in this.
The proposal, initially presented in a confidential report to the board of 
Kensington Regeneration CIC, was for Kensington CLT to be incorporated 
as a legacy body, covering an area delineated by the NDC boundaries, to take 
over assets currently held by the CIC in order to tap into legacy funding oppor-
tunities.6 A total of 21 sites or properties were identified in the scoping study 
as suitable for inclusion in the CLT, including an estimated 180 new homes to 
be built on land that had already been cleared by HMR. Membership of the 
CLT was envisaged as being open to a variety of groups in the local area. The 
Kensington Regeneration Board—a small group of stakeholders and experts 
overseeing the process—were generally receptive. The real challenge came 
in convincing the much larger community stakeholder group. This resident-
facing group of about 30 was intended to represent the community in the 
NDC area. They effectively controlled the process; their prior approval was 
required to sign anything off in the Kensington Regeneration Board. Early 
on in the participatory process, the consultant encountered resistance from 
the central steering committee of the board, who were the principal brokers 
of meetings with residents’ groups. This central steering committee was 
composed of vocal activists not necessarily speaking for the entire community 
6 Housing Consultancy Ltd, Private and Confidential Report to Board of Kensington 
Regeneration: Proposal to Establish a Community Land Trust (2008). Source: private 
correspondence.
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but with real commitment to the area and strong political ideologies driving 
their volunteering. The first hurdle was a negative experience of a CLT 
conference in London in April 2008, to which the community representa-
tives were invited to go on the suggestion of the council officers. Organised 
by Community Finance Solutions, the conference was aimed broadly at the 
professional class of architects, planners, lawyers, social investors, housing 
managers and movement advocates who were there to discuss the techni-
calities and challenges of developing CLTs in changing regulatory and political 
climates. The resident delegation thought they were going to, in the words of 
the consultant, “meet fifty or a hundred other residents in similar situations, so 
they could exchange notes” but came away daunted by the technical language, 
“quite freaked out by the industrial size of the intelligentsia”. 
As the process progressed, it was clear council officers were getting cold feet 
too. Whilst the initial invitation to explore a CLT came from middle management 
it soon drew the attention of senior directors who began, according to the 
consultant, to “mess things up because they really did not want to be giving up 
control or loss of budgets, and they wanted to recycle some of the profits they 
were going to make into other places, thinking ‘Liverpool big pot’ rather than 
Kensington”. Had the homeowners not reneged on their initial enthusiasm, the 
CLT may well have been killed off anyway by the territorialism of some high-
ranking council officers, seeing the CLT as “taking part of their empire”. The 
official council offer of support of the principle of the CLT was nonetheless, as 
recorded in the Kensington Regeneration Board report, “caveated by the need to 
ensure the existing legal agreements with its partners are not infringed”, referring 
directly to the lucrative redevelopment contracts in place between the council 
and its preferred ZOO developer, Bellway, to redevelop failing housing markets 
in line with HMR guidelines.7 The independent consultant had conversations 
with Bellway, who were relatively amenable to the possibility of a CLT, on the 
proviso that they maintain contracts for refurbishment work. The report to the 
Kensington Regeneration Board explicitly stated that “Kensington CLT would 
be able (subject to funding) to purchase completed properties, but not to act as 
development agent in its own right”8—thereby assuring the council and developer 
that the development agreements would remain unthreatened. A major point of 
contention, then, was the loss of potential revenue for developer, council and 
housing association alike; each standing to make a ‘profit’ from the government 
grant investment into HMR for acquisition, demolition and reconstruction. 
The council would profit from the sale of land to the developer and higher tax 
receipts from more affluent housing; the developer from the sale of new homes; 
7 Quoted in Housing Consultancy Ltd, Private and Confidential Report to Board of 
Kensington Regeneration, p. 10.
8 Housing Consultancy Ltd, Private and Confidential Report to Board of Kensington 
Regeneration, p. 10.
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the housing associations from higher rent revenue streams and higher value stock 
against which to leverage further private capital. This is one rationale behind the 
formation of grant regimes or coalitions in shrinking cities: to profit from ‘land 
banking’—capitalising on cost differentials secured through CPO acquisition at 
deflated market prices and resale at post-regeneration  revalorised prices.9 
Although land banking provides some clue to the puzzle of Kensington 
CLT’s non-establishment, the campaign appears to have been ultimately 
thwarted by fractious internal politics between the three main tenure 
groupings. The homeowners were the driving force behind the CLT. These 
residents had deep stakes in the area; many were lifelong inhabitants with the 
time and motivation to get deeply involved in the regeneration process and, 
just as in Granby, help defend their houses from HMR demolition threats. 
Kensington was the area that attracted perhaps the most critical academic 
and media attention in terms of anti-demolition campaigning highlighting the 
controversial impact of HMR in Liverpool.10 The fundamental barrier to the 
further development of the CLT came, according to the consultant who sat 
in countless homeowner forums as part of his engagement exercises, when
The leaders and shakers of the homeowners, the “heads above the 
parapet” people, suddenly realised “Whoops! Membership is open to 
everybody, not just us”; and although I was able to shape the support 
to give the homeowners a little bit of preferential representation, it 
was when they suddenly realised that vote for vote at the AGM all the 
private tenants, all the housing association tenants—and they particu-
larly hated the short-term, private-sector tenants—outnumbered them. 
What killed it in the end was the different resident constituencies.
Homeowners saw the other two tenure groupings as differentially deserving 
or capable of participation and inclusion in the CLT scheme—a kind of “tribal 
elitism”. In these debates, housing association tenants were favoured as ‘proper 
residents’ over private tenants on the basis of longevity and permanence of 
residence. The lead housing association in the area was a subsidiary of Riverside 
called ‘Community Seven’, rebranded due to prevailing resident hostilities 
towards Riverside in the area. The tenants were generally sceptical of Riverside 
and would have supported the CLT transfer. Although Riverside could lose 
9 Matthew Cocks and Chris Couch, “The Governance of a Shrinking City: Housing 
Renewal in the Liverpool Conurbation, UK”, International Planning Studies 17.3 (2012): 
277–301; Gordon MacLeod and Craig Johnstone, “Stretching Urban Renaissance: 
Privatizing Space, Civilizing Place, Summoning ‘Community’”, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 36.1 (2012): 1–28.
10 Anna Minton, Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty-First-Century City 
(Penguin, 2012); Chris Allen, Housing Market Renewal and Social Class (Routledge, 2008).
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potential revenue, it had a history of co-op development behind it as MIH, and 
ambitions to support future collective housing, demonstrated most recently by 
their seeding of new-build co-op housing to Langrove Co-op at cost.
A bigger barrier was presented by homeowners’ perceptions of private sector 
tenants. Kensington had experienced a similar trajectory to Granby: deteriorating 
Victorian terraces and falling property prices with short-term speculators and slum 
landlords moving into the area to make a profit on the difference between, on 
the one hand, purchase and maintenance costs and, on the other, rents accruable 
through housing benefits. The gap in the rental market filled by these landlords 
tended to be for those people who for whatever reason could not secure a tenancy 
with a registered provider: recently arrived immigrants who needed a cheap short-
term tenancy at short notice or those evicted from housing association tenancies, 
often with a history of anti-social behaviour or minor criminality. Established 
homeowners felt threatened by the newcomers—with their different tenurial 
interests—outnumbering them and potentially taking control of the democratic 
decision-making process that governed CLT land. The dominance of the ‘heads 
above the parapet’ people in the consultation exercises, coupled with their control 
of the community stakeholder group which ultimately decided outcomes, meant 
that the voices of other tenure groups—and indeed other homeowners below 
the parapet—were excluded from the discussion. The independent consultant is 
adamant that “if Kensington had been emptied of all except for the homeowners, 
there’d be a community land trust there today”. Such a perspective (albeit only one 
side to a complex story) does suggest one of the main factors for success in Granby 
was the relative absence of private sector tenants and the consequent opportunity 
for remaining homeowners to control the process as a relatively coherent domestic 
property class. It also reveals the dark side to collective housing in enabling tribal 
exclusivity, especially when internal democracy is not fully opened up to wider 
publics. Where every effort is made to engage all local residents and tenure factions 
in the process of building a collective alternative, when a democratic participatory 
process is written into the narrative from the outset, the results are very different. 
This is nowhere better exemplified than Homebaked, whose background in an 
earlier experiment in Anfield I explore next.
Dereliction-by-Design and Transatlantic Knowledge Transfer
Like Granby, Anfield had, in the first part of the twentieth century, been a 
relatively prosperous, “more appealing suburb” benefiting from Liverpool’s 
economic pre-eminence, but, from the late 1970s, began to suffer from the 
knock-on effects of decline of the docks, with a weakening local economy, 
falling population and greater housing vacancies and dilapidation.11 By the 
11 Alan Southern, “Local Economy Anfield: Elite Premier League Football and Localism”, 
Local Economy 29.3 (2014): 195–212 (p. 202).
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new millennium, the ward was arguably in much worse condition than 
Granby, at least in terms of socioeconomic metrics: 60 per cent of the ward 
was within the most deprived 10 per cent of areas in the country (according 
to Indices of Multiple Deprivation) in a local authority consistently ranked 
the highest or second-highest most deprived in the country since 2000.12 
Despite various local community groups and initiatives being recipients of 
previous regeneration programmes—notably EU Structural Funds ‘Pathways 
to Integration’13—by far the most significant intervention to arrest decline 
has been the Anfield/Breckfield HMR initiative, designated in 2002, which 
aimed to inject £40 million to £50 million of public money to lever in a 
further £300 million of private sector investment.14 Contrary to the popular 
media image of HMR—as universally despised by the local community it 
foists redevelopment upon without due consultation15—plans for demolition 
in Anfield were widely welcomed.16 Even before HMR was rolled out parts 
of the local community had supported demolition. In 1999, the Anfield 
Breckfield Community Steering Group, formed as an alliance between two 
neighbourhood councils involved in EU Pathways to Integration, worked 
with the city council and Liverpool Football Club to produce a report in 
2002 that advocated the demolition of over two thousand homes. The 2002 
community plan led to the formal Neighbourhood Renewal Assessment that 
would form the basis for securing HMR funding and official declaration of 
the Renewal Area in 2005, after which the Community Steering Group was 
replaced by the Anfield Breckfield Partnership Forum, which sought to place 
the community at the centre of regeneration decisions.
Yet such planning forums appeared only to keep the community at arm’s-
length from decision-making whilst providing a legitimating screen for the 
real power players. Since 2000, Liverpool Football Club has unilaterally 
developed a series of plans for the redevelopment of their stadium in the 
heart of Anfield—each entailing substantial damage to surrounding streets.17 
12 Hugh Ellis and Kate Henderson, Planning Out Poverty: The Reinvention of Social Town 
Planning (Town and Country Planning Association, 2013).
13 Richard Meegan and Alison Mitchell, “‘It’s Not Community Round Here, It’s 
Neighbourhood’: Neighbourhood Change and Cohesion in Urban Regeneration Policies”, 
Urban Studies 38.12 (2001): 2167–2194.
14 Ellis and Henderson, Planning Out Poverty: The Reinvention of Social Town Planning.
15 Rowan Moore, “Liverpool Biennial—Review”, The Guardian (23 Sept. 2012); Owen 
Hatherley, “Liverpool’s Rotting, Shocking ‘Housing Renewal’: How Did It Come to 
This?”, The Guardian (27 Mar. 2013); Charles Clover, “Nightmare on Lime Street”, Daily 
Telegraph (21 May 2005); Steve Doughty and Liz Hull, “Prescott’s Plan for Housing ‘Is 
Social Cleansing’”, Daily Mail (25 May 2007).
16 Ellis and Henderson, Planning Out Poverty: The Reinvention of Social Town Planning.
17 Southern, “Local Economy Anfield: Elite Premier League Football and Localism”.
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The wider neighbourhood suffers in general from a bipolar local economy 
catering to the transitory needs of football fans over local residents, exacer-
bated by the club’s noticeable lack of reinvestment back into the community. 
The indecision of Liverpool FC to settle on any one stadium redevelopment 
scheme and their failure to consult with surrounding property-owners and 
other residents has led to much local hostility, as well as hesitation from new 
businesses to invest in the area. As a result, the immediate streets around 
the stadium—now partly cleared or else renovated—were blighted for many 
years up until the stadium’s recent expansion. Other areas in Anfield have 
likewise been cleared by HMR or, following its cancellation, post-HMR 
council-led regeneration plans for ‘Anfield Village’. Some residents have 
fought hard against HMR—framed as a policy of ‘dereliction by design’—
and, in turn, campaigned for a CLT alternative, which has evolved into 
Homebaked and its family of community businesses today. However, prior 
to this community-led experimentation, the CLT idea was first mooted 
for Anfield in a lesser-known, aborted technocratic experiment led not by 
an anti-demolition grassroots group but by one of the very same housing 
associations involved in the HMR Pathfinder and thanked (contemptuously in 
Figure 6) for delivering dereliction by design. This provides an illuminating 
background to the limelight focused on Homebaked.
After years of successive regeneration partnerships between the council, 
housing associations and community forums, as well as a series of plans 
for the redevelopment of Liverpool FC’s stadium, an alternative plan was 
being developed by Arena Housing. Since 1999, Arena had been the single 
largest housing association in Anfield—gaining Lead LIFE status as preferred 
housing association partner in HMR delivery. Arena is another example 
of commercial expansion necessitating disconnection from place, having 
formerly been Liver Housing Association, merging with Grosvenor Housing 
Association in 2002, and now incorporated into Your Housing Group. At an 
early stage of the community planning process with the Anfield Breckfield 
Partnership Forum, Arena floated the idea of seeding some of their housing 
stock as a kind of ‘community endowment’, over which a resident-led 
subsidiary of Arena would have overall control for the use of revenues for 
community benefits and capacity-building. 
Arena’s interest in finding ways of utilising assets for self-sustaining 
community benefit led to its application for a Knowledge Transfer Partnership 
(KTP) with the University of Liverpool Management School. In 2006, the KTP 
successfully secured funding for an Associate, a dedicated worker based in both 
partner organisations to explore solutions with local tenants. A study tour to 
the USA was organised in 2007, to learn about the more established American 
CLT model and bring back ideas for transfer to the Liverpool context. This was 
attended by eleven delegates from tenant associations and universities as well 
as Arena. A key event was the (American) National CLT Network’s Annual 
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Conference in 2007 in Minneapolis, which included site visits to local CLTs. 
The findings of the tour were disseminated to the wider community as a report, 
seeking to “form part of the narrative of the story of Anfield and Breckfield 
which began in 1999 and is among other things the story of a quest for social 
Figure 6 Dereliction by design:  
irreverent Scouse wit on display in Anfield.
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justice in regeneration”.18 The report records the revelatory moments shared by 
professional and community representatives alike over the radical potential of 
the CLT model for securing long-term community control:
It was during a workshop discussion at the conference about what we 
mean by “perpetuity”, the debate touching, for example, on the concept 
of a 99-year lease and then on the implications for CLTs of having to 
expand to survive—what might this mean over 200 years? Then one 
of the delegates said, “When I think about perpetuity, I think about 
churches”. This wasn’t meant in an evangelical sense … but that the 
CLT estate, and the role of that estate, has the potential to endure 
down the centuries, capturing and preserving community heritage on 
community land.19
Despite the study tour capturing the imaginations of delegates, this unusual 
experiment in collective housing development ultimately failed. According 
to critical assessments published by some of the researchers involved in the 
study visit—notably Udi Engelsman, Alan Southern and Mike Rowe20—this 
failure is attributed to the top-down nature of the project, too constrained by 
formal processes and organisational agendas to find its ‘soul’ in the community. 
The driving seat of the project had been filled by Arena from the beginning; 
their motivations were to develop a prototype housing management scheme 
that would reduce organisational operating costs and eventually enable the 
community to manage stock in self-financing ways. The KTP Associate was then 
contracted to ‘sell’ the idea to the community through extensive consultation, 
as a mutually beneficial proposal with many potential gains for both parties. 
Arena’s tenants were initially keen on the idea of community control 
of assets and generation of revenues for community use; but appetite was 
less than expected. Independent of the council, HMR and Arena, the KTP 
Associate’s role was to bring these interests together for the co-construction 
of knowledge in CLT innovation. However, the council, though willing to 
negotiate over the possibility, was ultimately reluctant to be associated with 
18 Peter Bevington, Community Land Trusts—Learning from the USA: An Account of 
the KTP/Arena Housing Group Research Visit to the United States to Learn about the 
Community Land Trust Model and Its Potential Transferability to Anfield and Breckfield, 
Liverpool, 9–18 Oct. 2008, p. 3.
19 Bevington, Community Land Trusts—Learning from the USA, p. 6.
20 Udi Engelsman and Alan Southern, “Knowledge Transfer in Regeneration: Is It 
Feasible and Can the Community Benefit?”, Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal 4.2 
(2010): 147–157; Udi Engelsman, Mike Rowe and Alan Southern, “Community Land 
Trusts—A Radical or Reformist Response to the Housing Question Today?”, ACME: An 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 15.3 (2016): 590–615.
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the project, whilst Arena Housing was internally divided over the benefits of 
shedding properties to community ownership. Through this process, some 
residents became fatigued and alienated by years of seemingly purposeless 
and overtly bureaucratic consultation. Housing officials became more inter-
ested in the CLT idea as a way to cut costs and produce efficiencies in their 
organisation rather than for radical redistribution of land and power, keeping 
residents at arm’s-length in decision-making, regarding them “mainly as 
a means to secure resources, for their own organisational agendas”.21 As 
a result, the community became increasingly reticent to get involved in 
what was seen as a managerial operation. This case highlights the limits of 
professionalised, top-down, state-led approaches to collective housing that 
are focused on “exploring new ways to deploy capital more efficiently”, to 
“prevent further degradation of an asset base”.22 However, participating 
professionals from Arena report a different story: that it was generally 
supported by community leaders and eventually folded only due to diffi-
culties in securing the necessary state funding for a large-scale CLT scheme. 
Moreover, the KTP is recognised as having “opened up new opportunities for 
political agitation”23 and establishing vital connections and new networks of 
knowledge transfer between successful CLT initiatives in the USA—such as 
Dudley Street in Boston and Cooper Square in New York—and the emerging 
CLT campaigns in Liverpool, not least the project that was to evolve into 
Homebaked.
Homebaked: Brick by Brick, Loaf by Loaf, We Build Ourselves
Just like their counterparts in Granby, Homebaked activists are using the CLT 
model as a platform to innovate a participatory, embedded and holistic approach 
to local economic development. Over years of negotiations with Liverpool 
City Council to acquire a terraced row for redevelopment as affordable 
homes and a revitalised high street of community businesses—now coming 
to fruition—Homebaked CLT has become a neighbourhood hub for Anfield 
and a citizen platform for co-designing interventions in the built environment 
and local economy.24 Homebaked are perhaps most famous for their namesake 
cooperative bakery and café that act as the sister or partner organisation to the 
21 Engelsman, Rowe and Southern, “Community Land Trusts—A Radical or Reformist 
Response to the Housing Question Today?”, p. 602.
22 Engelsman, Rowe and Southern, “Community Land Trusts—A Radical or Reformist 
Response to the Housing Question Today?”, p. 600.
23 Engelsman, Rowe and Southern, “Community Land Trusts—A Radical or Reformist 
Response to the Housing Question Today?”, p. 600.
24 For photos of Homebaked and the surrounding neighbourhood as the project evolved, 
see https://asenseofplace.com/collections-of-posts/homebaked-anfield/.
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CLT. Homebaked bakery is a co-op that makes award-winning pies, employs 
many local residents, runs various skills courses, subsidises wholesome food 
for people in poverty, provides space for therapeutic and sharing activities 
around baking, cooking and growing and likewise acts as a meeting place and 
socioeconomic anchor. In 2018, the umbrella organisation Homebaked CLT 
completed its first affordable homes—a four-bedroom shared flat for young 
people above the bakery—with plans to rehabilitate the entire terraced row 
soon to be realised. Although providing affordable housing has always been an 
ambition, Homebaked is focused on a wider agenda of community business 
incubation and high street regeneration. 
Importantly, the CLT and bakery trade as separate legal entities—the 
CLT is registered as a Community Interest Company (CIC) whilst the 
bakery is a Community Benefit Society (BenCom), a relatively new legal 
form of cooperative that privileges wider community benefit over member 
benefit. This enables the CLT to operate as the landlord; the bakery its 
first and foremost tenant. This makes Homebaked an unusual CLT for 
having a commercial as opposed to a residential tenant. In the first few 
years, Homebaked bakery effectively comprised the ‘resident-tenant’ repre-
sentatives on the CLT board; in future, these positions will be increasingly 
filled by residents of the CLT-developed housing. Some members feel that 
Homebaked CLT should be renamed Hometrust in order to distinguish it 
from Homebaked bakery, to avoid further conflation between the two and 
to symbolise what the CLT is all about in its emerging role as a community 
anchor, business incubator and catalyst for holistic urban regeneration. 
Nonetheless, both organisations are part of the same Homebaked “family”, 
which has recently come to include the Homegrown Collective (an urban 
food growing project, craft microbrewery and community pub, evolving out 
of earlier ideas for Homefarm and Homebrew) as well as other spin-offs such 
as Homesquare, a revitalised public space for gardening, food growing and 
outdoor and cultural activities. Together as a united project, the Homebaked 
family intends to revitalise Anfield—in their prefigurative imagery—brick by 
brick, loaf by loaf, seed by seed, via an immersive, incremental, participatory 
slow-build method of community development. 
Right from the outset Homebaked had a powerful political agenda. It 
began as a public arts project commissioned by the 2010 Liverpool Biennial, 
whose organisers invited internationally acclaimed Dutch artist Jeanne van 
Heeswijk to visit Anfield in 2009 and work with local residents on a partici-
patory art initiative to address the effects of HMR on lived experience. Out 
of her initial interactions with local residents and artists, Jeanne created 
2Up2Down—a community-led design project to reimagine the terraced house, 
the traditional two-up two-down with its two rooms each on two storeys, 
and, by extension, to reimagine the future of the area as a whole. The slogan 
at this juncture was: ‘Housing is the battlefield of our time and the house is 
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its monument’.25 The aim was, first, to protect the area from top-down urban 
renewal programmes like HMR and, second, radically to transform place 
through collective alternatives. 2Up2Down was, stated its website in 2012, 
“a way for local people to ‘take matters into their own hands’ and make real 
social and physical change in their neighbourhood”.26 This was an explicitly 
radical, politically motivated project taking public arts funding to pursue 
something more akin to action-research or community activism aiming 
for radical redistribution of land and power to traditionally marginalised 
communities. Discourses like the right to the city, urban commons and direct 
democracy are central to the design philosophy of Jeanne van Heeswijk, who 
calls it “radicalising the local” and believes “communities should co-produce 
their own futures”.27 
The ambitious political agenda is augmented by a distinctive artistic 
approach that utilises performative, participatory and interactive methods 
to create a very different kind of socially engaged, co-produced artwork.28 
This places it, rather ambiguously, within the field of social practice29—an 
intriguing connection I explore in the Epilogue. Central to this effort was 
Britt Jurgensen, a theatre and performance artist and longstanding local 
resident, who directed and co-scripted some of the early artistic initiatives 
and has been one of the main contributors to the ongoing development of 
the CLT. Initiatives included ‘The Anfield Home Tour’ in the 2012 Biennial, 
an intensive urban tour of the area with narration by local residents, and a 
performative conversation as part of the Future City exhibition in 2013.30 Such 
artistic events set the tone for Homebaked being as much about the learning 
process of experiencing, remembering and narrating change as the urban 
change itself. Story-telling has indeed been valuable to 2Up2Down, helping 
build a national reputation and media platform. 
That being said, artistic rendering has always only ever overlaid strong 
foundations in local people creating home-grown, community-led solutions 
to problems produced by the state and market. The project was founded and 
driven from the beginning by a committed core of passionate locals born 
and bred in Anfield (Angela McKay for one) whose families have grown 
up over the course of their involvement in the project. Greater resident 
25 Jeanne van Heeswijk and Britt Jurgensen, “We Are Here to Stay”, Stages: Liverpool 
Biennial #1, Future City (2014).
26 Homebaked CLT, “2Up 2Down”, 2012: www.2up2down.org.uk/.
27 Heeswijk and Jurgensen, “Introduction”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2. 
28 Tim Jeeves, “Performance, Participation and Questions of Ownership in the Anfield 
Home Tour”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2, Homebaked: A Perfect Recipe (2014).
29 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (Verso, 
2012).
30 Heeswijk and Jurgensen, “We Are Here to Stay”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #1.
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involvement gained momentum through a participatory design process with 
forty young people from the area, which gradually expanded to include 
adults who were affected by HMR and whose housing needs and desires 
were expressed in the evolution of the project. The process was facilitated 
by Marianne Heaslip, an architect from URBED—the progressive urban 
design and research consultancy based in Manchester that first mooted the 
idea of an urban CLT as an alternative to and component within an HMR 
Pathfinder area, in Oldham, Greater Manchester.31 Heaslip had never used 
participatory techniques before this project but adapted URBED’s ‘Building 
for Change’ modelling toolkit that was usually used to get adults to remodel 
their neighbourhoods—a contemporary equivalent of the ‘planning for real’ 
exercises developed by CDS for new-build co-ops. Marianne explained to me 
how her interest in these issues was piqued by her architecture diploma thesis 
on the design process in community architecture, for which she compared the 
Eldonians with the pioneering development of Byker Wall in Newcastle and 
Manchester’s exemplar co-op, Homes for Change, in Hulme. Through the 
likes of Marianne we can trace a lineage from the design democracy infusing 
the 1970s new-build co-op and community architecture movements to the 
social engagement going on in Homebaked and Granby today. As well as a 
historical link, there is also a spatial connection—with Granby, on the other 
side of Liverpool, where Heaslip is also an activist campaigning for Granby 
CLT as part of Terrace 21. 
During this initial community engagement period, the 2Up2Down project 
team were looking for a terraced block for residents to work with and redesign 
as community-controlled affordable housing, but negotiations with the council 
and development companies failed to produce results: “They’re all charmed 
by the idea but don’t seem to want to give an inch of territory back to the 
community”.32 2Up2Down eventually became grounded in the neighbourhood 
in 2011 when they took over the lease of a newly vacant bakery in the heart of 
Anfield, which then became a base for community meetings and participatory 
design activities. The Mitchell’s Bakery—founded in 1903 and known as ‘The 
Pie Shop’ by football fans from all over the world—is located literally over 
the road from Liverpool FC, opposite the stadium main entrance. However, 
Mitchell’s was earmarked for demolition as part of HMR, and began to lose 
custom as residents were emptied from the surrounding streets such that, 
eventually, its custodians—who were by then in their seventies—accepted the 
deal offered by the council to buy them out. HMR was prematurely cancelled 
31 URBED, Werneth Freehold: A Masterplan for Housing Market Renewal (Oldham Local 
Strategic Partnership and North West Development Agency, 2004); Community Finance 
Solutions, ed., Placeshaping: A Toolkit for Urban Community Land Trusts (University of Salford, 
2008).
32 Heeswijk and Jurgensen, “We Are Here to Stay”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #1.
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shortly afterwards but the designation for demolition remained in the council’s 
effective continuation of the redevelopment plans. The Mitchells retired 
without compensation and closed the bakery, which then became vacant.
Symbolically, the bakery is a cornerstone of the community, and 2Up2Down 
capitalised on this cultural history to create hype around the project. The 
bakery was initially used merely as a meeting place for workshops, but then 
local people began dropping in to ask workshop participants when they could 
buy bread again. This inspired the vision to reopen the bakery, thereby 
becoming the central focus of community efforts to reimagine the neigh-
bourhood. With a temporary lease from the Mitchells, the 2Up2Down team 
set about rehabilitating the bakery and selling bread again to locals. In these 
early days, the baking of bread, cakes and pastries was crowd-sourced from 
various local residents who each used their own kitchens to bake delicious 
goods for sale in the café—quite literally home-baking, thus inspiring the 
name ‘Homebaked’. The clever branding conjured up slogans that would 
prove to be very marketable, such as the most famous one emblazoned across 
the building itself: ‘brick by brick, loaf by loaf, we build ourselves’. At 
around this time, artist-activist Nina Edge from the Welsh Streets—and now 
Granby Winter Garden’s artist-in-residence—brought bread to the bakery in 
a self-made bag that she labelled: “Rise up Anfield”.
Initially financed through voluntary home-baking backed by Biennial 
funding, Homebaked later ran a successful online crowd-sourcing campaign 
through Kickstarter called ‘An Oven at the Heart of Anfield’ to raise the 
capital for a new bread oven and renovate the kitchen and café area. Over four 
hundred people donated a total of £22,000. When the renovated co-op bakery 
opened in 2013, there still remained a compulsory purchase order on the 
building but—in true Scouse anarcho-entrepreneurial style—they decided to 
open for trading anyway and, by doing so, slowly but surely proved the concept 
to the council. The original business plan was to sell bread wholesale to other 
businesses and use the profits to subsidise food for locals, but this gradually 
evolved into a focus on pies as it became clear that football fans in particular 
constituted a big untapped market. Today, Homebaked is famed for its pies 
and turns a surplus largely on sales made on match days as well as contracts 
to cater for corporate events, including for Liverpool FC.
The co-op bakery represented just one piece of the puzzle. An overarching 
organisation was needed to take on the community ownership of the building 
in which the bakery was housed and, indeed, develop the broader aims of 
providing affordable homes and regenerating the local economy. By this 
point, residents and activists had already been discussing which organisational 
form would be suitable for incorporating the project as a legal entity. It was 
eventually decided—after “a steep learning curve … trying to find out about 
alternative models of co-owning and managing land and houses”—that the 
CLT model was best suited to community asset acquisition, “because it allows 
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genuine community ownership of the organisation”.33 When asked about 
their choice of the CLT model, Homebaked activists cited its suitability in 
the new policy and regulatory landscape created by the 2011 Localism Act 
as well as emerging social investment opportunities. But, digging deeper, it 
is clear that the connections between members of Homebaked and those of 
Liverpool’s other successful CLT project in Granby, as well as with the ideas 
being tested out by URBED, were just as important. Moreover, as outlined 
above, prior to grassroots experimentation the CLT idea was first mooted in 
Anfield in the knowledge transfer partnership led by Arena Housing. A senior 
figure within Arena Housing—one of the study tour delegates and leading 
proponents of Arena’s CLT proposal—reportedly presented his findings to 
some of the Homebaked activists early on in their campaign, thereby helping 
seed the CLT idea. He has also been a key source of professional support and 
advice for Homebaked over the years, offering up (what is now) Your Housing 
Group’s resources and expertise for use by activists, who attest to the critical 
importance of such professional assistance.
At first the council was deeply sceptical of the CLT, despite official 
backing from the Liverpool Biennial, a particularly powerful and influential 
partner in getting the project off the ground. In 2013, just when the bakery 
was due to open, the council drew up new development plans for what it 
was initially renaming “Anfield Village”, but failed to include Homebaked in 
the masterplan, still marking the terrace for demolition. Caught in a limbo 
until the lifting of demolition threats, local resident-activists Jayne Lawless, 
Angela McKay and Britt Jurgensen began meeting with public officials and 
representatives, including councillors and their then local Labour MP Steve 
Rotheram (now ‘Metro Mayor’ for the Liverpool City Region) to lobby for 
Homebaked to be included in the new masterplan. As the streets behind 
them were cleared of houses, Homebaked set about adapting their plans 
to the new policy landscape and proposed a scheme for redeveloping the 
terrace to the council. During this transitional period of continued uncer-
tainty, Homebaked were, rather gallingly, forced to give back £50,000 of 
government grant money they were unable to spend on developing new 
housing above the bakery due to the lack of a secure lease on the property 
preventing their attaining match-funding or a mortgage. In 2014, after 
countless meetings (for which activists took along home-baked pies) the 
council eventually began to see the value of the project and offered an 
informal agreement to retain and refurbish the terrace. In 2015, the council 
signalled its interest in a high-density, new-build development; Homebaked 
embarked on a participatory design process in which a ‘local core design 
team’ of members and other residents commissioned architects, working 
with them intensively over several months to create a multi-storey scheme 
33 Heeswijk and Jurgensen, “Introduction”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2, p. 4.
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of 40 flats above a row of shops. However, due to low land prices and too 
little grant funding at the time—notwithstanding a £10,000 grant from the 
National CLT Network helping fund the design and viability assessment—it 
struggled to stack up financially. Since then, the council has dropped its 
insistence on new build in favour of a rehabilitation approach. Today, the 
council positively celebrates Homebaked as one of the anchors of Anfield’s 
regeneration and a demonstration project to potential investors. By 2018, 
council officers were inviting Homebaked to deliver presentations at council-
run property investment events hosted at Liverpool FC.
What possibly explains such a turnaround? A turning point was marked 
in 2016, when the CLT won a big grant from Power to Change to redevelop 
the flat above the bakery, on the argument that third-party backing will 
finally unlock the bakery asset from the council and leverage further funds. 
By 2017, multiple strands were coming together. Homebaked had secured a 
“meanwhile lease” from a local housing association for the residual green space 
adjoining the terrace. What was to become the Homegrown Collective started 
running landscaping and urban farming courses and created a community 
garden christened Homesquare (or Hometurf as some like to call it), host to a 
temporary outdoor cinema and various ‘street’ parties. This became a demon-
stration project of how the neighbourhood’s green space could be transformed 
if residents were given the power to decide and do. It shares with Granby’s 
guerrilla gardening the experimental, do-it-together spirit of ‘insurgent’ 
urbanism and aspirations for claiming a ‘right to the city’.34 
A big milestone was achieved in 2018 when the CLT completed its first 
homes—the four-person shared apartment above the bakery. Crucially, this 
provides Homebaked with a more substantial rental revenue stream with which 
to fund activities, pay for staff and become independent of grant income. As a 
participant-observer on the CLT board, I played a part in thinking through the 
rationale and in the difficult task of drawing up the allocations policy. Hatched 
in response to some informal local market research, the idea was to provide 
affordable rooms for young people (aged 18–35) living or working locally who 
were in housing need and would otherwise be at the mercy of predatory private 
landlords. We were targeting Generation Rent with a personal stake in the area. 
When deciding on criteria for selecting tenants, we consulted Granby CLT and 
North West Housing Services (who shortly afterwards took on the management 
and maintenance contract for the flat). One criterion, other than need, was to 
be the contribution tenants envisaged making to the community. For instance, a 
number of the flat’s very first tenants were already employed as bakers downstairs 
in the co-op bakery (making those early morning starts so much easier).
Completing the flat marked the moment the CLT proved itself capable of 
delivering community-owned affordable housing in a way that creates social 
34 Iveson, “Cities within the City: Do-It-Yourself Urbanism and the Right to the City”.
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value. The flat was refurbished through a bespoke apprenticeship scheme 
for young people interested in learning skills and gaining experience in 
construction, resulting in a beautifully crafted apartment with ample shared 
living space, a terrace at the back and many original architectural features 
brought back to life. As a symbol of viability and a tangible demonstration 
project showcasing the vision for the wider neighbourhood, more local 
residents have been drawn into the design process for the next phase. In order 
to be eligible for new funding for community-led housing from Homes England 
to develop the remainder of the terraced row on which the bakery sits, the 
CLT had to partner with a registered housing association—and so it entered 
into partnership with Your Housing (formerly Arena). The plan is to develop 
the nine remaining terraces into eight homes, from traditional three-bed 
family houses to one- and two-bed apartments—all owned and managed by 
the CLT and retrofitted to high environmental standards with roof-based solar 
panels installed and constructed through a local apprenticeship programme. 
Homebaked have secured planning permission and the council has granted 
them a lease to begin the rehabilitation work of the terraces; once complete, 
the freehold will be transferred from the council into community ownership. 
Homebaked bakery is extending its café space into the downstairs of the 
neighbouring terrace to become more of a hub and offer additional community 
services such as debt advice. At the other end, adjoining Homesquare, its sister 
organisation the Homegrown Collective is creating a community business for 
growing hops and brewing, with space out front for pop-up businesses and 
cultural activities. In true Homebaked style, the final design was the result 
of five intensive participatory workshops with twenty local people, with 
Marianne Heaslip appointed as architect. Site visits to Granby Four Streets 
and other like-minded projects also helped with inspiration. 
Securing help and support from professional bodies has played a pivotal 
part in Homebaked’s success. Just as the Biennial stepped back from the 
project, handing over responsibility to local residents, the latter gained the 
support of key gatekeepers, including Ann O’Byrne, then Cabinet Member 
for Housing. Activists also attracted the interest of other powerful actors 
in the city region, not least John Sutcliffe, who managed one of the largest 
surveying firms and sat on many prominent boards, including Homebaked’s 
as its chair (until he sadly passed away in 2017). As a result of this ability to 
network, gain allies and project a positive image, Homebaked has received a 
great deal of interest from academic and activist networks and the national as 
well as local press.35 Homebaked are just as adept at promoting their brand 
35 Rowan Moore, “Liverpool Biennial—Review”, The Guardian (23 Sept. 2012); Lynsey 
Hanley, “This Is How We Can Solve the Housing Crisis—One Home at a Time”, The 
Guardian (13 Aug. 2012); Rachel Pugh, “‘This Is Not about Gentrification’: The Pie Shop 
Reviving an Anfield Street”, The Guardian (19 Apr. 2017).
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image and selling themselves, as they excel at baking and selling the pies that 
have won them national awards—in particular for their ‘Scouse Pie’. From 
origins in artistic narration, the Homebaked team have continued to use 
media—particularly social media—to their advantage, becoming a recog-
nised success story in community-led housing and arts-led regeneration.36 
Perhaps because of this, alongside the less visible or recognised harder graft 
going on behind the scenes—of tirelessly engaging in community meetings, 
developing new business plans, conducting design workshops, learning about 
building contracts, applying for planning permission, writing grant applica-
tions, ad nauseam—Homebaked has also been very successful in securing 
large grants from various sources, notably Power to Change and the Esmée 
Fairbairn Foundation. In fact, both the bakery and the CLT have each received 
substantial Power to Change funding, which is very unusual for two organi-
sations in such close proximity—one for business development, the other 
housing development. 
Whilst the bakery has achieved business success very quickly with 
significant local social impact—employing some twenty people by 2017 
and spending over £160,000 a year on salaries and £100,000 with local 
suppliers—the CLT has been slower to realise self-sufficiency, due to 
the complex property-based nature of the project. Until the new housing 
envisaged for the terraced row is inhabited and bringing in a sustained flow 
of rental income, the CLT must rely upon grants and the small, subsidised 
rent from the bakery alongside the shared apartment. Moreover, it depends 
largely upon volunteers and a number of temporary contract staff, employed 
on a fixed-term part-time basis. These staff have been invaluable to the 
success of the project, all working much longer hours than their contracts 
stipulate. To say this is more about love than money would be an under-
statement. There is a growing sense in the organisation, however, that such 
civic volunteerism is unsustainable in the long run, as it relies unfairly on 
committed individuals to give up so much of their time for a project that is 
becoming increasingly complex and labour-intensive. This raises questions 
over just how replicable or sustainable the model actually is. In neighbour-
hoods where these capabilities are less in evidence—as in the tragic case 
of Little Klondyke—this is all too starkly written in a very different fate.
But Homebaked was never simply fated to succeed. Success here is the 
result of gruelling graft, patience and perseverance. Recent progress made 
with redeveloping buildings and green space is just the start—the material 
embodiment—of a far-reaching vision to reimagine and transform life in 
Anfield. At its heart, this is about changing place, and the way we live 
and interact with each other and the urban environment. Throughout the 
36 Sue Bell Yank, “2Up2Down/Homebaked and the Symbolic Media Narrative”, Stages: 
Liverpool Biennial #2, Homebaked: A Perfect Recipe (2014).
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participatory design process, the question framing all other interventions 
that residents, activists and fellow travellers kept asking each other was what 
does it mean to live well? This resonates deeply with the asset-based community 
development approach of the community economy37 and solidarity economy38 
movements—where the emphasis is placed on well-being and qualitative use 
values over quantitative measures such as jobs created or income generated. 
The latter are still important to Homebaked—in fact, they are common 
answers given by local people when asked what it means to live well—but 
the focus is on the quality of those jobs and the relationships that that income 
nourishes as it circulates through the local economy.
Seeing Liverpool’s Housing History  
through a Bifocal Verb–Noun Lens
In all the various cases of CLT experimentation in Liverpool—both 
successes and failures—the issue of democratic control over land and assets, 
in response to the financialisation of land in the new urban question, is the 
issue of overriding importance. It is the issue that framed the failure of 
schemes in Kensington, Anfield and Little Klondyke (where, in some cases, 
residents felt they were not being given the control promised by council and 
housing association officers and, in others, the state ultimately did not want 
to give control away) just as much as it motivated successful campaigns in 
Homebaked and Granby. Unlike rural CLT initiatives in Britain, these urban 
CLTs are distinctive for privileging democratic control of land, housing and 
economic assets. The CLT model is just a means to an end: utilised as an 
institutional platform for gaining such community control. This point is made 
best by a CLT activist: 
What’s really important in both Granby and Anfield is the democratic 
control of land and assets, which is when a CLT comes into its own … 
as compared with the rural context where it’s more about affordability 
a lot of the time. Here it’s definitely more about democratic control, 
because people feel like they want the government to see that people 
have not been listened to all the time; that they can do it themselves, 
even though the government should have been doing it all along.
It is not only desires for democracy that motivate CLT campaigns. In all the 
diverse cases of CLT experimentation—successes and failures—residents and 
37 Ethan Miller, “Community Economy: Ontology, Ethics, and Politics for Radically 
Democratic Economic Organizing”, Rethinking Marxism 25.4 (2013): 518–533.
38 Peter North and Molly Scott Cato, eds, Towards Just and Sustainable Economies: The Social 
and Solidarity Economy North and South (Policy Press, 2017).
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activists have reacted against some external threat to dwelling in place. If we 
wish to move collective alternatives on from being a merely bespoke, isolated 
solution found in reaction to a contextualised problem to one constituting a 
newly democratic mainstream, we need first to identify the outlines of the 
dominant system that reproduces such problems. The distinction between the 
hegemonic system for housing and regeneration and the counter-hegemonic 
alternative gestured at by the Liverpool co-ops and CLTs can be glimpsed 
through the lens of John F.C. Turner’s metaphor of seeing housing as a verb 
or a noun. This is made manifest in Liverpool’s history—we can trace its 
shape in the divergence between large-scale top-down housing-led approaches 
and smaller-scale, bottom-up collective housing alternatives. This concluding 
section to Part IV is a retelling of this history through this dialectical lens of 
housing seen as a noun and a verb, as dead labour and everyday life, as material 
object and social process. 
Top-down property-led approaches tend to focus on the noun-like 
quality of dwelling, which all too often blinds policymakers from its 
verb-like dynamics. Whilst much of the justly called ‘slum housing’ cleared 
by Liverpool City Council was in dire need of replacing, this created a 
problematic precedent in successive state programmes for targeting the 
housing itself as the object of renewal efforts rather than deeper systemic 
processes and socioeconomic issues at the root of dilapidation and poor 
conditions. The slum-clearance programme aimed to rehouse residents 
in modern tenements, tower blocks and houses, mostly built out on the 
city’s periphery. But providing people with all the latest amenities in clean, 
spacious, safe environments was necessary but not sufficient to improve 
quality of life and, in fact, too often destroyed the delicate web of social 
relations that knitted communities together and provided the socioeconomic 
safety nets and systems of mutual aid and solidarity so important in times of 
hardship and precarity. Moreover, post-war slum clearances were conducted 
by the municipal authorities with such fervour as to help tip the inner city 
into a seemingly inexorable spiral of decline. Whilst similar programmes 
have posed problems for many post-industrial urban areas of the global rust 
belt, this has been especially acute for Liverpool—a city that has lost half its 
population in half a century. Thus the city’s housing question morphed into 
what I have called the neighbourhood question.
Repeated down the decades is a narrow focus on material dwellings (seen 
as a noun) to the detriment of the social relations that animate the activities 
of dwelling (as a verb). Deteriorating conditions in council-managed terraces 
and tenements were made worse by the political circumstances of Liverpool’s 
so-called ‘lost decade’ of 1973–83, during which minority Liberal administra-
tions pursued a policy of municipal housing retrenchment: putting a halt to all 
new council-housebuilding, and switching budgets into the voluntary and third 
sectors; leading to massive growth in dilapidated ‘hard-to-let’ properties and 
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a huge waiting list. Liberal motivations were part commendable commitments 
to the principle of dweller control and part politicking strategy to disarm 
the Works Department—the city’s heavily unionised housing maintenance 
division, whom the Liberals believed were too powerful, inefficient, bureau-
cratic and wasteful of public resources. Ironically, by fervently supporting the 
co-op and housing association movements as alternative means to resolve the 
housing question, the Liberals only exacerbated it, and paved the way for their 
demise, through the populist Militant backlash. 
For all the Militant-led council’s admirable ambitions to reappropriate 
the means of social reproduction and resolve the housing crisis of the 1970s 
through a massive £350 million programme of council house building, their 
Urban Regeneration Strategy was strangely fixated on the type of housing it 
built rather than its relation to wider socioeconomic processes. Influenced 
by Alice Coleman’s ‘design disadvantagement’ theory, URS architect Tony 
Byrne became seduced by a kind of design determinism in which the figure 
of the inter-war semi-detached suburban house was fetishised as the ideal 
design for his renewal of council housing. Militant’s monomania elevated their 
housebuilding programme as the answer to many of Liverpool’s problems: by 
socialising the ownership and management of housing, and striking partner-
ships with big developers, thereby creating new jobs, the council hoped to 
tackle the worsening unemployment problem as well as inject desperately 
needed investment into declining neighbourhoods and reverse deteriorating 
housing conditions for those thousands then stuck on waiting lists or in dilapi-
dated tenements. 
We see history repeat itself with HMR in the twenty-first century—
curiously similar outcomes from seemingly divergent ideologies. With homes 
emptying and many neighbourhoods left abandoned, the local state was forced 
to act: HMR renewed the state’s commitment to large-scale intervention 
in the urban environment after decades of retreat—only with a neoliberal 
twist. In neoliberalism’s assault of individualisation and atomisation on the 
social relations of state and society, self-interest trumps the common good 
and private profit triumphs over common wealth. The idea of collectively 
governing shared resources as a commons appears increasingly alien in this 
ideological context. The growing dominance of markets in urban policy 
thinking is evident in the narrow focus of HMR—concocted as a bespoke 
intervention in ‘failing housing markets’. By focusing on the functionality of 
the market and the exchange value of the housing product—rather than the 
health of the urban environment or the welfare of inhabitants—HMR seemed 
to usher in a new urban question, one concerned with the commodification 
and financialisation of land. 
Much like Militant’s URS, too much of the energies unleashed through HMR 
were directed towards treating the surface symptom of a deeper structural 
problem. Whilst HMR’s initial objective of restructuring housing markets was 
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in certain respects forward-thinking in taking as its object the wider systemic 
structure of regional housing markets, this expansive rationale was soon 
distilled down to the narrow issue of housing type and design. The reasons for 
this mission drift are complex and highly political—caught up, as I explained in 
the previous chapter, in increasingly financialised incentive structures governing 
housing associations since the 1988 Housing Act. Put simply, because HMR 
followed an abstract logic of markets and exchange, the problem was succes-
sively reformulated and reframed as one of housing ‘products’ competing for the 
attention of upwardly mobile ‘consumers’ in a residential ‘market of position’—
an expression of the incursion of logics of abstraction and commodification into 
housing regeneration policy. Terraced housing was deemed to be unpopular and 
therefore unviable by HMR researchers owing to its low market price, and so 
the solution was found in replacing it with a new product, reflecting consumer 
choice, rather than improving wider systemic factors, such as employment, 
education, health and environmental quality. The terraced house was thereby 
vilified as ‘obsolete’—internalising the responsibility for complex socio-spatial 
structural problems into the terraced house itself. 
In thus fetishising the housing itself over the activities that produce and 
enliven it, property-led (or noun-like) approaches to regeneration thereby do 
more damage than first meets the eye. The comprehensive renewal mentality 
shared by the Slum Clearance Programme, URS and HMR acts to ‘thingify’ 
the flow of space,39 by focusing in on the end-product, the final design, over 
the process of getting there—neglecting the lived space of inhabitants in favour 
of abstract visions of planners and technocrats. They tend to obfuscate the 
interactive connection between dweller and dwelling. The political potential of 
collective alternatives resides in protecting and democratising that connection.
With contestation over demolition provoked once more by HMR, the seeds 
of housing activism had reason to grow again—this time in the shape of CLTs. 
What activists in Granby and Homebaked were quick to realise—just as the 
Eldonians did before them—was that upgrading the materiality of housing alone 
would not be enough. This insight is acknowledged even by leading figures in 
HMR management. A former regional director of the Housing Corporation 
and managing director of a neighbouring HMR Pathfinder acknowledges that:
You have to try and make sure that housing is linked into other forms 
of socio-economic regeneration … And if I think a mistake was made in 
the work that led to Housing Market Renewal, well, it should have been 
called “Market Renewal”; because housing in a sense may stabilise, may 
39 Andy Merrifield, “Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation”, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 18.4 (1993): 516–531. For a Lefebvrian critique of HMR’s 
American counterpart, HOPE VI, see Jones and Popke, “Re-Envisioning the City: 
Lefebvre, HOPE VI, and the Neoliberalization of Urban Space”.
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stop decline, but in itself it will not be enough to promote economic 
wellbeing. You have to have other things that go alongside it. That’s 
where the Eldonians were clever.
Yet there is something about the demonstrable materiality of large-scale 
property-led development that maintains its hegemony: it produces quanti-
fiable, relatively rapid and visible results. With the increasing infiltration of 
abstraction into urban renewal policy—in the target-driven, performance-
measured, market-led and evidence-based approach to designing and evaluating 
interventions—large-scale housing-led schemes are able to attract large pots of 
funding from government and the EU, as well as demonstrate their outputs in 
measurable terms: number of houses demolished, built, refurbished etc. This 
becomes an almost self-verifying, reinforcing logic, in that greater quantities 
of demolished and completed homes validate the initial outlay, but also bring 
additional investment and secure the financial interests of the major stake-
holders—the council, housing associations and developers—that constitute 
Liverpool’s ‘grant regime’. To justify further investment, the grant regime 
must demonstrate need through evidence of further housing dereliction and 
socioeconomic malaise. Facing fiscal austerity—with decreasing resources 
from central government to resolve growing socio-spatial problems—munici-
palities like Liverpool are experiencing increasing pressures to exploit the 
‘rent gap’ as an alternative source of revenue.40
Despite pulling in huge amounts of government funding into the city, 
HMR and other schemes like it fail to embed this capital in place or within 
the social space of the neighbourhoods in need of investment. Instead, much 
of this capital is siphoned off into the pockets of the various public and private 
partners comprising the grant regime. This was put to good use in some 
instances, such as recycled back into basic public services, as a means of cross-
subsiding falling council budgets in times of austerity. However, it generally 
failed to leave a lasting trace in the neighbourhoods themselves, nor did it build 
the kind of durable socio-spatial infrastructures for the slow and steady work 
of regeneration once state funding dried up. We can see the shortcomings of 
housing-led redevelopment all too clearly in the case of HMR: when funding 
was cut, neighbourhoods were left like “war zones”, according to former Lib 
Dem Leader of Liverpool City Council, Warren Bradley, who has publicly 
recognised the limitations of this abstract, monolithic housing-led approach to 
the neighbourhood question:
You can’t rip the heart of the community and promise them something 
in 15 years’ time. … We announced six renewal areas, and in 
40 Hamish Kallin and Tom Slater, “Activating Territorial Stigma: Gentrifying Marginality 
on Edinburgh’s Periphery”, Environment and Planning A 46.6 (2014): 1351–1368.
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hindsight we should have done it one by one. Completing one area 
and then moving onto the next. … We should have landscaped areas 
so that people didn’t feel they were living in a war zone. … The big 
challenge is going to be to sustain communities in areas where we have 
announced renewal.41
Unrealised opportunities to utilise the CLT model within HMR delivery 
to ‘lock in’ capital investment and recycle surpluses locally—in a more self-
sustaining and self-sufficient method of regeneration that does not require 
continued top-up public funding—would have represented a paradigm shift 
from hierarchical dependence on the state towards local autonomy in which 
regeneration becomes self-generating, building its own momentum from an 
initial state investment. 
HMR was part of a broader trend. By the turn of the millennium, 
Liverpool had become very talented at playing the ‘regeneration game’: 
demonstrating deprivation in order to secure public funding from the EU and 
central government that could then be multiplied by grant regime partners. 
The effect on people and place, however, was equally impactful. Declining 
inner-city neighbourhoods like Anfield have been stuck for a long time in a 
self-defeating mindset of proving to authorities the severity of local deprivation 
and the need for external assistance. Born-and-bred local resident, artist and 
Homebaked co-founder Jayne Lawless (whose father Jimmy sat on the CLT 
board) describes the dampening, deadening effect this can have on self-esteem 
and collective identity:
There was a big pot of gold … In order to access this pot, the area had 
to tick so many boxes in the magical world of deprivation. So suddenly, 
we were told all the time that we were from this deprived area. And 
we were like “I’m not deprived. I don’t feel deprived. We have food and 
clothes, both parents work. How am I deprived?” But the more you feed 
that in: “You’re poor, you’re this, you’re that”, you watch the standards 
drop; everything seemed to drop, and it took about ten years, but they 
finally ticked that last box they needed to tick, and that was that.42 
This is a troubling example of the power of performativity: how the concep-
tualisations and categories used to analyse socio-spatial conditions can 
adversely reshape place in their own image.43 Whilst the regeneration game 
41 Quoted in David Bartlett, “Council Leader Warren Bradley: We Ripped Heart Out 
of Liverpool Communities”, Liverpool Echo (26 Apr. 2010).
42 Jayne Lawless, quoted in Jeeves, “Performance, Participation and Questions of 
Ownership in the Anfield Home Tour”, p. 7.
43 Manuel B. Aalbers, “Do Maps Make Geography? Part 1: Redlining, Planned Shrinkage, 
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is no doubt a laudable alternative to managed decline as a response to the 
neighbourhood question, it too enacts a certain cynical opportunism with 
respect to place—a cynicism which gets inscribed into the urban fabric. 
Conversely, Granby and Homebaked CLTs are perhaps the first initiatives 
of the last few decades positively to assert pride and a celebratory outlook: 
demonstrating to potential members and investors alike their extraordinary 
power to effect urban transformation through creative grassroots interven-
tions. By redescribing place in a more positive light, they may well begin 
to ‘perform’ that space into being. Seen as a pair, Homebaked and Granby 
represent a paradigm shift from conventional regeneration programmes. A 
large part of this shift is to do with time and the nature of learning. Local 
resident, activist and founder of the Homegrown Collective Sam Jones 
describes it as a logic of resilience: 
The hard-won cumulative victories and long-term asset-building that 
is framed in every aspect of the activities of Homebaked … is a slow 
and risk-laden process. … Homebaked has itself understood the impor-
tance of slow learning and cumulative change through this longitudinal 
model. … This open and long-term modality has been a difficult 
commitment to retain in the face of the urgency, and even desperation, 
that characterises the needs of the local residents of Anfield as regen-
eration strategies shift and change and continue to threaten not only 
Homebaked but also their own homes.44
It is in Granby we find this most viscerally embodied. Granby’s grass-
roots practices are essentially imagined collective claims that actively take 
ownership over neglected and derelict public space. Working without 
permission from the council, these guerrilla gardeners engage in everyday 
acts of commoning: bringing the domestic, intimate spaces of their homes out 
into the public streetscape, sharing it with others, and creating a distinctive 
hybrid community garden that mixes domesticity, privacy, communality and 
public openness—bearing the hallmarks of an ‘actually existing commons’.45 
In blurring and working in the liminal space between the spatial and legal 
boundaries of the ownership model, such insurgent acts are informal and 
and the Places of Decline”, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 13.4 
(2014): 525–556; Brett Christophers, “Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political 
Economy, Affordable Housing Development and the Performative World-Making of 
Economic Models”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.1 (2014): 79–97.
44 Samantha Jones, “Becoming Homebaked”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2, Homebaked: 
A Perfect Recipe (2014).
45 Efrat Eizenberg, “Actually Existing Commons: Three Moments of Space of Community 
Gardens in New York City”, Antipode 44.3 (2012): 764–782.
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unrecognised forms of ownership: an ‘imagined proprietorship’46 or an 
‘un-real estate’47—highlighting ownership as an active process of human 
doing, a verb, as well as a passive entitlement to an inert object. Enacting 
collective housing alternatives does not simply amount to a change in legal 
title securing redistribution of entitlements over land—but is vitalised by 
commoning: breathing life into institutional formulas. As Peter Linebaugh 
remarks on common property: “think first not of title deeds, but of human 
deeds”.48 Just as housing is not simply an object but also an activity, so 
too is property not a thing or possession but an active social relation, 
performed through embodied practices. Commoning in Granby cuts across 
political and social distinctions among residents, who have forged common 
bonds despite diverse world views through communal cleaning, planting 
and tending. Nonetheless, these practices are largely confined to a small 
number of remaining homeowners, highlighting how, as Linebaugh imparts, 
“Commoning is exclusive inasmuch as it requires participation. It must be 
entered into. … This is why we speak neither of rights nor obligations 
separately”.49 This suggests that commoners need to reach outwards to wider 
publics to achieve any kind of democratic legitimacy or broader social justice.
In this way, collective alternatives such as Granby and Homebaked 
CLTs embody what Lefebvre called ‘experimental utopias’—an incremental, 
embodied, performative approach to transforming social relations in the 
here and now, not some distant future, by staying close to “its implica-
tions and consequences on the ground”.50 Lefebvre distinguished ‘utopian’ 
(concrete explorations of the possible in everyday life) from ‘utopist’ (abstract, 
transcendental visions of an ideal city) which tend towards authoritarianism 
in their prescriptions.51 The dialectic between temporal openness and spatial 
closure—between verb-like and noun-like aspects—marks a creative tension 
within any utopian project, not least Homebaked. A playful temporary art 
installation fronts the terrace row whilst it awaits rehabilitation. On each 
boarded-up window on the first floor are stencilled big colourful letters that 
read: N-O-W-H-E-R-E. According to artist Daniel Simpkins, this invites 
46 Nicholas Blomley, “Un-Real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public Gardening”, Antipode 
36.4 (2004): 614–641.
47 Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership 
(Westview Press, 1994).
48 Peter Linebaugh, The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All (University 
of California Press, 2009), p. 45.
49 Peter Linebaugh, Stop, Thief!: The Commons, Enclosures, and Resistance (PM Press, 2014), 
p. 15.
50 Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities (Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), p. 151.
51 David Pinder, “Reconstituting the Possible: Lefebvre, Utopia and the Urban Question”, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39.1 (2013): 28–45.
12: Technocratic Experiment or Experimental Utopia? 259
its mis-reading as NowHere—a playful reference to Thomas More’s original 
coinage of the word utopia out of the Greek ou-topos meaning ‘no place’ or 
‘nowhere’ as a pun on the similar word eu-topos or ‘good place’. This double-
vision creates a jarring juxtaposition, as Simpkins implies:
The word “nowhere” is also in stark contrast to the language of “place 
making” used by city planners, architects and estate agents who attempt 
to offset the soullessness of generic urban developments through 
naming, branding and marketing aimed at creating a false sense of 
something unique and special.52 
Little encapsulates this better than the generic HMR regeneration zone 
billboards thrown up across the city—formatted in standardised script from 
Granby to Anfield, which could be anywhere or nowhere at all. The taglines 
gesture vaguely at ‘creating neighbourhoods for the future’—not for the 
present. Paradoxically, ‘creating’ suggests an active doing in the present—it 
assures us action is happening now to regenerate these neighbourhoods—
but with an ever-receding time horizon, created for the end-user in some 
distant, abstract future. This assumes a division between the makers and 
users of urban space—what sociologist Fran Tonkiss calls the ‘fallacy of 
the end-user’.53 Here, development becomes abstracted from its context and 
current inhabitants excluded from the production process. The abstract time 
horizons of neoliberal urban policy, a little like revolutionary socialism—both 
more ‘utopist’ than utopian—tend to privilege the future, and the future 
end-user, over the present. Fortunately, the HMR billboard has been replaced 
by NOWHERE. If we squint, instead of seeing NoWhere we might just 
glimpse NowHere. What better way of signifying utopian transformation in 
the here and now; the immanent sense of prefigurative change; the dialectics 
of temporal urgency and spatial determinacy? No better way of demonstrating 
arrival, presence, proprietorship: now we’re here to stay.
52 Quoted in Becoming Homebaked, timeline developed by Britt Jurgensen for ‘Trainings 
for the Not-Yet’ Exhibition, Utrecht, 14 Sept. 2019 to 12 Jan. 2020: www.bakonline.org/
program-item/trainings-for-the-not-yet/.
53 Fran Tonkiss, “Austerity Urbanism and the Makeshift City”, City: Analysis of Urban 
Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 17.3 (2013): 312–324.
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In September 2018, during the Labour Party’s annual national conference in 
Liverpool, its then leader Jeremy Corbyn took time out of his busy schedule to 
pay a special visit to Granby. After meeting various residents, who gave him a 
tour of newly inhabited CLT-owned homes and relayed the story of how they 
saved them from near total destruction to transform the four streets into a 
flourishing community-owned neighbourhood, Corbyn had this to say:
Granby Four Streets is a blueprint for what the rest of the UK could 
look like under a Labour Government. These homes, once empty, are 
now filled with life. This community, once abandoned, is now rebuilt. 
When you give communities democratic control over their local 
economy and community, real change can happen. When we go into 
Government, we won’t just take power, we’ll give it back.1
That a Labour Party Leader was so supportive of a community-led project—
all too often in the not-so-distant past associated cynically with the Tories’ 
so-called ‘Big Society’ localism—is surprise enough. That this project 
for democratic local control was hailed as a “blueprint” for governing 
the country is truly remarkable. Corbyn’s—and Corbynism’s—support 
for Granby Four Streets signalled not only a significant realignment in 
political direction for the left wing of the Labour Party but also for how we 
(re)conceive a democratic-socialist state and the provision of public services, 
not least public housing. This has big implications not just for the UK but 
internationally too. Notwithstanding news of their resounding electoral 
defeat on Friday the 13th of December 2019, Corbyn’s Labour Party had 
been widely held on the Left, especially across the Atlantic and in conti-
nental Europe, as one of the last-remaining bastions of political hope in an 
otherwise gloomy global landscape marked by rising reactionary populisms, 
proto-fascisms, neo-colonial state capitalism and corporate-controlled digital 
feudalism. The rise of Corbynism mirrored comparable developments in 
Spain, where the left-populist party Podemos is just one part of an emergent 
1 Joe Thomas, “Corbyn Hailed This Liverpool Community as a ‘Blueprint’ for His Vision 
of the UK”, Liverpool Echo (24 Sept. 2018).
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counter-hegemonic historic bloc built on the back of the Indignados anti-
austerity mass social movement and new municipalist projects such as 
Barcelona en Comú, the radical citizen platform leading a global movement 
of Fearless Cities2—representing two wings of a multi-scalar counter-
offensive to financialised neoliberalism and austerity urbanism. In the UK, 
if not quite so developed as in Spain, an institutional infrastructure for 
new policy ideas generation and implementation—a potential Mont Pelerin 
Society for the Left3—is coming together at the national level, including 
new media and political education organisations like Novara Media and 
The World Transformed, campaign and community organisers such as the 
New Economy Organisers Network (NEON) and new think tanks such 
as Autonomy and Common Wealth. Moreover, just as housing (as a social 
right of citizenship) has been a central concern in Spanish municipalist 
movements—(Barcelona en Comú draws its energies from cooperative 
housing movements and anti-eviction activism combating the foreclosure 
crisis)4—so too in the UK is the notion of public housing back on the agenda. 
At the municipal scale we see a great deal of experimentation in different 
forms of public housing from diverse actors. Local authorities are building 
council houses again, for the first time in decades—more on which below. 
Activists, housing practitioners and action-researchers are forging coalitions 
of support for collective housing alternatives, such as Greater Manchester 
Housing Action’s Housing Futures research partnership, which makes the 
case to Greater Manchester’s devolved city-regional government for the 
social value of community-led alternatives.5 So too does housing play a key 
part in the fashionable municipalist model developed for Preston, where 
local mutualised housing associations are enrolled as anchor institutions and 
the development of community land trusts for the provision of community-
owned affordable homes is a major priority.6
So how does the new economic policy thinking orbiting Corbynism—at 
the moment when Corbynism, now without Corbyn, evolves into its next 
iteration—depart from the Labour Party of the past, the party of centralised 
socialism, top-down national ownership of the economy, comprehensive 
2 Bertie Russell, “Beyond the Local Trap: New Municipalism and the Rise of the Fearless 
Cities”, Antipode, 51.3 (2019): 989–1010.
3 Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World without 
Work (Verso, 2015).
4 Melissa García-Lamarca, “From Occupying Plazas to Recuperating Housing: Insurgent 
Practices in Spain”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 41.1 (2017): 37–53.
5 Richard Goulding, Housing Futures: What Can Community-Led Housing Achieve for Greater 
Manchester? (Greater Manchester Housing Action, 2019).
6 Matthew Thompson, “What’s so new about New Municipalism?”, Progress in Human 
Geography (2020): 1–26: https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132520909480.
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urban renewal and mass public housing? Answers can be gleaned from 
Labour’s seminal Alternative Models of Ownership Report,7 written in 2017 
by policy thinkers drawn from the cooperative movement, think tanks 
specialising in community-led local economic development and research 
institutes interested in remunicipalisation and democratisation of public 
services. The report laid out a vision for what a democratically owned and 
socially just economy might look like. Although it focused on economic 
forms of ownership, it also cited as vital components of a democratised 
society the housing cooperative movement, mutualised housing associations, 
community land trusts and mutual home ownership societies. Granby Four 
Streets CLT’s holistic approach to local economic development has been 
characterised in this vein—at the risk of journalistic overreach, riffing on 
the portmanteau Corbynomics—as ‘Granbynomics’.8 Corbynomics was the 
result of the Labour Party’s so-called ‘institutional turn’—a radical reori-
entation in policy thinking towards cultivating the new institutions (CLTs 
and co-ops amongst them) capable of bringing about “a bold transformation 
of the British economy organised around ownership, control, democracy, 
and participation”.9 Whether Corbynomics survives Corbyn is beside the 
point; this recent shift in Labour Party thinking is just one manifestation 
(and personification) of a deeper political and intellectual current calling 
for democratising and, after decades of neoliberal dismantling, reconstructing 
public ownership.10 
It is in this spirit I have written this book—as an intervention in recon-
structing the recent history of public housing. Whilst the popular narrative 
renders it as the rise and fall of monolithic municipal housing, I have sought to 
construct an alternative account that mines the subterranean seam of experi-
mentation with collective housing alternatives. This possible pathway towards 
Public Sector Housing 2.0 or Mark II—tentatively undertaken in Liverpool 
but ultimately not travelled—could nonetheless provide the conceptual 
building blocks for reconstructing public housing today and in the future, 
for a system of provision refounded on cooperative practices and collective 
ownership. But this is about more than just reconstructing public sector 
housing; it is about renewing political optimism in democratic socialist—
and utopian—alternatives to a broken system. Since Marx and Engels first 
7 Labour Party, “Alternative Models of Ownership” (Labour Party, 2017): http://labour.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Alternative-Models-of-Ownership.pdf.
8 Julia Rampen, “Granbynomics: How Liverpool Is Building a New Economic Model”, 
New Statesman (17 Oct. 2019).
9 Martin O’Neill and Joe Guinan, “The Institutional Turn: Labour’s New Political 
Economy”, Renewal 26.2 (2018): 5–16 (p. 5).
10 Andrew Cumbers, Reclaiming Public Ownership: Making Space for Economic Democracy 
(Zed Books, 2012).
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caricatured utopian thought as idealist and insufficiently materialist, utopian 
housing projects of various pedigrees—from anarchist to state-technocratic—
have been ‘put on trial’.11 Emerging from the long decades of derision for 
anything remotely utopian, during which the End of History and There is 
No Alternative postured as common sense, with critical-theoretical analogues 
in ‘post-politics’12 and ‘capitalist realism’,13 the balance of forces are finally 
shifting and, in this Gramscian interregnum when the old is dying and the 
new cannot be born, there is renewed appetite for exploring what Erik Olin 
Wright described as ‘real utopias’—actually existing alternatives that respond 
to historical material conditions of suffering and injustice and which transform 
power relations, incrementally and experimentally, to broaden and deepen 
possibilities for meaningful democracy.14 
The collective housing alternatives explored in this book are each, in 
their own limited and contradictory ways, real utopias. They were all born 
out of conditions of urgency, of needs left unmet by the state and market; 
radical new spaces invented out of a pragmatic will to survive in the face of 
adversity. Closing the gaps opened up by the abstraction and fetishisation of 
space under capitalism—gaps within the dialectic of the ‘thingness’ and ‘flow 
of space’,15 its noun-like and verb-like qualities, between material outcome 
and creative process, between producer and consumer—is the real utopian 
potential of collective housing alternatives.16 They attempt to reconnect the 
producer and user of housing by utilising and cultivating the skillsets, passions, 
energies and imaginations of current residents—not some abstract target 
consumer population who may or may not materialise. This is the realm of 
Lefebvre’s ‘experimental utopia’—concrete explorations of the possible in 
everyday life17—in which inhabitants themselves, the street-level innovators as 
opposed to modernist planners or visionaries, concretely shape spatial projects 
through the testing out by trial and error of experimental material practices, 
guided by ambitious political visions but rooted in local knowledge and 
practical wisdom. Experimental utopias tentatively created by co-operators, 
commoners, community homesteaders, guerrilla gardeners and revolutionary 
11 Alice Coleman, Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing (Hilary Shipman 
Ltd, 1985).
12 Japhy Wilson and Erik Swyngedouw, eds, The Post-Political and Its Discontents: Spaces of 
Depoliticization, Spectres of Radical Politics (Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
13 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Zero Books, 2009).
14 Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (Verso, 2010).
15 Merrifield, “Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation”.
16 I explore these arguments in greater depth in Thompson, “Contesting Dilapidated 
Dwelling”.
17 David Pinder, “Reconstituting the Possible: Lefebvre, Utopia and the Urban Question”, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39.1 (2013): 28–45.
13: Reconstructing Public Housing (History) 267
recipe-makers thus tend to transform space endogenously in the here and now, 
through immanent and immersive methods that are intense (not future tense); 
foregrounding collective property claims as an active ‘doing’ rather than a 
passive entitlement, thereby renewing a sense of dwelling as social activity as 
well as material object. 
In sum, this book is about trying to see in collective alternatives a real 
utopian potential to transform public housing and urban economies. It is 
about making the commons a foundation of a renewed public sector; about 
making the foundational economy, of which housing is an intrinsic part, a 
more democratic domain. It is about democratising and making more socially 
responsive and collectively beneficial what is arguably the most founda-
tional component of personal and public life: the activity (and materiality) 
of dwelling. This is a vision by no means shared by all those involved in the 
projects I have studied or all those I interviewed—although it is implied in 
the words of many. They have drawn for me the coordinates of a new, alter-
native system of doing housing, regeneration and urban governance and I have 
joined up the dots. There is thus real utopian potential to combine the best 
of the co-op, community development trust and CLT models to create an 
alternative system of public housing provision and urban governance that may 
one day, with the right political and institutional support, begin to challenge 
the hegemony of private property rights and market-oriented, property-led 
approaches to regeneration.
In this opening chapter of the concluding part, I first return to some of the 
theoretical political-economic concerns with which I introduced and framed 
the book, focusing on the power of collective housing alternatives as Polanyian 
counter-movements and as articulations of the commons in relation to the state 
and capital. Next, I revisit the three guiding questions structuring the book—
the Housing, Neighbourhood and Urban Questions—before highlighting the 
contradictions manifest in co-ops and CLTs entailed by their (to adapt a phrase 
from the black feminist poet Audre Lorde) using the master’s tools to dismantle the 
master’s house.18 This helps frame subsequent reflections, in chapter 14, on (re)
constructing historical narrative through story-telling and myth-making. Here, 
I explore the dialectic between event and process: the initial spur to action of 
fighting for collective alternatives in dramatic political campaigns set against 
their ongoing management and governance through bureaucratic procedures. 
Next, I consider the myth of Liverpool exceptionalism—whether Liverpool’s 
Cooperative Revolution is an exceptional, one-off occurrence inextricably 
bound up with the city’s unique socioeconomic conditions and cultural identity 
or, conversely, whether something similar can be replicated elsewhere. In 
arguing for the latter, I then analyse in finer detail what, precisely, were the 
18 Audre Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House”, in Sister 
Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Crossing Press, 1984), pp. 110–114. 
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factors for its emergence in Liverpool; identifying the individual ingredients 
in the ‘recipe for revolution’ (to borrow a phrase from Homebaked19) as a 
means for concocting similarly potent cocktails elsewhere. Engaging further 
with drawing out generalisable lessons from this particular history, in chapter 
15 I consider how the task of replication and expansion of housing commons 
may be achieved through institutional design. The aim here is to advance 
our understanding of how we might redesign state institutions and prefigure 
new institutional infrastructure for the reconstruction of public housing 
through the cooperative coordination, replication and scaling of collective 
housing alternatives, without sacrificing their radical roots or democratic 
socialist potential. In short, how might we, rather counterintuitively, build a 
bureaucracy from below? Finally, in an extended Epilogue, I reflect upon the 
trilingual translating required of successful campaigners between different 
registers of communication with fellow activists, with the wider public and 
with powerful gatekeepers—what activist-writer Dougald Hine calls “Inward”, 
“Outward” and “Upward” languages—where I delve deeper into the power of 
language and representation for expanding housing commons. Finally, through 
this lens, I reflect upon Granby’s Turner Prize achievement and consider the 
social, cultural and political implications of the artistic representation of public 
housing experiments in Granby and Homebaked as forms of socially conscious, 
politically performative works of art.
In, Against and Beyond Public Housing
In this book I have purposefully represented mutual housing societies, 
co-operatives, co-housing, community development trusts and CLTs as 
types of what I call collective housing alternatives for precisely this reason: 
to emphasise their proximity to public housing, as an alternative to state-led 
provision; foregrounding their capacity to reimagine and reconstruct public 
housing in more democratic directions, and to establish collective or common 
ownership of land and assets as a bulwark against commodification and 
enclosure of the commons. This perspective helps us move beyond bounded 
definitions of their belonging strictly within communities or civil society as 
implied by the conventional term ‘community-led housing’ and highlights, 
contra ‘collaborative housing’, their potential to challenge and transform 
rather than collaborate with capitalism. Although this conceptualisation has 
been shaped by specific reference to the British context, the concept of insti-
tutionalising a ‘non-state public’ form of housing is applicable to many other 
19 Sue Potts, Homebaked—Impact Report: Recipes for Revolutions (Homebaked, 2014): www.
biennial.com/files/pdfs/3216/140509-final-homebaked-impact-report-suepotts.pdf.
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national contexts—as has been recently explored in the case of Denmark20—
and is intended to resonate internationally.
Collective housing movement-building—in Liverpool and elsewhere—has 
always been a highly transnational and globally interdependent phenomenon. 
Cooperative housing is a story of travelling ideas and mobile technologies 
originally exported from Britain to Scandinavia and back again,21 spreading 
out across central and southern Europe where co-ops have really taken root, 
and now growing through cross-pollination of projects from all over the world. 
American-founded CLTs were inspired by anti-enclosure philosophies from 
India and England before being exported across the global North and South.22 
In an increasingly globalised capitalism, collective housing projects are fighting 
similar threats of accumulation by dispossession. Sharing ideas, learning from 
each other and developing transnational and inter-urban networks of mutual 
support and cooperative exchange will only become more salient in the years 
ahead.
Collective housing alternatives can be understood in Polanyian terms as a 
counter-movement counteracting the tendencies of capitalism to dis-embed 
the market from its social foundations in society and commodify land and 
other common resources. CLTs and co-ops can thus be conceptualised as 
institutional innovations that attempt to de-commodify land (in the realm 
of social reproduction) just as worker-owned co-ops do so for labour (in the 
sphere of production) and community-owned banks and building societies do 
so for money (in the circuit of exchange). In this sense they are part of an 
alternative system to capitalism, part of a distinctive social economy rooted 
in histories of voluntary association, mutualism, anarchism, cooperativism 
and guild socialism, and defined by the (Polanyian) logic of reciprocity in 
contrast to the opposing logics of (market) exchange and (state) command. 
The reciprocity of the social economy combined with the most progressive 
elements of the state—its powers of redistribution—together maintain social 
solidarity against the alienation, atomisation, competition and dispossession 
wrought by capitalism. 
Yet the collective housing alternatives explored in this book have rarely 
remained within the domain of social reproduction—they are about more 
than just housing. The Eldonians have cleverly utilised the Community 
Development Trust model to realise their vision of becoming a self-regen-
erating community—transforming ex-industrial derelict land into a popular 
20 Lorenzo Vidal, “Securing Social Gains in, against and beyond the State: The Case 
of Denmark’s ‘Common Housing’”, Housing, Theory and Society 36.4 (2018): 448–468.
21 David Clapham and Keith Kintrea, “Importing Housing Policy: Housing Co-operatives 
in Britain and Scandinavia”, Housing Studies 2.3 (1987): 157–169.
22 Tom Moore and Kim McKee, “Empowering Local Communities? An International 
Review of Community Land Trusts”, Housing Studies 27.2 (2012): 280–290.
Part V: Conclusion270
and sustainable urban village collectively controlled by the community, with 
many positive multiplier effects on local job and business creation and the 
surrounding environment. Like the Eldonians, Granby and Homebaked have 
gone beyond just housing to harness collective housing alternatives for local 
economic development. In Granby, ambitions to revitalise Granby Street as a 
local retail and cultural artery have already begun to materialise, with new 
businesses opening up for the first time in decades and plans afoot to install 
the market in more permanent form. Homebaked have created a community 
anchor in the co-op bakery, now considered a central keystone in the council’s 
wider regeneration vision—attracting inward investment and football fans to 
spend their money locally. Now with additional philanthropic funding and the 
backing of the council, Homebaked are rehabilitating their entire terraced row 
and nurturing a family of like-minded community projects and enterprises—
Homebaked bakery and the Homegrown Collective amongst them—brought 
together around the common goal of revitalising and democratising the local 
economy. 
Collective alternatives are also part of the foundational economy—a more 
recently formulated concept informed by a Polanyian perspective. It describes 
that sphere of economic activity traditionally associated with unproductive 
tax-supported public services, but which can be reconceived, following 
the Foundational Economy Collective,23 as the most socially valuable and 
highest-employment-generating part of the economy fundamental to all other 
(re)production. It provides those essential foundations for human and societal 
flourishing such as health, education, transport, energy, water, food and, last 
but not least, housing. This thinking suggests all housing is a matter of public 
interest. Many nation-states recognise this by funding or subsidising almost 
all tenures, including private rental and owner-occupation, either through tax 
relief, monetary policy, indirect grants or more direct provision. In Britain, 
dwellers are incentivised to buy a house by various tax benefits; ‘buy-to-let’ 
property investment is likewise encouraged; and housing benefit, once paid 
directly to councils or housing associations, is increasingly diverted to private 
landlords who profit at public expense.24 This apparent privatisation and 
marketisation belies the fact that the state still subsidises a large proportion 
of housing costs—in large part due to the housing question—because the 
market, under financialised capitalism, creates artificial scarcity amidst plenty. 
In some sense, then, all housing is public—funded publicly through redis-
tributive taxation, delivering social value for the good of society as much as 
for the individual citizen. Collective housing models such as co-ops and CLTs 
23 Foundational Economy Collective, Foundational Economy: The Infrastructure of Everyday 
Life.
24 Stuart Hodkinson, Paul Watt and Gerry Mooney, “Introduction: Neoliberal Housing 
Policy—Time for a Critical Re-Appraisal”, Critical Social Policy 33.1 (2013): 3–16.
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must be understood in this sense before we even begin to look at those special 
characteristics that contribute to the more delineated notion of public housing 
as a social right of citizenship.
Yet at the same time as highlighting these important connections with 
‘the public’ I have sought to dissociate collective housing alternatives from 
the public–private dualism—the ownership model—that pervades property 
relations under neoliberal capitalism. Here, the notion of the public is reduced 
to the domain of the state—the Leviathan—as regulator of public space, 
manager of public services and sovereign arbiter of property relations, serving 
private interests in exclusive ownership of land and other commodities critical 
to the accumulation of capital. The commons attempts to ‘unsettle this settle-
ment’25 by constituting a different conception of the public, one predicated 
on an expansive public sphere of participation, interaction, interdependence 
and cooperative self-governance. As legal and organisational articulations 
of housing commons, collective housing alternatives prefigure a way out of 
the ‘Leviathan logic’26 ordained by Hobbes and since suffusing (neo)liberal 
society—in the characteristics they share with emerging digital peer-to-peer 
and platform technologies, as I have argued in greater depth elsewhere.27 Such 
configurations tend to short-circuit the inter-mediating forces of state power 
and capital that currently structure social relations; they tend to replace the 
Leviathan logic of citizens related to each other ultimately only by virtue of 
their shared vertical relationships with the state with an alternative way of 
structuring human relations that privileges the more direct and horizontal ties 
of mutual aid, co-operation, solidarity and reciprocity. By embodying these 
values and practices within their institutional structures, co-ops and CLTs, 
alongside other articulations of the commons, move us in this direction even 
if, in reality, under conditions still dominated by the state and capital, they 
rarely live up to their real utopian potential.
Working within the ownership model, actually existing commons—like 
all real utopias—are neither free from contradictions nor immune to power 
relations. They are essentially pragmatic compromises made within a hostile 
legal landscape that attempt to express common relations in institutional form. 
As common property regimes for housing, they are complex hybrid social spaces: 
combining the privacy of the home with more cooperative social relations for 
the democratic governance of land. They must necessarily construct their 
own walls and boundaries—as collective but no less exclusive enclosures—in 
25 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City (Routledge, 2004).
26 Jeremy Gilbert, Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism 
(London: Pluto Press, 2013).
27 Matthew Thompson, “Playing with the Rules of the Game: Social Innovation for 
Urban Transformation”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 43.6 (2019): 
1168–1192.
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order to protect the commons against the more pernicious enclosures of capital 
and private property. They do this in different ways. Co-ops operate with 
the concept of ownership as forms of ‘collective private ownership’,28 whilst 
CLTs attempt to move beyond ownership towards the distinctive concept of 
stewardship, which has the potential to transcend the problem of inward-
facing exclusivity associated with co-ops through a more transparent, open and 
publicly accountable trust structure involving a broad base of stakeholders and 
the wider community—and not just member-residents. We can see this at play 
in both Granby and Homebaked CLTs. Stewardship is rooted in the classical 
CLT model’s founding concept of trusterty, which understands land—like all 
fictitious commodities as originally conceived by Polanyi—as a free gift from 
nature and therefore something entrusted to all of us and not rightfully owned 
by any one person. 
Of all counter-movements, collective housing alternatives are unique in 
dealing directly with land and property. That land is a fictitious commodity is 
an important point for understanding the political potential—as well as ethical 
roots—of collective housing movements. It is ‘fictitious’ because unlike a ‘real’ 
commodity it is not produced by human labour, pre-existing in nature, yet is 
artificially presented as a commodity for sale on the market. Moreover, because 
its value is almost entirely created not through the actions of any particular 
landowner but through its relationality, locational advantage and countless 
interactions between multiple actors across society, it is part of our common 
wealth, whose fruits are justly shared and governed by all. Of all the fictitious 
commodities—land, labour, capital—land is arguably the most foundational—
as it provides the necessary space and natural resources for all production 
to occur—for both the reproduction of human life and the production of 
(capitalist) value. Writing in The New Enclosure, critical geographer Brett 
Christophers reminds us of its special qualities: it is a fixed, finite, permanent, 
immovable, non-reproducible and legally excludable yet easily divisible and 
universally valuable good, defined by natural monopoly, making it the perfect 
vehicle for the distribution and store of value, as collateral underwriting debt 
and credit, and an object of speculative investment for future capital gains.29 
These qualities place land—and all that it supports, not least housing—at the 
heart of capitalist accumulation and contestation. Moreover, as global capital 
has exhausted its capacities for productive reinvestment of surplus capital, it has 
turned towards financialisation of common, public and natural assets as a kind of 
spatial fix to crises of profitability elsewhere in the system, entailing aggressive 
speculative investments and accumulation by dispossession in what Harvey has 
28 Charles Geisler and Gail Daneker, Property and Values: Alternatives to Public and Private 
Ownership (Island Press, 2000).
29 Brett Christophers, The New Enclosure: The Appropriation of Public Land in Neoliberal 
Britain (Verso, 2018).
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argued is the defining feature of our contemporary capitalist epoch.30 This is 
the New Urban Question animating the contemporary double movement—the 
movement towards commodification of land, including via state-led regeneration 
programmes, such as HMR in Liverpool, facilitating public–private harvesting 
of urban land value differentials, and the counter-movement of resistance from 
society, such as collective housing activists deploying community land trusts as 
institutional tools to resist commodification. 
The state has historically played a central role in both the fictitious 
commodification of land—alongside labour and capital—and counter-moves 
against it. The state has been instrumental in coordinating and accelerating the 
expansion of market exchange—its genesis is inseparable from the early devel-
opment of capitalism through enclosure of the commons, colonial plunder and 
extraction. Liverpool’s housing history attests to this: the Irish Potato Famine 
which brought so many refugees to Liverpool, into crowded slums by the 
docks, thereby seeding the conditions and the culture for collective action, was 
a by-product of the British state’s violent capitalist-colonial practices in Ireland. 
The municipal state acted, eventually, to ameliorate some of these appalling 
conditions through health and sanitation legislation and building amongst the 
world’s first public housing. The national state was harnessed alongside local 
authorities in the counter-movement against the market through massive 
state-funded programmes of comprehensive urban renewal and council house 
building, including the funding of co-ops in Liverpool. This is the state logic 
of redistribution being put to work for the development of reciprocity. Yet 
state motivations were often deeply ambivalent: state financing for public 
housing following the First World War was designed to absorb the labour of 
five million military-trained returning conscripted workers and avoid their 
disaffection, as an “insurance against Bolshevism and revolution”.31 Thus we 
should approach the state cautiously as neither friend nor foe, not as a unitary 
entity serving capitalism—as some anti-capitalists tend to see it—but as an 
ambivalent field of social relations governing a complex set of fiscal, regulatory 
and legal tools that can, under the right political conditions, be re-engineered 
for developing housing commons. 
Most recently, the state has been commandeered to serve capital. 
Since the neoliberal discrediting of state intervention from the late 1970s, 
public provision has been recommodified, outsourced through public–private 
partnerships, and austerity administered from the centre, leaving local 
government to pick up the pieces and seek to resolve the crisis in social 
30 David Harvey, Limits to Capital (Verso Books, 2007).
31 Parliamentary secretary, quoted in Neil Gray, “Spatial Composition and the 
Urbanization of Capital: The 1915 Glasgow Rent Strikes and the Housing Question 
Reconsidered”, in Neil Gray, ed., Rent and Its Discontents: A Century of Housing Struggle 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 49–67 (p. 52).
Part V: Conclusion274
reproduction, most visibly in rising homelessness and destitution, wrought 
by economic liberalisation. The privatisation of public land has been a 
primary—if, until recently, relatively invisible—flank in neoliberalisation. 
Since 1979, around 10 per cent of Britain’s total land has been privatised by 
the state, including council housing—that is approximately half of all the 
publicly owned land when Thatcher came to power, estimated at around 
£400 billion in today’s value, representing by far the biggest public sell-off.32 
Most of this has gone to private individuals and corporations; some, especially 
in recent years, sold off to developers by cash-strapped councils to pay for 
statutory services. Bucking this trend, a growing number of local authorities 
are experimenting with arm’s-length ‘special purpose vehicles’ to act as 
developers of new public stock—Liverpool City Council’s new municipal 
housing company was established in 2019 and named, rather appositely, 
Foundations. Such instruments are an ingenious means of bypassing legal 
constraints on council borrowing powers hitherto preventing their sourcing 
finance to build new homes as well as circumventing Right to Buy legislation 
once built. However, they have been critiqued for leveraging public assets 
to build for-profit market housing as well as non-profit social housing as a 
means to generate alternative sources of revenue to cross-subsidise austerity-
squeezed public services such as health and social care.33 In other words, with 
one hand they stoke the fire of financialisation, asset inflation, speculation 
and privatisation whilst, with the other, protect public services from those 
very same flames. Though this may end the direct privatisation of public 
assets effected through the public–private partnerships of previous modes of 
roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism, it is still a process of commodification, 
albeit one municipalised, undertaken by municipalities themselves.
Thus we can understand the state dialectically as a problematic institutional 
ensemble embroiled in a history of ongoing capitalist-colonial dispossession 
and extraction, enrolled in upholding elite class interests and accorded an 
ultimate mandate on the almost untrammelled use of violence whilst, at the 
same time, recognising it as the only social structure of sufficient scope and 
scale capable of protecting, supporting and expanding that common sphere of 
collective life resisting the logic of capital. The task, then, is not to reject the 
state wholesale but to reimagine and redesign its contours—using cooperative 
32 Christophers, The New Enclosure.
33 Joe Beswick and Joe Penny, “Demolishing the Present to Sell Off the Future? The 
Financialisation of Public Housing in London”, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 42.4 (2018): 612–632; Brett Christophers, “Putting Financialisation in Its 
Financial Context: Transformations in Local Government-Led Urban Development in 
Post-Financial Crisis England”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 44.3 (2019): 
571–586.
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principles as a template—or to prefigure an entirely different kind of state.34 
What might this look like in practical terms? A concomitant alternative to 
public–private partnerships resides in public–common partnerships whereby 
the state engages associations of commoners, such as co-ops and CLTs, in 
mutually beneficial partnerships to democratically govern public and common 
goods. Common Wealth, one of the new think tanks building a policy infra-
structure for the Left, has recently published a report on the subject,35 proving 
particularly influential in struggles for collective control over community 
assets and ex-council housing estates in London, and providing inspiration 
for reimagining state institutions for the development of collective housing 
alternatives. These are the kinds of institutional innovations that may work 
symbiotically with co-ops and CLTs to reconstruct public housing in the 
twenty-first century—ideas which I explore in greater depth in the final 
chapter.
How to Answer the Housing, Neighbourhood  
and Urban Questions?
If collective housing alternatives can be understood in Polanyian terms as 
part of a counter-movement against commodification, in Marxian terms 
such “solutions to the social question”36 tend to be interpreted more 
critically—as too utopian or simplistic to contend with the incredibly 
complex problem of capitalism. Engels’ original formulation of the housing 
question—that there can be no isolated solution to persistent material 
deprivation, class inequalities and uneven urban development so long as 
the capitalist mode of production persists—is one not easily addressed by 
co-ops or CLTs acting alone, at least not within the terms set by Marx and 
Engels. Although they framed the problem too narrowly as one of material 
deprivation, failing to foresee that the state could (and did for some time in 
some European countries) effectively resolve much housing poverty through 
public provision, particularly in the inter-war and post-war periods, their 
rendering remains relevant today. No sooner had the state provided good 
quality public housing in one locality than did the problem of deprivation 
appear elsewhere—especially if we trace these displacements globally. As 
34 Davina Cooper, “Prefiguring the State”, Antipode 49.2 (2017): 335–356; Davina 
Cooper, Nikita Dhawan and Janet Newman, Reimagining the State: Theoretical Challenges 
and Transformative Possibilities (Routledge, 2019).
35 Keir Milburn and Bertie Russell, Public–Common Partnerships: Building New Circuits 
of Collective Ownership (Common Wealth, 2019): https://common-wealth.co.uk/Public-
common-partnerships.html.
36 Marx, quoted in William Clare Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital 
(Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 23.
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per Engels’ thesis, isolated solutions to the housing question merely displace 
and reproduce the issue in different locations. 
Working within these parameters, community development trusts and 
CLTs can play an important role in addressing what I have called the 
neighbourhood question—how to resolve the socio-spatial concentration, 
reproduction and displacement of multiple deprivations within specific neigh-
bourhoods, wrought through uneven urban development, as evident in 
Liverpool. Whereas state-led solutions (comprehensive inner-city renewal and 
the construction of outer estates and new towns) focused on material improve-
ments and failed adequately to embed in place new opportunities for individual 
and collective economic development and community self-governance—
leading to the reappearance of symptoms—collective alternatives can act as 
anchors for recovery. However, they too cannot prevent the displacement of 
symptoms elsewhere. Only by creating a more systematic, comprehensive 
coverage of collective alternatives across all neighbourhoods threatened by 
capital flight can the neighbourhood question be more effectively addressed; 
and for this we need institutional infrastructure and scalar coordination.
Conventional state attempts to tackle the housing and neighbourhood 
questions—comprehensively clearing inner-city slums and constructing 
council housing or renewing the market for housing through public–private 
partnerships like HMR—have revealed new problems of deprivation related 
to social and cultural needs in the inadequacies of modernist renewal and 
distant bureaucratic landlordism. Resolving the (material) exploitation of the 
tenant–landlord relation is not enough; public housing also needs to deal with 
(cultural) alienation and (socio-spatial) exclusion. This is where collective 
alternatives can achieve more than traditional state-led forms of provision in 
terms of what public housing, at its most utopian and politically ambitious, 
was once intended to accomplish. They can reconnect the producer and user 
of housing and attempt to resolve the alienation and exploitation inherent to 
capitalism via collective democratic control over the means of social repro-
duction and, by extension, production.
Liverpool’s co-ops have helped protect tenant-co-operators from material 
exploitation/deprivation (through the economic security of collective 
ownership, promoting education, skills learning and new employment), from 
alienation/disconnection (through the process of democratic design, self-
build and ongoing cooperative management), from socio-political exclusion 
(through the collective empowerment of campaigning, inspiring renewed 
engagement in electoral politics and securing greater political representation 
in city decision-making) and from spatial displacement (through security of 
tenure of collective ownership). By taking control of housing assets and the 
surpluses generated by rents, the 1970s co-ops have effectively become mini 
welfare states, collectivising risks and rewards amongst members by, for 
instance, using co-op surpluses to provide funds for residents to go on skills 
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training or further education courses, helping many find jobs or routes into 
higher education. Today, the low, below-market rents that they offer for co-op 
members enable many to pursue creative, political and caring vocations and 
civic volunteering that creates social value but little exchange value—the kind 
of endeavours that were once subsidised by the dole—including developing 
more collective alternatives. 
Whilst Liverpool’s experiment in cooperative housing was ultimately 
unable to provide a comprehensive answer to Engels’ housing question—
partly for structural limitations of the cooperative model in challenging the 
dominance of capital; partly for contextual factors such as sectarianism and 
urban decline combining with the exclusivity of the co-op model; partly for the 
co-op movement being prevented from further growth by exogenous political 
events—it has, in the various modest ways outlined above, provided a partial, 
localised, isolated solution to Liverpool’s housing crisis and, interestingly, a 
defence against urban decline, which, if sufficiently scaled up and supported 
by the state, might constitute an answer to today’s urban question. Co-ops 
represent a possible cell structure for a more cooperative state and society—a 
template for the larger-scale cooperative ownership and management of public 
housing and other common resources as a workable alternative to our current 
marketised or previously more statist systems.
Collective alternatives have proven more effective than state-led forms at 
protecting publicly funded housing commons from being (re)commodified by 
the market—partly because they are better insulated from the vagaries of 
electoral politics governing the fate of state-led provision which has, through 
a cross-party penchant for privatisation, been residualised and marketised 
into social housing. The trust structure and asset lock of CLTs especially are 
useful instruments capable of preventing such a trajectory if utilised for any 
future renewal of public housing. CLTs may even work in combination with 
co-ops—as we see in Granby—as their stewards, providing protection from 
co-optation by the state or commodification by capital. The CLTs are designed 
for the long haul—slowly to revitalise areas of longstanding decline through 
incremental, iterative and cumulative participatory design and reconstruction 
methods—so although perhaps too embryonic to evaluate success, there are 
already tentative signs of their power to address the neighbourhood question 
in particular. Bringing residents on board is a painstaking process that requires 
great effort and patience. Like the Eldonians, they have sought to move 
beyond just housing to tackle wider socioeconomic regeneration. Whereas 
the new-build co-ops were pro-demolition, the CLTs are anti-demolition; the 
focus has moved from housing to wider neighbourhood concerns, reflecting 
broader shifts from the housing question to the urban question.
An interesting, and problematic, aspect of both Homebaked and Granby is 
the relatively blank slate with which they started—the loss and opportunity 
presented by years of local depopulation and forced eviction—to reconstruct 
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a community from the ground up, redefining and reshaping place in the 
image of a distinctively bohemian, and perhaps exclusive, habitus. Unlike the 
earlier, more community-driven co-op campaigns, the CLTs are the product 
of a minority of remaining homeowners and politically oriented activists from 
near and far. A great deal of work has been put into community organising 
for both projects, to gain the trust of the wider community and galvanise 
more active participation from more than just the most vociferous residents. 
Through their CLT governance structures, Granby and Homebaked have 
the potential to do more than what the Eldonians have achieved in terms of 
democracy: to establish an open neighbourhood forum or a public arena for 
the coming together of disparate local groups to discuss common issues and 
debate the future of the area; as a ‘politics of space’37 uniting people in delib-
eration around shared spatial issues, cutting across traditional class, ethnic 
and religious cleavages. The CLT model’s tripartite trust structure, with 
democratic representation of a broad constituency of local residents as well 
as other stakeholders, combined with its ability to own land and property 
assets for the benefit of the wider community—and not just members, as in 
the case of co-ops—places Granby and Homebaked in a potentially powerful 
position to take on the role of democratic governance as well as stewardship; as 
‘meso-scale governance shims’38—a term borrowed from joinery to describe 
a ‘wedge’ inserted between two existing modes of governance, the household 
and local government.
The especially strong—if not unique—focus on democratic control in 
the Liverpool CLTs is largely a product of global capital’s locational see-saw 
depressing the political economy of Liverpool—a shrunken city scarred by 
capital flight and ‘failing’ housing markets where affordability, unlike for most 
other areas of CLT activism in the UK, such as inner London or rural hotspots, 
has never really been a big problem. The biggest problem for residents of 
Liverpool has been in acquiring democratic control in order to determine 
the fate of their neighbourhoods in the face of overweening political forces 
pushing for their ‘managed decline’—either by arch-austerians seeking to 
speed the ‘natural’ autotomy of a diseased part of the body politic drained of 
the lifeblood of capitalism or, once it is realised that the state has the leverage 
to tilt the see-saw, by neoliberal opportunists repackaging people’s neigh-
bourhoods as ‘zones of opportunity’ (ZOOs) to capitalise on the rent gap. At 
the same time, the relative lack of demand from capital has left a vacuum in 
development pressure, providing the opportunity and opening up the space 
for social innovators to imagine and experiment with something different. 
37 Mark Purcell, “Neighborhood Activism among Homeowners as a Politics of Space”, 
Professional Geographer 53.2 (2001): 178–194.
38 Olivia Williams and Joseph Pierce, “Inserting Scales of Urban Politics: The Possibilities 
of Meso-Urban Governance Shims”, Urban Geography 38.6 (2017): 795–812.
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This makes Liverpool an interesting laboratory—a socially experimental 
field—for testing out new ideas and ‘isolated solutions’, which, if successful 
in combating capital in one place, might then be replicated elsewhere in the 
global counter-movement.
Engels’ central rebuttal of Proudhon’s argument—that is, the tenant–
landlord relation is not tantamount to the labour–capital relation, but merely 
a secondary reflection of the primary contradiction of capitalism—now rests 
upon less clear-cut a distinction than it used to. Feminists have long argued 
that this distinction between production of value in the workplace and its 
ultimate source in the hidden abode—in the life-encompassing field of social 
reproduction—is mostly a matter of perspective, of accounting measures, of 
where we draw the line. Yet this distinction—however arbitrarily drawn it 
may have been by Marxists down the decades—has by now almost completely 
dissolved in the FIRE economy (Finance-Insurance-Real Estate) of globalised 
capitalism in which housing is no longer secondary but one of the primary 
commodities fuelling capital accumulation. This is an economy in which value 
is produced and extracted at almost every moment in the cycle, not just at 
the point of production as the labour theory of value holds. This re-centres 
housing in struggles against capital. Struggle in and around the workplace—
through syndicalism, trade unions or political parties—still matters; but it 
is no longer even the primary point of contestation. Any wins for the labour 
movement in protecting wages or gaining a greater share of the surplus 
created in the realm of production are siphoned off through fictitious rent 
inflation and compounding interest imposed by an increasingly powerful and 
bloated capitalist class coalition of landowning and financial interests through 
their use of ever more sophisticated financial instruments in the realm of 
consumption—and especially housing. Rentier capitalism is fast delivering 
the ‘urban revolution’ Lefebvre prophesied in how value is harvested under 
capitalism.39 The extension and intensification of the digitally mediated 
planetary urbanisation of capital blurs the boundaries between primary and 
secondary contradictions, between production of commodities and the social 
reproduction of human beings and social support systems. Housing is not only 
a field of social reproduction; it is increasingly a site of production of surplus 
value through the commodification of land and property as real estate. This 
explains why we are caught in a counterintuitively perpetual ‘housing crisis’.40 
Class decomposition muddies the waters still further. Since neoliberal 
reforms of the 1980s, such as the Right to Buy, the proletariat (all of us who 
sell our labour power for survival) has become increasingly enmeshed and 
interdependent with capital through credit and rising (until very recently) 
39 Henri Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution (University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
40 David Madden and Peter Marcuse, In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis (Verso, 
2016).
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owner-occupation. Owner-occupiers have serious financial stakes in escalating 
property price inflation, not least in order to fund retirements in an era 
of imploding social security, asset-based welfare and a social contract 
overstretched to breaking point. Employee and private pension pots are 
otherwise entangled in speculative property investments worldwide. Real 
estate now provides the foundation, the collateral, for most global financial 
trading—“the commodity which underpins all wealth held in the known 
‘universe of securities’”.41 Credit advanced for (real commodity) production is 
therefore made dependent on investments in (fictitious) real estate. At the same 
time, homelessness, dispossessions and deprivations are on the rise as a result 
of the fictitious bubble economy squeezing so many out of accessing affordable 
housing and, in periodically crashing, causing debt defaults and foreclosures. 
Land and housing have become a central battleground over value in ways which 
Engels could not have foreseen. Gaining collective control over property has 
always been an important part of contesting capitalism—founded, as this 
system is, on the state-enforced ideology of private property ownership—but 
is proving an increasingly important part of contending with the new urban 
question, the contemporary incarnation of the housing question.
Nevertheless, Engels has a point. Co-ops and CLTs will always be plugged 
into global circuits of capital so long as capitalism remains the primary mode of 
production. They rely on the dead labour of previous rounds of production—the 
old houses they seek to renovate—or, if building anew, they remain dependent on 
extractive industries to source bricks and mortar through complex global value 
chains woven through layers of exploitation. However successfully they act to 
transform the tenant–landlord relation—and however deeply capital penetrates 
the secondary circuit of land and property for new sources of profit—there 
will always be underlying processes, often hidden from view, through which 
housing and its value is created through the exploitation of other human beings 
and the plunder of non-human nature. Engels suggested that the only possible 
resolution of the housing question was the revolutionary overthrow of capital via 
the seizing of the means of production by the proletariat as a socialist transition 
to communism. But class decomposition makes it far less clear how the lines will 
be drawn; (almost) everyone now has skin in the game (at least in the UK). If we 
wait for the Revolution, we will be waiting quite some time. In the meantime, 
and in the interstices, collective housing alternatives are building, slowly but 
surely, a bridge between everyday life and systemic transformation, a bridge 
between ends and means. Channelling utopian desires into more practical tasks 
such as property transfer negotiations with the council is seen, by one activist 
working with Homebaked, as a kind of ‘pragmatic radicalism’—an interesting 
41 Louis Moreno, “Always Crashing in the Same City: Real Estate, Psychic Capital and 
Planetary Desire”, City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 22.1 (2018): 
152–168.
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analogue to Colin Ward’s brand of ‘pragmatic anarchism’.42 Whether we call it 
pragmatic anarchism, radical reformism or real utopian experimentalism—such 
an approach treads a cautious middle ground between the two false binaries 
polarising the all-or-nothing revolutionary logic of Engels’ housing question. 
That bridge leads us to the commons. Our only hope to escape capitalist incor-
poration is through a process of outward and inward expansion of the commons, 
countervailing and, perhaps, eventually superseding capital.
It is no accident that the commons as an idea is being rediscovered just as 
neoliberalism and new forms of accumulation by dispossession are becoming so 
entrenched. This post-capitalist alternative has ancient roots in the concept of 
commoning—a customary way of life for many before acts of enclosure were 
enforced by the early modern state and brought capitalism into being through 
primitive accumulation. Commoning helps us see the dialectical nature of 
commons as both material resource and social practice—a dialectic into which 
I have delved by following John F.C. Turner in seeing housing as both noun 
(material object) and verb (social process). Understanding collective housing 
alternatives as acts of commoning helps us do two things. First, a focus on 
commoning situates housing commons within political economy as just one—
albeit foundational—part of a broader and deeper global eco-socialist struggle 
over social reproduction, for wresting control of the means of reproducing 
human and non-human life itself out from under capital. As various auton-
omist and feminist Marxists remind us,43 capitalism is parasitical on human 
life (and non-human nature) but there is always a social surplus remaining 
after extraction of surplus value, dynamic energies that can never be totally 
captured or enclosed, the life-force of the commons.
Second, it moves our attention beyond campaigns for the protection and 
preservation of existing commons onto the novel terrain of producing new 
commons. Rent strikes, for instance, have been an important tactic in the 
struggle to protect our housing commons—some, notably the Glasgow Rent 
Strike of 1915, preceded the development of public housing by putting pressure 
on political representatives to put the right policies in place.44 Strikes effectively 
quell the flow of capital going to private and public landlords—and thereby 
break the circuit of rentier capitalism. In this regard, they represent what I 
42 Stuart White, “Making Anarchism Respectable? The Social Philosophy of Colin 
Ward”, Journal of Political Ideologies 12.1 (2007): 11–28.
43 Silvia Federici, Re-Enchanting the World: Feminism and the Politics of the Commons (PM 
Press, 2019); Massimo De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia: On the Commons and the 
Transformation to Postcapitalism (Zed Books, 2017); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Commonwealth (Harvard University Press, 2009); John Holloway, Crack Capitalism (Pluto 
Press, 2010).
44 Neil Gray, Rent and Its Discontents: A Century of Housing Struggle (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2018).
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have characterised as reactive rather than proactive forms of commoning—a 
distinction variously expressed by scholar-activists as ‘maintaining’ versus 
‘expanding’ the commons45 or ‘defensive’ versus ‘offensive’ commoning.46 
Although rent strikes play a part in Liverpool’s collective housing history, in 
this book I have sought to highlight more offensive forms of commoning aiming 
to produce new housing commons, to create new circuits of the common. 
In some sense, Liverpool’s history is a story of defensive commoning—from 
rent strikes and anti-displacement campaigns against the Slum Clearance 
Programme of the 1970s to anti-demolition campaigning against HMR in the 
2000s—transforming, through the very process of struggle, into offensive 
modes of commoning, from new-build co-op development to guerrilla 
gardening and CLT projects. 
Reflecting findings from other examples of housing commons in cities 
around the world, such as in Copenhagen and Montevideo,47 Barcelona48 
and Washington DC,49 Liverpool’s collective housing alternatives began as 
pragmatic responses to some threat or crisis, motivated by the necessity 
of securing decent affordable housing, only slowly evolving into a more 
widespread political consciousness around ‘collective dweller control’.50 
Although democratic control over community assets, including but not 
limited to housing, became the abiding issue for Liverpool’s urban CLTs—as 
opposed to more material housing conditions, as it was for the co-ops—what 
initially catalysed CLT activists to action was the demolition threat posed to 
their homes by HMR, which came to signify a general lack of control over 
the future of their neighbourhoods, decided undemocratically without their 
consent. It is doubtful whether such ideological commitments and institu-
tional transformations would have ever crystallised in Liverpool were it not 
for the initial spur to action—the urgency and desperate need of commu-
nities, responding to exogenous shocks and crises, resorting to extraordinary 
measures to defend their right to dwell in place. This raises questions: how 
45 Amanda Huron, Carving out the Commons: Tenant Organizing and Housing Cooperatives in 
Washington, DC (Minnesota Press, 2018).
46 Tim Joubert and Stuart Hodkinson, “Beyond the Rent Strike, Towards the Commons: 
Why the Housing Question Requires Activism That Generates Its Own Alternatives”, in 
Neil Gray, ed., Rent and Its Discontents: A Century of Housing Struggle (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2018), pp. 185–200.
47 Lorenzo Vidal, “Cooperative Islands in Capitalist Waters: Limited-Equity Housing 
Cooperatives, Urban Renewal and Gentrification”, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 43.1 (2019): 157–178.
48 García-Lamarca, “From Occupying Plazas to Recuperating Housing: Insurgent 
Practices in Spain”.
49 Huron, Carving out the Commons.
50 Colin Ward, Tenants Take Over (Architectural Press, 1974).
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do we move from the particularities of people and place to more generalisable 
movements; from reactive bespoke campaigns, precariously dependent on civic 
volunteerism, to proactive systematic development of collective alternatives? 
In short, how do we expand, offensively, whilst maintaining, defensively, our 
housing commons?
In mirror-image of Marx’s circuit of capital, theorists of the commons are 
beginning to sketch out a ‘circuit of the common’.51 If the commodity is the 
cellular form of capital, then commons—that is, any good or value produced 
to be shared rather than accumulated—are the cell form of the common. In 
the capital circuit, money is used to buy labour power and means of production 
to produce commodities which, in turn, are traded on the market for more 
money, some of which is invested for further accumulation. Money begets 
commodities begets more money than before. In the common circuit, money 
is no longer the mediator of the process of expansion, which is, instead, 
voluntarily self-directed by associations of commoners who come together 
to harness and govern common resources or common wealth to produce 
commons. Common wealth and associations beget commons beget associations 
and common wealth. The final conversion is not money but the reproduction of 
commons, understood as associations of commoners (such as co-ops and CLTs, 
and their practices of commoning) and common resources (community-owned 
housing). Any ‘surplus’ of common wealth or value created in the process is 
shared for expanding the common circuit. 
Association, cooperation and connections between associations of 
commoners, through expanded reciprocity, are the key conduits of this 
circuitry. In the case of cooperatives, it is little surprise that cooperation 
between cooperatives is deemed a pivotal governing principle of the global 
movement. If cooperatives are to survive in a world market dominated by 
capital—as “cooperative islands in capitalist waters”52—they must engage 
each other in alternative exchange relations and networks of solidarity 
through the development of integrated cooperative supply chains and alter-
native global circuits of value. It is extremely difficult, however, to create 
common circuits of value entirely autonomous from capital when there are 
so many diverse inputs, labours and materials that go into its production 
and reproduction—as in the case of housing. When movements for the 
commons are still relatively weak, sporadic, disconnected and few and far 
between—as in the case of housing commons—the onus on building these 
connections is all the more urgent, for in the meantime they remain exposed 
51 Greig de Peuter and Nick Dyer-Witheford, “Commons and Cooperatives”, Affinities: 
A Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action 4.1 (2010): 30–56; De Angelis, Omnia Sunt 
Communia: On the Commons and the Transformation to Postcapitalism.
52 Vidal, “Cooperative Islands in Capitalist Waters: Limited-Equity Housing Cooperatives, 
Urban Renewal and Gentrification”.
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to short-circuiting by capital and are in many ways made reliant on capital’s 
own conduit—that is, money. 
What role for the state in all this? The state is clearly a key player in the 
circuit of capital—as creator of new markets, issuer of currency, underwriter 
of public and private debt, regulator of production, consumption and exchange 
and facilitator, generally, of capital accumulation. Although the commons may 
appear anathema to the state as envisioned under capitalism, the state may also 
play a role in facilitating the circuit of the common. As Harvey has likewise 
argued, theorists of commons governance—from liberals to Marxists—
recognise the need for some kind of overarching nested scalar structure to 
connect and coordinate the activities of localised commons and redistribute 
resources between them to ensure socio-spatial justice.53 This need not take 
the form of the state as we know it, but some kind of state-like institutional 
structure is useful nonetheless. Following Massimo De Angelis’ interpre-
tation of systems theory for commons-building,54 we can conceptualise the 
development of housing commons and the broader expansion of the circuit of 
the common as supported by reimagined state institutions—public–common 
partnerships, for instance—as a kind of ‘structural coupling’ in which an 
emergent system of commons can access and harness the complexity and 
resources of state systems to its own advantage. 
What might this look like in practice? In their Common Wealth report, 
scholar-activists Keir Milburn and Bertie Russell present public–common 
partnerships less as a fixed institutional blueprint than a set of principles. 
Three are notable: joint enterprise, in which ownership and governance 
is shared equally by the state (such as a municipal council) and a common 
association (such as a co-op or CLT) as the two principal parties on the board 
of democratically elected directors; joint capitalisation whereby the state 
agency contributes the majority of funds and underwrites those provided 
by the common association, such as crowd-funding, charitable grants and 
membership fees; and distributed democratic control of surplus value. The 
last suggests that surplus value created by public–common partnerships 
gets reinvested to support the incubation of other commons projects and 
their development through further public–common partnerships, thereby 
transforming surplus capital into common use value to “create an ever-
expanding movement of de-commodification and collective democratisation”.55 
In accepting that the state contains powerful tools (albeit fashioned primarily 
for capital) and that the state apparatus can be re-engineered to strengthen 
the circuit of the common over capital, the question becomes how—a question 
53 David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (Verso, 2012).
54 De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia: On the Commons and the Transformation to Postcapitalism.
55 Milburn and Russell, Public–Common Partnerships: Building New Circuits of Collective 
Ownership, p. 16.
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I address in more practical policy terms in the final chapter on “building a 
bureaucracy from below”.
Using the Master’s Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House
If it is true that “The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house”,56 the master’s tools nonetheless radically shape and discipline the 
slave in any master–slave dialectic. Money and the state are the two master 
mediators of capitalist social relations. In being necessarily mediated by the 
state and money, co-operatives and CLTs—like all other tools wielded by 
commoners—face the constant threat of co-optation and incorporation into 
state and market logics. Max Weber famously described the modern trap of 
ratcheting bureaucratisation and instrumental rationalisation of society as 
the ‘iron cage’—an image since borrowed by institutionalists to describe 
the process of ‘institutional isomorphism’: the creeping correspondence of 
individual (especially embryonic) organisations to the tools, procedures and 
values that dominate and homogenise organisational fields.57 This process is 
especially problematic for insurgent organisations attempting to transform 
emergent fields whose operating principles are still being fought over—
such as social entrepreneurs and social innovators in the social economy.58 
Organisational fields which are relatively inchoate, which attempt to insert 
themselves into institutional ensembles and which pose a potential threat to 
those ensembles, are placed under enormous pressure to comply with the 
rules of the game, especially as they attempt to resist bureaucratisation and 
marketisation. There are always huge incentives in mimicking the behaviours, 
processes and organisational forms of the dominant players and the main 
funders of the field, to morph into their image, to become isomorphic with 
state bureaucracy and capital. 
The story of professionalisation and commercialisation of housing associa-
tions on Merseyside over the past several decades, their becoming increasingly 
embroiled in accumulation by dispossession and state regulation of social 
housing, is an exemplary case of institutional isomorphism. The challenge for 
collective housing alternatives—if they are to avoid the fate of the housing 
associations—is to grow by ‘going viral’59 rather than scaling up; to coordinate 
multi-scalar activities through confederated structures of democratic rather 
56 Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. 
57 Paul J. Dimaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”, American Sociological 
Review 48.2 (1983): 147–160.
58 Alex Nicholls, “The Legitimacy of Social Entrepreneurship: Reflexive Isomorphism 
in a Pre-Paradigmatic Field”, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 34.4 (2010): 611–633.
59 Tom Moore and David Mullins, “Scaling-Up or Going Viral? Comparing Self-Help 
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than bureaucratic governance; to harness their existing legal powers to 
resist commodification, such as asset locks, and innovate new forms of legal 
constitution when such tools lose their power to resist capital; and to use the 
resources of the state and the mediums of money and markets only sparingly 
whilst developing alternative self-funding mechanisms and means of circu-
lating the common. 
Disciplined by isomorphic pressures towards bureaucratisation, largely 
dependent on the capital circuit for resources for survival and, at the same 
time, struggling to expand the circuit of the common—collective housing 
alternatives must be excellent shape-shifters, able to adapt flexibly to suit 
the requirements of different gatekeepers and powerbrokers whilst staying 
true to original principles. This shape-shifting ability—restated in the 
metaphor of communicating inwardly, upwardly and outwardly to suit 
different audiences—is the subject of the Epilogue. In this language game, 
constructing institutional structure around a project is necessary in order 
to gain the trust of stakeholders, attract funding, simplify decision-making 
and codify vision and strategy into workable day-to-day procedures, thereby 
enabling the reproduction of values. Movement and institution, verb and 
noun—constituent power and constituted power—form a difficult dialectic. 
In this there is a constant interplay between creativity and codification. In 
seeking to establish codifications for the endurance and replication of projects 
over time, we run the risk of diluting, paralysing and fossilising into inflexible 
bureaucratic structures the informal, spontaneous and creative energies 
animating radical collective action. The challenge becomes one of expressing 
and sustaining the original energies through and within—not outside of—
codified structures. These constitutions of power must be flexible and open 
enough to allow for adaptation and learning through their periodic reimagining 
and reengineering by constituents—yet stable and legible enough to maintain 
continuity and legitimacy. Just as radical legal theorists such as Davina Cooper 
are taking a more creative approach to reimagining the state60—as an insti-
tutional structure amenable to being transformed through performative and 
prefigurative practices—so too can collective housing constituents become 
more proactive in reinventing the legal and organisational models that channel 
their energies towards common goals. They must avoid fetishising CLTs or 
co-ops—or any other model—as somehow the end in itself whilst recognising 
their performative power, if continually (re)designed in the right way, to enact 
new worlds and defend against entrapment within the iron cage of rationali-
sation and commodification. There is always a risk in becoming complacent 
Housing and Community Land Trust Facilitation”, Voluntary Sector Review 4.3 (2013): 
333–353.
60 Cooper, Dhawan and Newman, Reimagining the State: Theoretical Challenges and 
Transformative Possibilities; Cooper, “Prefiguring the State”.
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about the power of models to embody and enact social change; the fate of the 
Eldonians’ development trust EGL—its mission drift, commercialisation and 
collapse—provides a salutary lesson.
That being said, so long as the master’s house remains the principal 
source of subsistence and shelter and the main measure of value, the 
master’s tools remain the only instruments to hand by which to forge new 
tools that can do the dismantling. Co-ops and CLTs have been forged out 
of a compromised reconfiguration of the master’s tools, as imperfect insti-
tutional articulations of a housing commons that each in their own specific 
way promotes a bespoke bundle of common and individual rights in relation 
to property as presently conceived under capitalism. For instance, the 
CLT model appears to strike a more even balance than the co-op model, 
perhaps, between individual and collective property interests: safeguarding 
individuals’ rights to a share of equity, which can be tweaked according 
to context. The contradictions created for commoners in appropriating 
the master’s tools—when counteracting circuits of value, capital and 
common, come into contact—is illustrated by more than one conundrum 
facing the CLT movement in particular. To recap: according to the classic 
American model that has become canonical internationally, CLTs separate 
the ownership of land from that of any improvements upon it, notably 
buildings. This enables the community—present and future residents—to 
hold the land in trust through a form of stewardship; whilst the buildings 
themselves—homes or businesses—can be leased or ‘owned’ by individuals 
according to covenants that govern things like resale or lease value. But the 
CLT’s ownership of the land is at best abstract and nominal. In practice, 
occupants of the buildings enjoy full use rights to the property except for 
just one specific right—the right to exchange for market value, which is 
curtailed by CLT covenants. The notion that the land under the buildings 
can somehow be abstracted from its social use and ‘owned’ by the CLT is 
a total fiction—for owning land means enjoying the full bundle of rights, 
from protection against eviction to the ability to dispose of it on the market, 
which the model forbids CLTs from doing. Thus a group of American 
scholars61 are beginning to reconceptualise the CLT model as a ‘fiction’ 
which “buries” the rights usually associated with property ownership, in 
that they cannot actually be exercised by actors. By explaining its opera-
tions within the conceptual scaffolding of the ownership model, the CLT 
‘shores up’ the private property relation and, by the same token, speaks in 
the language—wrought by the master’s tools—that people accustomed to 
property rights will understand. Its focus on land as an organising device is 
61 Joseph Pierce, Richard Kruger, Azadeh Hadizadeh Esfahani et al., “Ownership Is a 
Habit of Mind: How Community Land Trusts Expose Key Consensual Fictions of Urban 
Property”, Urban Geography (forthcoming).
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both its greatest weakness (in terms of transforming property relations) and 
its greatest strength (in communicating an idea that may otherwise seem so 
alien to aspiring homeowners). 
A further contradiction resides in how land and housing are valued in CLTs. 
How can the CLT set rents and resale prices, or indeed borrow money for 
further development using its land ‘assets’ as equity, if the CLT-owned share 
of the property bundle—the land abstracted from the building—is ultimately 
unrealisable as exchange value? If the entire premise of the CLT idea is to 
take land off the market in perpetuity, how can any market value be attached 
to its assets? A potentially fatal flaw in this ‘dialectic of value’ is that whilst 
low-income residents are helped to realise a form of homeownership within 
a CLT, they are at the same time prevented from realising the equity of their 
investments elsewhere, owing to the discrepancy between their equity share 
in the CLT—whose value is decoupled from the market to ensure security 
of tenure—and the general rise in property prices in local, national and 
international capitalist markets.62 For low- and middle-income people alike, 
this ‘liquidity trap’ may amount to a kind of spatial entrapment. Only the 
large-scale expansion of CLTs through institutional coordination—and their 
connection and cooperation with other movements for the common—can 
resolve such seemingly intractable problems. Such contradictions underline the 
curious fact that when people enter into a contract with a CLT, what they are 
‘buying into’ is not the property value of the capitalist market so much as a 
narrative about a different way of conceiving and distributing value. Capitalism 
has some powerful ideological buttressing shoring up its own conception of 
value as commodity form—from folkloric tales and popular historical narra-
tives to scientific ‘discoveries’ such as the tragedy of the commons. It is to the 
utility of narrative as a tool for the outward expansion of the common circuit 
for housing (partly through reflection on what it has done—and continues to 
do—for capital) that I now turn. 
62 Sarah Ilene Stein, “Wake up Fannie, I Think I Got Something to Say to You: Financing 
Community Land Trust Homebuyers without Stripping Affordability Provisions”, Emory 
Law Journal 60.1 (2015): 209–249.
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On (Myth) Making History
14: On (Myth) Making History
Narrative, story-telling and myth-making may help sustain collective energies 
in making the difficult transition all collective housing alternatives must make 
if they are to succeed—that from the exciting events punctuating political 
struggle to the more mundane, complicated work of building new institu-
tional processes; moving “from the ‘military’ administration to the ‘civil’ one” 
once the campaign has been won.1 Writing about the curiously interwoven 
phenomena of Brexit and Englishness, journalist James Meek presents two 
myths bound up with English national identity, Robin Hood and St George—a 
juxtaposition that might shed some light on this transition. The Brexiteers’ 
narrative of ‘taking back control’ of British sovereignty from a ‘bureaucratic’, 
‘elitist’ and ‘anti-democratic’ European Union through the victory of a popular 
referendum is likened to the event of St George slaying the dragon with one 
fell swoop of his sword. In contrast, the myth of Robin Hood—stealing from 
the rich to give to the poor in an ongoing, incremental process of vigilante 
redistribution—appears to better represent “slow, complicated, boring Robin 
Hood-like achievements such as the National Health Service, progressive 
taxation and universal education” but which “yield in the folk-narrative of 
England to St George-like releases”.2 Meek puts it succinctly: “Robin Hood 
is a process; St George is an event … Robin Hood is justice; St George is 
victory”. Just as the event of Brexit is contrasted in this way with the process of 
post-war welfare state institutionalisation, so too can the victorious campaigns 
to reclaim a housing commons in Liverpool be likewise juxtaposed with the 
subsequent struggle to build institutional structures for the long-term survival, 
growth and replication of collective alternatives. Whilst “the slaying of the 
dragon is quick, easy to remember, and easy to celebrate”, Meek remarks, the 
ongoing process of institutionalisation is “slow, complicated, boring”. 
Whatever we think of the politics of Brexit—and I draw no direct comparison 
here with the substance of radical housing politics—Meek’s analogy nonetheless 
provides some interesting lessons for understanding the institutionalisation of 
1 Alan McDonald, The Weller Way: The Story of the Weller Street Housing Cooperative (Faber 
& Faber, 1986), p. 203.
2 James Meek, “Brexit and Myths of Englishness”, London Review of Books 40.19 (2018): 
17–20 (p. 17).
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collective housing alternatives. Focusing on St George-like events over Robin 
Hood-like processes makes for a more exciting and dramatic narrative. It 
enlivens the telling of history with characters, drama, battles between enemies 
and victories against all odds; but it tends to simplify, personify and dramatise 
history and, therefore, necessarily misses other, more complicated, perhaps 
more boring but also more important aspects of the story. This is evident in 
how I conjured my own mythic tale of a grand battle between two forces—
seeing housing like a noun or like a verb: between technocratic comprehensive 
redevelopment and democratic collective alternatives—with obvious connota-
tions of good versus evil, of allies and enemies. But if we see St George-like 
events and Robin Hood-like processes as part of a dialectical whole rather than 
as distinct entities, it is clear that I have focused more on the first counterpart 
of this dialectic—on the eventful and almost mythic beginnings of collective 
housing alternatives—than on their ongoing institutionalisation. Liverpool’s 
history demonstrates that campaigns flow from proactive, disruptive and often 
extra-legal attempts to claim a common right to place. The Weller Street Co-op 
asserted their right to stay together as a community against the council policy 
of slum clearance and rehousing. The Eldonians likewise refused displacement, 
and occupied Portland Gardens during council attempts to municipalise the 
co-op. Langrove initiated an occupation against demolition, and so too did 
Granby residents resist the bulldozers through direct action. These were all 
campaigns about gaining popular democratic control, some kind of sovereignty, 
from an overbearing authority, albeit one located at the scale of the local state 
rather than supra-national level. They are all great stories of fights won against 
the odds. However, the long-term survival and viability of collective control 
over the means of social reproduction is, in all these cases, dependent on the 
construction of new institutions to incubate and support such practices as well 
as on state support to authorise and finance community acquisition of land and 
recognise its legal ownership. The campaign battle itself only commences the 
longer-term struggle to build institutional durability. As Billy Floyd is reported 
to have proclaimed at the carnivalesque street party celebrating the Weller 
Street’s completion of their cooperative scheme in 1982: “This is not the end, 
it’s the beginning”.3 
Myth-making is all too often overlooked in its power to communicate and 
replicate like a meme the enduring value and meaning of any counter-hegemonic 
movement, not least cooperativism and commons, in galvanising popular 
and political support and in keeping the co-operative spirit alive amongst 
co-operators long after the campaign struggle is over. Following political 
theorist William Clare Roberts’ exploration of the socialist, communist and 
mutualist myths and discourses that animated Marx’s writing of Capital, we 
can define myths as 
3 Gibson, Counterweight: The Neighbourhood Option, p. 23.
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the stories we tell ourselves and one another to make shorthand sense 
of the world. They are not true in the way that science is, but that is 
neither here nor there. They are action-guiding, meaning-giving, and 
their truth or falsity is an ethical and political question, not merely an 
epistemological one.4 
We need new myths that can help transform what seems ideologically 
impossible today into real possibilities tomorrow—‘demanding the urban 
impossible’ as Chatterton encapsulates it.5 Liverpool has a particular penchant 
for myth-making. Its foundational myth as a city of radicals helps narrate its 
rich history of collective action—more on which below. But it does not mean 
that collective alternatives cannot happen anywhere else. In order to move 
beyond the confining perspective of people and place—beyond colourful 
characters and one-off St George-like events—we need stories that tap into the 
popular imagination, speak to shared experience and inspire a new common 
sense.
Liberal and neoliberal protagonists know this all too well. Take, for 
instance, the myth of the commons. In The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett 
Hardin presents the concept of property as the only logical solution to 
the tragic inevitability of the ‘free-rider problem’, in which unowned and 
unmanaged resources available to all are said always to result in overuse and 
underinvestment owing to self-interested short-termist competitive individu-
alism—with a strict choice between distribution of private property rights or 
public ownership by state management. Hardin is hardly original—the myth 
can be traced back as far as Aristotle’s philosophical concept of the distribution 
of care, in which humans were said to be more careful with things they can call 
their own than with those owned in common. There is a performative power 
to this myth: the assumed root cause of the tragedy of the commons—selfish 
individualism—is better seen as a symptom of the successful transmission of 
such powerful parables buttressing the hegemony of private property. The 
lack of counter-narratives or popular myths that tell positive stories about 
the commons is all too evident. Nick Blomley quips: “the tragedy of the 
commons … is less its supposed internal failures than its external invisibility”.6
Hobbes’ Leviathan represents another powerful (neo)liberal-propagated 
parable that has successfully permeated our collective consciousness. The 
state of nature that Hobbes imagined as defining human existence before the 
invention of the sovereign state to arbitrate a ‘social contract’ was one in which, 
without the protection of the Leviathan and the tacit collective agreement to 
be governed by its rules, life was notoriously ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
4 Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital, p. 33.
5 Chatterton, “The Urban Impossible: A Eulogy for the Unfinished City”.
6 Blomley, Unsettling the City, p. 8.
Part V: Conclusion292
short’. That this tale has embedded itself deep within our cultural fabric as to 
make the need for a powerful state to rule over us appear intuitively obvious—
so much so that the social contract has become the conceptual starting point 
for all subsequent Western political philosophy working in the liberal tradition, 
from Rousseau to Rawls—says more about the ideological power of this fable 
than it does about its historical accuracy. Communitarians and anarchists such 
as Kropotkin have long contested this narrative by telling another story—a 
myth in mirror image—in which humans are said to have lived in relatively 
peaceful, materially abundant and highly co-operative self-organised tribes in 
which mutual aid, gift relations and reciprocity predominated over hierarchical 
command or exchange relations and that it was, in fact, only with the consoli-
dation of the Leviathan in the emergence of empires and nation-states that 
violence, war, competition and brutal domination became such common facets 
of human existence. The historical record suggests the reality is rather more 
complicated; that these tendencies existed concurrently. Recent anthropological 
and archaeological evidence attests that parasitical state-like bureaucracies 
emerged in ancient agrarian societies in order to measure, coordinate, collect 
and appropriate the mass harvesting of grains to supply surpluses.7 Outside of 
this hegemony, pre-agrarian humans adopted radically different social arrange-
ments depending on the seasons, allowing authoritarian structures within small 
bands to predominate at certain times, during hunting for instance, whilst 
gathering together in very large numbers to form temporary, self-organised, 
horizontally governed proto-city-states during times of feast and plenty.8 This 
suggests several things: that our pre-agrarian ancestors were more adept at 
flexibly adapting their institutional arrangements to changing contexts and 
adopting different social roles within such structures; that egalitarianism is not 
the mainstay of small tribes or communes, which can be just as authoritarian 
and dominating as states; and that egalitarian city-states were commonplace 
long before the advent of bureaucracy or capitalism. The corollary is that we 
can relearn the lost art of institutional innovation and flexibility; that libertarian 
socialism at the scale of the state is a real possibility under the right conditions.
The Left—especially the radical revolutionary Left—has been pretty 
good at conjuring myths too. We might see Engels’ argument in The Housing 
Question as belonging to that powerful mythological tradition presented as 
scientific socialism and depicting the proletarian takeover of the state through 
insurrectionary action as the only way to defeat capitalism and inaugurate 
communism—the very same tradition that inspired so many violent revolu-
tions across the world and established the authoritarian Soviet Union. Whilst 
7 James C. Scott, Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (Yale University 
Press, 2017).
8 David Graeber and David Wengrow, “How to Change the Course of Human History 
(at Least, the Part That’s Already Happened)”, Eurozine (2 Mar. 2018).
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we can say that Marxist mythology had powerful material and social effects on 
the world, it is also true to say that it has not always created a better world nor, 
indeed, brought about anything resembling post-capitalism—only a highly 
centralised, productivist and undemocratic form of state-socialism nonetheless 
participating in the capitalist world economy. The Revolution as envisaged 
by the Leninist strain in Marxist thought is much like St George slaying the 
dragon. It is a strategy that foregrounds the event itself as the end goal without 
due consideration of how to sustain its energy after the clamour and fervour 
is depleted. It would appear that the Left is much better at inventing complex 
yet compelling mythologies about the structural power of capitalism and the 
ultimate futility of any attempt to make capital impotent—short of slaying the 
proverbial dragon—than it is at creating utopian visions that both inspire and 
sustain incremental action in the here and now.
Engels’ dramatisation of the Marxist myth through the characters of 
Proudhon and his fellow anarchists—rendering them as little more than 
utopian dreamers—has done untold damage to the task of resolving the 
housing question as well as to the intellectual coherence, political cohesion and 
tactical success of the Left, broadly conceived. In an early chapter in his unfin-
ished work Acid Communism, the late cultural theorist Mark Fisher provides 
insight into how the Left has been riven with division by such misguided 
myth-making—in ways we can trace through Liverpool’s history of cooper-
ative housing. Fisher describes the two leftist foes of democratic socialism or 
libertarian communism—what could just as easily apply to the co-operative 
movement and its two successive opponents, Liverpool Council’s labour organ-
isation, the Works Department, and, later, the Militant Tendency-controlled 
administration:
The first obstructive figure of the left was the complacent steward of 
Cold War organised labour or social democracy: backward-looking, 
bureaucratic, resigned to the “inevitability” of capitalism, more inter-
ested in preserving the income and status of white men than in 
expanding the struggle to include, this figure is defined by compromise 
and eventual failure.
The other figure—what I want to call the Harsh Leninist Superego—
is defined by its absolute refusal of compromise. According to Freud, 
the superego is characterised by the quantitatively and qualitatively 
excessive nature of its demands: whatever we do, it’s never enough. The 
Harsh Leninist Superego mandates a militant ascesis. The militant will 
be single-mindedly dedicated to the revolutionary event, and unflinch-
ingly committed to the means necessary to bring it about.9
9 Mark Fisher, K-Punk: The Collected Writings of Mark Fisher (2004–2016) (Repeater, 2018).
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Whilst the first allegorical figure is perhaps too caught up in slow, boring, 
complicated bureaucratic procedures to remember the point of galvanising 
moments of resistance to the collective struggle for transformation, the second 
is so fixated on the revolutionary event itself that he (again, probably a man) 
misses the importance of practice. This is just another formulation of the 
dialectic of means and ends. The promise of collective housing alternatives 
lies in treading an alternative path between these two extremes—a radical 
reformism that shuns compromise but prizes cooperation. For collective alter-
natives to flourish, we need a refocusing of the ends and means in campaigning 
and institutionalisation. Engels’ housing question will not be resolved without 
the slow, complicated, boring work of cultivating Robin Hood-like practices 
of commoning and institutions for the commons that may prefigure a post-
capitalist future from within ‘the cracks of capital’10 by working ‘in, against 
and beyond the state’.11 Working within the state to move beyond it speaks to 
a myth that economic geographer Andy Cumbers identifies amongst commons 
advocates—the myth of civil society. Here, the imagined possibility of radical 
autonomy for the commons from state-capitalism rests on the liberal myth 
of the abstract separability of the domains of state, market and civil society 
when in reality they cannot be separated as all are interrelated. Power works 
relationally, through and between these relations, not as some entity that can be 
possessed in isolation. If the commons does indeed transcend these opposi-
tions, then housing commons are to emerge and to be cultivated in the spaces 
in between.
From Heroic Event to Boring Bureaucratic Process
The art of myth-making seems to run against the grain of (whilst remaining 
deeply embedded within) our modern mentalities. Max Weber charted how 
modernity entailed a disenchantment from superstitious, mythical, spiritual 
and heroic ways of seeing the world and, through the Enlightenment, their 
secularisation and rationalisation into scientific and bureaucratic systems.12 
In The Utopia of Rules, David Graeber follows Weber to present bureaucracy 
as the neutral, transparent and value-free form of regulation and adminis-
tration which defines modernity and, importantly for my argument here, 
appears to be diametrically opposed to the heroic, mythic and folkloric 
societies of the pre-modern periods that went before it. Bureaucracy as an 
‘ideal type’ is stripped bare of all notions of heroism, chivalry, honour, 
valour, ritual, custom, magic and the epic battles between good and evil that 
10 Holloway, Crack Capitalism.
11 Andrew Cumbers, “Constructing a Global Commons in, against and beyond the 
State”, Space and Polity 19.1 (2015): 62–75.
12 Karl Löwith, Max Weber and Karl Marx (Routledge, 1993).
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seem to have marked ancient and medieval societies and, instead, embodies 
distinctly bureaucratic codes—there are the principles of value-free, rule-
bound neutrality (disavowing notions of good and evil); indifference (that the 
rules are the same for everyone, the law is indifferent between persons and 
their characteristics); regularity and predictability (that actions by the state 
are routinely and evenly applied across events of a similar kind); mechanical 
operation (that actions are taken not according to stories or human interpre-
tation but through machine-like detachment) and, lastly, transparency (rules 
are supposed to be clear, uniformly expressed, and accessible to all).13 Whilst 
bureaucracy pertains to a certain comforting routine and assurance in being 
treated equally and transparently by the Leviathan—a ‘utopia of rules’—it 
also entails a certain amount of disillusionment and alienation.
There is certainly a sense in which the phenomenon of ‘post-development 
blues’—the deflation experienced by so many participants in Liverpool’s 
co-op movement as the excitement of campaign victory dissipated and 
the reality of managing and maintaining a housing development set in—
involves a disenchantment and disillusionment from the world as it once was, 
animated by collective spirits, as bureaucratic routines replace more dynamic 
events. Juxtaposing exciting events and boring institutional processes captures 
something intractable standing in the way of developing collective alternatives 
from sporadic campaigns into durable institutions. Much of the tailing off of 
individual commitments to collective dweller control can be attributed to the 
inevitable burn-out and anti-climactic come-down from the intensity of the 
struggle. But keeping the original participants interested in the ongoing devel-
opment of co-ops and CLTs is not the only issue. Not only are routine jobs more 
mundane, technical and laborious, but the people doing them inevitably change, 
as some people move on, older are replaced by younger generations and—to 
invert a criticism levelled at the Eldonians—revolutionaries do eventually 
retire, just like the rest of us. The second and third generations of the Liverpool 
co-op member-residents do not have personal memories of severe housing 
need—they lack the life-defining experience of solidarity in struggle—which 
helped motivate the first generation to manage co-ops directly. Much of the 
voluntary ‘heavy-lifting’ required—financial, staffing, facilities management, 
repairs, allocations, legal services—is complex and demanding, not to mention 
‘boring’, so it is understandable why residents are happy to offload these 
responsibilities onto trained specialists such as NWHS. For these reasons, the 
creation of folktales and myths about the collective struggle remains important 
for transmitting the value of cooperation down the generations. 
Myth-making, however, can be dangerous. Campaigners can all too easily 
become intoxicated by their own mythologies—with potentially poisonous 
13 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of 
Bureaucracy (Melville House, 2015).
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consequences. This is precisely what happened to Weller Street: they got 
so carried away with their own self-asserted image as pioneers of radical 
autonomy that they alienated other co-ops, their potential allies and partners, 
leading to the collapse of their independent secondary agency before it even 
really got going. They got so drunk on the narrative they had constructed of 
their independence and autonomy (their motto, as Alan McDonald described 
it, was ‘professionals on tap, not on top!’)14 that they overlooked the fact 
that CDS were instrumental in their success. They created an origin story 
that denied the role of their ‘mother’ co-op, who they then disowned, even 
attempting ‘matricide’. Similarly, Granby CLT may have succumbed to the 
power of their own myth of ‘do-it-yourself’ insurgent urbanism. Their 
history of successfully challenging the council, preventing HMR demolition 
and taking ownership over the four streets through direct action, coupled 
with the resourceful culture of guerrilla gardening and experimentation with 
commoning has led to a celebration of amateurism and activism over expertise 
and professionalism. This ‘cult of the amateur’ has only been fuelled further 
by Assemble’s involvement (none of the collective is RIBA qualified) and the 
Turner Prize endorsement of their self-styled amateurism—their unconven-
tional, anti-professional and distinctively experimental methods of engaging 
people in architecture and urban design. Such a celebration of amateurs was 
very much in evidence in the Weller Street Co-op, too. One of their many 
mottos, in Tony Gibson’s account, proudly proclaims that “Professionals built 
the Titanic. Amateurs built the Ark”.15 
Residents do, indeed, generally know better than experts about the nature 
of their own neighbourhood and housing needs; the successes of the new-build 
co-ops and the CLTs alike are testament to that. Arrogant rejection of profes-
sional knowledge, however, can lead to poor results. In Granby, this has had 
implications for the project that suggest professional expertise is not to be so 
easily dismissed. For instance, before they can begin retrofitting, Terrace 21 
are currently awaiting the legal transfer of their allocated houses from the 
council—a decision that rests with Homes England (the quango formerly 
known as the Homes and Communities Agency and before that the Housing 
Corporation). This decision hinges on the removal of a covenant that stipu-
lates the buildings cannot be transferred out of public ownership owing to 
the public subsidy, not least through HMR, that has been invested in them 
over the years. It is the regulatory remit of Homes England to ensure that 
state-funded assets are being disposed of in the public interest. Whilst Terrace 
21 are waiting, Granby CLT has simply gone ahead with the renovation of 
their properties (likewise subject to this covenant) without consent—doing 
as they have done countless times before. There is a certain sense in which 
14 McDonald, The Weller Way.
15 Gibson, Counterweight: The Neighbourhood Option, p. 113.
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this is an admirable ‘can do’ attitude to gets things done by transgressing 
bureaucratic and legal boundaries. Yet there is also a feeling, shared by some 
observers and fellow travellers, that such bold action is not always guided by 
deliberate intention but often done out of ignorance, owing perhaps to the 
lack of specialist construction and legal knowledge among Assemble and the 
CLT. Indeed, the mythology built up around campaigns—particularly when 
emphasising the heroic activist or amateur architect—can have detrimental 
impacts on relationships with professionals and experts who are critical to 
the success of inherently complex projects in the built environment. What 
is needed, therefore, is not a complete renunciation of professionalism but a 
new kind of professional that integrates an amateur do-it-yourself attitude and 
democratic approach with expert knowledge.
As society becomes increasingly bureaucratised, myths—through dialectical 
association—maintain an even greater hold over our collective consciousness. 
For Graeber, this explains the recent resurgence in grand mythic and mystical 
tales, magical realms and fantasy worlds in literature, cinema and gaming 
that we see in such popular cultural phenomena as Game of Thrones, Harry 
Potter, Lord of the Rings, Dungeons and Dragons and The Lion, the Witch and the 
Wardrobe. (Recall that Narnia is used as an image to convey the mystical world 
of ‘Eldonia’.) Even fantasy sci-fi worlds set in a distant future such as Star Wars 
conjure up a lost heroic past, pitting the evil and thoroughly bureaucratic 
Galactic Empire against the romantic figures of The Resistance. Graeber 
also cites the strange confluence of mythic or heroic narrative devices within 
archetypally bureaucratic contexts as further evidence of the tightening grip 
of bureaucracy—Sherlock Holmes, James Bond, countless American cop shows, 
even Harry Potter, all present heroes working within more confined, ordinary 
bureaucratic settings of law enforcement, state espionage or boarding schools. 
The growing popularity of such cultural forms is, claims Graeber, largely 
explicable as “an attempt to imagine a world utterly purged of bureaucracy, 
which readers enjoy both as a form of vicarious escapism and as reassurance 
that, ultimately, a boring, administered world is probably preferable to any 
imaginable alternative”.16 (Hence utopia of rules.) Interestingly, the Terrace 
21 co-op in Granby was originally named the Northern Alliance Housing 
Co-operative by its founder Ed Gommon as a subtle nod towards the Rebel 
Alliance of Star Wars.17 Asked why they rebranded it Terrace 21, leading 
members suggest it was partly because it had become commonly abbreviated 
to NAHC and “NAHC sounds too officious and bureaucratic!”
16 Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy.
17 Ed’s greater inspiration was the Afghan freedom fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, the 
Lion of the Panjshir and leader of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. The original 
vision for the Northern Alliance Housing Cooperative was for a rebel network of rehab 
co-ops across northern cities hit by HMR.
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The dialectic of heroic event and bureaucratic process presented here—and 
in the myths of St George and Robin Hood—speaks to a number of tensions 
latent within movements for collective housing alternatives. One is an apparent 
incompatibility between bureaucratic organisation and democracy, as articu-
lated by Weber and other social theorists such as Robert Michels. Michels’ 
‘iron law of oligarchy’ holds that the need for organisational leadership inevi-
tably leads to the creation of a bureaucracy controlled by an undemocratic 
elite—those we might now call technocrats—who govern on claims to 
expertise that therefore disavow direct popular participation. We can see these 
tendencies at work in Liverpool where processes of professionalisation have led 
to the bureaucratic co-optation and dilution of democratic values. A ‘tendency 
to oligarchy’, argued Colin Ward,18 following Michels, operates within all 
forms of human organisation; co-ops and CLTs—conceived as institutionali-
sations of a housing commons—are certainly not exempt. For instance, we 
see a tendency towards abstraction in the Eldonian model—with a growing 
gap between ends and means as the project has scaled up. Very little active 
direct participation from residents in the decision-making and management 
of their housing means the village is run more like an efficient community-
based housing association or parish council than a mutual. Residents treat the 
management of their housing and environment as a service provided to them 
as of right rather than a co-produced benefit of collective self-government.
A big question left unanswered by collective housing advocates (myself 
included) hangs on whether deep engagement really matters. Should declining 
levels of participation in the cooperative self-management of housing be seen 
as a problem or, conversely, a mark of success? What if, for instance, the 
efficiencies of scale produced by the Eldonians (or, by extension, the municipal 
state) mean that residents are freed to engage in other worthwhile activities for 
which they may be better suited, and which may have a deeper social value and 
political impact than the mere management of housing? How does this change 
our assessment of Eldonia the ‘nanny state’? Is there not a sense in which 
the bureaucratisation of (public) housing as a universally provided, efficiently 
delivered, transparently regulated service would allow for the freeing up of 
our imaginations and energies for other, more worthwhile activities like the 
pursuit of knowledge, care and love or the arts, crafts and sciences? This 
depends, perhaps, on whether one thinks of the design, construction and 
maintenance of housing as an intrinsic part of the art of living, a craft in itself, 
or as a means to an end, a mere administrative burden.
It is worth dwelling on the tension between professionals and residents—
bureaucracy and democracy—running through attempts to construct collective 
housing alternatives. In cases where this relationship had not been cultivated 
with enough care and consideration, we see deleterious results. Liverpool’s 
18 Ward, Anarchy in Action.
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1970s co-ops were much better than the Eldonians at inculcating participation 
and cooperation within their smaller communities, but their exclusionary and 
inward-facing ‘waggon train’ urban designs produced a problematic legacy. 
Where professionals had a good relationship with their client co-op (as in the 
case of architect Bill Halsall and Weller Street) they produced arguably more 
successful urban designs. But where these two forces clashed rather than 
co-operated (as in the case of the council town planner confronting the will of 
Leta-Claudia Co-op) the results have been less sensitive to the tried and tested 
principles of the urban design discipline, such as public openness, legibility, 
permeability and connectivity. 
Bureaucracy and expertise are important brakes on darker tendencies latent 
within heroic or parochial perspectives on the world. Defensive designs were 
not so much a spatial expression of the co-op model as they were a popular 
response to Liverpool’s threatening environment marked by deprivation, 
dilapidation, crime, sectarian violence and state-led displacement. Many 
co-ops turned their backs on the city, setting a trend as exemplars of defensible 
space that would inform the policy development of secured-by-design. Such 
defensive (sub)urbanism created spatial divisions in an already divided city: 
splintering Liverpool’s urban environment and ramifying the sense of parochi-
alism and disconnection, as “a city of a thousand villages” (a common phrase 
said of Liverpool) sharply divided between localist neighbourhoods. It risks 
adding new layers to a history of sectarianism: producing isolated clusters of 
‘militant particularisms’,19 incapable of drawing strength from cooperation and 
solidarity, and disconnected from the wider struggle for urban land reform. 
Communication, mutual learning and movement-building are made all the 
more difficult by such a context. 
These lessons garnered from the juxtaposition of mythic event and 
bureaucratic process highlight a number of implications for movement- and 
institution-building. First, it suggests the need to create and embed within 
new institutional forms the bureaucratic procedures and governance processes 
that will ensure the long-term reproduction of practices of commoning and 
common management of housing as the founding members and original 
activists are, over time, succeeded by future generations. Second, it highlights 
that institutional structures need to be developed that are capable of 
countering uncooperative tendencies embedded in histories of sectarianism, 
mistrust of authorities and urban angst in order to instil new practices of 
cooperation, mutual aid and solidarity amongst those whose experience tells 
them otherwise. Third, it suggests we need to make the bureaucratic tasks of 
such institutions as collectively governable, legible and meaningful as possible 
19 David Harvey, “Militant Particularism and Global Ambition: The Conceptual Politics 
of Place, Space, and Environment in the Work of Raymond Williams”, Social Text 42 
(1995): 69–98.
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so that member-residents can do it themselves. At the same time, we need to 
ensure that professional expertise is built into coordinating structures from the 
outset. How can we (re)configure an institutional infrastructure to support the 
development of expertise, close the gap between professionals and residents 
and make the former more accountable to the latter—to create an institutional 
infrastructure that is more democratic? In short, how do we go about building 
a bureaucracy from below? Before attempting to answer this question, I want to 
consider one more salient myth that raises the issue of replicability.
The Myth of Liverpool Exceptionalism
Approaching collective housing development through the lens of myth-making 
has one last lesson to teach us. It is very tempting to mythologise this history 
of collective housing experimentation as a product of Liverpool’s unique 
cultural character—its ‘exceptionalism’ as a ‘city of radicals’ oft-suggested 
to be ‘in but not of England’. Such a reading of history would emphasise the 
particularities of people and place—foregrounding Liverpool’s unusual socio-
geographical position at the crossroads of continents and its unique historical 
traditions—in explaining why the city became host to these events and 
movements. How might such a myth be constructed? It would start by building 
on the ‘foundational myth’ of Liverpool as a radical, revolutionary city—the 
1911 strike and the anarcho-syndicalism that infused its culture of political 
militancy, whose legacy was arguably the Trotskyist Militant Tendency.20 
Tony Lane, amongst others, claims anarcho-syndicalism had a subtly pervasive 
impact on Liverpool culture and urban politics: first seeping into land-based 
industries via anarchic seafarers regularly moving between different occupa-
tions, who “in their wake left traces of their experience and habits of mind”; 
eventually infusing into broader community-based action over council housing 
as the “democratic moment, born and then nurtured in the workplace, took 
wing and outflew its origins”.21 
We can see the spirit of Liverpool’s distinctively anarchic, firebrand politics 
embodied in some of the more politically motivated co-op campaigns—
Weller Street, Leta-Claudia, Thirlmere, the Eldonians and Langrove—in 
their bolshie challenge to local authority plans for rehousing, and the pride 
of place given to direct action in their repertoire of contention. Critical 
in driving forward these campaigns were strong community organisers 
and charismatic leaders. Their figureheads tended to be authoritative and 
powerful men—the likes of Billy Floyd and Tony McGann—who, as we 
have seen, were so often characterised in terms of heroic acts of war fought 
20 Ball, “‘Militant Liverpool’ as Liverpool Exceptionalism: The Rise, Fall and Character 
of the City Council, 1983–1987”.
21 Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea, pp. 116, 135.
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against the council. Here we are back in the realm of St George. Most of the 
co-op organising, however, was done by women through established neigh-
bourhood networks. Later co-ops were even more female-led, especially in 
Kirkby, galvanised by mostly young single mothers seeking better housing 
conditions for their families. Thus we can trace another strand of influence 
in Liverpool’s exceptional growth of co-ops to the traditionally ‘matriarchal 
society’ of many of its neighbourhoods.
The influence of place-based radicalism may have been fairly direct: coming 
through certain residents’ contact with syndicalist practices in their work on 
the docks and factories and experience with local trade unionism. There was 
also perhaps a more circuitous route at play here: anarchist ideas transmitted 
through families and social networks down the generations to the children 
of workers involved in direct action. These ‘children of the revolution’ may 
have come into contact with radical ideas during their university years of 
the 1960s, graduating to become those architects, co-op developers and 
community workers so ideologically committed to cooperativism and who 
were critical in making the movement. Architects such as Tom Clay for 
Neighbourhood Housing Services and Bill Halsall for CDS and MIH co-ops are 
excellent examples of this generation of young radicals, exposed to new ideas 
in participatory design at university and through their formative work with 
SNAP, which provided them the tools and inspiration to innovate new models 
of democratic neighbourhood regeneration in their work with rehab and 
new-build co-ops respectively. So too were co-ops a kind of political school 
for member co-operators. Countless working-class residents were empowered 
by their experience of campaigning to find jobs or to pursue further education 
for the first time; many others were politicised and radicalised by the process 
and stood for local election. The influence on Liverpool politics of key 
councillors—invariably Labour—who cut their teeth in co-op campaigning is 
palpable. Phil Hughes of Weller Street was instrumental, as Chair of Housing 
following the deposal of Militant, in securing the future of Langrove Street 
Co-op, then threatened by Tony Byrne’s plans to expand Everton Park. One 
of Langrove’s principal resident-activists, Jane Corbett, is still going strong 
today, at the time of writing, as Assistant Mayor of Liverpool and Mayoral 
Lead for Fairness and Tackling Poverty. 
Likewise, a large number of the housing managers working with CDS, 
MIH and LHT were schooled in co-op development. Some have retained 
their passion for co-ops even as their organisations have mutated into large 
commercialised bureaucratic behemoths. Riverside (formerly MIH) now 
working with Langrove to support the development of the first co-op on 
Merseyside in decades, for instance, would not have been possible were it 
not for key advocates still working—now in positions of power—within the 
organisation. In the 1970s, a significant proportion of this new ideologically 
driven class of urban community professionals came not from Liverpool but 
Part V: Conclusion302
from around the country, and even internationally, attracted to the city by its 
radical reputation, including Paul Lusk from Oxford and Jack McBane from 
Canada. Thus a virtuous cycle of radical innovation was spun in Liverpool 
through the 1960s and 1970s: momentum generated by the city’s history and 
reputation attracting innovators from elsewhere, brought into contact with the 
last remnants of working-class anarcho-syndicalism and the young heirs of this 
tradition, to co-produce a brief surge of cooperative activism.
We then see a direct thread—embedded in place and local practices—
between the co-ops and the subsequent CLT activism several decades later. 
Many of the vociferous local activists campaigning against HMR were 
themselves involved in earlier instances of Liverpool radicalism: those leading 
resistance in Granby had cut their teeth on various forms of activism, such 
as a women’s housing co-op, a radical printing press and voluntary housing 
action in the 1970s. In Granby, the idea for a co-op, which led to exploration 
of the CLT model, was originally mooted by, amongst others, Ed Gommon—a 
longstanding member-resident of one of the early rehab co-ops in L8, Alt 
Co-op, and the son of one of the leading architects of the new-build co-ops 
who helped design Hesketh Street and Shorefields as part of the practice Innes 
Wilkin Ainsley Gommon. This young professional inherited a great deal from 
the co-op movement to become something of an enthusiast, and the founding 
member of the Northern Alliance Housing Co-operative, Granby CLT’s 
partner co-op now known as Terrace 21. In Granby we can see the direct 
lineage from SNAP and the new-build co-op movement to the fruition of the 
contemporary CLT campaign. Activists there are “continuing the work that 
SNAP started”.
Liverpool’s CLT movement, therefore, does not just draw on the rich 
repository of radicalism embedded in place but so too on another, deeply 
intertwined Liverpudlian tradition: the borrowing of ideas from across the 
globe. The idea for Homebaked as a cooperative bakery was largely sourced 
from Dutch inspiration and the international experience with co-op models 
embodied in the artist-activist Jeanne van Heeswijk. The CLT idea was 
first introduced to Anfield by Arena’s KTP American study tour, whose 
participants—community representatives, academics and housing profes-
sionals—diffused their new knowledge locally in ways which would inform 
the later campaign to establish a CLT as part of Homebaked. Terrace 21 
co-op activists in Granby sought advice from the academic researchers on the 
KTP study tour, disseminating the CLT model to Granby, where it gained 
the approval of residents, winning out over an alternative vision for a purely 
cooperative scheme. 
In these many ways, Liverpool’s CLT movement has evolved as a product 
of place: the descendent of a distinctively local co-op tradition, coming to 
fruition through the creative collision of ideas from elsewhere. This process 
of travelling ideas can be likened to that for mobile policies, in which buzzy 
14: On (Myth) Making History 303
new models for urban policy such as creative quarters or enterprise zones are 
mobilised by public professionals and private consultants plugged into global 
circuits of fast policymaking.22 Only, with the collective housing models 
brought to Liverpool, these more alternative ideas are mobilised by a variety 
of different actors, through slower, more circuitous and sporadic routes—
South American self-help traditions via John F.C. Turner and Colin Ward, for 
instance—reassembling in Liverpool, where they mutate through exposure 
to local radical traditions—themselves the result of earlier global mobilisa-
tions, not least Spanish anarcho-syndicalism—to construct novel assemblages 
in Homebaked and Granby. These collective alternatives are made up of 
material practices in participatory planning techniques, developed locally 
though derived globally, as well as more contemporary ideas associated with 
claiming the right to the city and reclaiming the urban commons arriving 
from Europe and the USA. The importance of place to the development of 
collective housing alternatives in Liverpool is therefore as much a function 
of Liverpool’s international connectedness and hybrid relationality—as a 
mongrel maritime city made up of bits from elsewhere—as it is the city’s 
distinctive historical-geographical context and cultural character.
The neat narrative I have just sketched of Liverpool as especially fertile 
ground for collective housing alternatives to take root may well help identify 
and link together some of the key characters and cultural characteristics 
that brought all this into play where and when they did but, if we rely too 
heavily upon such a reading of history—a reading that plays too much into 
mythological renderings of Liverpool’s exceptionalism as a uniquely radical 
city—it does real damage to the notion that such movements can be repli-
cated and grown elsewhere. If we wish to see collective housing models grow 
into a counter-hegemonic alternative system of delivering public housing and 
urban governance—one which can seriously rival and eventually supplant the 
dominant system of private property and state–market relations—we need to 
move beyond such particularistic explanation and think in clearer terms what 
the essential factors are in developing the movement on a more generalisable 
scale. 
Recipes for Revolution: From Cultivating Local Delicacies  
to Sourcing Essential Ingredients
As I suggested in the prologue, a large part of my interest in delving into the 
reasons behind the co-op movement’s growth is to understand how a certain 
set of factors came together to produce Liverpool’s so-called Co-op Spring 
or Cooperative Revolution in order to impart insight into the necessary 
22 Cristina Temenos and Tom Baker, “Enriching Urban Policy Mobilities Research”, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39.4 (2015): 824–827.
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ingredients and possible trajectories of future collective housing movements. 
Everyone I interviewed was asked why they thought it was Liverpool, of 
all places, that became host to one of the most vital housing co-operative 
movements in British history, and why this happened when it did. Almost all 
interviewees, many of whom were personally involved in Liverpool’s co-ops, 
said something similar: that “it was just of the moment”. Other responses were 
similarly elusive: that “a set of circumstances” peculiar to inner-city Liverpool 
of the 1970s had made it “ripe for development”; that “a confluence of factors 
had come together to make it happen” or a “cocktail enabled it to occur” 
or, alternatively, “a combination of mutual interests” coalesced at the right 
time and the right place. Others grasped for more elaborate metaphors: the 
movement was said to “blossom briefly under this kind of political spotlight, 
showered with money to develop co-ops, but only for a very short time, until 
the heavens closed again”. But all these responses seem to beg the question; 
they leave the answer tantalisingly hanging. 
What are the specific components which make up this ‘cocktail’, this 
‘confluence of factors’? From the history I have traced in this book, we can 
straightforwardly identify seven basic ingredients: (1) housing need amongst 
communities left unmet by the state and market translating into collective 
desires for alternatives; (2) strong leadership and social organisation 
within these communities to lead and organise campaigns; (3) dedicated 
activists and professionals committed to cooperative principles supported 
by secondary support networks based locally; (4) availability of cheap and 
vacant land to develop or empty housing in need of refurbishment; (5) local 
political will and policy support from council officers; (6) a benign funding 
and legislative regime at the national scale; and (7) place-based cultural 
traditions of political radicalism and experimentation with alternatives upon 
which to draw. 
These seven factors align very closely with the coordinates mapped out by 
Johnston Birchall in his enquiry into the ‘hidden history’ of cooperative housing 
in Britain.23 Like my interviewee above, Birchall employs a horticultural 
analogy, conjuring a naturalistic, pre-modern image of housing, to distinguish 
between the seeds, soil, cultivation, environment and climate required for 
co-ops to take root and blossom: housing needs left unmet; cooperative models 
that work in practice; charismatic promoters or ‘cultivators’; a favourable 
legal and financial environment; and a conducive psychological, ideological 
and political climate. Similarly, Homebaked plays on a baking metaphor to 
suggest the right “recipe for a revolution” with ingredients listed under step-
by-step points like ‘Find the Correct Oven’, ‘Set the Right Temperature’, ‘Use 
Locally Sourced Ingredients’, ‘Kneed [sic] with Care’ and ‘Understand your 
23 Birchall, “The Hidden History of Co-operative Housing in Britain”; Birchall, Building 
Communities the Co-operative Way.
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Customer’.24 Evoking the sphere of social reproduction as a key site of struggle, 
such a baking analogy was employed in Homebaked’s early days by co-founder 
Fred Brown (who is no longer with us):
Taking the time it needs is a recognised and vital part of the baking 
process, next to applying heat to produce the best results. Give it the 
time, give it the resources and try not to prescribe. We nurture each 
other. As the dough rises, we rise.25
Heeding Fred’s cautions over being too prescriptive, we might nonetheless ask: 
what were the essential ingredients in the recipe for Liverpool’s Cooperative 
Revolution? We can see how Liverpool’s co-op movement only ever grew 
amidst relatively conducive financial and legal conditions as well as a favourable 
political and ideological climate. The 1974 Housing Act and its amendments 
by key co-op advocates in the heart of the Labour Government—notably 
Harold Campbell and Reg Freeson—created a hospitable legal and financial 
environment at the local level. Cultivators were forged in the fire of radical 
political action of the late 1960s and early 1970s—the second cycle of 
contention set in motion against capitalist mass consumption and state bureau-
cracy. This radicalism infused idealistic professionals and urban communities 
alike. Innovative organisations and practices—like CDS and participatory 
design processes—were cultivated in this period. A whole ecosystem emerged: 
multiple development agencies, ‘mother’ co-ops, competed with each other to 
spawn daughter co-ops amongst communities with the collective desires to 
address their housing needs. As these offspring grew in number, strength and 
confidence, they began to self-organise and create new grassroots organisa-
tions, such as the Merseyside Federation of Housing Co-operatives, which in 
turn provided support to enable further growth and replication.
Fast forward to the twenty-first century and the cataclysmic global 
economic crash of 2008 (‘the strange non-death of neoliberalism’)26 and its 
political fallout in 2011 (‘the year of dreaming dangerously’)27 have precipi-
tated an ideological climate with both new opportunities and new challenges 
for experimental projects aimed at transformative change. Just as 1968 inaugu-
rated the long decade of the 1970s in which ideas from the counter-culture 
24 Sue Potts, Homebaked—Impact Report: Recipes for Revolutions (Homebaked, 2014): 
www.biennial.com/files/pdfs/3216/140509-final-homebaked-impact-report-suepotts.
pdf.
25 Quoted in Becoming Homebaked, timeline developed by Britt Jurgensen for 
‘Trainings for the Not-Yet’ Exhibition (2020): www.bakonline.org/program-item/
trainings-for-the-not-yet/.
26 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism (Polity Press, 2011).
27 Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously.
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and the New Left fomented a period of contention and experimentation with 
new forms of social organisation, including collective housing alternatives, so 
too can we see similar signs of rupture and transformation in the efflores-
cence of social movements in the wake of 2008. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
much has changed since the cooperative heyday of the 1970s. Neoliberalism 
is still stubbornly stumbling on, if only as a zombie.28 Neoliberal values have 
seeped into almost every pore of society; private homeownership ingrained 
in the national psyche. Public housing—like all things public—has long been 
in retreat, replaced by a watered-down version called ‘social housing’. Public 
service provision has been privatised and outsourced to quasi-governmental 
organisations, such as housing associations, or wholly for-profit private 
consortiums. Government has splintered into a fragmented form of governance. 
‘Community’ has become a buzzword in urban policy—part of a new localism 
of offloading welfare responsibilities onto citizens themselves. 
As forms of social innovation, collective alternatives have emerged in this 
context from civil society organisations and social movements outside the 
state, in reaction to state and market failure, yet are increasingly caught up in 
a dense web of governance arrangements and actors—across public, private 
and third sectors—often working at cross-purposes, but sometimes collabo-
ratively and cooperatively in state-funded projects. The state once played a 
more direct and central role in this process of social innovation, at least in 
Liverpool. SNAP was a council-commissioned action-research project run by 
the voluntary housing campaign group Shelter, using state funding to deliver 
its radical participatory agenda. The co-op movement was effectively bank-
rolled by central government, via the Housing Corporation, and promoted 
locally by the Liberal-led council. The Eldonians received unprecedented 
political and financial support from Thatcher’s government. But these sources 
of support have become increasingly indirect and circuitous—mediated 
through a confused web of governmental agencies, quangos, arm’s-length 
financial intermediaries, charities, foundations, banks, social investors and 
private companies. Homebaked was commissioned by Liverpool Biennial, 
itself funded by a range of state agencies, including Liverpool Council, the 
Arts Council for England and the EU, and also Peel Holdings, the Merseyside-
based private consortium with huge investments in Liverpool’s infrastructure 
and speculative development. Granby has relied on philanthropic capitalism 
in the shape of social finance from an ex-stockbroker ‘mystery millionaire’. 
The idea for a CLT in Liverpool was first tested out by a large commercialised 
housing association in Anfield and a state-funded regeneration partnership in 
Kensington. What all these examples demonstrate is the increasingly complex 
crossovers, permeable boundaries and multiple enmeshments between grass-
roots groups and professional companies, housing associations and charities as 
28 Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism.
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well as local and national state actors in the innovation of potentially trans-
formative—but all too often co-opted and compromised—collective housing 
alternatives. 
So how did we get here? The 1988 Housing Act effectively put paid to any 
further co-op development, causing existing co-ops to “wither on the vine” as 
one interviewee likened it. The Act placed great pressure on small-scale chari-
table trusts like CDS, LHT and MIH to expand through mergers, acquisitions 
and stock transfers—dropping their titular place identities and morphing into 
placeless commercialised concerns: Plus Dane, Onward Homes, Riverside. 
Through this process, the place-based system of dedicated secondary devel-
opment agencies all but dissolved—subsumed within corporate agendas tied 
to generating exchange value above all else. Committed co-operators working 
within Plus Dane, after its takeover of CDS, disbanded to reincarnate a 
secondary organisation in the form of North West Housing Services, which 
now offers professional support to both Homebaked and Granby as well as 
most remaining co-ops on Merseyside but which, as I argue below, lacks the 
democratic impetus for collective alternative development.
Aside from NWHS, the organisations that evolved out of the co-op 
agencies are now too implicated in large-scale profitable redevelopment—as 
evident in HMR—to be of much service to CLTs. Homebaked has been lucky 
enough to have at their disposal the professional contacts and experience of 
Liverpool Biennial. Granby has been fortunate in finding a social investor 
to back the project not just with financial but also with cultural capital, 
helping bring Assemble to the neighbourhood. In the past, these processes 
of procurement and selection of architects and agents would have been 
facilitated by CDS et al., but today depends upon the personal connections 
of activists in a snowballing process of trial and error. Both Granby and 
Homebaked are privileged by a broad range of professional involvement, but 
Little Klondyke was not; part of the reason for its failure was the lack of 
social capital and professional know-how to draw upon. Both Homebaked 
and Granby have drawn upon advice from independent consultancies, 
such as Locally Made and URBED, as well as from the national umbrella 
organisation, the National CLT Network. The other major players are SAVE 
Britain’s Heritage and the Empty Homes Agency, two national campaign 
organisations with particular ideological interests in conserving architec-
tural heritage and promoting the reuse of empty homes respectively. These 
two groups have supported CLTs not necessarily as mutual experiments 
for affordable housing but as instruments conducive to the realisation of 
their own, albeit related, agendas (the Empty Homes Agency is committed 
to community self-help, of which CLTs are a significant component). The 
central involvement of partisan single-issue charities in the development of 
Liverpool’s CLT movement suggests just how far collective housing devel-
opment has fallen from its height, standing on the shoulders of the state in 
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the 1970s, when co-ops were generously state-funded and systematically 
developed by a bespoke professional infrastructure. 
After 2011, with a renewed localism agenda and funding opportunities for 
self-help, the premature abandonment of HMR, coupled with slowly changing 
attitudes in the council, the essential ingredients for collective housing growth 
began to mix again, only to leave lingering the bad taste of austerity. In a public 
talk at an academic housing conference in Liverpool in 2016, Ann O’Byrne, then 
Liverpool Council Member for Housing and political supporter of Granby and 
Homebaked, revealed the logic behind the council’s continued preference for 
large-scale redevelopment schemes over small-scale community-led projects. 
Conservative government-led fiscal austerity had entailed 58 per cent cuts to 
the city’s budget, leaving the council little choice—if they wished to protect 
essential public services from any further cutbacks, to avoid compounding 
the untold harm already afflicted on thousands of vulnerable people—than 
to make up the shortfall from other sources. The main alternative method 
of revenue generation left open to the council is property-led regeneration: 
selling public land to developers for large capital receipts and then procuring 
higher council taxes from the more affluent housing built in place of low value 
terraces—an admission of exploiting the rent gap through state-led ‘gentrifi-
cation by stealth’.29 Austerity urbanism thus opens with one hand a window 
of opportunity for small-scale alternative solutions while slamming it shut 
with the other—forcing the hand of the council to maintain the hegemony 
of large-scale housing-led development rather than support collective alter-
natives. This sheds new light on the reasons why Sefton council—similarly 
hard-hit by austerity—was so indisposed to accept £5 million of central 
government funding to support Little Klondyke CLT. Austerity urbanism and 
neoliberalism thus pit potential allies—municipal authorities and collective 
alternatives—against each other. As alternative forms of public provision, 
CLTs must now compete with councils and housing associations for control 
over increasingly scarce public resources.
Collective housing alternatives today risk exposing themselves to unwanted 
responsibilities for delivering public services on the cheap—and falling 
through the ‘trapdoor of community’.30 This may be a backdoor route to 
further privatisation and cutbacks in public services, which are offloaded onto 
communities, and justified through such discourses as sustainability, self-suffi-
ciency and especially resilience—tacitly promoting community capabilities 
to defend against structural forces by maintaining the status quo rather than 
achieve any kind of radical transformation. By reproducing such discourses, 
29 Bridge, Butler and Lees, Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth?; Kallin and Slater, 
“Activating Territorial Stigma: Gentrifying Marginality on Edinburgh’s Periphery”.
30 Steve Herbert, “The Trapdoor of Community”, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 95.4 (2008): 850–865.
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collective alternatives ironically play into the hands of neoliberal austerity. This 
was certainly the stance of Militant, who saw co-ops as a threat to socialism. 
Indeed, the values of entrepreneurialism, creativity, self-reliance, flexibility, 
experimentalism and do-it-yourself initiative so central to Granby CLT and 
Homebaked—as experimental utopias—are at the same time the values 
treasured by ‘roll-with-it’ neoliberalisation: the normalisation into everyday 
life of enterprise and self-governing capabilities.31 Granby and Homebaked 
might be framed as the unwitting agents of austerity urbanism: taking up the 
slack in a paralysed development model and filling the gap left by the retreating 
state to reuse derelict housing productively when all else has failed. They may 
pave the way for the next wave of speculative property development to hit 
Liverpool after its long decline: rescuing desirable architectural assets from 
near-destruction, valorising the land and environment through painstaking 
unpaid voluntary labour—civic volunteerism—and attracting social finan-
ciers, artists and architects in nascent waves of gentrification. Yet we must 
remember that these projects grew out of a community’s passion for place and 
radical ideals; they were not foisted upon them by the state seeking to offload 
responsibilities. In the cases where this did happen (such as with Kensington’s 
and Anfield’s failed experiments) tenants actually resisted the imposition of 
the CLT idea and rejected the narratives presented to them, which at base 
were about operational costs and organisational efficiencies. There is perhaps 
an inbuilt safeguard against neoliberal exploitation of communities within the 
CLT model: to get it going, residents really have to want to do it.
No less dangerous is an associated tendency for individual projects to pursue 
a kind of competitive vanguardism—encouraged by neoliberal discourses of 
austerity localism and community resilience. This risks fragmenting an already 
fragile CLT movement in Liverpool—dividing and conquering projects before 
they can be connected through networks of mutual support. To move towards 
a strategy of mutual ‘resourcefulness’ rather than self-reliant ‘resilience’, 
for which critical geographers Danny MacKinnon and Kate Derickson have 
argued,32 the co-op and CLT movements in Liverpool need to build bridges 
between individual projects and develop those supportive infrastructures 
and ‘enabler’ organisations promoted by the likes of John F.C. Turner and 
embodied by CDS in the late 1970s and later by the Merseyside Federation of 
Co-ops. It is vital, however, as I argue below, for such enablers—or any kind 
of bureaucratic structure—to be grounded in the democratic decision-making 
of grassroots movements.
31 Roger Keil, “The Urban Politics of Roll-with-It Neoliberalization”, City: Analysis of 
Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 13.2–3 (2009): 230–245. 
32 Danny MacKinnon and Kate D. Derickson, “From Resilience to Resourcefulness: 
A Critique of Resilience Policy and Activism”, Progress in Human Geography 37.2 (2013): 
253–270.
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If the local state is no longer in a position to help develop institutions for 
collective alternatives as it was perhaps better placed to do so in the 1970s—
and is, in fact, so systematically weakened by a central state apparatus turned 
against local government by political forces hell-bent on displacing the debts 
of neoliberalism, via devolved austerity, such that there are more immediate 
and stronger incentives to work against the development of collective alterna-
tives, not least for its own survival—then alternative institutions must be 
constructed from the ground up. At the same time, the state should not be 
altogether abandoned. An all-too-common knee-jerk response, particularly 
among radicals associated with the commons, is to reject the state entirely for 
its complicity with and takeover by capital and to build alternatives outside its 
institutional walls. But as we have seen in the historical rise and fall (and recent 
rediscovery) of the foundational economy—first with municipal socialism in 
the 1890s and later with post-war institutions such as the NHS—the state 
is very much amenable to be harnessed for interests and causes other than 
capital; that its relative receptivity in this regard comes in waves shaped by 
cycles of contention and their structural undercurrents. Reforming the state 
and reshaping its institutions to the benefit of collective alternatives, then, 
is an important—and possible—task to be undertaken alongside incubating 
social innovations in the cracks of capitalism. So, how do we go about this 
dual strategy of building alternatives outside the state whilst simultaneously 
attempting to reinvent the state from the inside? What are the tools available 
in the current conjuncture that can generate momentum for a new wave of 
collective alternatives?
CHAPTER 15 
Building a Bureaucracy from Below
15: Building a Bureaucracy from Below
What would a bureaucracy for the democratic development of collective alter-
natives look like? If Public Sector Housing 2.0 never quite took off in the 1970s, 
how might it do so today? If we recall that a housing commons is both a material 
resource pool (e.g., common land) and a set of social practices (commoning)—
both noun and verb—then we need institutions that can, on the one hand, 
provide resources for specialist advice and acquire land and housing for 
(re)development and, on the other, cultivate practices of commoning through 
education. Education and a supportive infrastructure are fundamental if we are 
to see collective alternatives developed more proactively by others than those 
already interested ideologically or motivated by reaction to need left unmet. 
In short, we need agencies that can offer resources for housing development 
and professional support and complementary organisations that can provide 
education, skills training and platforms for communication, co-operation and 
knowledge sharing. For the 1970s co-op movement, these two functions were 
delivered by an institutional structure comprising a national body, the Housing 
Corporation, which coordinated state funding, and local secondary organisa-
tions, like CDS, which offered professional support and education to co-ops. 
What was good—and not so good—about this set-up? And why has it proven 
ultimately inadequate to enable the institutionalisation of an autonomous and 
democratic movement?
First, there are reasons to be wary of a centralised bureaucracy such as 
that enabling the 1970s co-ops. Modern bureaucracies arose through violent 
imperial plunder and domineering colonial conquest, with the tools and 
techniques used to map, categorise, control, subjugate and ultimately exploit 
a given territory and its people, as much as they did by any supposedly 
public-spirited attempt to provide a peaceful, rational, trustworthy system 
of governance.1 The Housing Corporation is an interesting example of how 
bureaucratic and colonial forms of administration are bound up together in 
troubling ways, as one co-op development worker remarked to me:
Part of its function was to give employment to ex-colonial civil servants 
coming out of a newly independent … coming from Nigeria, to the 
1 William Davies, Nervous States: How Feeling Took over the World (Jonathan Cape, 2018).
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Housing Corporation! So you had these people who were pro co-op 
working in it, but you also had these ex-colonial civil servants, you 
know: “The natives don’t want to cooperate!” When I started in the late 
’70s, there was a guy doing registration, the local officer of the Housing 
Corporation, he had a great grey handlebar moustache and saw his job 
of doing registration as health kit inspection … There’s something 
quite colonial about the whole Housing Corporation ethos: going in 
“civilising the natives”, empowering them, although “empowering” was 
not in the vocabulary back then.
This underlines the need to build a bureaucracy from below—to put 
democracy first wherever they conflict. Nonetheless, bureaucracies like 
all social structures are composed of multiple and contradictory parts 
and the localised system of support emerging in Liverpool in the 1970s, 
whilst financially tied to the Housing Corporation, was shaped more by the 
instincts of anarchist, self-build and community architecture movements. 
Without the extensive support of co-op development agencies acting as 
secondary or ‘mother’ co-ops, Liverpool’s cooperative revolution would 
never have begun. SNAP was seminal in setting up the first rehab co-ops: 
revolutionising community planning methods, providing the basic tools for 
further experimentation and demonstrating how rehab could be delivered 
as an effective alternative to demolition. Neighbourhood Housing Services 
and CDS were both incredibly important to the development of the rehab 
and new-build movements respectively. The reason CDS proved viable 
where Neighbourhood Housing Services did not was its strategy to build its 
own houses to provide an asset base and continuous rental stream to cross-
subsidise new-build co-op projects, which were very resource-intensive 
despite generous Housing Corporation HAG funding. 
There are lessons here for building an institutional infrastructure from 
below—the need to secure an asset base and a sustainable source of revenue 
independent of the state. CDS embodied the role of ‘enabler’ promoted 
by John F.C. Turner in his recommendations for an autonomous system of 
self-help housing, supported by state-funded infrastructure. It was an early 
example of the intermediaries identified as so important to the contemporary 
growth of self-help housing and CLTs, either through ‘scaling up’ or ‘going 
viral’.2 In either case—arborescent growth or rhizomatic replication—key 
intermediaries or secondaries offer essential education, training, communi-
cation, guidance and support. Yet there is a great danger that professional 
organisations exploit unequal power relations for their own ends. Though 
there were certainly suspicions amongst Weller Street residents that CDS 
2 Moore and Mullins, “Scaling-Up or Going Viral? Comparing Self-Help Housing and 
Community Land Trust Facilitation”.
15: Building a Bureaucracy from Below 313
were taking them for a ride, participant testimony suggests CDS was 
committed to promoting dweller control, pushing against financial and legal 
constraints. Experimental socio-material practices like participatory planning 
techniques—innovated in partnership with architects such as Bill Halsall—
were the result of CDS stretching its organisational capabilities to the limit and 
taking risks by investing heavily in untested methods in the hope of producing 
lasting social value. While CDS played a central role, other organisations 
were also pivotal—not least LHT and MIH. Indeed, competition between 
secondary co-ops and service providers was a fundamental factor in social 
innovation: paradoxically furthering the possibilities for cooperation within 
communities through competition at higher scales driving up standards and 
providing choice. This suggests a monolithic, centralised, one-size-fits-all 
structure is ill-suited to the plural forms of collective alternatives.
Dormant, Not Defunct: Self-Funding the Next Co-Op Spring
Following its demise through the 1980s, there are good reasons why now 
is the moment to rebuild a city-regional institutional infrastructure. As one 
observer told me, the cooperative spirit in Liverpool is “dormant” rather than 
“defunct”; another, that the city “still has that ferment feel about it” despite 
the fact that “we haven’t got the money to play with now”. This may be about 
to change. Many participants believe that the time has come, that co-ops are 
now at a critical threshold, on the cusp of a new phase of expansion having 
accumulated a large asset and resource base in the intervening fallow period. A 
curious implication of the 1988 Act rent reforms was unintentionally to create 
the opportunity for co-ops to make large surpluses. Their modest mortgage 
repayment schedules had been originally calculated on the basis of very low 
rents, the ‘fair rents’ set by the 1974 Act. The 1988 Act, however, replaced 
these with ‘assured rents’, generally much higher in order to pay for ongoing 
costs in the absence of HAG funding. Any new tenants coming in after 1988, 
therefore, would be paying assured rents, and, as turnover escalated, co-ops 
found it easier to pay mortgage and other costs, pocketing increasing surpluses. 
The co-ops are now, as one member revealed, “coming out of the other end” 
of the dormant period, having repaid debts, with potentially considerable 
“reserves to enable them to now start to develop new homes”. Collectively, 
liquid assets are estimated to be well into the millions—at least £21 million—
just sitting in individual co-op bank accounts. If these co-op reserves could 
somehow be made available to those currently campaigning for alternatives, 
there may be a CLT Uprising to match the Co-op Spring.
When CDS merged with Plus Dane, it came under the regulatory purview 
of the Housing Corporation, which put pressure on Plus Dane to utilise 
this untapped asset base—“to get them sweating their assets”—as a means 
to leverage funding for further development. This may account for CDS’s 
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break with Plus Dane, due to its dependence on Housing Corporation grants 
and allocations for developing its social housing portfolio, with an incentive 
to follow the top-down mandate to divert co-op surpluses into new devel-
opment. Legally, the surpluses are owned securely by the co-ops, but whilst 
managed under the auspices of Plus Dane they were at risk of being co-opted. 
By becoming independent as NWHS, this enabled the safeguarding of co-ops 
from any potential asset-stripping. Previously, CDS had been registered with 
the Housing Corporation, which enabled the organisation to build its own 
houses and develop an asset base, against which to leverage private capital for 
expansion. Although this was the foundation that assured the early viability of 
CDS, in contrast to Neighbourhood Housing Services, such a logic has since 
driven the ‘empire building’ of the big housing associations. NWHS is now 
sitting in a unique position as financial manager and advisor for the majority 
of Liverpool co-ops, with the potential to reincarnate the initiating secondary 
role of CDS for a possible co-op revival. For this to occur, NWHS needs to 
persuade their co-op clients of the efficacy of pooling surpluses together and 
investing this resource into new co-op development. The process of setting up a 
collective fund coordinated by NWHS is under way. The idea is to pool capital 
reserves in a central pot which could then provide grants and low-interest loans 
for new or existing groups to develop new co-operative housing. This would 
be self-sustaining patient capital that is financially beneficial for cooperative 
development and which would not seek to make a profit, only to replenish the 
‘solidarity fund’ over the long term such that contributing co-ops do not lose 
their initial investments.
However, it is unclear whether NWHS has the capacity, incentive 
or commitment to drive the wider renewal of the co-op movement on 
Merseyside. By all accounts, NWHS provides a good service in supporting 
co-ops and now CLTs but, like CDS before it, the organisation has its own 
prerogatives, which while aligning quite closely with collective alternatives 
are very much distinct. NWHS, like all professional secondary organisations 
not owned by their members, has an incentive to make money like any other 
business, to push their own professional agenda and, above all, to present 
themselves as an indispensable intermediary for the successful operation of the 
co-ops. Secondaries have the perverse incentive—whether realised or not—to 
keep their members (or, rather, ‘clients’) in the dark about their operations, to 
prevent co-ops from deliberating amongst themselves or from seeing ways in 
which they could pool resources and share knowledge more directly without 
recourse to a professional organisation. Without democratic underpinnings, 
such an organisation may do more to divide and rule co-ops than bring 
them together in strength and solidarity. In many ways, then, professional 
secondary organisations like NWHS, CDS, MIH and Neighbourhood Housing 
Services all embody a state-like Leviathan logic in that they act to maintain 
relations between members only via their shared vertical relationship with the 
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secondary. This is no way to build a democratic movement. The professional 
expertise of secondaries is vital to movement-building but needs to be made 
the servant of the movement. In short, the secondary should be the client of 
the movement, not vice versa. 
Liverpool’s co-op movement requires a democratically governed 
city-regional federated structure to negotiate with local government, to 
communicate its values to wider publics, to facilitate knowledge sharing and 
source professional expertise, to pool resources between individual co-ops in 
order to coordinate funds for further development, to undertake education and 
training for new and existing members and to provide the kind of democratic 
arena for the grassroots cultivation of a movement. The development of 
such networks and federations is fundamental to one of the seven founding 
principles of cooperativism, building on the original five values of the Rochdale 
Pioneers and enshrined by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1966—
that of cooperation among co-operatives. Conduits for cooperation had originally 
been put in place by CDS, who suggested the establishment of the Merseyside 
Federation of Co-ops, which for some time provided a fruitful arena for 
collaboration, knowledge sharing, resource pooling and mutual learning. 
However, the Federation disbanded in the early 1990s, after the generous 
state funding of co-ops inaugurated by the 1974 Act (which had helped pay 
for Federation activities) had finally come to an end and its members became 
increasingly detached from movement-building or cooperative education. 
Radical Routes, a nationwide grassroots network of around 40 housing co-ops, 
worker-owned co-ops and social centres working explicitly towards radical 
social change, provides an interesting alternative template for emulation. 
Promisingly, Radical Routes have begun to research possibilities for pooling 
resources for renewed co-op development, in a similar though more universal 
and bottom-up vein to NWHS in Liverpool—what they call the ‘co-op 
cluster’ model.3 Re-establishing a member-based and democratic federation of 
Merseyside co-ops needs to go hand in hand with establishing a fund organised 
through a co-op cluster if we are ever to see the revitalisation—and not merely 
diluted expansion—of the movement. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly for their relative youth, CLTs have a far less 
mature dedicated secondary infrastructure. The National CLT Network works 
closely with its members to provide advice, directing them to resources and 
funding opportunities and coordinating activities between regions as well 
as lobbying government for legislative reform and public programmes. But 
there are communication gaps between the Network, based in London, and 
their members in various localities—a gap that is now being bridged by 
regional ‘umbrella’ CLTs. However, such umbrellas operate at regional scales 
3 Radical Routes, “Co-op Clusters: Roundtable Report” (2018): www.radicalroutes.org.
uk/publicdownloads/Co-opClusters_report_lowres.pdf.
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often covering several counties; unlike the co-op movement, no substantial 
secondary infrastructure has (yet) emerged at the urban or city-regional scale, 
except for tentative signs in London. East London CLT, established in 2007 as 
the very first urban CLT in the UK, a little ahead of Granby and Homebaked, 
and since evolved into an enabler organisation, London CLT, which incubates 
new CLTs across the capital. It was set up by London Citizens, part of Citizens 
UK, a powerful and well-resourced body of community organisers and civic 
volunteers who have been instrumental in campaigning for and delivering 
East London CLT at the St Clements hospital site and now further ‘sister’ 
sites in other boroughs.4 Unlike a secondary co-op organisation, London CLT 
operates almost as a franchise, maintaining legal control over each additional 
CLT they help establish. It is a highly effective model of development built 
upon the expertise and organisational capacities of London Citizens although, 
increasingly, questions over local autonomy and democracy simmer beneath 
surface successes. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity in Liverpool to imitate 
this model whereby Granby and Homebaked work together to help create new 
CLTs with their expertise or else establish an entirely independent enabling 
organisation to do so.
But it is no use thinking inside the silo of just one collective housing model 
or only the Liverpool city region; we need to develop such structures at a 
larger scale, between regions and across all collective housing movements, 
so that co-ops and CLTs, alongside others, are linked together by mutually 
beneficial common infrastructure. Communication gaps and missed oppor-
tunities for cooperation between collective housing movements currently 
exist. Individual movements will be much stronger by working together if 
they too, just like individual projects, share knowledge, pool resources and 
forge political alliances. Greater coordination in the development of different 
models is now gaining momentum in the UK. There are signs of this with 
the coming together in 2017 of the national umbrella organisations for 
CLTs, co-housing and co-ops to host jointly, for the first time, the National 
Community-Led Housing Conference, mirroring the UK government’s £300 
million Community-Led Housing Fund, running until 2020.5 
Lessons might be learned from London—the only other city in Britain 
with an established co-op sector and a growing CLT movement. Here, various 
organisations have come together to establish the London Community-Led 
Housing Hub, a resource and advice centre for all kinds of community-
led housing. This is financially supported by the Mayor of London and 
several borough councils, coordinated by the National CLT Network, the 
4 Bunce, “Pursuing Urban Commons: Politics and Alliances in Community Land Trust 
Activism in East London”.
5 Mullins and Moore, “Self-Organised and Civil Society Participation in Housing 
Provision”.
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Confederation of Co-operative Housing and UK Cohousing and, crucially, 
hosted by CDS Co-operatives, the original London-based secondary organi-
sation from which sprung Liverpool’s CDS. Together, NWHS and CDS 
Co-operatives are the only two independent secondaries in the country; the 
latter is the larger, owning around a thousand co-op homes across London 
and managing 45 co-ops with around two thousand homes. The Hub’s offer of 
financial and technical support to any community group interested in housing 
themselves is underpinned by an inclusive ethos that attempts to transcend 
traditional movement divides and silo-thinking such that, in the words on their 
website,6 “a determined and enthusiastic group of people is more important 
than any theoretical model”. This has the potential to go a long way towards 
galvanising a more cohesive and cooperative meta-movement of collective 
housing alternatives in ways which share resources and knowledge between 
co-op, CLT, co-housing and other like-minded movements. 
Interestingly, it was CDS Co-operatives who really pushed and lobbied 
for the establishment of the London Community-Led Housing Hub, which 
demonstrates the potential importance of NWHS in doing something similar 
in Liverpool and the north-west. Indeed, Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority has recently invited NWHS to trial an enabling hub in Manchester, 
influenced by policy-relevant action-research into community-led housing.7 
To this end in Liverpool, Power to Change are working with some of the 
exemplar organisations they have funded (notably Granby and Homebaked, 
two of their favourites nationally) as well as NWHS to help set up an ‘enabler 
hub’ for the city. Yet this charitable trust, endowed by the Big Lottery Fund 
with money raised from national lottery ticket sales to support neighbourhood 
regeneration through community enterprise, is on a ten-year time-limited 
programme and whose networking reach is limited to those organisations they 
have funded, overlooking the larger localised ecosystem of collective alterna-
tives. This underlines how, in the current absence of progressive state funding 
or consistent coordination from above, we need a new system of support 
constructed from below with self-sustaining resources generated by collective 
alternatives themselves. 
In sum, Liverpool’s recent history of co-op movement renewal spells out 
a number of lessons for broader collective alternative institutionalisation. 
It points to how investments made in assets such as land and housing will 
one day mature for harvesting for the reinvestment in new growth—if only 
the governance structures and cultures of co-operation among co-ops can 
be (re)constituted. So too does it make clear the dangers of institutional 
capture by the state, capital and professional agendas: had CDS/NWHS 
remained under Housing Corporation regulation they would have been 
6 https://www.communityledhousing.london/.
7 Goulding, Housing Futures: What Can Community-Led Housing Achieve for Greater Manchester?
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forced to leverage ‘their assets’ for indiscriminate social housing construction 
without consideration of cooperative values, and one of the movement’s key 
independent resources would have been lost to the state and its neoliberalised 
conception of public housing development. Nonetheless, it also articulates the 
essential role of the state and the ambiguous relationship collective housing 
alternatives maintain with the public sector. In this case, the assets now 
potentially providing a new source of growth for an autonomous cooperative 
movement were originally the product of state investment—the substantial 
public funding for the purchase, planning, construction and maintenance of 
new-build co-op housing. Likewise in the case of Granby and Homebaked 
CLTs, their ownership of property assets—a critical factor in their economic 
viability—is only thanks to the council. It is in this sense that we must see 
collective alternatives as a bridge between the common and the public—as 
a potential site for the renewal of public housing and the  transformation of 
the state more broadly. 
Realising Municipal Dreams
Of all community anchor organisations in Liverpool, the Eldonians have shown 
how a community development trust model can generate surpluses for more 
self-sustaining regeneration and urban governance—albeit one with massive 
initial state investment—providing a starting point for how the state system 
might be redesigned. Commentators writing in 1988 made some interesting 
divinations of government intentions for funding the Eldonians: 
Perhaps they would like to see—in Liverpool and elsewhere—a 
city run by a federation of development trusts on the lines of the 
Eldonians’ prototype, with government funds being coordinated by a 
Task Force … The city council could then be allowed to wither away.8
This Marxist phrase was said, rather sardonically, of a context in which 
the central state was centralising political control, stripping the local state 
of economic powers and shutting down socialist dissent—from the ousting 
of Militant from Liverpool City Council to Thatcher’s abolishment of the 
radical municipal socialist Greater London Council. While we must be wary 
of any strategy to allow city councils to wither away—at least in the current 
conjuncture of neoliberal austerity—there are some interesting lessons here 
for renewing a municipalism centred on collective alternatives. First, it recalls 
the SNAP final report recommendations for a “task force under the Cabinet 
Office” to coordinate a decentralised Urban Programme of metropolitan 
8 Cowan, Hannay and Owens, “The Light on Top of the Tunnel”, p. 63.
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development agencies.9 Any mention of ‘Task Force’ summons images of a 
highly technocratic and unaccountable structure of quangos coordinated by a 
central state unresponsive to local democracy. We must remain cognisant of 
the need to embed democracy in any such multi-scalar structure. But if we 
read it in a more politically expansive light, it conjures the anarchist vision for 
decentralised self-governing city-regions, composed of community-controlled 
associations and connected through a democratic federated structure through 
the subsidiarity principle—envisioned by the likes of Kropotkin and the 
eco-socialist Murray Bookchin, whose ideas on libertarian municipalism we 
can trace through the new municipalist movement emerging globally.10
Grassroots groups and collective alternatives across inner-city Liverpool 
are beginning to discuss the development of a local political manifesto for 
urban transformation inspired by the new municipalist movement Fearless 
Cities11 and which they are tentatively calling Fearless Neighbourhoods.12 Thus 
we might follow their lead in taking inspiration from the recent resurgence of 
municipalism in cities around the world, including Preston in the UK. Here, 
a Labour-led council administration (with strong links to its sister Cooperative 
Party and the wider cooperative movement) is experimenting with new policy 
approaches around developing the foundational economy through collective 
alternatives.13 Borrowing ideas from Cleveland in the USA as well as the 
Mondragon Corporation in Basque Spain, the largest and most successful 
federation of worker-owned co-ops in the world, the so-called Preston model 
harnesses the spending powers of anchor institutions—those place-based and 
locally embedded (that is, anchored) organisations with important civic and 
social functions, often the mainstays of the foundational economy—for local 
economic development and the stimulation of new co-operative enterprises 
and collective alternatives. The idea is that procurement and commissioning 
and the supply chains of participating anchor institutions—which include 
universities, hospitals, housing associations, local authorities, county councils, 
police constabularies, Further Education colleges and school trusts—are 
redirected towards local social enterprises, especially worker-owned co-ops, 
so that contracts for cleaning, catering, marketing, construction and the 
like go to firms that, as much as possible, employ local labour, are governed 
democratically and reinvest surpluses within the locality for the generation 
of social value over private profit. This is a two-pronged approach: bending 
9 McConaghy, Another Chance for Cities: SNAP 69–72, p. 207.
10 Thompson, “What’s so new about New Municipalism?”.
11 Russell, “Beyond the Local Trap: New Municipalism and the Rise of the Fearless 
Cities”.
12 Jurgensen, ‘Trainings for the Not-Yet’ Exhibition (2020): www.bakonline.org/
program-item/trainings-for-the-not-yet/.
13 Thompson, “What’s so new about New Municipalism?”.
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institutional spend to create local demand for goods and services—for which 
public housing provision is well suited—coupled with meeting that demand 
by stimulating local supply through the incubation and development of the 
cooperative movement and social enterprise sector. Another strategic flank is 
the development of community land trusts to take on underused private or 
public assets for community benefit. Preston’s is a nascent model of how the 
local state can be retooled for the gestation and institutionalisation of collective 
alternatives as part of an economy reoriented to the foundational. 
Building on these new municipalist foundations, we can see how an archi-
tecture for collective alternatives—in public housing, urban regeneration and 
neighbourhood governance—might take shape. Anchor institutions operate 
at a relatively large scale—with civic functions that stretch across an entire 
municipality, metropolitan area or wider region. At a more localised scale, 
‘community anchor organisations’ can do for deprived neighbourhoods what 
anchor institutions do for economically depressed cities like Preston or 
Liverpool.14 They may take on a coordinating or mediating role for contracts 
and commissions that smaller individual co-ops and social enterprises seek 
with anchor institutions; act as hubs for a whole host of community activities, 
from meeting places to food growing and street markets; provide incubation 
space and expertise for social entrepreneurs and start-ups; and an arena for 
democratic deliberation between otherwise unconnected diverse members of 
the wider community. Community development trusts like the Eldonians and 
CLTs like Granby and Homebaked are well-placed to adopt this community 
anchor function. In the USA, such collective alternatives have been likened to 
‘governance shims’15—a new layer of governance wedged between community 
and local authority—to emphasise the important role they may play in cities 
of the future, as democratic stewards of place. That these are common 
property regimes—that is, they hold land and community assets in trust, 
protecting these from market predation through an asset lock whilst enabling 
participatory decision-making over their use—represents an important and 
under-recognised potential civic function in democratic urban governance.
These ideas are not all that new. There is a long-established Community 
Development Corporation sector in the USA, with roots in 1960s radicalism 
but since becoming a ubiquitous feature of urban North America with a 
large number of organisations operating today across a diverse range of local 
14 Matthew Thompson, Vicky Nowak, Alan Southern et al., “Re-grounding the City with 
Polanyi: From Urban Entrepreneurialism to Entrepreneurial Municipalism”, Environment 
and Planning A: Economy and Space: 1–24: https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X19899698; 
James Henderson and Christopher McWilliams, “The UK Community Anchor Model and 
Its Challenges for Community Sector Theory and Practice”.
15 Williams and Pierce, “Inserting Scales of Urban Politics”.
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economic development activities.16 They were once seen as “the crucial coordi-
nating agent” of the three domains of production, consumption and exchange 
in an alternative system of community-based development, overseeing the 
activities of CLTs, credit unions, consumer and worker cooperatives.17 
Although most do not function in their fullest, most radical capacity and 
have been subject to co-optation and mission drift from radical community 
control towards more operational service delivery as part of the shadow state, 
community development corporations nonetheless provide important lessons 
for how similar institutional forms may be developed in the UK in answer to 
the neighbourhood question. 
The neighbourhood question forces us to consider scale. Collective housing 
alternatives are very energy-intensive and complicated to coordinate at a suffi-
ciently large enough scale to address the urban-economic problems of a city 
the size and nature of Liverpool or, indeed, to provide the necessary strategic 
oversight to link together and avoid duplication of diverse small-scale projects 
all operating in a piecemeal fashion. This is one of the reasons why conventional 
regeneration programmes like HMR adopt a more abstract, professionalised 
and uniform approach—for the efficiencies and simplicities that come with 
economies of scale. Nonetheless, HMR went too far in this direction. There 
is no necessary reason why HMR funding could not have been channelled into 
a diversity of CLT projects, as suggested by URBED and tentatively explored 
in Kensington to no avail. A more balanced, hybrid combination needs to be 
innovated so that resident-led, locally responsive, publicly accountable and 
resourceful projects can develop—supported and coordinated by larger-scale 
enabling bodies, like community development corporations but with greater 
grassroots engagement. 
Democratically governed and publicly accountable community development 
corporations could replace HMR Pathfinders and other such public–private 
partnerships in the next round of state-led urban regeneration, if and when 
austerity urbanism releases its stranglehold. After democratic voting and 
deliberation in a local area have established the need and desire for state inter-
vention, any resulting community development corporation would need to 
be statutorily protected so that long-term housing restructuring programmes 
cannot be simply switched off halfway through their cycle by the whims of 
electoral party politics, as happened in the case of HMR, but are instead 
controlled locally through democratic structures. This would enable a more 
sustained ‘investment mode’ of state funding—the state as ‘friendly investor’, 
as one interviewee put it, rather than drip-feeder of sporadic grants. The 
16 DeFilippis, Unmaking Goliath; Bruyn and Meehan, Beyond the Market and the State: New 
Directions in Community Development.
17 Bruyn and Meehan, Beyond the Market and the State: New Directions in Community 
Development, p. 16.
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culture of grants is counterproductive for the long-term regeneration of areas, 
as it encourages competitive bidding, vanguardism and vulnerable dependence 
on civic volunteerism as well as on government and philanthropic hand-outs. 
When combined with competitive tendering of public sector assets, this leads 
to a monumental waste of resources, as potential co-operators are pitted 
against each other in a zero sum game, resulting in time wasted, unrealised 
ideas and exhausted creativity for all but the winning bidder. More collabo-
rative processes of public tendering would allow competing visions to be 
explored in creative dialogue. 
This brings us back to the issue of funding. As we know, the 1970s co-ops 
were funded through a state-led system of grants centrally coordinated by the 
Housing Corporation. Since then, we have seen the dismantling and splin-
tering of governance and funding mechanisms for collective alternatives and 
the wider social economy such that a number of intermediaries have patchily 
filled the gaps between centralised funders and local projects. Big Society 
Capital—which, since its establishment in 2012 by the Conservative Coalition 
government, has been one of the biggest providers of social investment (loans 
to social enterprises including CLTs), awash with dead people’s dormant bank 
accounts and match-funding from the big four retail banks—has struggled 
to reach or attract enough applications from deserving beneficiaries at the 
local level.18 For instance, Access (the Foundation for Social Investment) 
exists fundamentally to find more effective ways to distribute funds from 
Big Society Capital as well as grants from the Big Lottery Fund to those that 
need them—and takes a slice of the pie in the process. A tangled competitive 
ecosystem of private consultants and quasi-public intermediaries has thus 
sprung up—what some in the field liken to a “non-profit industrial complex”, 
a trend accelerated by the ‘Market Stalinism’19 of the New Labour years and 
the ongoing ‘bullshitisation’ of jobs in an economy increasingly exhausted 
of meaningful and socially (re)productive work.20 There is a real need to 
reform this confusing, exploitative and wasteful system of social investment 
for one that provides patient capital and grants attuned to project needs, 
democratically coordinated through city-regional Solidarity Funds, such as that 
potentially emerging amongst the Liverpool co-ops with or without NWHS. If 
we are to work towards the replacement of this irrational centralised system by 
a democratically federated municipalist structure of self-governing collective 
alternatives through the incremental and prefigurative contracting of different 
social, economic and institutional relationships—how can we speed up this 
18 Leslie Huckfield, The Rise and Influence of Social Enterprise, Social Investment and Public 
Service Mutuals, NCIA Inquiry into the Future of Voluntary Services, Working Paper 3 (National 
Coalition for Independent Action, 2014).
19 Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?
20 Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory.
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transformation of the state? How can we help reinvent the state from the 
inside—as the councillors and co-operators in Preston suggest it can be done? 
To unleash the self-expansive dynamic of the circuit of the common, we need 
to genetically reengineer the DNA code underwriting its cell form, those legal 
models that constitute CLTs and co-ops.
Recoding the DNA of Collective Alternatives
It is not only the tools of the local state that require reinvention; the central 
state and its legislative apparatus are vitally important, too, for the development 
of collective alternatives. The Labour and Cooperative Party councillors 
retooling the armoury of the state in Preston are the Reg Freesons and the 
Harold Campbells of our day—but where are the cooperative advocates and 
innovators operating at the national level? We need legislative reform compa-
rable in potency to the 1974 Housing Act to work alongside new municipalism. 
We also need new legal codes. If we see co-ops and CLTs as the cell structure 
comprising the body of the movement (with secondary enabler organisations 
as the organs, perhaps) then the legal models through which collective alter-
natives are constituted represent the DNA code. The legal form of collective 
alternatives defines their capabilities and limitations and determines the stream 
of benefits and costs that flow to such organisations from the state and capital. 
The role of bureaucracy and of technocrats resides in creating, defining and 
arbitrating the codes that determine the specific social, political and economic 
powers of collective alternatives. What do these codes look like in practice? In 
the UK, the legal DNA of co-ops was the Industrial and Provident Society, up 
until 2014, after which, due to legislative reform, this was recoded as either 
a Co-operative Society or Community Benefit Society (BenCom). Urban 
CLTs, meanwhile, are generally established as Community Interest Companies 
(CICs), the favoured form for social enterprise inaugurated by the Companies 
Act 2004. However, for all the benefits of the CIC legal form, more radical 
community enterprises—Homebaked and Granby CLTs included—associate 
it with the co-optation and instrumentalisation of the social economy by New 
Labour and its Third Way agenda of instilling a business mentality in projects 
for social inclusion and redistribution. 
An alternative to forming as a CIC is to be a charity—a Charitable 
Incorporated Organisation or, perhaps, a Company Limited by Guarantee. 
CIOs in particular are more established charitable forms with roots in philan-
thropy and voluntary association—overseen by the national regulatory body, 
the Charity Commission. Distinguishing charities from CICs is their emphasis 
on a legally accountable and transparent trust structure governed by trustees, 
who have greater control over the actions and decisions of any executive staff, 
including their pay. By contrast, there is nothing to stop social entrepreneurs 
running a CIC from remunerating themselves however much they like while 
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also claiming non-profit status. The CLT tripartite structure is designed to 
prevent such aberrations but the legal form it takes will help or hinder its 
constitutional covenants in different ways. The important factor for CLTs is 
that the legal form chosen enables an asset lock to prevent profiteering or the 
flipping of land. Because co-ops come from a different tradition and lack an 
asset lock, they were, up until the 2014 reforms, inappropriate forms for CLTs 
to adopt. Co-ops share all surpluses amongst members and while this brings 
people together around a shared material interest, it also makes the co-op 
more vulnerable to co-optation. ‘Carpet-bagging’, as the movement refers to 
it, occurs when members use co-operative resources for their own private 
benefit rather than for collective aims, either actively through ‘stair-casing’ 
equity shares and then selling for a profit or, more passively, by allowing rents 
to fall to a minimum and under-occupying properties.21 
Interestingly, the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 
2014 attempts to tackle some of these issues by splitting the cooperative 
movement down the middle between those organisations more classically 
resembling co-ops—Cooperative Societies, which work for the mutual benefit 
of members—and those that make moves towards trust-like constitutions—
Community Benefit Societies, or BenComs, which work for the benefit of the 
wider community. Unlike traditional co-ops, including cooperative societies, 
BenComs have the added mechanism of incorporating an asset lock, much like 
a CIC. At the same time, they maintain a cooperative ownership structure such 
that members of a CLT constituted as a BenCom are effective part-owners in 
the endeavour and have a greater stake than they would in the case of being 
a CIC or charity. In the current context, many philanthropic funding bodies 
are wary of giving grants to organisations which lack the critical scrutiny of a 
trustee structure or an asset lock, and it is unclear whether BenComs can attract 
the same funding from organisations such as English Heritage or The Esmée 
Fairbairn Foundation as can CICs and Charitable Incorporated Organisations. 
Nonetheless, BenComs open up alternative avenues of funding that are more 
grounded in the community. They enable the issuing of community shares—a 
valuable source of revenue which also engages more people in the ownership 
of the project. Homebaked CLT have for a while been weighing up the advan-
tages of switching from a CIC to a BenCom legal form. Part of the appeal for 
Homebaked is that this would allow them legally to pay their trustees, many of 
whom also do consultancy or part-time project work for the CLT. The BenCom 
is a good example of a legal innovation which creates new possibilities for CLTs 
like Homebaked to realise their cooperative values whilst protecting their assets 
within a trust structure. More innovation—and education—in legal coding is 
required if we are to see a flourishing of new projects to suit different contexts.
21 Radical Routes, “Co-op Clusters: Roundtable Report”, 2018: www.radicalroutes.org.
uk/publicdownloads/Co-opClusters_report_lowres.pdf.
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Yet all these innovations are ultimately sticking plasters over a fundamen-
tally broken system that lacks the legal or political recognition of common 
property rights as legitimate forms of ownership. Currently, British law only 
acknowledges two distinct types of tenure: freehold and leasehold; landlord 
and tenant—a bipolar separation inherited from feudalism but fiercely guarded 
under capitalism. As such, the law treats members of collective housing alter-
natives as essentially tenants or as part-owners, which gives individuals either 
too much or too little power over their stake. David Rodgers, the former chief 
executive of England’s largest housing cooperative agency, CDS Cooperatives 
in London, alerts us to the peculiar fact that 
In a housing co-operative a member has a dual relationship with 
the co-operative, firstly as member with rights to participate in the 
democratic control of the co-operative’s affairs, secondly as a tenant of 
the landlord co-operative. The two relationships are, legally, entirely 
separate. In tenancy law the co-operative is as feudal a landlord as any 
other.22 
Efforts at reform that are not radical enough—reformist reforms rather than 
radical reforms—only lead us down into deeper perversities. Ironically, lease-
holder empowerment legislation passed to protect tenants from their vulnerable 
position with respect to ruthless landlords—notably the 1967 Leasehold 
Reform Act—now threatens the operation of CLTs by empowering members 
to buy out their share of the scheme and preventing the collective organisation 
from imposing limits on individual control of equity. The CLT and Mutual 
Home Ownership Society (MHOS) models, as pursued by Terrace 21 in 
Granby, are two examples of institutional innovations that have been specifi-
cally designed to work within the current polarised system to utilise aspects 
of freehold and leasehold to create the effect of a common property regime. 
But only with the constitution of a truly cooperative tenure bringing about 
the complete overhaul of the landlord–tenant binary—a master–slave relation 
of exploitation and alienation upon which stands the capitalist ownership 
model—will the institutional space be cleared for commoning to thrive.
If we wish to move beyond forever (re)inventing ever-more sophisticated 
but ultimately constricted compromises, we need radical legal reform—or 
revolution. The housing cooperative movement in the UK has been a vocal 
proponent of tenure reform. David Rodgers has argued—in person as well 
as in print23—for a ‘third estate’ to complement the two original estates we 
have inherited from medieval feudalism and to provide the legal basis for 
common property relations—a legal common property right—as a possible 
22 David Rodgers, New Mutualism: The Third Estate (The Co-operative Party, 1999).
23 Rodgers, New Mutualism.
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way to empower tenants from what amounts to a state of feudal dependency. 
Legislating the ‘third estate’ would provide the legal protection required for 
common property institutions, including collective housing alternatives, to 
maintain their relations of commoning over time. To this end, not only do we 
need skilled story-tellers and mythologists to conjure new narratives that can 
capture the popular imagination for the outward replication of collective alter-
natives—to build the movement alongside the co-operators and commoners 
themselves—so too do we need social innovators, radical lawyers and socialist 
legislators to come up with imaginative ways of codifying new institutional and 
legal (re)forms in order to surmount the multiple problems and contradictions 
inherent to articulating actually existing commons in, against and beyond the 
capitalist system of public–private property relations. 
Epilogue
Translating Between Inward, Upward and  
Outward Languages
Reconstructing Public Housing 
Epilogue
In a fascinating collection of writings about a community gardening project 
in Peterborough called The Green Backyard, Dougald Hine’s offering—aptly 
titled “Spelling It Out”—evokes the different languages all such projects must 
learn if they are to be at all successful. “The Inward language”, Hine writes:
is the way that those at the heart of a project make sense of what they 
are doing, the way of seeing the world that makes it possible. It may be 
a complex model of how things are and how they could be; it may be 
entirely intuitive and largely unspoken. It is a creative, living language.1
Alongside this ‘mother tongue’—spoken by activists, comrades and fellow 
travellers to craft a common vision and theory of change—Hine identifies two 
important others, each differing in vocabulary, tone and register, each with 
their own intended audience and purpose in mind. The ‘upward language’ is 
the language of “power and resources: the language of funding applications, the 
language of those who are in a position to interpret regulations and impose or 
remove obstacles”. In contrast to the living creativity of the inward, this is “not 
a reflective or a curious language, it is a language of busy people who make 
decisions without having time to immerse themselves in the realities their 
decisions will affect …” But it is only through learning the upward language 
that a community project has any hope of negotiating the challenging terrain of 
legal constitutions, funding applications, legislative reform, planning approval, 
professional partnerships and the like. 
All the collective housing alternatives explored in the preceding pages 
have each, in their own way, been defined by their ability to master these two 
dialectically opposed languages. Speaking only one of them is not enough by 
itself to ensure survival—inward and upward are complementary parts of a 
whole just as much as they appear to pull in different directions. It is useless 
1 Dougald Hine, “Spelling It Out”, in Jessie Brennan, ed., Re: Development—Voices, 
Cyanotypes and Writings from the Green Backyard (UCL Press, 2017): https://medium.com/@
dougald/spelling-it-out-ce47d4ea8d9b#.okzjrjw1q.
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cultivating a richly woven discourse internally, amongst a small group of avid 
enthusiasts, if that means the more challenging task of speaking upwards, to 
the gatekeepers of political support, legal legitimacy and financial resources, 
is neglected. Without this, collective housing alternatives will wither on the 
vine. We see this in the case of the failed Little Klondyke CLT—but not for 
want of trying. By the same token, if all energies are directed upwards, to 
the detriment of inward fluency, this may well prevent the seed from ever 
growing or, alternatively, risk the fruit being plucked and discarded before 
fully ripening. For the former outcome, the two CLTs driven from above by 
institutional actors, in Kensington and Anfield, are cases in point. The more 
recent experience of the Eldonians gestures towards the latter. Such institu-
tional capture and extraction of grassroots energies is an ever-present threat 
posed by conversing in the language of power. Yet campaigners must use the 
tools of the upward—spatial visions, business plans, professional terminology, 
construction methods etc.—in order to plan, develop and manage anything 
at all or, indeed, to negotiate land acquisition from the state, which must be 
convinced of the community’s competency to manage public assets. Campaigns 
must, to some extent, become fluent in the language of state bureaucracy, 
market processes and professional mores if they are ever to gain the trust of 
key gatekeepers and successfully attract essential financial and legal support.
This translation balancing act is made trickier still by the introduction of a 
third vocabulary—the outward language—in which a project is distilled down 
to its core essence and articulated to wider publics. In Hine’s analogy, this is 
“the language in which you can explain it to your mum, or to someone you 
just met in the pub, and realise that they get it—not that they have understood 
everything about what you’re doing, but that something here makes sense and 
sounds good”. Both the inward and the upward necessarily engage in complexity, 
and try to explain, in different ways, how a project might work—either in 
terms of ideological visions and social theories about the world and how the 
project intends to change it, or else in the terminology of public policies, 
government regulations, legal instruments, financial mechanisms and business 
plans. The outward, by contrast, shuns all such intricacies and pretensions to 
explain simply, in lay terms, what the project does and why it is at all useful 
or interesting for everyday life. In Hine’s words, it is “not about how your 
project works, it’s about what it does”. Crucially, to distil the complexity of the 
inward and the upward into an intuitively compelling and attractive idea that 
can be grasped at a stroke by anybody even vaguely interested, the outward 
language needs to be concise, straightforward and persuasive. It might work 
best by analogy and metaphor—employing images that capture concepts in 
the quotidian and vernacular. This is a discourse that can thrive in media 
representation and go viral on social media. It is the medium through which 
a project communicates its significance to the outside world and attempts to 
gain popular appeal. 
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Granby and Homebaked CLTs have become well-versed in the outward 
language. They are each fortunate enough to have powerful linguists in their 
midst who are talented in the art of representation. The story of Granby has 
been articulated through an artistic medium by architects Assemble who 
helped secure popular and political recognition through the Turner Prize. 
Homebaked was gifted by a simple yet effective image at its heart—the 
sensually evocative image of home baking—and has used this to craft a 
compelling brand narrative that has helped catch the imaginations of neigh-
bours and punters, politicians and funders. The outward literature produced 
by and for Homebaked is conscious of this image. For instance, a piece written 
for the special issue dedicated to Homebaked in the Liverpool Biennial online 
journal #Stages reveals the third flank in Homebaked’s strategy, which might 
rather read: brick by brick, loaf by loaf, story by story, we build ourselves:
It is very difficult to give up control of the symbolic media narrative in 
favour of the actual on-the-ground work, because it seems that one may 
determine the other …A symbolic counterattack on prevailing narra-
tives, carefully calibrated through self-branding and actualisation, can 
shift understanding and pave the way for progress, as surely as baking 
bread or laying down brick.2
It is not only individual projects that must utilise the outward language to gain 
support; the movement as a whole must be canny about the way it presents 
itself if it is to ever win over the public. One of the biggest challenges facing 
the expansion of collective housing as a popular tenure of choice—rather than 
bespoke reaction to need, as it has so often been over its history in Liverpool—
lies in convincing potential residents to forfeit some of their equity share and 
accumulative property rights, for other more intangible benefits in collective 
control, social justice and security of tenure. The elephant in the room is 
the system of private property rights under the ownership model, where 
individual homeownership is ideologically entrenched as the most desirable 
option—almost a precondition for neoliberal forms of citizenship—and a 
central strategy of economic security for aspiring homeowners in a period of 
welfare retrenchment and uncertainty. Collective models, however, require 
residents to reorient their personal interests towards more collective ends. 
For this reason, they may be limited to very specific contexts: protecting 
neighbourhoods from financial speculation or spiralling decline, and securing 
against the threat of gentrification or state-led displacement. A large part of the 
challenge is therefore branding: marketing models cleverly so that they swim 
rather than sink in the discursive mainstream. The Mutual Homeownership 
Society (MHOS) model used by Granby’s Terrace 21 co-op is a good example 
2 Yank, “2Up2Down/Homebaked and the Symbolic Media Narrative”, p. 6.
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of how what is essentially good old-fashioned cooperativism can be rebranded 
within the ideological parameters of the ownership model. 
There is something in the tension between inward and upward languages, 
in particular, which captures the dialectic at the heart of any attempt to 
develop and grow a collective housing alternative. One way to represent the 
growing chasm between inward and upward, activist and professional, civil 
society and state, is through the metaphor offered up by John F.C. Turner—
that housing can be seen from essentially two perspectives: as a noun or as 
a verb. Whilst the upward language of policy and bureaucracy tends toward 
abstraction and objectification and is in some sense, therefore, noun-like, the 
inward, as Hine paints it, “is a creative, living language” and is more at home 
with the active, unfolding, uncontained flows of everyday life, more verb-like. 
But this should be seen as a holistic dialectic rather than binary choice. The 
relatively fluid and spontaneous energy of innovators, activists, campaigners 
and residents—expressed through, and in some sense already codified by, the 
inward language spoken amongst them—must be translated into institutional 
codes if it is to ever get past the gatekeepers to access legal, financial and 
political help. The challenge of growth, replication and institutionalisation 
hinges on this tension: between, on the one hand, inspiring, mobilising and 
sustaining the intense political campaign energy and grassroots practices 
of commoning that are the lifeblood of collective alternatives and, on the 
other, the need for legal definition, professional expertise and codification 
into institutional structures if such alternatives are to reproduce and replicate 
their practices across space and time. In this tension lies the ever-present 
danger of projects mimicking and gradually resembling, through institutional 
isomorphism, their funders, regulators and legislators. Practising the upward 
language at the cost of sustaining the inward and outward opens the door to 
co-optation or dilution by more powerful agents and agendas that run counter 
to original values.
Nonetheless, engaging in the upward world—be that of professionals, 
politicians, lawyers or local or national state officials—to reconfigure existing 
vocabularies or invent new words is a critically important and often overlooked 
aspect of developing collective housing movements. This is the spirit with 
which collective housing advocates have lobbied for the construction of 
new legal models and codes for the articulation of their inward visions of 
an urban commons in the upward language of law and politics. Co-ops and 
CLTs are not by themselves all that meaningful in upward terms. For this, 
they must be translated into legal models, such as, in the UK, Industrial and 
Provident Societies (pre-2014), Community Benefit Societies (post-2014) and 
Community Interest Companies (since 2006)—each unlocking a number of 
benefits and powers in various combinations. The way in which collective 
alternatives choose to express themselves upwardly has real material impacts 
for their long-term success but so too is the form in which they have been 
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branded, outwardly, important for attracting support. This is the realm in 
between the inward and the upward, in which actors vie with each other 
over the popular articulation of collective alternatives. The ‘co-operative’ and 
‘community land trust’ models are in many ways symbolic distillations in 
outward terms of ideas emanating from inward languages. They sink or swim 
depending on their ability to catch the wave of popular imagination. 
Part of what makes the collective housing alternatives explored in this book 
extraordinary is the way in which these three languages—but particularly the 
inward and upward—have been brought together in such close conversation. 
It is not just the inward-speaking campaigners doing the talking: upward-
speakers play an important role in this narrative too. In the late 1970s, the 
Liverpool-based co-op development agency CDS was skilled at bridging the 
gap between the lived space of co-op communities and the professional world 
of architects and planners: drawing on and developing local skills and practical 
wisdom, helping residents acquire the knowledge and tools required to take 
control over the decision-making process, even though the actual development 
work itself was conducted by professionals. More-responsive housing designs 
and urban environments that better stand the test of time than much of the 
surrounding housing built by the municipal or private sector; socioeconomic 
empowerment of residents to find jobs in architectural and building companies 
as well as other firms; political mobilisation of campaigners to stand for local 
election and represent their communities in important council positions—
these are some of the benefits derived from this approach, only made possible 
by intensive exchange between inward and upward languages.
The participatory techniques first tested out by SNAP and later reincar-
nated in the community homesteading approach innovated by Assemble in 
Granby are proven ways to close the gap between grassroots innovators and 
institutionalised experts. Assemble’s approach to living on site throughout the 
development process, in one of the very houses that has since been rehabili-
tated, is an excellent example of how professionals can get more hands-on 
in helping residents learn the tools of the trade and necessary expertise as 
they work, and reside, together in the same space—an innovative method 
to help bring into closer contact the often antagonistic and disconnected 
inward and upward worlds. But this is a lot to ask of professionals unused to 
such immersive practices and extreme time commitments. Assemble are not 
RIBA-qualified and there is the question of whether they would have such 
freedom to innovate if they were fully paid up members of the architectural 
profession. 
At the same time, we must acknowledge the serious limitations to cross-
fertilisation of the inward and upward. One limit is the appetite or indeed 
capacity of communities to cooperate with professionals. We can see this 
in the intense power struggle of Weller Street with CDS. Another limit is 
the financial self-interest of professionals to remain gatekeepers of specialist 
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knowledge, to protect their privileged status and sustain a mystique around 
their work in order to be able to keep charging people for it. Here’s Weller 
Street Co-op’s Chairman Peter Tyrell recounting his experience:
These professionals play the word game on you. They start with all 
these long load of words … There’s always that language barrier and 
that professional mystique which they’re not prepared to give away. 
They always want to hide something from you … They don’t want to 
allow you to have complete and free access to all their knowledge … 
They give you the impression that they do but it’s my experience that 
they don’t.3
One final limit may be more fundamental. It remains impractical to 
incorporate residents completely into the design and development process, 
for this is extremely complex, involving the multiple interactions of compli-
cated bureaucratic, architectural, legal and financial procedures, each of 
which have their own forms of expertise honed over years of learning and 
experience. Do we really expect residents of co-ops and CLTs, often from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, to upskill themselves in a matter of months? 
To suggest that residents can rehabilitate or build housing anew through 
a grassroots self-help approach misapprehends the scale and difficulty of 
the challenges facing urban neighbourhoods. Assemble, for instance, have 
attempted to implement such an approach as fully as possible, but have come 
up against these constraints, and have had to employ professional contractors 
to carry out the most demanding structural refurbishment work. Collective 
alternatives rely on an incredibly close engagement between residents 
and professionals in resource-intensive and time-consuming participatory 
processes—not least to overcome the inward and the upward languages 
getting lost in translation.
Hine’s analogy also conveys—unwittingly—the great burden placed on 
the shoulders of collective housing alternatives, forced to be polyglot by the 
accumulating demands and splintering divisions of neoliberal capitalism. 
There is massive waste, lost time and missed opportunity in a system set up 
in such a way as to entail so many failed funding and land acquisition applica-
tions by so many different groups all competing to claim from a beleaguered 
state their collective rights to housing. Everything at the outset seems stacked 
against them. They must somehow engage in three different worlds, speak 
three different languages. There is a certain schizoid mentality attendant to 
changing register between audiences, often at a moment’s notice, keeping 
divergent interests all in play, holding multiple perspectives simultaneously. 
Speaking inward, upward and outward languages and constantly translating 
3 Tony Gibson, Counterweight: The Neighbourhood Option (Russell Press, 1984), p. 112.
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between them takes a great deal of energy and resources and creates strain 
for those brave and passionate enough to play the game. But this should not be 
seen simply as wordplay for its own sake. Such projects have at stake people’s 
livelihoods and dwellings; their ability to live with dignity in the place they 
call home. If these things are so important, why does the process of securing 
them have to be so difficult?
Part of the answer, here, might be found in the apparently widening 
gap between upward and inward languages—between the language of the 
state and professionals, on the one hand, and the language of activists and 
citizens on the other. As the capacity of local government has been shattered 
by central government policy and the onus has moved from the state onto 
communities, the distance between these two worlds has only widened. Into 
this gap have stepped a number of professional translators—from activist-
artists to community organisers and consultants. Many of those involved in 
the collective campaigns of the past and the present imparted to me the huge 
barriers to comprehension upheld by the gatekeepers; how surmounting these 
barriers seems to have become harder over the years; and that more should 
be done to speak in a common tongue. What might have been achieved in 
Kensington, one wonders, were the community representatives, on their first 
experience of a CLT practitioner conference in London, not so “freaked out 
by the industrial size of the intelligentsia”. Hine hints at the challenge—but 
also sees hope—in this task of divining the key to the gate:
You need a guide who is initiated into the relevant version of this 
language, who knows which words currently act as keys to which 
doors, what you have to say to have a decent chance of the gatekeepers 
letting you through. Yet inside these institutions, you are dealing with 
human beings, so if you can allow glimpses of what matters about 
your project to show through the filter of keywords, it may just make 
a difference.4
Whilst Hine’s analogy of linguistic translation no doubt rings true for many 
community projects, it resonates especially with grassroots campaigns for (re)
claiming the commons. The Green Backyard in Peterborough—for which it 
was written—albeit a gardening project, bears deep affinities with many of 
the housing commons that have been reappropriated, defended and created 
in Liverpool. Indeed, translation is an idea at the core of commoning. In his 
book on commoning in the city, activist-architect and spatial theorist Stavros 
Stavrides argues that “the creation of common spaces involves practices of 
translation that build bridges between people with different political, cultural 
4 Dougald Hine, “Spelling It Out”, in Jessie Brennan, ed., Re: Development—Voices, 
Cyanotypes and Writings from the Green Backyard (UCL Press, 2017).
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or religious backgrounds”.5 The art of translating across differences—of 
negotiating a common space out of disparate elements—is all the more 
important for keeping alive the emancipatory and transformative potential of 
commoning; for sustaining its expansive dynamic and preventing its co-option 
by the homogenising and flattening forces of capital and bureaucracy, which 
seek to do all the mediating and keep their subjects passive, in the dark, 
isolated from one another except by their shared hierarchical relationship to 
the master code. Stavrides quotes philosopher Jacques Rancière in suggesting 
“An emancipated community is a community of narrators and translators”.6 
Thus Hine’s metaphor also invites us to reflect upon the nature of narration 
and story-telling—not only for those involved in crafting campaigns in the 
present but also for those of us concerned with framing and explaining events 
of the past in ways which may have some bearing on the future. In this book, 
it was never my intention to speak from the page to policymakers or the 
gatekeepers of resources and I do not offer here any specific policy recom-
mendations or detailed critique of legislation or regulation. Having said that, 
much of the material I have included is critical of urban policy discourses 
and practices (for instance, the argument about the damaging abstraction 
of HMR and other technocratic forms of urban renewal) and it would be a 
missed opportunity if this were to be incomprehensible if it ever did reach 
their ears. Some parts of the history told herein—such as SNAP and the early 
rehabilitation co-operative movement—might come across as more versed 
in the technicalities of the upward than the intuitive visions of the inward. 
For these older histories, it was much harder to track down those residents 
involved in the original community campaigning—many have moved on, lost 
touch with the co-ops or passed away. The perspectives of professionals loom 
larger here, then, than they do perhaps in the more contemporary narratives 
on the CLTs. I have sought to counter these tendencies by triangulating my 
interviews with secondary sources, but, like any history, my reading is neces-
sarily a partial one.
Having worked closely with Homebaked and come into personal contact 
with Granby as well as a few Eldonian and co-op activists, their inward 
language has no doubt infused my own reading of their history. But I have 
tried to reach outwards, too. I have tried to translate their inner discourse—
“the shorthand expressions and the charged words that build up among a 
group of people working together to bring about or sustain something that 
matters to them deeply”7—into an explanatory model of the wider housing 
landscape, the political-economic forces shaping it and how it could be trans-
formed by such alternatives. This is meant to speak to as wide an audience as 
5 Stavros Stavrides, Common Space: The City as Commons (Zed Books, 2016), p. 43.
6 Stavrides, Common Space: The City as Commons, p. 42.
7 Hine, “Spelling It Out”.
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possible, although I am all too aware of the inevitable compromises at play. 
The difficulty has come in developing a story that adequately represents the 
intricacies, complexities and contradictions of the wider social reality within 
which collective housing alternatives are embedded whilst also keeping an 
eye on making the language as clear, fresh and relatable as possible so as to 
communicate outwardly to potential supporters without expert knowledge the 
meaning of these projects for everyday life.
Artificial Hells, Social Practice and Artistic Spectacle:  
Who (or What) Is All This For?
Finally, in closing, Hine’s analogy spells out more than first meets the eye—or 
at least than he intended. The focus on linguistic representation in collective 
alternative campaigning—on the idea of expression, on translation between 
mediums, on the separation between the presentation of a project and its 
reception by an audience, on the use of metaphor, on representation in any 
sense—implies a certain artistic bent to today’s activists. Artistic represen-
tation is central to both Granby and Homebaked: Granby’s Turner Prize 
victory enters it into a genre of performance art; Homebaked has been driven 
by artists from the get-go, funded by the Liverpool Biennial arts festival. 
Indeed, it seems to suggest a certain curatorship—and spectatorship—has 
come to mark such projects, as if they were conceived first and foremost as 
aesthetic objects. In some sense, artist-activists have stepped into the yawning 
space between the inward, the upward and the outward languages emerging 
as a result of the dismantling of public housing, the splintering of governance, 
the financialisation of the economy and the atomisation of society. 
There is a certain paradoxical sense in which treating housing and 
regeneration as a verb is to invite its objectification as art, albeit a kind of 
performance art. This is most clearly visible in the popular rendering and self-
expression of Granby and Homebaked as distinctly artistic—as well as social 
and political—projects. Both Homebaked and Granby embody prevailing 
trends towards participatory art—what has come to be known in the field as 
‘social practice’ alongside a number of associated terms from community arts 
and socially engaged art to experimental, dialogic, interventionist, research-
based and collaborative art. Through citizen engagement in art, social practice 
is seen to have, argues art historian, critic and theorist Claire Bishop in her 
provocative critique Artificial Hells,8 performative transformative power in 
cultivating emancipatory social relations, but so often falls short of the mark. 
The unwitting progenitor of social practice is the libertarian-Marxist Guy 
Debord, the founder of the avant-garde Situationist International. Following 
8 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (Verso, 
2012).
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Debord’s promotion of a radical kind of participatory art to eliminate the 
spectator’s position in a society increasingly dominated by commodities, 
consumption and spectacle,9 socially engaged artists attempt to break down 
the boundaries between creator and spectator and release art from the elitist 
and consumerist curated space of the gallery to be set free in the street, to 
interact spontaneously with people and place, for more culturally generative, 
socially useful and politically potent interventions. 
One of the early examples of contemporary social practice identified by 
Bishop is a project devised in 1999 by Danish arts collective Superspin around 
collaboration with elderly residents of a high-rise block in Liverpool—one of 
those earmarked for redevelopment in the Liverpool Housing Action Trust 
regeneration programme—to create their own community TV and commu-
nications channel named tenantspin. Supported by Liverpool’s Foundation for 
Art and Creative Technology (FACT), Liverpool Housing Action Trust and 
Arena Housing (the housing association which would go on to experiment 
with a CLT in Anfield through its Knowledge Transfer Partnership), tenantspin 
had a big influence on the deepening intersection of urbanism and art in the 
city. Some of the housing and community engagement professionals working 
on the project (such as Paul Kelly) would go on to become board members 
of Homebaked CLT. The project in many ways anticipated—and set the bar 
for—what was to come via the urban curatorship of Liverpool Biennial, 
founded in 1998, which has since funded and showcased a number of social 
practice interventions into Liverpool’s housing politics, especially in response 
to HMR. Bishop points to biennial art festivals as one of the main conduits 
for social practice—citing their rapid replication across the world (33 new 
biennials founded in the decade leading up to 2006) as evidence of what she 
first identified, in an influential essay, as the art world’s ‘social turn’.10 
Clearly, social practice thinking has deeply permeated Liverpool’s housing 
activism. Issue #3 of Stages, the online journal of Liverpool Biennial, is 
dedicated to documenting a five-day interactive workshop held in 2014 in 
which prominent artists, writers, curators and community organisers—
including many of those involved in Granby and Homebaked, such as Theresa 
MacDermott, Sam Jones and Nina Edge, who has received a number of 
Biennial commissions over the years for artistic provocations on housing 
demolition and HMR—gathered “to consider how Liverpool Biennial might 
inhabit its city in more significant ways. … Their starting point was the state 
of housing in the district of Toxteth, Liverpool 8. … This complex, loaded 
situation acted as the prompt for a week of research and inquiry”.11 In Artificial 
9 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle and Other Films (Rebel Press, 1967/1992).
10 Claire Bishop, “The Social Turn: Collaboration and Its Discontents”, Artforum 44.6 
(2006): 178–183 (p. 178).
11 See www.biennial.com/journal/issue-3/pdf/introduction.
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Hells Bishop cites as a globally pioneering practitioner of social practice Jeanne 
van Heeswijk—the Liverpool Biennial-commissioned creator of 2Up2Down 
and co-founder and abiding critical friend of Homebaked.12 According to her 
author biography in the special issue of Stages dedicated to Homebaked, Jeanne
embeds herself, for years at a time, in communities from Rotterdam 
to Liverpool, working with them to improve their neighbourhoods and 
empowering them to take matters into their own hands, creating an 
alternative to the urban planning schemes which rarely take embedded 
culture into account, that are often foisted upon by local authorities. 
Her work often attempts to unravel invisible legislation, governmental 
codes, and social institutions, gradually enabling areas to take control 
over their future. She calls it “radicalising the local” by empowering 
communities to become their own antidote.13
Jeanne is part of a global network of artists, activists, architects, urbanists 
and critical academics—including David Harvey—linked together through 
Cohabitation Strategies, a non-profit cooperative for socio-spatial research, 
design and development, founded in response to the 2008 global financial 
crash, in Rotterdam—where Jeanne lives and does most of her work. Their 
mission is to help others claim the right to the city; “to generate socially just 
and environmentally responsible urban projects by designing and developing 
diverse socio-spatial strategies”.14 Concluding their seven aims is: “Envisioning 
new collective urban imaginaries leading to socio-spatial change using 
creativity and urban play”.
All this—however admirable—is by no means unproblematic. Bishop 
argues that the social turn in art has produced a concomitant ethical turn in 
art criticism, in which the working process rather than finished product—the 
how over the what—is judged on the degree to which it produces transform-
ative processes of collaboration and social impact rather than on the aesthetic 
merit of the actual artwork. “This emphasis”, she writes, “on process over 
product (i.e. means over ends) is justified as oppositional to capitalism’s 
predilection for the contrary”.15 Here, we begin to see parallels with housing 
seen as a verb over a noun, a lived experience over a commodity. In a similar 
way in which it might be asking too much of collective housing alternatives 
to perform all those political, economic and cultural transformations argued 
for in this book, for Bishop, the ethical criteria of social practice may stretch 
12 Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship.
13 Jeanne van Heeswijk and Britt Jurgensen, “Introduction”, Stages: Liverpool Biennial #2, 
Homebaked: A Perfect Recipe (2014).
14 Cohabitation Strategies (CohStra): www.cohstra.org/.
15 Bishop, “The Social Turn: Collaboration and Its Discontents”, p. 180.
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the function of art too far, may ask just too much of it. In drawing these 
comparisons, I do not mean to demean the political power of participatory 
art, collective housing alternatives or their combination—indeed, if Granby 
and Homebaked are to be framed in this way, I would suggest that they have 
had a positively powerful impact on people and place—but I do intend to 
question how this sits next to the traditional purpose of art as ultimately 
residing in beauty, with aesthetics, not political or social reform. There 
is clearly a problem with the way in which art, today, has become such a 
valuable global commodity, reduced to exchange value, yet there is equally 
cause for concern if art is to be valued only for its use value, its instrumen-
tality, for this would mean reducing it to something else. Oscar Wilde’s take 
on the eternal nature of art—that “all art is quite useless”16—throws in doubt 
the entire premise of social practice. The implication is that, in constructing 
urban spaces as art works to be collectively crafted, experienced and then 
consumed in the popular, architectural or academic press, we risk turning 
them into spectacles and aestheticising—trivialising, even—deeply political 
issues.
Is this really such a bad thing? Art has long been used as a political tool 
for highlighting important issues in the public sphere; an age-old debate has 
engulfed aesthetic theory over the role and function of art in society. Is art’s 
ultimate aim the Beautiful—pure, formal aesthetics divorced from ethical and 
epistemological concerns—or is the Good or even the True part of its purview 
too? Recent trends in contemporary art around social practice place political 
activism centre-stage; art has been weaponised as a tool for social justice, as a 
platform for speaking truth to power. Granby CLT’s Turner Prize nomination, 
though unprecedented, is not anomalous. For the 2018 award, yet another archi-
tectural collective was shortlisted—one likewise unaffiliated to the profession 
and concerned fundamentally with socio-spatial justice. Forensic Architecture, 
the Goldsmiths-based action-research agency founded by architect scholar-
activist Eyal Weizman and comprising architects, journalists, lawyers and 
scientists, was shortlisted for film, text and photographs documenting their 
investigative work into state violence in Palestinian Bedouin communities, 
which has been instrumental in bringing charges against the Israeli police. Seen 
generously, Forensic Architecture and Assemble show art at its most politically 
and socially transformative—art that shocks an audience out of complacency or 
defamiliarises troubling states of affairs we normally take for granted; art that 
presents alternatives and possible ways out of societal systems that dominate, 
demean and dehumanise us.
Looked at sceptically, however, Assemble and Forensic Architecture are part 
of the polarisation of art as either consumerist entertainment or professional 
16 Oscar Wilde, Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, in Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine 
(1890).
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commodity. As they attempt to subvert the ‘society of the spectacle’,17 they 
enact, in the same breath, their own spectacle and thereby help reproduce 
this society, in darkly comic Situationist style. Their outward framing in the 
academese of social practice and the art-speak18 of the art world acts to alienate 
and exclude potential supporters and drives a wider wedge between the inward 
and the outward languages than that existing before. In collective alterna-
tives of the past—Weller Street and the Eldonians, for instance—residents 
were more straightforward about what they wanted and spoke in more 
direct, tangible and meaningful terms: of achieving better housing conditions 
and staying together as a community; of achieving democratic control over 
decisions being taken and collective ownership of land, houses, shops and 
enterprises; of winning a war against the council and in defining the terms 
of debate against middle-class professionals. The permeation of art-speak into 
more recent interventions can only represent a kind of gentrification of the 
discourses used inwardly to frame and outwardly to pitch projects to the public 
and the art world. This is just one aspect of their creeping commodification. 
The spectacle-isation of Granby—and, in less dramatic ways, Homebaked—
demeans the long, hard struggle of resisting the dominance of exchange value 
over use value and asserting an alternative, more people-focused conception 
of place-making. It fetishises as a product—a commodity and curiosity—the 
deeply embedded social process of regeneration. In reifying these projects as 
outstanding, one-of-a-kind artistic creations, to be sold on the global (socially 
engaged) art market, we place them in a bubble of exception, depoliticising 
their power to contest neoliberalism by boxing them off as unthreatening 
spectacles. Their treatment as such has serious implications for what I have 
tried to convey as their real utopian power. 
For some critics, such as the community arts practitioner and scholar–
activist Stephen Pritchard, Granby is the product of auspicious collaborations 
with globally networked and highly mobile creative professionals and social 
innovators at the frontier of urban commodification. From this perspective, 
Assemble’s intervention in Granby is “not here used as a form of resistance 
but rather as an instrument for the neoliberal concept of culture-led regen-
eration, albeit in more novel forms”.19 It is certainly difficult to argue with 
Pritchard’s assessment that “The extensive and often complexly intertwined 
experiences of the Granby 4 Streets and Steinbeck Studio teams makes it 
rather difficult to accept claims that the project was under-skilled or, indeed, 
17 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle and Other Films (Rebel Press, 1967).
18 Andy Beckett, “A User’s Guide to Art-Speak”, The Guardian (27 Jan. 2013): www.
theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/jan/27/users-guide-international-art-english.
19 Stephen Pritchard, “Complexity, Uncertainty and Scalability: How Assemble’s Granby 
4 Streets Won 2015 Turner Prize”, Colouring in Culture Blog, 2016: http://colouringin-
culture.org/blog/assemble-complexity-uncertainty-scalability#_ftn4.
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that it was community-led”. Indeed, despite Assemble’s (anti)credentials as a 
trans-disciplinary design collective generalising in cooperative DIY through 
a self-consciously amateur ethos, they have become a highly successful and 
sought-after outfit at the vanguard of the arts-led regeneration industry. 
Catapulted into the limelight so soon after their establishment in 2010, the 
“dazzling trajectory of this loosely assembled collective of designers and 
makers”, as architectural critic Oliver Wainwright put it,20 was, according to 
Pritchard, already very much on display by the time they landed in Granby. 
Even though the eighteen-strong collective, many graduates of the University 
of Cambridge, were all still in their mid-twenties and lacked architectural 
qualifications when nominated for the Turner Prize, they were already the talk 
of the (arts-led regenerated) town, having delivered a number of significant 
commissions as a longstanding partner of Create London, a prolific grant 
funder of social practice projects across east London.21 Moreover, Assemble 
were brought to Granby via their connections with Steinbeck Studio’s Xanthe 
Hamilton, who so happens to be the daughter-in-law of Saskia Sassen, the 
globe-trotting superstar urbanist. Sassen’s ideas on world city formation and 
the ‘brutality’ and ‘complexity’ of globalisation, on the global capital flows and 
complex assemblages that shape planetary urbanisation and produce violent 
‘expulsions’,22 have helped define the new urbanist zeitgeist. Appositely, the 
innovative model of social investment-fuelled arts-led regeneration which 
Xanthe presented at the London Festival of Architecture in 2016—Pritchard 
quotes her as revealing23—was written “for Saskia Sassen”.
Writing in the inaugural issue of Stages recording the outputs of Liverpool 
Biennial’s Future City forum—alongside an article about Homebaked24—
Sassen asks the pointed question: where is the “new frontier zone” in our global 
urban condition? During historical colonial-capitalist and imperial times, she 
muses, “the frontier was at the edge of the system, but now we’re past that 
kind of edge”.25 In our age of planetary urbanisation, increasingly subsuming 
everyone and everything within a globalising capitalism, nothing remains 
20 Oliver Wainwright, “The Street That Might Win the Turner Prize: How Assemble 
Are Transforming Toxteth”, The Guardian (12 May 2015).
21 Create London: https://createlondon.org/about-us/.
22 Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Harvard 
University Press, 2014).
23 Hamilton, Granby 4 Streets: The Ideals of Specificity and Scalability in a Social and Architectural 
Endeavour, 2016, quoted in Pritchard, “Complexity, Uncertainty and Scalability: How 
Assemble’s Granby 4 Streets Won 2015 Turner Prize”.
24 Jeanne van Heeswijk and Britt Jurgensen, “We Are Here to Stay”, Stages: Liverpool 
Biennial #1, Future City (2014).
25 Saskia Sassen and Irit Rogoff, “What is our Globalised Urban Future?”, Stages: Liverpool 
Biennial #1.
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outside the all-consuming purview of capital such that the frontier space of 
encounter, complexity, indeterminacy, experimentation, possibility and conflict 
has shifted from the colonial edge to the immanent “inside” of capitalist cities, 
into urban development itself and the spaces in between: “a zone where actors 
from different worlds have an encounter, an encounter for which there are 
no established rules”. Here, Sassen is translating insights from Marxist urban 
theory—Lefebvre’s ideas on planetary urbanisation and their reinterpretation 
by Merrifield in The New Urban Question—into the neoliberal lingua franca. The 
new, urbanised Wild West she alludes to—a world of cowboys and speculators 
in the gold rush economy of rental extraction, property-led creative destruction 
and gambling on collateralised debt obligations, all competing to “cash in on 
legalized looting”26—has as its corollary those residual, liminal, often derelict 
‘frontier’ spaces intermittently evacuated by capital in which the vacuum left by 
managed decline is quickly (re)occupied by social innovators and entrepreneurs 
riding the latest wave of ‘roll-with-it’ neoliberalisation.27 Granby is in many 
respects precisely such a frontier zone—a Zone of Opportunity for diverse 
opportunists all vying to make something (their name, a living, a ‘killing’?) out 
of the differentials and indeterminacies; a ZOO in which to watch the spectacle 
of ‘the latest thing’ being performed. On this reading, Assemble’s choice of 
conceptual rendering—community homesteading, claiming original/indigenous 
territory and pushing the boundaries of the urban frontier—reveals more about 
their celebrated approach than perhaps they are even conscious of.
Pritchard’s diagnosis of Granby Four Streets as a frontier zone of capital 
accumulation and neoliberal intermediation may well be overstated—the 
upshot of capitalocentric ‘strong theorising’.28 Such an analysis overlooks the 
foundational role played by grassroots guerrilla gardening in transforming 
Granby long before Steinbeck Studio or Assemble rocked up to curate the scene, 
conveniently brushing over the renewed hope and energy that these actors 
have inspired amongst residents, activists and their supporters. It also fails to 
recognise that Granby—like the wider city for which it is a microcosm—has 
always been an ‘edgy’ intersection of energies on the ‘edge’ of different worlds,29 
a globally interconnected place of transition and encounter of people from 
Ireland to the Caribbean, from Somalia to Malaysia.30 Nonetheless, important 
26 Andy Merrifield, The New Urban Question (Pluto Press, 2014), p. 73.
27 Roger Keil, “The Urban Politics of Roll-with-It Neoliberalization”, City: Analysis of 
Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 13.2–3 (2009): 230–245.
28 J.K. Gibson-Graham, “Diverse Economies: Performative Practices for ‘Other 
Worlds’”, Progress in Human Geography 32.5 (2008): 613–632. 
29 Steve Higginson and Tony Wailey, Edgy Cities (Northern Lights, 2006); John Davies, 
Cities on the Edge (Liverpool University Press, 2008).
30 Tim Bunnell, From World City to the World in One City: Liverpool through Malay Lives 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2016).
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and troubling questions remain unanswered, namely: who—or what—is Granby 
Four Streets really for? 
In her public statement about becoming the Granby Winter Garden’s 
inaugural artist-in-residence, Nina Edge implies a possible answer:
Granby people have inspired the world, by digging in and planting 
themselves a bright future. I’m as pleased as punch to be appointed for 
the horticultural commission, which will be formed from plants, struc-
tures and lighting, inside a house that has been empty for many years. 
This is exactly the kind of experimental and creative environment in which new 
ways of making art can grow.31
There is a sense in which Granby Four Streets has been curated by Assemble 
to meet the bohemian-bourgeois liberal-ethical gaze—voraciously consumed 
by expert, amateur and armchair critics alike. Assemble have used the Turner 
Prize success as a sleek PR campaign for their own work—and who can 
blame them? Granby has been inadvertently inserted into global circuits of 
(cultural) capital—part of a circus of urban policy tourism frequented by 
professionals and students of art and architecture, planning and geography 
(myself included). Their intervention is part of an emerging assemblage in 
Liverpool—intersecting with multi-scalar assemblages globally—pushing the 
city’s over-played ‘regeneration game’ to its logical (exhaustively creative, 
creatively exhausted) conclusion. Benefiting materially from this new culture-
led regeneration industry, this new kind of grant regime, an arts-led grant 
regime—the latest arm of the non-profit industrial complex—are the 
countless artists, community arts practitioners, arts organisations, biennials, 
charities, philanthropic foundations, philanthropists, social financiers, cultural 
economists, regeneration consultants, think tanks, housing associations, 
speculative property developers, community engagement professionals, policy 
wonks, social innovators and urban imagineers, joined by the academics, 
journalists and art critics who study and evaluate them, all connected in a 
loosely assembled network of value production and extraction … I could 
go on. But it is too easy to caricature Granby and Homebaked as ‘novel 
forms’ of ‘neoliberal culture-led regeneration’. This represents resignation 
to just one part of the dialectic; social reality is more complex than that. 
Commodification of housing and neighbourhoods and their enrolment into an 
arts-led regeneration industry is only one side of the story. That Granby and 
Homebaked are artificial hells and real utopias, at the same time, reflects the 
dual character of housing as both noun and verb; the dead labour of capital 
and the dynamic, embodied practices of commoning. 
31 Emphasis added. Quoted on Granby CLT’s website: www.granby4streetsclt.co.uk/
granby-winter-garden/.
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Granby’s and Homebaked’s categorisation as ‘art’ seems to express a 
cynical post-political mood that lingers on in spite of recent reopenings in the 
ideological fissures of neoliberalism better than it does their status as politi-
cally transformative projects. They have been showered with art awards and 
grants not only for charting a new frontier in arts-led commodification but 
because they disclose something truly beautiful in their design, in their culti-
vation of vital places and the social relationships that reproduce such spaces. 
In this way, they are exceptional—but their extraordinariness says less about 
the art world than it does about the inadequacies of urban policy and political 
economy. That artists have had to step into the gap left by the retreating state 
when it comes to important political issues like the right to shelter and dwell 
in a particular place says a great deal about our current conjuncture. If we 
wish to move beyond this impasse towards the reproduction and replication 
of such practices—that is, if we wish to see collective housing alternatives 
more systematically developed—we need to construct the requisite insti-
tutional infrastructure. Until we do, they will continue to be sporadically 
curated and celebrated as novel spectacles. If the value of art is not simply to 
represent reality but also to provide a counterpoint to it, and thereby invite its 
transformation, then perhaps this is what the artistic presentation of Granby 
and Homebaked reveals: a window into alternatives as well as a mirror of 
the system as it currently looks. Their artistic function is to charm us with a 
carefully curated alternative approach to urbanism—one that bears aesthetic 
as well as socio-political appeal—and, by the same token, to shock us with 
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